{ "id": 2633835, "name": "RALPH F. VOSS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ASSOCIATED LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Voss v. Associated Life Insurance", "decision_date": "1976-02-24", "docket_number": "No. 75-55", "first_page": "105", "last_page": "110", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 105" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "21 A.L.R.3d 1155", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 3d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 N.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. App. 2d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5293142 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/65/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 N.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1598853 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/105/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "867" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 2d 15", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578964 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/124/0015-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 N.E.2d 540", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. App. 3d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2852498 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/12/0476-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 N.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "10 Ill. App. 3d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5393223 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/10/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 N.E.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2848905 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. App. 3d 1039", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2693970 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/1039-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 563, "char_count": 11343, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1812494239324262e-07, "percentile": 0.5886957116032634 }, "sha256": "fa1b494b7e416e2adeb671dc79f336921a978d3eec325001486880ab2dc74931", "simhash": "1:e05f79fe1c952593", "word_count": 1877 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:53.941211+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RALPH F. VOSS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ASSOCIATED LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court;\nThis is an appeal by the defendant, Associated Life Insurance Company, from a judgment in the amount of $7,200 entered by the circuit court of St. Clair County on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Ralph F. Voss.\nThe plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint seeking recovery under an insurance policy issued by the defendant. The pertinent portions of this policy read as follows;\n\u201cAssociated Life Insurance Company, hereinafter called the Company, hereby insures the person named in the Policy Schedule on Page 4 as the Insured against specific losses resulting from accidental bodily injury * * * or resulting from disease or sickness * * subject to all the provisions, exclusions, reductions and riders, if any, as set forth on or attached herein. # # #\nPART n LOSS OF TIME DUE TO INJURY\nIf, within 30 days of the date of the accident, such injury disables the insured so that he is continuously prevented from performing each and every duty of his occupation and the Insured is under the regular care of a physician the Company will pay at the rate of the Monthly Indemnity for Total Disability specified in the Policy Schedule while so disabled, but not to exceed 24 months for any one accident. After the payment of monthly indemnity for 24 months as aforesaid, the Company will continue the payment of such monthly indemnity so long as the Insured shall be totally and continuously disabled and prevented by such injury from engaging in any occupation or employment for wage or profit, but not to exceed an additional period of 36 months for any one accident.\nPART III LOSS OF TIME DUE TO SICKNESS\nIf such sickness disables the Insured so that he is continuously prevented from performing each and every duty of his occupation, and the Insured is under the regular care of a physician, the Company will pay at the rate of the Monthly Indemnity for Total Disability specified in the Policy Schedule for the period during which such disability continues after the expiration of the Elimination Period for Sickness but not to exceed 24 months for any one period of sickness. # # #\nPART IX EXCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS\nLoss due to hernia, strained or lame back, sunstroke or heatstroke will be considered as loss under the sickness provision of this policy. * * *\u201d\nThe plaintiff alleged that he had suffered an injury compensable under the 36-month extended provisions of Part II of the policy during a period in which the policy was \u201cin force and effect.\u201d The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had paid the plaintiff the sum of $200 per month for the first 24 months under Part II of the policy.\nThe defendant responded by filing a motion to dismiss. This motion was denied. The defendant then filed an answer. In its answer the defendant admitted that it had issued an insurance policy to the plaintiff and that it had paid the defendant the sum of $200 per month for a 24-month period \u201cunder the provisions of the policy of insurance which it issued the Plaintiff,\u201d but denied that the plaintiff\u2019s injury was compensable under the 36-month extended provisions of \u201cPART II\u201d of the policy. Attached to its answer was an affirmative defense, wherein the defendant set forth in \u201cPART III\u201d and \u201cPART IX\u201d of the policy. In its affirmative defense the defendant claimed that \u201cthe physical deformity for which the Plaintiff made a claim on the basis of the above mentioned policy is spondylolisthesis and degenerative osteoarthritis of the spine.\u201d The cause then came to trial.\nAfter hearing the evidence the jury was instructed on the applicable law. Included with these instructions were three special interrogatories. The first interrogatory asked: \u201cDo you find from the evidence that Plaintiffs condition is the result of an injury sustained in an accident?\u201d The second interrogatory asked: \u201cDo you find from the evidence that the Plaintiff had a strained or lame back during the period of March 15, 1972 to and including July 9, 1974?\u201d The third interrogatory asked: \u201cDo you find from the evidence that Plaintiff is able to engage in the job or occupation of a salesman?\u201d The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $7,200 in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. It answered the first two interrogatories affirmatively. It answered the third interrogatory in the negative. After the denial of its post-trial motion the defendant perfected the instant appeal.\nOne of the contentions raised by the defendant is that the jury\u2019s answer to the second special interrogatory, i.e., that the plaintiff had a strained or lame back, is inconsistent with the jury\u2019s general verdict and, consequently, the latter should be vacated and judgment entered in favor of defendant. After reviewing the pleadings, examining the provisions of the insurance policy in question, reading the evidence presented to the jury, and perusing the instructions given the jury, we are in agreement with tire defendant.\nSection 65 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 65), provides that \u201c[w]hen the special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former controls the latter and the court may render judgment accordingly.\u201d The plaintiff acknowledges section 65 of the Civil Practice Act, but argues that:\n\u201cThe answer to Interrogatory No. 2 does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the general verdict, for the jury might well have believed that plaintiff, after two back operations and extensive medical treatment, did indeed have a \u2018strained or lame back,\u2019 whatever that means, but that he had nevertheless sustained an accidental bodily injury within the terms of the policy and was, by reason thereof, totally and continuously disabled.\u201d\nThe plaintiff further argues that:\n\u201cAt best, Special Interrogatory No. 2 did nothing more than seek support for defendant on an evidentiary matter; at worst, it was unsupported by any evidence, did not deal with an ultim\u00e1te fact issue on which the rights of the parties depended, and invited speculation and conjecture as to its meaning. Since it does not control the general verdict, its disposition is academic.\u201d\nWe disagree.\nAs stated by the court in Dawe\u2019s Laboratories v. Commercial Insurance Co., 19 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1048, 313 N.E.2d 218, 224-25:\n\u201cIn considering the language of the policy of insurance, as above quoted, our primary objective must be to ascertain and to give effect to tire intention of the parties as therein expressed. Where there is no ambiguity in the policy provision, tire intent of the parties must be determined solely from the language used/ (Schek v. Chicago Transit Auth., 42 Ill. 2d 362, 364, 247 N.E.2d 886.) In this regard insurance policies must be treated like any other contract and \u2018[w]here the language in a policy is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken in its plain, ordinary and popular-sense/ (Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Case Foundation Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 115, 121, 294 N.E.2d 7.) \u2018The issue of whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law.' Gaffney v. Burns Detective Agency, 12 Ill. App. 3d 476, 480, 299 N.E.2d 540, and cases there cited.\u201d\nMoreover, the question of the construction of an insurance contract presents an issue of law only; it is not submissible to a jury. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Case Foundation Co., 10 Ill. App. 3d 115, 294 N.E.2d 7, 12; Cohen v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Co., 124 Ill. App. 2d 15, 259 N.E.2d 865, 867; Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124, 126.\nIn the absence of any ruling by the trial court, this court must first examine the policy and, as a matter of law, determine the extent of the coverage afforded the insured. Applying the foregoing principles to the language of the policy before us, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the language of this policy is clear and unambiguous. In the context of tire facts shown here, it may be read and understood by giving all of the language its plain and ordinary meaning. In situations in which the bodily injury of the insured comprises a \u201cstrained or lame back\u201d the insured is limited to coverage under \u201cPART III\u201d of the policy, \u201cLOSS OF TIME DUE TO SICKNESS.\u201d It necessarily follows that if the trier of fact determines that the insured\u2019s infirmity is a \u201cstrained or lame back\u201d the insured is limited to \u201cMonthly Indemnity for Total Disability specified in the Policy Schedule for a period * * * not to exceed 24 months for any one period of sickness.\u201d Consequently, if the insured suffers a \u201cstrained or lame back\u201d the cause of the condition becomes irrelevant.\nNotwithstanding the jury\u2019s general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the jury affirmatively answered the defendant\u2019s special interrogatory: \u201cDo you find from the evidence that the Plaintiff had a strained or lame back during the period of March 15, 1972 to and including July 9, 1974.\u201d When the jury\u2019s answer to this interrogatory is read with reference to the other instructions, particularly the issue instruction offered by the plaintiff, it becomes apparent that the jury, as the trier of fact, found that the basis of plaintiff\u2019s claim was a \u201cstrained or lame back.\u201d After examining the evidence before the jury we cannot say that its categorization of the plaintiff\u2019s infirmity as a \u201cstrained or lame back\u201d is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIn view of the jury\u2019s special finding that the plaintiff\u2019s condition was a \u201cstrained or,lame back,\u201d the trial court should have, as requested by the defendant, vacated the jury\u2019s general verdict in favor of the plaintiff and entered judgment in favor of the defendant. Under the provisions of \u201cPART II\u201d of the policy the maximum length of payments is 24 months. Since the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant had completed 24 monthly payments, the plaintiff was not entitled to any further indemnification.\nThis conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the other contentions raised by the defendant. While we have discovered some commentary on this court\u2019s decision in Snelson v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co. (1965), 65 Ill. App. 2d 416, 212 N.E.2d 873 (see Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1155, 1193, N.6 (1968)), we find that the facts of this case provide an inappropriate forum for any clarification of the position we set forth in Snelson.\nFor reasons set forth we reverse the judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff by the circuit court of St. Clair County and, by the power vested in this court by Supreme Court Rule 366(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110A, par. 366(a)), we enter judgment in favor of the defendant, Associated Life Insurance Company, against the plaintiff, Ralph S. Voss.\nJudgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County reversed. Judgment for defendant, Associated Life Insurance Company, an insurance \u25a0 corporation, against plaintiff, Ralph S. Voss, entered.\nJONES and CARTER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE EBERSPACHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Cornelius Thomas Ducey, Jr., of Ducey and Feder, Ltd., of Belleville, for appellant.", "Dixon, Staines, Nester, McDonnell & Stegmeyer, of Belleville (Joseph B. McDonnell, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RALPH F. VOSS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ASSOCIATED LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 75-55\nOpinion filed February 24, 1976.\nRehearing denied March 23, 1976.\nCornelius Thomas Ducey, Jr., of Ducey and Feder, Ltd., of Belleville, for appellant.\nDixon, Staines, Nester, McDonnell & Stegmeyer, of Belleville (Joseph B. McDonnell, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0105-01", "first_page_order": 131, "last_page_order": 136 }