{
  "id": 5595738,
  "name": "In re TAYLOR B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Thomas B., Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Thomas B.",
  "decision_date": "2005-08-18",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re TAYLOR B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Thomas B., Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nTaylor B. is the minor daughter of the respondent, Thomas B. The trial court adjudicated Taylor to be neglected because of an injurious environment. In its dispositional order, the court found that it was in Taylor\u2019s best interest to suspend visitation between the respondent and the minor. On appeal, the respondent argues that the trial court erred by suspending visitation. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nTaylor was born on August 17, 1989. She lived with her mother until 1992, when her mother died of cancer. The minor has been placed with various foster homes and subsidized guardians since her mother\u2019s death.\nThe respondent has been incarcerated several times during Taylor\u2019s life. One of his incarcerations was the result of a conviction for the battery of Taylor by punching her in the face, which gave her a black eye. According to the minor, the respondent also threatened to kill her.\nOne of Taylor\u2019s subsidized guardians was her paternal grandmother. According to Taylor, on January 27, 2004, the minor was locked out of her grandmother\u2019s home and had nowhere to go. Consequently, she went to a fire station and called the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Taylor\u2019s grandmother, however, claimed that Taylor was not locked out, but merely ran away from the home after failing to knock loudly enough for the grandmother to hear. Nonetheless, the grandmother told DCFS that she did not wish to be Taylor\u2019s guardian any longer because of the minor\u2019s behavioral problems.\nOn January 29, 2004, DCFS petitioned the trial court to find Taylor neglected because of an injurious environment based on the grandmother having left Taylor alone with no care plan. The court placed Taylor in shelter care on January 30, 2004. On June 14, 2004, the court adjudicated Taylor to be neglected based on an injurious environment.\nThe court held the dispositional hearing on October 4, 2004. At that time, the respondent was incarcerated in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). The DOC transported him to the hearing.\nAt the dispositional hearing, the court acknowledged receipt of various social history reports and addendums prepared by Catholic Charities (CC). These reports indicated that Taylor had told caseworkers that she feared the respondent and did not want to have contact with him. Taylor had told the caseworkers that she planned to obtain an order of protection against the respondent after he was released from the DOC.\nThe respondent has an extensive criminal history. At the time of the hearing, he was serving a six-year sentence for witness harassment, which he had begun to serve in January 2004.\nThe respondent testified at the hearing. He said that he would like to communicate with Taylor, but that she would not communicate with him. The respondent stated that other family members were not helping matters. Initially, he said that he did not wish to return to court concerning the case.\nDuring closing arguments, the guardian ad litem (GAL) for Taylor stated:\n\u201cMy client wishes no contact with [the respondent]. If *** and when he were to get out of jail, she would be filing an order of protection against him anyway. Therefore, I would definitely ask that the Court do not order any visitation privileges, no phone contact, no letter.\nHe punched her in the eye, he\u2019s threatened her that he\u2019s going to kill her, and I don\u2019t blame her for being scared of him, as she\u2019s indicated to many people, the caseworker and myself.\u201d\nThe court made Taylor a ward of the court and named DCFS as her guardian. Then, the following exchange took place between the judge and the respondent:\n\u201c[THE COURT:] Based upon [the respondent\u2019s] statement at this time with respect to visits, it would appear that it would be in the best interest of the minor that there not be visits under the circumstances until some of this is resolved.\nNow, this case is going to be reviewed in the normal course of the statute, Mr. [B.] The next court date for that review is going to be March 21st at 1:15. *** Are you telling me that you do not wish to be brought back? ***\n[THE RESPONDENT]: Despite the contrary, Your Honor, March will suffice, *** I don\u2019t mind being here in March.\nTHE COURT: So the answer to my question is, yes, you wish to be here?\n[THE RESPONDENT]: Yes, yes.\u201d\nThe court issued its dispositional order on October 4, 2004. In the order, the court found the respondent to be unfit and ordered him, among other things, to cooperate with DCFS and CC, to obtain drug and alcohol assessments, to complete any drug and alcohol treatment recommended as a result of the assessments, to obtain anger management counseling, and to complete a parenting course. The court also ordered Taylor to cooperate with independent living classes, to attend school regularly, and to participate in counseling. The order stated, \u201cThe Court finds it is in [the] minor\u2019s best interest to suspend visitation based upon [the] GAL\u2019s representations and Taylor\u2019s statements to her caseworker.\u201d The respondent appealed.\nANALYSIS\nThe respondent contends that the trial court erred by suspending his visitation with Taylor in its dispositional order.\nOn review, we will reverse a trial court\u2019s dispositional determination only if the court\u2019s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the court abused its discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re K.S., 343 Ill. App. 3d 177, 796 N.E.2d 215 (2003).\nUnder the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2004)), a parent retains residual rights and responsibilities concerning a minor \u201cafter the transfer of legal *** guardianship of the person, including, but not necessarily limited to, the right to reasonable visitation (which may be limited by the court in the best interests of the minor as provided in subsection (8)(b) of this Section).\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(13) (West 2004). Subsection (8)(b) of section 1 \u2014 3 states that a guardian\u2019s duty and authority concerning a minor are \u201csubject to residual parental rights and responsibilities\u201d including, but not limited to, \u201creasonable visitation, except to the extent that these have been limited in the best interests of the minor by court order.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(8)(b) (West 2004).\nThe respondent cites In re S.J.K., 149 Ill. App. 3d 663, 500 N.E.2d 1146 (1986), and In re P.F., 265 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 638 N.E.2d 716 (1994), for the proposition that, under the Act, a trial court is required to issue an order of protection for a specified period when it suspends a parent\u2019s residual visitation rights. Regarding the present case, the respondent submits that the trial court erred by suspending visitation without issuing an order of protection for a specified period.\nS.J.K. and P.F. considered earlier versions of the Act than the version in effect at the time of the present case. S.J.K. analyzed the 1983 version of the Act, and P.F. dealt with the 1991 version. In each case, the court said that the only provision of the Act permitting suspension of visitation was the subsection allowing the court to include an order of protection in the dispositional order. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 705\u20142(2); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 802\u201423(2). The \u201corder of protection\u201d subsection, in each case, stated that such an order could require a person to stay away from the home of the minor for a specified period. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 705\u20145(1)(a); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 802\u201425(1)(a). The S.J.K. and EF. courts reasoned that, under the versions of the Act they were considering, a dispositional order suspending visitation must be in the form of an order of protection for a specified period.\nAlthough the version of the Act in effect at the time of the instant case includes subsections similar to those in effect in 1983 and 1991 (see 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(2), 2 \u2014 25(1)(a) (West 2004)), the 2004 version of the Act also includes a subsection that was not in effect in 1983 and 1991. The new subsection states that \u201c[t]he court also shall enter any other orders necessary to fulfill the service plan, including, but not limited to *** (ii) restraining orders controlling the conduct of any party likely to frustrate the achievement of the goal, and (iii) visiting orders.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(3)(ii), (3)(iii) (West 2004). Because the version of the Act in effect at the time of the instant case included a new subsection concerning \u201crestraining orders\u201d and \u201cvisiting orders\u201d that was not considered by the S.J.K and EF. courts, we find the holdings of those cases to be inapplicable to the present cause.\nAccording to this court\u2019s research, the statutory construction of subsections 2 \u2014 23(3)(ii) and 2 \u2014 23(3)(iii) is a matter of first impression. When analyzing a statute, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 688 N.E.2d 137 (1997). The best indication of legislative intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in the statute. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 688 N.E.2d 137. The construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d 498, 804 N.E.2d 499 (2004).\nIn the present case, the trial court\u2019s order suspended the respondent\u2019s residual visitation rights in the best interests of the minor. The written order did not state a time period for the suspension. However, at the dispositional hearing, the court said that the suspension was to last \u201cuntil some of this is resolved.\u201d When a conflict exists between the court\u2019s oral pronouncement and its written order, the oral pronouncement prevails. See People v. Smith, 242 Ill. App. 3d 399, 609 N.E.2d 1004 (1993). The court also ordered both Taylor and the respondent to undergo various forms of counseling and to attend classes, including anger management for the respondent. The matter was scheduled for a review hearing on March 21, 2005, at which time the court could have determined if the tasks assigned to Taylor and the respondent had begun to \u201cresolve\u201d the intense emotional conflicts between Taylor and her father.\nUnder the plain language of section 2 \u2014 23(3), the trial court\u2019s order suspending visitation was both a \u201crestraining order\u201d and a \u201cvisiting order,\u201d that is, an order \u201crestraining\u201d the respondent from \u201cvisiting\u201d with Taylor \u201cuntil some of this is resolved.\u201d See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(3)(ii), (3)(iii) (West 2004). The trial court found this order was necessary so as not to frustrate the goals, which were integral parts of the court\u2019s \u201cservice plan.\u201d\nIt should be noted that neither the \u201crestraining order\u201d subsection of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(3)(ii) (West 2004)) nor the \u201cvisiting order\u201d subsection (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(3)(iii) (West 2004)) mentions a time limitation. Conversely, the \u201corder of protection\u201d subsections (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23(2), 2 \u2014 25(l)(a) (West 2004)) require such an order to be for a \u201cspecified period.\u201d\nUnder the plain language of the 2004 version of the Act, the trial court\u2019s order suspending visitation was authorized by subsection 2 \u2014 23(3) as a matter of law. Furthermore, the order placed reasonable limits on visitation that were in the best interests of the minor. See 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(8)(b) (West 2004). Therefore, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion by selecting a dispositional order suspending visitation without issuing an order of protection for a specified period. See K.S., 343 Ill. App. 3d 177, 796 N.E.2d 215.\nAdditionally, we note that the trial court had scheduled a review hearing for March 21, 2005, at which time the respondent could have asked the court to review the issue of visitation. Presumably, the respondent may ask the court to review the issue of visitation at subsequent hearings concerning this case.\nWe also note that the trial court knew that Taylor had told her caseworkers and her GAL that she intended to obtain an order of protection against the respondent as soon as he is released from DOC custody. Under the circumstances of this case, it would have been redundant for Taylor to seek an order of protection while the respondent was in prison.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY and McDADE, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Louis E Milot, of Peoria, for appellant.",
      "Kevin W Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Lawrence M. Bauer and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re TAYLOR B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Thomas B., Respondent-Appellant).\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201404\u20140797\nOpinion filed August 18, 2005.\nLouis E Milot, of Peoria, for appellant.\nKevin W Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (Lawrence M. Bauer and Gary F. Gnidovec, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0647-01",
  "first_page_order": 665,
  "last_page_order": 670
}