{ "id": 5596295, "name": "In re T.A., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Aaron T. Washington, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Washington", "decision_date": "2005-09-08", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201405\u20140319", "first_page": "953", "last_page": "962", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 953" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "762 N.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 1110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281488 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1115-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/1110-01" ] }, { "cite": "768 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472391 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 N.E.2d 1053", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1058" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415428 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "810 N.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4022496 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "942" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1476994 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 954", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "968" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 985", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5455250 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0985-01" ] }, { "cite": "819 N.E.2d 813", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 883", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3362952 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "892-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0883-01" ] }, { "cite": "818 N.E.2d 1214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1227", "parenthetical": "noting that at the best-interest hearing, \"the focus shifts to the child\"" }, { "page": "1227" }, { "page": "1226" }, { "page": "1228" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2443992 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "noting that at the best-interest hearing, \"the focus shifts to the child\"" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "363-64" }, { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 1177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1183, 1186" }, { "page": "1186" }, { "page": "1186" }, { "page": "1186" }, { "page": "1186" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 1046", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777034 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1052-53, 1056" }, { "page": "1056" }, { "page": "1056" }, { "page": "1056" }, { "page": "1056" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/1046-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 781, "char_count": 18490, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.545684249604181e-07, "percentile": 0.673751249590227 }, "sha256": "0bc36d249bfed95cc1e8285e8c42e2b9e24ec4889150a060224a2cb81212b455", "simhash": "1:8becc016328c12f1", "word_count": 3014 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:05:25.227457+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re T.A., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Aaron T. Washington, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn January 2005, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent, Aaron T. Washington, as to his daughter, T.A. (born August 27, 1999). Following a March 2005 hearing on the State\u2019s petition, the trial court found respondent unfit. Following a best-interest hearing later that same day, the court found that it would be in T.A.\u2019s best interest to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights. (The court also terminated the parental rights of T.A.\u2019s mother, Patricia Allen; however, she is not a party in this appeal.)\nRespondent appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in the neglect proceedings that preceded the State\u2019s termination petition because respondent was not made a party to those proceedings; and (2) the court\u2019s unfitness and best-interest findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn May 2003, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that T.A. was a neglected minor in that Allen had left her in the care of \u201cvarious individuals who [had] prior involvement with [the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)]\u201d and were not appropriate caregivers.\nAt a July 2003 hearing on the neglect petition, respondent did not appear and Allen admitted to the allegation in the petition. The trial court accepted Allen\u2019s admission and adjudicated T.A. neglected (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3 (West 2002)). The court\u2019s written adjudicatory order indicated, in pertinent part, that (1) the court had jurisdiction over Allen because she received service of process by summons, and (2) respondent had \u201cinsufficient contact [with T.A.] to require notice\u201d of the proceedings.\nFollowing an August 2003 hearing, the trial court entered a dispositional order (1) adjudicating T.A. a ward of the court, (2) granting guardianship to DCFS, and (3) providing that T.A. remain in Allen\u2019s custody. The court further ordered Allen and DCFS not to allow contact between T.A. and respondent. (The trial court later entered an order making DCFS TA.\u2019s custodian.)\nIn January 2005, the State filed its petition to terminate the parental rights of Allen and respondent. In pertinent part, the State alleged that respondent was an unfit parent in that he (1) failed to make reasonable progress toward T.A.\u2019s return within nine months of the court\u2019s neglect adjudication (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m)(ii) (West 2004)); (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for T.A.\u2019s removal (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m)(i) (West 2004)); and (3) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to T.A.\u2019s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(b) (West 2004)).\nAt the March 2005 hearing on the State\u2019s petition to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights, April Coats testified that she was T.A.\u2019s DCFS caseworker from July 2003 to October 2004. During that time, Coats knew that respondent was in prison and the court had ordered that T.A. have no contact with him. Coats explained that she did not have a service plan in place for respondent because (1) the court had entered the no-contact order and (2) respondent \u201chad never had any contact with [T.A.] or shown any interest in her.\u201d Respondent received a letter from the court in March 2004, informing him that T.A. had become a ward of the court.\nDCFS caseworker Jenna Sisk testified that she was assigned to T.A.\u2019s case in October 2004. When she took over the case, she mailed respondent a client-service plan. That plan required respondent to (1) obtain sex-offender treatment and attend parenting classes while in prison (respondent was a registered sex offender), (2) maintain contact with DCFS, (3) sign various releases of information, and (4) upon his release from prison, contact DCFS and provide DCFS with his probation officer\u2019s name.\nRespondent was released from prison on November 16, 2004, and three days later he stopped by the DCFS office. He talked to Sisk about his DCFS cases (DCFS was also involved with four of respondent\u2019s other children) but spoke mainly of his ex-wife, Kartney Washington. Respondent indicated that he had not completed any services while in prison. He did not inquire about T.A., her health, or well-being. Sisk reminded him that a no-contact order was in effect as to T.A.\nIn mid-December 2004, respondent came to the DCFS office to sign some papers. He did not inquire about T.A. He stopped in the office a few days later and inquired about his children\u2019s social security numbers. However, he did not inquire about T.A.\u2019s health or well-being.\nSisk acknowledged that respondent asked for help in enrolling in parenting classes and counseling. However, two parenting class providers denied his application because of the no-contact order as to T.A. Sisk believed that respondent was attending sex-offender treatment. Her contact with respondent was \u201cregular\u201d until early 2005. Between January 2005 and the March 2005 hearing on the State\u2019s petition, Sisk\u2019s only contact with respondent was at court hearings.\nOn this evidence, the trial court found that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit on the ground that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to T.A.\u2019s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2004)).\nAt the best-interest hearing, Sisk testified that T.A. was five years old and had been living with Randy and Kelly Green since August 2004. T.A.\u2019s infant sister was also with the Greens, and T.A. liked to hold her sister and talk to her. Sisk further testified that the Greens were nurturing and loving toward T.A. and were interested in adopting her. T.A. called Kelly \u201cmom\u201d or \u201cmommy\u201d and gave her hugs and kisses. She also called Randy \u201cDaddy\u201d and had told him she loves him. The Greens were very consistent and firm, and T.A. obeyed them.\nOn this evidence, the trial court found that it was in T.A.\u2019s best interest to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. The Neglect Proceedings\nRespondent first argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in T.A.\u2019s neglect proceedings because he was not made a party thereto. Respondent further contends that pursuant to In re Miracle C., 344 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 801 N.E.2d 1177 (2003), respondent was denied his right to due process in the termination-of-parental-rights proceedings because the neglect adjudication was void for lack of jurisdiction. The State concedes this argument, but because we disagree with the Second District\u2019s decision in Miracle C., we do not accept the State\u2019s concession or agree with respondent\u2019s argument.\nIn Miracle C., the trial court terminated the respondent father\u2019s parental rights after finding him unfit on the grounds of (1) abandonment (750 ILCS 50/1 (D) (a) (West 2000)) and (2) failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to his children\u2019s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(b) (West 2000)). On appeal, the respondent challenged the trial court\u2019s termination of his parental rights based, in part, on the fact that he had not received actual notice of the neglect proceedings that preceded the State\u2019s termination petition. The Second District concluded that (1) the failure to notify the respondent rendered void the trial court\u2019s orders adjudicating the children neglected and making them wards of the court; (2) as a result of the void orders, the respondent was denied due process in the termination-of-parental-rights proceedings; and (3) the order terminating the respondent\u2019s parental rights could not stand. Miracle C., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1052-53, 1056, 801 N.E.2d at 1183, 1186. In so concluding, the court reasoned as follows: (1) \u201cThe dispositional hearing on a neglect petition is a vital stage in the process by which parental rights may be terminated and is therefore important to the fairness of any future termination proceeding\u201d (Miracle C., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1056, 801 N.E.2d at 1186); (2) because the lack of notice of the neglect proceedings deprived the respondent of an opportunity to comply with the guidelines contained in the dispositional orders, he was \u201cdeprived of an opportunity to learn what he needed to do to enhance the likelihood that he would be able to preserve his parental rights\u201d (Miracle C., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1056, 801 N.E.2d at 1186); and (3) \u201cwhere the petition to terminate parental rights followed a neglect petition, the lack of notice of the neglect proceedings *** tainted the subsequent proceedings\u201d (Miracle C., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1056, 801 N.E.2d at 1186).\nInterestingly, the focus of the Second District\u2019s analysis was on the best-interest phase of the termination proceedings. According to the Second District, \u201c[rjegardless of the effect that the lack of notice in the neglect proceedings would have on the findings of unfitness,\u201d at the best-interest stage, the trial court \u201crightfully considers whether a parent is in compliance with the dispositional guidelines.\u201d Miracle C., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 1056, 801 N.E.2d at 1186.\nWe decline to follow the Second District. Although we agree that the totality of a parent\u2019s conduct is a factor that may be considered at the best-interest stage of termination proceedings, in our view, when the trial court\u2019s unfitness finding is not based on an assessment of the parent\u2019s compliance with the dispositional order in the neglect proceedings (as was the case here), the termination proceeding stands on its own. Accordingly, a flaw in the preceding neglect proceedings \u2014 even a flaw that renders void an order entered therein \u2014 has no bearing on the subsequent termination case.\nIn so concluding, we fully recognize that a different result might be required if the respondent had been found unfit under section 1(D) (m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(m) (West 2004)). Under that section, an unfitness finding is linked to the respondent\u2019s complianee with the directives he received in the neglect proceedings. Thus, the respondent\u2019s participation in those proceedings might be viewed as essential to a fair determination of whether he has made reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to his child\u2019s removal (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2004)) or reasonable progress toward the child\u2019s return within a given time period (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii), (D)(m)(iii) (West 2004)). However, because this is not the situation in the case before us, we decline to discuss it further.\nWe also disagree with the Second District\u2019s placement of particular importance on the consideration of the respondent\u2019s conduct during the best-interest stage of termination proceedings. At that stage of the proceedings, the focus is properly placed on the child, not on the conduct of the parents. See In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227 (2004) (noting that at the best-interest hearing, \u201cthe focus shifts to the child\u201d). At the best-interest stage, \u201cthe parent\u2019s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child\u2019s interest in a stable, loving home life.\u201d D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364, 818 N.E.2d at 1227. Although a parent\u2019s conduct may be considered at that stage, it is but one of many factors that the court considers in determining what is in the child\u2019s best interest. As our supreme court wrote in D.T. :\n\u201cOnce the State proves parental unfitness, the interests of the parent and the child diverge. [Citation.] Thus, at a best-interests hearing, the parent and the child may become adversaries, as the child\u2019s interest in a loving, stable[,] and safe home environment becomes more aligned with the State\u2019s interest in terminating parental rights and freeing the child for adoption. Although the parent still possesses an interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship, the force of that interest is lessened by the court\u2019s finding that the parent is unfit to raise his or her child.\u201d D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 363-64, 818 N.E.2d at 1226.\nMoreover, section 1 \u2014 3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 1 through 7 \u2014 1 (West 2004)) provides the following factors to be considered when determining a child\u2019s best interest:\n\u201c(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child ***;\n(b) the development of the child\u2019s identity;\n(c) the child\u2019s background and ties ***;\n(d) the child\u2019s sense of attachments, including:\n(i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued ***;\n(ii) the child\u2019s sense of security;\n(iii) the child\u2019s sense of familiarity;\n(iv) continuity of affection for the child;\n(v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child;\n(e) the child\u2019s wishes and long-term goals;\n(f) the child\u2019s community ties, including church, school, and friends;\n(g) the child\u2019s need for permanence ***;\n(h) the uniqueness of every family and child;\n(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and\n(j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(4.05) (West 2004).\n(Although these factors appear in the Juvenile Court Act, they are also considered in determining a child\u2019s best interest during termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. See, e.g., In re Tiffany M., 353 Ill. App. 3d 883, 892-93, 819 N.E.2d 813, 822 (2004); In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d 985, 1001, 817 N.E.2d 954, 968 (2004).) Notably \u2014 and appropriately \u2014 the foregoing list does not include an evaluation of the respondent parent\u2019s conduct.\nIn sum, in termination proceedings under sections of the Adoption Act that do not require that a parent\u2019s fitness be determined based on conduct related to the trial court\u2019s dispositional orders in neglect proceedings, neither the parent\u2019s failure to participate in those proceedings nor the existence of a void order therein requires the trial court to dismiss or deny the State\u2019s termination petition. Accordingly, we conclude that in this case, the trial court did not err by proceeding on the State\u2019s termination-of-parental-rights petition against respondent.\nB. The Trial Court\u2019s Unfitness Finding\nRespondent next argues that the trial court\u2019s finding that he was unfit because he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to T.A.\u2019s welfare was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.\nThe State must prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court\u2019s findings must be given great deference because of its superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility. We will not reverse a trial court\u2019s finding of parental unfitness unless it was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning that the correctness of the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a review of the evidence. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498, 777 N.E.2d 930, 942 (2002).\nSection 1(D) (b) of the Adoption Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cThe grounds of unfitness are any *** of the following ***:\n(b) Failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern[,] or responsibility as to the child\u2019s welfare.\u201d 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2002).\nBecause the language of section 1(D) (b) is in the disjunctive, any of the three elements may be considered on its own as a ground for unfitness. We recognize that in examining allegations under subsection (D)(b), a trial court must (1) focus on a parent\u2019s reasonable efforts, not his success, and (2) consider any circumstances that may have hindered his ability to visit, communicate with, or otherwise show interest in his child. However, \u201ca parent is not fit merely because she has demonstrated some interest or affection towards her child.\u201d In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 259, 810 N.E.2d 108, 125 (2004). Rather, a parent\u2019s interest, concern, or responsibility must be reasonable. In re E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d 720, 727, 724 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (2000).\nRespondent points to the evidence that (1) he showed an interest in T.A. between October 2004 and the termination proceedings, and (2) as soon as he was released from prison in November 2004, he initiated contact with DCFS. However, the trial court also heard evidence that (1) respondent had never had any contact with T.A. or showed any interest in her and (2) in respondent\u2019s postrelease meetings with Sisk, he did not inquire about T.A. Reviewing the evidence in accordance with the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s unfitness finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nC. The Best-Interest Finding\nLast, respondent argues that the trial court\u2019s best-interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.\nFollowing a finding of parental unfitness, the trial court must give full and serious consideration to the child\u2019s best interest. In re G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d 18, 24, 768 N.E.2d 367, 372 (2002). At the best-interest stage of termination proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child\u2019s best interest. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366, 818 N.E.2d at 1228. We will not disturb a court\u2019s finding that termination is in the children\u2019s best interest unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1115-16, 762 N.E.2d 701, 706 (2002).\nAt the time of the best-interest hearing, T.A. had been living with the Greens for approximately seven months and was doing well. She had bonded with the Greens, and the Greens had expressed an interest in adopting her. Meanwhile, respondent was a long way from being in a position to assume parental responsibility for T.A. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s decision that it was in T.A.\u2019s best interest to terminate respondent\u2019s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Scott D. Larson, of Blickhan, Woodworth & Timmerwilke, of Quincy, for appellant.", "Jon Barnard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re T.A., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Aaron T. Washington, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201405\u20140319\nOpinion filed September 8, 2005.\nScott D. Larson, of Blickhan, Woodworth & Timmerwilke, of Quincy, for appellant.\nJon Barnard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Quincy (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0953-01", "first_page_order": 971, "last_page_order": 980 }