{ "id": 5596065, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. $5,608 UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. $5,608 United States Currency", "decision_date": "2005-09-14", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201404\u20140988", "first_page": "891", "last_page": "896", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 891" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "112 Pa. Commw. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Commw.", "case_ids": [ 1368047 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" }, { "page": "460-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-commw/112/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 F. Supp. 666", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 287572 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/93/0666-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5011261 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428-29", "parenthetical": "the defendant's employee, whose alleged negligence injured the plaintiff, was not incompetent to testify under Dead-Man's Act in the plaintiffs action against employer" }, { "page": "425", "parenthetical": "parties are all persons having a right to control the proceedings, to make a defense, to call and .cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/339/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 Ill. App. 2d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5301802 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124-25", "parenthetical": "insurance agent not incompetent to testify under Dead-Man's Act in action against insurance company" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/61/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. App. 3d 1010", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2666694 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1018" }, { "page": "1018" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/187/1010-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472420 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5456535 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887245 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279667 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" }, { "page": "156" }, { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 620, "char_count": 11529, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.16248148058052805 }, "sha256": "1965a27e21aa499a0fe23dfe7b258385171bdff95ff1a02e00d3d142ddfec645", "simhash": "1:bbea946a7eef0529", "word_count": 1909 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:05:25.227457+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. $5,608 UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State filed a complaint for the forfeiture of $5,608 that had been seized from Richard Brown, who was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. Brown answered the complaint and asserted that the money was not subject to forfeiture. Brown passed away during the course of the proceedings, and his wife, Denise Brown, was appointed as special administrator. At trial, the court sustained her objections that the State\u2019s evidence was inadmissible under the Dead-Man\u2019s Act (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 201 (West 2002)), and it granted her motion for a directed finding. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the Dead-Man\u2019s Act precluded the presentation of its case in chief. We reverse and remand.\nThe State filed its complaint for forfeiture on February 22, 2002. It alleged that the money was seized from Brown\u2019s residence and that the money was used or intended to be used in a manner that violated the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2002)).\nThe amended forfeiture complaint, filed on July 8, 2004, alleged the following. The police executed a search warrant at defendant\u2019s residence on November 7, 2001. Brown was on a sofa in the living room. \u201c[U]nder the person of Richard Brown,\u201d the police found a pouch with several plastic baggies containing a white powder, which \u201cfield tested\u201d positive for the presence of cocaine. The police searched Brown and found $5,308 and three $100 gaming chips. Brown also had a key that unlocked a safe on the premises. The safe contained a white powder substance that also tested positive for the presence of cocaine.\nThe State instituted forfeiture proceedings against the $5,608 under section 6(A) of the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (Forfeiture Act) (725 ILCS 150/6(A) (West 2002)). On February 22, 2002, Brown filed a claim and answer to the State\u2019s complaint. Brown asserted that the money was not subject to forfeiture because he earned the money legitimately, and he requested its return. See 725 ILCS 150/8(A)(i) (West 2002).\nA supplemental disclosure, filed by Brown\u2019s attorney on September 4, 2003, showed checks that Denise had made out to various casinos and gambling vouchers from the casinos in Brown\u2019s name. Brown\u2019s attorney moved for summary judgment on October 10, 2003, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the money came from legitimate gambling winnings. On December 3, 2003, the trial court noted that Brown had passed away and that his estate was now the claimant.\nOn March 17, 2004, Brown\u2019s attorney moved to have Denise appointed as special administrator in the case. The motion alleged that Brown had passed away on July 10, 2003, and that, following his death, the State had nol-prossed the criminal charges against him. The trial court granted the motion on April 24, 2004.\nOn August 11, 2004, the State moved for summary judgment, arguing that because Denise had not properly responded to the State\u2019s request to admit facts, the facts became admitted. The trial court denied the State\u2019s motion and allowed Denise to file an amended answer to the request to admit facts.\nThe case proceeded to trial on August 18, 2004. According to the bystander\u2019s report, the State called Detective Patrick Gengler of the Kane County sheriffs office. Detective Gengler testified that he had been a detective sergeant in narcotics for more than four years. On November 6, 2001, Brown was present when \u201cMike Godfrey was to deliver ten ounces of cocaine to 901 Autumn Lane.\u201d Denise objected based on the Dead-Man\u2019s Act, and the trial court sustained the objection.\nDetective Gengler further testified that he, along with a SWAT team, executed a search warrant at 803 Kensington Place at 5:30 p.m. on November 7, 2001. Officers rammed the door and found Brown lying in front of a couch. Detective Gengler searched the couch and Brown.\nDenise objected to the testimony, arguing that it was barred by the Dead-Man\u2019s Act. The State responded that the Dead-Man\u2019s Act did not apply, because the detective was not an interested party under the statute since he did not stand to gain from the case\u2019s outcome. The trial court ruled that Detective Gengler\u2019s testimony was barred under the Dead-Man\u2019s Act, reasoning that the State could receive a pecuniary gain from the proceeding and that the detective was an agent of the State. The trial court further ruled that the Dead-Man\u2019s Act barred testimony from the State\u2019s witnesses \u201cregarding the circumstances surrounding [Brown\u2019s] location and surroundings.\u201d\nThe State rested, and Denise moved for a directed finding. The trial court granted the motion and ordered that the money be released to Denise. The court denied the State\u2019s motion to reconsider, and the State timely appealed.\nOn appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the Dead-Man\u2019s Act precluded the presentation of its case in chief, because (1) Detective Gengler was not an interested person under the statute and (2) even if he was an interested person, his testimony was permissible under the Forfeiture Act. Although Denise has not filed an appellee\u2019s brief, the record and issues are simple enough that we can address the issues raised on appeal. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).\nThe Dead-Man\u2019s Act provides in relevant part:\n\u201cIn the trial of any action in which any party sues or defends as the representative of a deceased person or person under a legal disability, no adverse party or person directly interested in the action shall be allowed to testify on his or her own behalf to any conversation with the deceased or person under legal disability or to any event which took place in the presence of the deceased or person under legal disability[.]\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 201 (West 2002).\nThe Dead-Man\u2019s Act lists a few exceptions not relevant to this appeal. See 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 201 (West 2002). The Dead-Man\u2019s Act bars an\ninterested party from testifying on his or her own behalf as to conversations with the deceased or to events that took place in the deceased\u2019s presence. In re Estate of Goffinet, 318 Ill. App. 3d 152, 156 (2001). A witness incompetent to testify under the Dead-Man\u2019s Act must either be a party to the case or have in interest in the outcome, and he or she must be adverse to the party protected by the statute. Overcast v. Bodart, 266 Ill. App. 3d 428, 431 (1994). However, an interested person \u201cdoes not include a person who is interested solely as executor, trustee or in any other fiduciary capacity, whether or not he or she receives or expects to receive compensation for acting in that capacity.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 201(c) (West 2002). The purpose of the Dead-Man\u2019s Act is to protect the decedent\u2019s estate from fraudulent claims by barring evidence that the deceased person could have refuted. Goffinet, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 156.\nHere, the trial court ruled that Detective Gengler was an interested person under the Dead-Man\u2019s Act because he was an agent of the State and the State could have benefitted directly from the forfeited money. A trial court\u2019s ruling on an evidentiary matter will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Gunn v. Sobucki, 352 Ill. App. 3d 785, 787 (2004). Additionally, a trial court\u2019s ruling on an issue involving the Dead-Man\u2019s Act will not be reversed unless the error was substantially prejudicial and affected the trial\u2019s outcome. Goffinet, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 156.\nThe State argues that the trial court abused its discretion in barring the detective\u2019s testimony, because the detective did not have a direct interest in the forfeiture action. We agree. A person is interested under the Dead-Man\u2019s Act if he or she will directly experience a monetary gain or loss as an immediate result of the judgment. In re Estate of Hurst, 329 Ill. App. 3d 326, 337 (2002); see also M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 606.3, at 338 (8th ed. 2004). Moreover, \u201c[i]f the testimony of the witness does not show direct, certain and immediate pecuniary interest, the witness\u2019 interest, if any, goes merely to his or her credibility and not to his or her competency to testify.\u201d Bernardi v. Chicago Steel Container Corp., 187 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1018 (1989).\nIn this case, Detective Gengler would not have directly received the forfeited money if the State prevailed. Thus, he was not incompetent to testify under the Dead-Man\u2019s Act. Furthermore, even if Detective Gengler could be considered an agent or employee of the State, these designations alone would not disqualify him as a witness. See Gieseke v. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 61 Ill. App. 2d 119, 124-25 (1965) (insurance agent not incompetent to testify under Dead-Man\u2019s Act in action against insurance company); Sankey v. Interstate Dispatch, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 420, 428-29 (1950) (the defendant\u2019s employee, whose alleged negligence injured the plaintiff, was not incompetent to testify under Dead-Man\u2019s Act in the plaintiffs action against employer). We recognize that Detective Gengler may have preferred that the State succeed in the case, because he had participated in seizing the money and because the forfeited money may possibly have been given to his police department. However, such an interest would not be a direct interest and would affect only the detective\u2019s credibility rather than his competency to testify. See Bernardi, 187 Ill. App. 3d at 1018. We additionally note that other jurisdictions have also held that dead-man\u2019s statutes do not bar the testimony of state police witnesses in cases involving forfeitures. See United States v. One 1949 Lincoln Coupe Auto, 93 F. Supp. 666, 668 (W.D. Mich. 1950); In re Kulbitsky, 112 Pa. Commw. 477, 483, 536 A.2d 458, 460-61 (1988).\nAs such, Detective Gengler was not an interested person under the Dead-Man\u2019s Act. He also was not an \u201cadverse party\u201d disqualified from testifying under the statute, as it is undisputed that he was not a party to the action. See Sankey, 339 Ill. App. at 425 (parties are all persons having a right to control the proceedings, to make a defense, to call and .cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision); M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 606.3, at 337 (8th ed. 2004) (\u201cDetermining whether the witness is a party presents few problems\u201d). Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in barring Detective Gengler\u2019s testimony. As the trial court\u2019s erroneous ruling precluded the State from presenting its case in chief, it substantially prejudiced the State. Thus, we reverse the trial court\u2019s ruling and remand the cause for a new trial. Based on our resolution of this issue, we need not address the State\u2019s argument that the detective\u2019s testimony was permissible under the Forfeiture Act.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Kane County circuit court, and we remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nGEOMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "John A. Barsanti, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. $5,608 UNITED STATES CURRENCY, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201404\u20140988\nOpinion filed September 14, 2005.\nJohn A. Barsanti, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Mary Beth Burns, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0891-01", "first_page_order": 909, "last_page_order": 914 }