{ "id": 5595137, "name": "In re ESTATE OF REGINALD S. GREEN, JR., a Minor (Margaret C. Benson, as Guardian ad litem for the Minor, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Estate of Green", "decision_date": "2005-08-31", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201404\u20140944", "first_page": "730", "last_page": "739", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 730" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "653 N.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291586 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "809 N.E.2d 1248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451063 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Lieberman" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "Lieberman" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 N.E. 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1894, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5469384 ], "year": 1894, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/151/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2803836 ], "year": 1882, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/103/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N. E. 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 Ill. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3430035 ], "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/250/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 N.E.2d 1334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Herrod" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 1061", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2978290 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1064-65", "parenthetical": "Herrod" }, { "page": "1065" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/1061-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 N.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "S.G." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295791 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "S.G." }, { "page": "486" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "492" }, { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Ill. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2462322 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1846, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Cowls" }, { "page": "437" }, { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/8/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"if the power to act in the particular case exists independently of the statute, the validity of the latter is a mere abstract question not necessary for determination of the issue presented\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 2d 581", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2779011 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "\"if the power to act in the particular case exists independently of the statute, the validity of the latter is a mere abstract question not necessary for determination of the issue presented\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/12/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "M.M." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777553 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63", "parenthetical": "M.M." }, { "page": "57-59" }, { "page": "63" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "63" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "65-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 N.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3551711 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/169/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592836 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 N.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Smythe" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 2d 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5293612 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "Smythe" }, { "page": "441", "parenthetical": "circuit court may appoint guardians of minors \"independent of any authority that the Probate Act or other legislation confers\"" }, { "page": "439" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "440-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/65/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 N.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Suggs" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3458535 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797", "parenthetical": "Suggs" }, { "page": "797" }, { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "799 N.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Muldrow" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 1148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719612 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Muldrow" }, { "page": "1153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/1148-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 N.E.2d 1228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Roy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872566 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Roy" }, { "page": "100" }, { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "810 N.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4023038 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0554-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 950, "char_count": 21031, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.041502013137158e-08, "percentile": 0.37413011337726637 }, "sha256": "8d0dea6d74153770d677bce5677bca88e7a426cc8ee54ef154c8c8dedc463fec", "simhash": "1:af34356a3b044115", "word_count": 3549 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:05:25.227457+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF REGINALD S. GREEN, JR., a Minor (Margaret C. Benson, as Guardian ad litem for the Minor, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ERICKSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAppellant Margaret C. Benson, as guardian ad litem (GAL), appeals from the trial court\u2019s order denying Kenneth Clair\u2019s petition to be appointed guardian of the 13-year-old minor, Reginald S. Green, Jr. On appeal, appellant asserts that when the trial court engaged in a decision to appoint a guardian for the minor, the court\u2019s sole responsibility was to provide for the best interest and welfare of the minor. Appellant argues that a trial court possesses the inherent power to appoint a guardian independent of the criteria set forth in section 11 \u2014 3(a) of the Illinois Probate Act of 1975 (Probate Act or Act) (755 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 3(a) (West 2004)) (section 11 \u2014 3(a)).\nAlternatively, appellant argues that section 11 \u2014 3(a) provides only a list of qualifications the court must consider when appointing a guardian and that the section must be construed liberally to effectuate the purpose and intent of the Act, to provide for the minor\u2019s best interest and avoid an unjust result.\nThis appeal is taken on appellant\u2019s brief only.\nThe facts are not in dispute.\nOn September 18, 2003, Kenneth Clair filed a pro se petition for guardian of a minor, asking to be appointed guardian for the minor, Reginald Green, Jr. At the time of the filing, a familial relationship had already developed, as the minor had been living with petitioner and his daughter for approximately two years. The daughter, 16-year-old Kenyatta Clair (Kenyatta), is the minor\u2019s half sister. Petitioner afforded structure and permanency for both children by assuming the role of father.\nIn his petition, Clair alleged that it was in the minor\u2019s best interest to have him appointed guardian for the reasons that the minor\u2019s biological mother was financially unable to care for him and the biological father was not involved in the minor\u2019s life.\nOn November 19, 2003, Chicago Volunteer Legal Services (CVLS) was appointed by the court to be GAL of the minor. Benson, a GAL for CVLS, was asked to investigate and report back to the court. Benson interviewed petitioner and the minor, investigated the minor\u2019s education and social environment, and reported back.\nThe GAL reported that petitioner is 54 years of age, unmarried, and although not biologically related to the minor, is the biological father of the minor\u2019s sister, Kenyatta. The three lived as a family since August of 2002. Prior to August, both the minor and Kenyatta lived with Carolyn Johnson, the biological mother, and their maternal grandmother until October of 2001, when the grandmother died. Even though the natural mother lived with the family, the grandmother was the children\u2019s caretaker. Johnson has had substance abuse problems for most of her life.\nUpon the grandmother\u2019s death, petitioner took his daughter to live with him, while the minor moved with Johnson to live with \u201cfriends.\u201d In the summer of 2002, Johnson\u2019s \u201cfriends\u201d told her they no longer wanted the minor in the house. Petitioner stated the minor\u2019s father was never able to take care of him since he lived \u201cpretty much on the streets most of the time.\u201d The investigation revealed that Johnson was not supervising the minor, that he was \u201crunning wild\u201d and \u201cbeginning to get into trouble.\u201d\nSince living with petitioner, the minor has improved emotionally, academically and socially. He goes to counseling two times per week, regularly attends school, his grades have improved, and he attends church on a regular basis.\nPetitioner stated, in his interview, that he gave much thought to accepting the responsibilities of a troubled teenager, but after discussion with his pastor, decided it is Reginald\u2019s only chance to stay out of trouble. Mr. Clair believes that if he does not become Reginald\u2019s guardian, he likely will end up living on the streets.\nThe GAL\u2019s report also made the trial court aware that petitioner had a 1994 felony conviction for possession of a handgun. The petitioner was sentenced to one year of probation.\nIn a statement before the trial court on January 21, 2004, the minor said he wishes to continue living with petitioner, that he has known petitioner his entire life and he is a \u201cgood guy.\u201d He added that he wants petitioner to be his guardian.\nAt the same hearing, the GAL recommended that the guardianship would be in the minor\u2019s best interest despite petitioner\u2019s 1994 conviction, which she described as \u201cinsignificant and ten years old,\u201d adding \u201c[t]here is no indication that the minor is or will be in any danger living with the petitioner.\u201d She expressed that the minor\u2019s \u201conly alternative is DCFS [the Department of Children and Family Services] and a good foster care home is unlikely considering his age and circumstances.\u201d\nAt the January 21, 2004, hearing, the foregoing additional information was presented to the court by the GAL (who also filed a \u201cMemorandum of Law in Support of Guardian Ad Litem\u2019s Recommendation\u201d). No cross-petition was filed.\nThe trial court agreed with the GAL, finding it was in Reginald\u2019s best interest to have Kenneth Clair appointed his guardian.\nThen, on March 3, 2004, at a subsequent hearing, the court denied the petition despite its own conclusion of \u201cbest interest.\u201d The court based its ruling solely on petitioner\u2019s 1994 felony conviction, finding that \u201cas a result of the felony conviction, the petitioner is not qualified to be appointed guardian of the minor.\u201d\nANALYSIS\nThe issues presented for review involve only questions of law; the standard of review is de novo. Anderson v. Department of Professional Regulation, 348 Ill. App. 3d 554, 560, 810 N.E.2d 228 (2004).\nOn appeal, appellant argues that the trial court may appoint a guardian for a minor under its inherent authority independent of the Act and in derogation of the qualifications set forth in section 11\u2014 3(a).\nAppellant discusses In re Estate of Roy, 265 Ill. App. 3d 99, 637 N.E.2d 1228 (1994) (Roy), as support for her argument. In Roy, the appellate court interpreted a parallel section of the Act (755 ILCS 5/lla \u2014 5(a) (West 1992)), which precludes convicted felons from acting as guardians of disabled persons. There, the trial court denied the wife\u2019s petition to adjudicate her disability and to appoint her husband of 43 years as her guardian, based on the husband\u2019s 36-year-old felony convictions for armed robbery. The court rejected her request and appointed her daughter as guardian. Roy, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 100. The appellate court rejected the husband\u2019s equal protection argument, but remanded the case, holding the section \u201ccould have been unconstitutionally applied\u201d since \u201cthere is no rational, basis for treating a person with a 36-year old felony conviction differently from any other husband of 43 years who seeks to be appointed as his wife\u2019s guardian upon her becoming disabled.\u201d Roy, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 105.\nAppellant argues in the wake of Roy, the probate courts extended that holding to minor guardianships, no longer mechanically denying petitions due to a prior felony, but scrutinizing the worthiness of petitioners to determine whether their appointments would be in the best interest of the minor.\nAppellant acknowledges the appellate court departed from Roy in In re Estate of Muldrow, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1148, 799 N.E.2d 497 (2003) (Muldrow). There, the trial court denied petitioner\u2019s attempt to disqualify cross-petitioner as executor of their mother\u2019s estate under a similar section of the Act (755 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 13(a) (West 2002)), basing its decision on Roy. The appellate court reversed, holding \u201c[a]n executor is entrusted with property to which others have claims and must safeguard that property and ultimately distribute it in accordance with the law. A convicted felon has demonstrated an inability to act within the confines of the law.\u201d Muldrow, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 1153.\nAppellant argues unlike Muldrow, which involved a decedent\u2019s estate, this case concerns a minor. This difference is significant. The administration of decedents\u2019 estates is a creature of statute, whereas the administration of minor guardianships is not, as minor guardian-ships are derived from the common law and, therefore, a trial court inherently is empowered to appoint a guardian independent of any authority given to the courts under the Act. In re Estate of Suggs, 149 Ill. App. 3d 793, 797, 501 N.E.2d 307 (1986) (Suggs); In re Guardianship of Smythe, 65 Ill. App. 2d 431, 441, 213 N.E.2d 609 (1965) (Smythe).\nThe probate court has broad discretion in determining whether to appoint a guardian. \u201cThis discretion is not unlimited and will be overturned if the reviewing court finds that the [court] abused its discretion\u201d (Stevenson v. Hawthorne Elementary School, East St. Louis School District No. 189, 144 Ill. 2d 294, 302, 579 N.E.2d 852 (1991)) (Stevenson), or if its decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence (In re Marriage of Russell, 169 Ill. App. 3d 97, 103, 523 N.E.2d 193 (1988)). The appointment must be made \u201cin light of all the relevant facts\u201d and the guiding standard is the best interest of the minor. Stevenson, 144 Ill. 2d at 302; 755 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 5(a) (West 2004).\nThe relevant provisions of the Act are as follows. Section 11\u2014 3(a), entitled \u201cWho may act as guardian,\u201d provides:\n\u201cA person who has attained the age of 18 years, is a resident of the United States, is not of unsound mind, is not an adjudged disabled person as defined in this Act, has not been convicted of a felony, and who the court finds is capable of providing an active and suitable program of guardianship for the minor is qualified to act as guardian of the person and as guardian of the estate.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 3(a) (West 2004).\nSection 11 \u2014 5(a), entitled, \u201cAppointment of guardian,\u201d states:\n\u201cUpon the filing of a petition for the appointment of a guardian or on its own motion, the court may appoint a guardian of the estate or of both the person and estate, of a minor, or may appoint a guardian of the person only of a minor or minors, as the court finds to be in the best interest of the minor or minors.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 5(a) (West 2004).\nSection 11 \u2014 13(e), entitled, \u201cDuties of guardian of a minor,\u201d provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cUpon petition by any interested person (including the standby or short-term guardian), with such notice to interested persons as the court directs and a finding by the court that it is in the best interest of the minor, the court may *** enter such other orders as the court deems necessary to provide for the best interest of the minor.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 13(e) (West 2004).\nAt the outset, it must be noted that unlike Roy and Muldrow, appellant here is not challenging the constitutionality of section 11 \u2014 3(a) on equal protection grounds. Appellant\u2019s argument is premised on the notion that where, as here, the appointment is in the minor\u2019s best interest, a trial court inherently possesses the authority to appoint a guardian independent of the strictures of the Act, namely, the guardianship qualifications set forth in section 11 \u2014 3(a). The supreme court has stated that \u201ccircuit courts of this State have an inherent plenary power to appoint guardians of minors independent of any authority given to the courts by the legislature.\u201d In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 63, 619 N.E.2d 702 (1993) (M.M.); see also Suggs, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 797, citing Smythe, 65 Ill. App. 2d at 441 (circuit court may appoint guardians of minors \u201cindependent of any authority that the Probate Act or other legislation confers\u201d).\nThe issue presented in this case is not resolved by construing the meaning of section 11 \u2014 3(a). If the circuit courts \u201chave inherent power to appoint guardians of the estates and persons of minors, independent of statute, a discussion of whether the statute purporting to give this jurisdiction to the courts had been complied with is irrelevant to the question of whether or not the circuit courts of this state have such jurisdiction.\u201d Smythe, 65 Ill. App. 2d at 439; see also People ex rel. Ryan v. Sempek, 12 Ill. 2d 581, 584, 147 N.E.2d 295 (1958) (\u201cif the power to act in the particular case exists independently of the statute, the validity of the latter is a mere abstract question not necessary for determination of the issue presented\u201d). Accordingly, it must be determined whether a circuit court may appoint a guardian in derogation of section 11 \u2014 3(a) where the appointment is in the minor\u2019s best interest.\nIn M.M., the supreme court was presented with several cases in which circuit judges sought to impose restrictions on a guardian\u2019s power to consent to an adoption. In each case, the circuit judge found it was in the child\u2019s best interest to retain contact with his or her biological parents. As a result, the circuit judges attempted to limit the guardian\u2019s consent to an adoption to instances where the adoptive parents had agreed to keep the child in contact with his or her biological parents. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 57-59. In rejecting this practice, the supreme court acknowledged the circuit court\u2019s \u201cinherent plenary power to appoint guardians of minors independent of any authority given to the courts by the legislature.\u201d M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 63.\nThe M.M. court went on to explain that as early as Cowls v. Cowls, 8 Ill. 435 (1846) (Cowls), the supreme court \u201cupheld a custody decree, not on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by the Divorce Act, but under the \u2018power of the court of Chancery to interfere with and control, not only the estates but the persons and custody of all minors within the limits of its jurisdiction.\u2019 \u201d M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 68, quoting Cowls, 8 Ill. at 437. The court reasoned that \u201c[t]he legislature conferred no new authority or jurisdiction upon the court; \u2018[i]t was by its original jurisdiction clothed with the same powers before.\u2019 \u201d M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 68, quoting Cowls, 8 Ill. at 438.\nAlso instructive is In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 677 N.E.2d 920 (1997) (S.G.), where the supreme court addressed whether the timeliness requirements of section 2 \u2014 14 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 14 (West 1994)), which requires dismissal of a petition for adjudication of wardship if the adjudicatory hearing is not completed within the statutory time period, violate the separation of powers provision of the Illinois Constitution. S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 486.\nThe supreme court held that neither parens patriae nor the court\u2019s inherent guardianship powers provide a basis to invalidate the section. S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 488. The court further held \u201csection 2 \u2014 14 does not take from the courts the judicial power to adjudicate a child\u2019s best interest, but merely requires that judicial duties get exercised in a manner that protects all the rights of the parties.\u201d S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 492.\nIn this case, petitioner seeks appointment of guardianship pursuant to the Probate Act, unlike M.M. and S.G., which involved the circuit courts\u2019 exercise of authority derived exclusively from the Juvenile Court Act. Although a court\u2019s power to appoint the guardian of a minor is now conferred statutorily by the Probate Act, such authority also existed at common law. In re Estates of Herrod, 254 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1064-65, 626 N.E.2d 1334 (1993) (Herrod). \u201c \u2018[T]he jurisdiction exists *** by inheritance from the English courts of chancery and not because equitable rights or titles are involved.\u2019 \u201d M. M., 156 Ill. 2d at 63, quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, 95 N. E. 345 (1911). \u201c \u2018The power conferred *** is but of the same character of the jurisdiction exercised by the court of chancery over the persons and property of infants, having foundation in the prerogative of the Crown, flowing from its general power and duty, as parens patriae, to protect those who have no other lawful protector.\u2019 \u201d Smythe, 65 Ill. App. 2d at 440, quoting In re Petition of Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 371-72 (1882).\nApplying the reasoning espoused in M.M. and S.G., a trial court\u2019s power to appoint the guardian of a minor does not transcend its traditional common law authority; it exists independently of any statute, including the Probate Act. See M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 64. Although the legislature may preclude or limit the authority of the trial courts in legislatively created \u201cjusticiable matters,\u201d where, as here, there exists a counterpart, in common law or equity, to a legislative enactment of a comprehensive statutory scheme, the court is not bound to proceed within the strictures of the statute. M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 65-66. \u201c \u2018Courts of equity have plenary jurisdiction over the persons and estates of infants, and will in the exercise of that jurisdiction, cause to be done whatever may be necessary to preserve their estates and protect their interest.\u2019 \u201d Smythe, 65 Ill. App. 2d at 440-41, quoting Ames v. Ames, 151 Ill. 280, 285, 37 N.E. 890 (1894).\nUnlike S.G., application of the relevant section here operates to strip the trial court of its judicial power to adjudicate the minor\u2019s best interest. This runs contrary to the court\u2019s sole responsibility \u201cto provide for the best interest and welfare of the minor.\u201d Herrod, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 1065; Suggs, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 798.\nHere it is clear that the trial court meticulously and correctly considered all relevant factors when coming to its decision that it is in Reginald Green, Jr.\u2019s best interest to have petitioner become his guardian.\nThe trial court\u2019s exercise of its inherent authority in this case \u201cdoes not represent an independent judicial power to strike down legislation on grounds that it violates \u2018the best interest of the child\u2019 \u201d (S.G., 175 Ill. 2d at 488); rather, it enables the court to comply with its obligation to safeguard the best interests of the minor where legislative qualifications are incompatible with the greater aims of the Act. If the qualifications in section 11 \u2014 3(a) are given greater priority than the minor\u2019s best interest, section 11 \u2014 5(a) of the Act, requiring the appointment of a guardian whom \u201cthe court finds to be in the best interest of the minor\u201d (755 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 5(a) (West 2004)), and section 11\u2014 13(e), which permits the court to enter any order \u201cthe court deems necessary to provide for the best interest of the minor\u201d (755 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 13(e) (West 2004)), would be rendered superfluous. \u201cEach word, clause and sentence of [a] statute, if possible, must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous.\u201d In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 308, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002) (Lieberman). Section 11 \u2014 3(a) must be read with consideration of these two additional relevant sections of the Act, since all provisions of a statutory enactment are viewed as a whole; words and phrases should not be construed in isolation, but must be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308. Section 11 \u2014 3(a) also must be read in the context of the Act\u2019s greater purpose to protect the minor\u2019s best interest. The court properly may consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 308.\nCourts also may presume the General Assembly, in its enactment of the legislation, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience or injustice. Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 309. Here, strict application of section 11 \u2014 3 would lead to unjust consequences by forcing the court to ignore its own conclusion and subordinate the minor\u2019s best interest to generic criteria enacted to serve the minor\u2019s best interest. To the extent the Act is in derogation of the common law, it must be construed strictly in favor of petitioner, as he is subject to its operation. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 68-69, 809 N.E.2d 1248 (2004).\nThe trial court determined petitioner\u2019s appointment to be in the minor\u2019s best interest; the court\u2019s subsequent denial of the petition was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, this court exercises its power pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 366 (155 Ill. 2d R. 366), and grants the instant petition for petitioner\u2019s appointment as guardian of the minor. In re Petition of K.M., 274 Ill. App. 3d 189, 205, 653 N.E.2d 888 (1995).\nFor the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed.\nReversed; petition granted.\nKARNEZIS, EJ., and SOUTH, J., concur.\nThe record on appeal does not provide the precise offense of which petitioner was convicted.\nThe trial court found that the minor\u2019s mother and father are neither willing nor able to care for the minor, and both consent to the appointment of petitioner as guardian; there are no relatives able and willing to care for the minor or act as his guardian.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ERICKSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Chicago Volunteer Legal Services Foundation, of Chicago (Margaret C. Benson and Patricia Nelson, of counsel), guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF REGINALD S. GREEN, JR., a Minor (Margaret C. Benson, as Guardian ad litem for the Minor, Appellant).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201404\u20140944\nOpinion filed August 31, 2005.\nChicago Volunteer Legal Services Foundation, of Chicago (Margaret C. Benson and Patricia Nelson, of counsel), guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0730-01", "first_page_order": 748, "last_page_order": 757 }