{ "id": 5594240, "name": "FLYNT JULES LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CRAIG FINDLEY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Lee v. Findley", "decision_date": "2005-09-26", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201404\u20140973", "first_page": "1130", "last_page": "1137", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 1130" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "551 N.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682, 685" }, { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. App. 3d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455, 460" }, { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/194/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "826 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "a section 2 - 615 motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint by alleging defects appearing on the complaint's face; such a motion does not raise affirmative factual defenses" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750454 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "a section 2 - 615 motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint by alleging defects appearing on the complaint's face; such a motion does not raise affirmative factual defenses" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ill. Reg. 3063", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "an individual on mandatory supervised release remains in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections for the duration of his release period" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 926971 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "an individual on mandatory supervised release remains in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections for the duration of his release period" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/184/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 N.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "a parolee remains in custody and is subject to the authority of the Parole and Pardon Board (now known as the Prisoner Review Board) until his sentence expires" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903930 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "a parolee remains in custody and is subject to the authority of the Parole and Pardon Board (now known as the Prisoner Review Board) until his sentence expires" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "75" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5434483 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "804 N.E.2d 519", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463178 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 N.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599820 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 471", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782797 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" }, { "page": "495" }, { "page": "2601" }, { "page": "485-87" }, { "page": "496-98" }, { "page": "2602-04" }, { "page": "488-89" }, { "page": "498-99" }, { "page": "2604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477007 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 N.E.2d 1267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1272" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542386 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 N.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243955 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "1977 Ill. Laws 3264", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 735, "char_count": 14582, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0237775856791986e-07, "percentile": 0.5460868568013039 }, "sha256": "790799f3af189328696e802c7414ea142dad8970b7d57c28291cc488d75a325f", "simhash": "1:e23c50946b62be40", "word_count": 2403 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:05:25.227457+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FLYNT JULES LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CRAIG FINDLEY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn May 2004, plaintiff, Flynt Jules Lee, pro se filed a petition for writ of mandamus relief, alleging that defendant, Craig Findley, chairman of the Prisoner Review Board, failed to perform certain ministerial duties and violated his due-process rights during June 2003 parole-revocation proceedings. In August 2004, Findley filed a motion to dismiss Lee\u2019s petition; and in November 2004, the trial court granted Findley\u2019s motion. Lee appeals, and we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.\nI. BACKGROUND\nInitially, we note that although both parties refer to Lee as having been released on \u201cparole,\u201d he had been released on mandatory supervised release. As part of Public Act 80 \u2014 1099 (Pub. Act 80\u2014 099, eff. February 1, 1978 (1977 Ill. Laws 3264)), which included sweeping changes to the Unified Code of Corrections, the concept of parole was eliminated and mandatory supervised release was created. See 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20141 (West 2002) (setting forth the guidelines regarding the establishment and appointment of the Prisoner Review Board); see also 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20143(c) (West 2002) (providing that individuals sentenced after the effective date shall be released under mandatory supervised release after serving their determinate sentence minus their accrued credit for good behavior). Nonetheless, because both Lee and Findley use the terms \u201cparole,\u201d \u201cparolee,\u201d and \u201cparole revocation\u201d in their briefs to this court, we will also use those terms in this decision.\nIn December 2002, Lee, an inmate at the Shawnee Correctional Center, was released on parole. Lee\u2019s parole was subject to a number of conditions, including that he was required to (1) wear an electronic bracelet that monitored his whereabouts and (2) remain at his residence. In April 2003, a State parole agent cited Lee in a parole-violation report. The report indicated that on the afternoon of April 23, 2003, an electronic-monitoring-system company determined that Lee was not at his residence. A company representative telephoned Lee\u2019s residence, and an unidentified woman who answered the telephone confirmed that Lee was not there. The representative then notified a state parole agency supervisor about Lee\u2019s absence. Shortly thereafter, two parole agents went to Lee\u2019s residence and were unable to locate him. Several days later, Lee was arrested for violating three conditions of his parole, in that he failed to (1) notify his parole agent of a change in his residence (condition 9), (2) follow his parole agent\u2019s specific instructions (condition 15), and (3) comply with the Prisoner Review Board\u2019s orders (condition 16).\nFollowing a June 2003 hearing, a three-member panel of the Prisoner Review Board found that Lee violated the conditions of his parole as alleged. The Board\u2019s written order indicated that Lee\u2019s parole was revoked based on his violating parole conditions 9, 15, and 16.\nLater in June 2003, Lee filed a grievance with Findley, alleging that he had been denied a fair and impartial parole-revocation hearing. In November 2003, Findley, as chairman of the Prisoner Review Board, denied Lee\u2019s grievance.\nIn May 2004, Lee pro se filed a petition for writ of mandamus relief, alleging that the Prisoner Review Board had refused to perform certain ministerial duties despite Lee\u2019s \u201cclear entitlement to performance of the specific duties.\u201d In particular, the petition alleged that the Board failed to provide Lee with (1) a statement of facts supporting the revocation of his parole and (2) a statement of the evidence the Board relied upon in revoking his parole. Lee\u2019s petition also alleged that the Board had denied him (1) an impartial hearing officer and (2) evidence that would have supported his innocence \u2014 namely, the transcripts of the recordings made by the electronic-monitoring-system company on April 23, 2003.\nIn August 2004, Findley filed a motion to dismiss Lee\u2019s petition under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2002)), arguing that (1) Lee\u2019s petition was barred by the doctrine of laches, and (2) Lee had failed to establish a right to the requested relief. (On appeal, Findley has abandoned his laches argument.) Later that month, Lee filed a motion opposing Findley\u2019s motion to dismiss. In November 2004, the trial court granted Findley\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nThis pro se appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Petition for Mandamus\n\u201cMandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, \u2018the performance of official duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his part is involved.\u2019 \u201d Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198, 229, 710 N.E.2d 798, 813 (1999), quoting Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514, 501 N.E.2d 1267, 1272 (1986). A trial court will grant a writ of mandamus \u201conly if a plaintiff establishes a clear, affirmative right to relief, a clear duty of the public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official to comply with the writ.\u201d People ex rel. Ryan v. Roe, 201 Ill. 2d 552, 555, 778 N.E.2d 701, 703 (2002).\nB. The Trial Court\u2019s Dismissal of Lee\u2019s Claim That the Prisoner Review Board Denied Him Due Process\nLee argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his claim that the Prisoner Review Board denied him due process when it failed to comply with the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972). Specifically, he contends that his claim stated a cause of action in that it alleged that the Prisoner Review Board failed to provide him with a written statement as to (1) the evidence the Board relied upon in revoking his parole and (2) the Board\u2019s reasons for revoking his parole. We agree.\nA motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Civil Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2002)) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Hynes v. Snyder, 355 Ill. App. 3d 394, 397, 823 N.E.2d 231, 234 (2005). In reviewing a section 2 \u2014 615 dismissal, we must decide whether the allegations, when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Bajwa v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 208 Ill. 2d 414, 421, 804 N.E.2d 519, 525 (2004). We review de novo a trial court\u2019s decision to dismiss a petition for writ of mandamus. Lucas v. Taylor, 349 Ill. App. 3d 995, 998, 812 N.E.2d 72, 75 (2004).\nIn Morrissey, the Supreme Court held that an individual whose parole is subject to revocation has a protectible liberty interest. (Although the Morrissey Court used the term \u201cparole,\u201d its holdings apply with equal force to mandatory supervised release, which is analogous to parole. See People ex rel. Johnson v. Pate, 47 Ill. 2d 172, 174, 265 N.E.2d 144, 146 (1970) (a parolee remains in custody and is subject to the authority of the Parole and Pardon Board (now known as the Prisoner Review Board) until his sentence expires); Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430, 704 N.E.2d 350, 351 (1998) (an individual on mandatory supervised release remains in the legal custody of the Department of Corrections for the duration of his release period); 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20147 (West 2002) (setting forth conditions that apply equally to both parolees and releasees).) The Court explained that the revocation of parole \u201ccalls for some orderly process, however informal.\u201d Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 495, 92 S. Ct. at 2601. The Court further held that minimum due-process requirements exist at two stages of a typical parole revocation: (1) the arrest of a parolee and the preliminary hearing and (2) the parole-revocation hearing. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485-87, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 496-98, 92 S. Ct. at 2602-04. In terms of the revocation-hearing stage, the Morrissey Court held that due process entitles the parolee to the following: (1) written notice of the alleged parole violations; (2) disclosure of the evidence against him; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, unless the hearing body finds good cause for not allowing such confrontation; (5) a neutral and detached hearing body, such as a traditional parole board; and (6) \u201ca written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.\u201d Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488-89, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 498-99, 92 S. Ct. at 2604.\nIn addition, the Illinois legislature has authorized the Prisoner Review Board to promulgate its own rules regarding the conduct of its work. 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20142(d) (West 2002). One of the rules adopted by the Board specifically addresses revocation hearings. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1610.150, as amended by 13 Ill. Reg. 3063, 3063 (amended February 28, 1989). Section 1610.150(i) of the Illinois Administrative Code provides as follows:\n\u201c[I]f a panel [of the Prisoner Review Board] determines that the parolee has violated any of the terms and conditions of parole, it shall issue a written statement as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole. The parolee shall receive a copy of this statement.\u201d 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1610.150(i), as amended by 13 Ill. Reg. 3063, 3063 (amended February 28, 1989).\nAlthough section 1610.150(i) refers only to a parole violation, reading part 1610 in its entirety makes clear that subsection (i) applies to mandatory-supervised-release revocation as well. In particular, section 1610.160, which addresses dispositions following the Board\u2019s determination of a \u201cparole violation,\u201d provides that in adult cases, the Board may \u201crevoke the parole\u201d and reconfine the violator for a certain period of time, depending upon whether the individual (1) had violated conditions of his mandatory supervised release or (2) had been adjudicated prior to the February 1, 1978, effective date of Public Act 80 \u2014 1099 (Pub. Act 80\u20141099, eff. February 1, 1978 (1977 Ill. Laws 3264)) (and, thus, had violated conditions of his parole). See 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1610.160, as amended by 13 Ill. Reg. 3063, 3063 (amended February 28, 1989).\nIn this case, Lee\u2019s petition for writ of mandamus alleged that the Prisoner Review Board failed to provide him with (1) a statement of facts supporting the revocation of his parole and (2) a statement of the evidence the Board relied upon in revoking his parole. Lee attached to his petition the Board\u2019s June 2003 written order, which consisted of a preprinted form. Three boxes on the form were checked off to indicate that (1) Lee had been declared a parole violator (with a handwritten notation that Lee violated parole on April 23, 2003); (2) he had violated parole conditions (with a handwritten notation that the conditions he violated were numbers 9, 15, and 16); and (3) his \u25a0>arole was revoked. The order was signed by three members of the isoner Review Board. The form contained a section entitled \u201cEvidence Relied Upon,\u201d under which the following categories were listed with a check-off box beside each one: (1) \u201cCounselor\u2019s Report,\u201d (2) \u201cPolice Report,\u201d (3) \u201cWitnesses\u2019 testimony,\u201d and (4) \u201cOwn admission.\u201d However, none of those categories had been selected. In addition, the form contained the statement, \u201cThe [Prison Review] Board finds that this evidence is sufficient because,\u201d followed by nine blank lines. However, nothing had been written in the space provided. On this record, we conclude that Lee\u2019s petition states a cause of action for mandamus relief. We thus reverse the trial court\u2019s dismissal of this claim and remand for further proceedings. In so doing, we are not suggesting that this claim may not be properly denied in further proceedings. In addition, because Lee does not challenge the court\u2019s dismissal of his other claims, we affirm the court\u2019s dismissal of those claims.\nIn reversing the trial court\u2019s dismissal of Lee\u2019s claim, we reject Findley\u2019s contention that Lee is not entitled to mandamus relief because (1) he received a parole-violation report and the Prisoner Review Board\u2019s final order and (2) when viewed together, those documents provide (a) a statement of the evidence relied upon in revoking his parole and (b) the Board\u2019s reasons for revoking his parole. In support of his contention, Findley relies, in part, on extraneous facts not apparent on the face of Lee\u2019s mandamus petition. However, Findley\u2019s motion to dismiss (which he concedes was brought under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Civil Code, not section 2 \u2014 619(a) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619(a) (West 2002))) attacked the legal sufficiency of Lee\u2019s petition. His motion did not raise an affirmative factual defense to negate or refute Lee\u2019s cause of action, as would a section 2 \u2014 619 motion. See Jackson v. Callan Publishing, Inc., 356 Ill. App. 3d 326, 331, 826 N.E.2d 413, 421 (2005) (a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff\u2019s complaint by alleging defects appearing on the complaint\u2019s face; such a motion does not raise affirmative factual defenses). Thus, Findley cannot raise for the first time on appeal such affirmative factual matters.\nAs a final matter, we reject Findley\u2019s contention that the Fifth District\u2019s decision in Blythe v. Lane, 194 Ill. App. 3d 451, 551 N.E.2d 680 (1990), requires a different result. In that case, a parolee argued that the Prisoner Review Board was required to provide a hearing and issue a summary of the evidence relied upon in denying his request that his parole be discharged early. Blythe, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 455, 460, 551 N.E.2d at 682, 685. The Fifth District rejected that argument, upon concluding that the parole-discharge statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1003\u20143\u20148(b) (now 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20148(b) (West 2002))) did not create a protectible liberty interest. Blythe, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 459, 551 N.E.2d at 685. Blythe simply did not address parole-revocation proceedings or examine what process is due in such proceedings. \u00bf\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nTURNER and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Flynt Jules Lee, of Chicago, appellant pro se.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Leslye Jones-Beatty, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FLYNT JULES LEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CRAIG FINDLEY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140973\nOpinion filed September 26, 2005.\nFlynt Jules Lee, of Chicago, appellant pro se.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Leslye Jones-Beatty, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1130-01", "first_page_order": 1148, "last_page_order": 1155 }