{ "id": 5594935, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL L. THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Thompson", "decision_date": "2005-09-14", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201404\u20140636", "first_page": "947", "last_page": "953", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 947" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 665", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5575385 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" }, { "page": "672-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0665-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 1158", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1163" }, { "page": "1163-64" }, { "page": "1163" }, { "page": "1163-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243850 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" }, { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "2069" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 N.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5282359 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 N.E.2d 1334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1339", "parenthetical": "other-crimes evidence is admissible where it relates to the events that led to the charged offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5109341 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625-26", "parenthetical": "other-crimes evidence is admissible where it relates to the events that led to the charged offense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 801", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2960286 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0801-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596242 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060183 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 467", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" }, { "page": "479-80" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 719, "char_count": 14173, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.081956312932394e-07, "percentile": 0.5627223826562862 }, "sha256": "4e0c7f45137b27fc25328a53fc95953fedf9c125115d1c81d3ac0164b991bbce", "simhash": "1:3374ed3094a558dd", "word_count": 2315 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:05:25.227457+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL L. THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn December 2003, the State charged defendant, Michael L. Thompson, with aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(1) (West Supp. 2003)) and unlawful use of weapons (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1(a)(2) (West 2002)). After a May 2004 trial, a jury found defendant guilty as charged. In June 2004, the trial court sentenced defendant to 42 months\u2019 imprisonment for aggravated battery to run consecutive with 300 days\u2019 imprisonment for unlawful use of weapons.\nDefendant appeals, asserting he is entitled to a new trial because of (1) the admission of prejudicial other-crimes evidence and (2) his failure to receive effective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn December 24, 2003, defendant held a party at his apartment that began in the afternoon. Mandy Frazier, who lived across the hall from defendant, was also having a party, and people were going back and forth between the two apartments all evening. Around 11:30 p.m., an incident occurred between defendant and Molly Crow. That incident led to an altercation between defendant and Ryan Parrish involving a knife, and Parrish sustained three knife wounds. On December 30, 2003, the State charged defendant with aggravated battery and unlawful use of weapons based on the knife incident.\nAt the May 2004 jury trial, Parrish testified he was 19 years old at the time of the incident and was drinking at the party. Around 11:30 p.m., Parrish was sitting on a couch in defendant\u2019s living room when he heard \u201ca loud boom sound\u201d over the music that was similar to a sound that would come from \u201ckicking a dryer.\u201d He then saw Crow crying. She stated defendant had pushed her head, and it hit the stove. At that point, everyone left defendant\u2019s apartment and went over to Frazier\u2019s.\nUpon realizing he left his sweatshirt and coat in defendant\u2019s apartment, Parrish returned to defendant\u2019s apartment to retrieve his clothing. As he was leaving, he observed defendant, Brian Vandenbrink, and James Bates having a heated discussion in the hall. Vandenbrink returned to Frazier\u2019s apartment, and Parrish continued to listen to Bates and defendant. Parrish heard defendant say something that \u201cset him off,\u201d and Parrish called defendant a \u201ccrazy F\u2019er.\u201d Defendant replied, \u201c[wjell, I have something for you,\u201d and went to his kitchen.\nDefendant came running back from the kitchen with a knife. He began swinging the knife at Parrish. Parrish grabbed defendant\u2019s wrist, but defendant broke free. Parrish then attempted to dodge the knife. Vandenbrink and Dustin Nunamaker came to the hallway, and Vandenbrink got defendant in a choke hold. Defendant eventually dropped the knife. The knife incident lasted about 30 seconds, and Parrish sustained a cut above his left eye, a cut to his left hip, and a \u201cnick\u201d on his upper torso. Parrish did not seek medical treatment or contact the police because he had been drinking.\nBates testified he was at Frazier\u2019s apartment that evening when Crow entered the apartment and stated defendant had pushed her head against the stove. He did not see or hear any of that incident. After talking with Crow, he, along with Parrish and Vandenbrink, confronted defendant about the incident outside defendant\u2019s door. The reason defendant gave for slamming Crow\u2019s head into the stove was that she was not respecting his house. The three continued to yell at defendant until he snapped. At that point, defendant went into the kitchen, got a knife, ran out the door, and began flailing the knife around. Parrish \u201cgot most of it.\u201d Eventually, Vandenbrink grabbed defendant around the neck until he dropped the knife. Bates, who was 17 years old at the time of the incident, also admitted he was drinking alcohol that night.\nVandenbrink also testified he was drinking underage the night of the incident and admitted he was drunk by the time the incident occurred. He was in defendant\u2019s living room when he heard a noise from the kitchen that sounded like someone smashing into the stove. He did not see anything. After everyone cleared out of defendant\u2019s apartment, he, along with Bates and Parrish, started an argument with defendant outside his door about Crow\u2019s head being slammed into the stove. Defendant stated, \u201cI got something for you,\u201d and got a knife from his kitchen. Defendant then came running out of his apartment, slammed Parrish into the wall, and began slashing at him with the knife. He pulled defendant by the neck off of Parrish and held defendant until he dropped the knife.\nParrish, Bates, and Vandenbrink all testified Parrish did not have a knife during the incident.\nWilliam Flemming, defendant\u2019s nephew, testified he spoke to defendant on Christmas afternoon at defendant\u2019s parents\u2019 (Flemming\u2019s grandparents\u2019) house. Defendant told Flemming that he had a party the night before at his apartment, at which he had quite a bit to drink. During the party, he got into a fight with a \u201cguy\u201d over music, \u201cwent off,\u201d and stabbed the \u201cguy\u201d numerous times. The incident had occurred outside defendant\u2019s apartment, and defendant did not return to his apartment because he did not want to be arrested. He had his parents pick him up near his apartment building. Defendant then asked Flemming, who lived in Peoria, Illinois, for a ride to Blooming-ton, Illinois, so he could get out of the area. After dropping defendant off at a Denny\u2019s in Bloomington, Flemming reported the incident to police.\nDefendant testified he had quite a few drinks during the party. At around 11:30 p.m., he was talking to his children on the telephone to make plans with them since he was going to have them for five days. When he got off the phone, he saw Crow and Nunamaker coming out of his bathroom after having taken a shower together. At that point, he kicked everyone out of his apartment except for Crow. He got really mad at her and \u201csmacked\u201d her in the head. He did not hear her head hit the stove.\nAfter Crow left, Parrish barged back in his apartment with a knife in his hand. Defendant recognized the knife as one he had given Parrish a long time ago. Parrish was mad about what defendant had done to Crow and was swinging the knife at defendant. Since Parrish was threatening him, defendant tried to get the knife away. He wrestled with Parrish until he got the knife out of his hands. Defendant then threw Parrish and the knife out into the hallway. Additionally, defendant denied having a conversation with Flemming beyond asking for a ride to Bloomington to see his kids.\nIn rebuttal, the State entered a certified copy of defendant\u2019s 2002 conviction for theft. Parrish testified defendant never gave him a knife as a gift, and he never had a knife or weapon in his possession that evening. Flemming testified defendant never mentioned visiting his children until they got to Bloomington, where defendant called them.\nAfter hearing all of the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. At a June 2004 hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant as stated. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Other-Crimes Evidence\nDefendant first asserts he is entitled to a new trial because of the admission of evidence regarding his actions toward Crow. He acknowledges he has forfeited this issue but urges this court to review the issue under the plain-error rule (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)).\nUnder the plain-error rule, a reviewing court can consider an unpreserved error only under the following circumstances: \u201c(1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.\u201d People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187, 830 N.E.2d 467, 479 (2005). Here, defendant asserts the admission of the other-crimes evidence falls under the second circumstance. Thus, defendant must prove (1) plain error and (2) that the error was so serious it affected the fairness of his trial and challenged the judicial process\u2019s integrity. See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187, 830 N.E.2d at 479-80. Thus, we first consider whether any error occurred at all. See People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 299, 830 N.E.2d 527, 536 (2005).\nOther-crimes evidence is inadmissible for the purpose of showing the defendant\u2019s disposition or propensity to commit crime. However, such evidence is admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the propensity to commit crime. When other-crimes evidence is offered, the trial court must weigh its probative val\u00fae against its prejudicial effect and may exclude the evidence if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).\nThis court has specifically recognized evidence of another crime is admissible if it is part of a continuing narrative of the event giving rise to the offense or, in other words, intertwined with the offense charged. People v. Harper, 251 Ill. App. 3d 801, 804, 623 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1993); see also People v. Lewis, 243 Ill. App. 3d 618, 625-26, 611 N.E.2d 1334, 1339 (1993) (other-crimes evidence is admissible where it relates to the events that led to the charged offense). As this court has explained, \u201c[w]hen facts concerning uncharged criminal conduct are all part of a continuing narrative which concerns the circumstances attending the entire transaction, they do not concern separate, distinct, and unconnected crimes.\u201d People v. Collette, 217 Ill. App. 3d 465, 472, 577 N.E.2d 550, 555 (1991).\nHere, defendant\u2019s incident with Crow is part of the events that led to the charged offenses as it explains how the altercation between Parrish and defendant arose. While none of the State\u2019s witnesses saw the Crow incident, they all testified Crow told them about it and the incident was the reason an argument ensued between Parrish and defendant. Additionally, two of the witnesses heard a noise that corroborated Crow\u2019s statement. Defendant further asserts Crow did not testify. However, no evidence was presented that she witnessed the charged offenses, and thus her testimony would only draw attention to her encounter with defendant. Accordingly, we find the testimony regarding the Crow incident was relevant for another purpose other than to show the propensity to commit crime.\nDefendant further argues that even if the Crow evidence was relevant, its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We disagree. The Crow incident was a significant part of the facts that led to the knife incident, and the evidence regarding the Crow incident was limited to its role in the knife incident. In fact, the Crow evidence was critical to defendant\u2019s self-defense argument since it demonstrated a motive for Parrish to attack defendant.\nAccordingly, we find the evidence relating to the Crow incident was admissible, and thus defendant has failed to establish an error occurred.\nB. Effective Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant next contends he did not receive effective assistance of trial counsel because his counsel did not object to the admission of the other-crimes evidence, did not preserve the issue for appeal, and failed to request a limiting instruction as to the other-crimes evidence (see Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.14 (4th ed. 2000)).\nThis court reviews ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 708 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (1999). To obtain reversal under Strickland, a defendant must prove (1) his counsel\u2019s performance failed to meet an objective standard of competence and (2) counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163-64.\nTo satisfy the deficiency prong of Strickland, the defendant must demonstrate counsel made errors so serious and counsel\u2019s performance was so deficient that counsel was not functioning as \u201ccounsel\u201d guaranteed by the sixth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VI). Further, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption the challenged action or inaction could have been the product of sound trial strategy. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163.\nTo satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must prove a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the proceeding\u2019s result would have been different. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163-64. The Strickland Court noted that when a case is more easily decided on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice rather than that counsel\u2019s representation was constitutionally deficient, the court should do so. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.\nSince we have already found the other-crimes evidence was admissible, defendant cannot establish he was prejudiced by his counsel\u2019s failure to either challenge the admissibility of the evidence or preserve the admissibility issue for appeal. Defendant also cannot establish prejudice as to his counsel\u2019s failure to request a limiting instruction because a limiting instruction is not required when, as here, \u201cthe other-crimes evidence is an integral part of the context of the crime for which defendant has been tried.\u201d People v. Figueroa, 341 Ill. App. 3d 665, 672, 793 N.E.2d 712, 718 (2003). Additionally, since defendant testified to the other-crimes evidence, it is unlikely a limiting instruction would have affected the ultimate outcome of this case. See Figueroa, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 672-73, 793 N.E.2d at 718. Accordingly, defendant has failed to prove he was denied effective assistance of counsel.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Kara M. Craig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL L. THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140636\nOpinion filed September 14, 2005.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Kara M. Craig, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nNorbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for the People." }, "file_name": "0947-01", "first_page_order": 965, "last_page_order": 971 }