{ "id": 2634133, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNEST A. JONES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "1976-02-10", "docket_number": "No. 61883", "first_page": "190", "last_page": "193", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 190" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "288 N.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 Ill. App. 3d 709", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2677494 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/7/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. App. 3d 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2758575 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5407350 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/1090-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 N.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2838692 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487-488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. 2d 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2895335 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/45/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 U.S. 25", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9136521 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/407/0025-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 417, "char_count": 6153, "ocr_confidence": 0.722, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.645840997291168e-07, "percentile": 0.8235391329764785 }, "sha256": "4c04bfef29db166c21a5e8aab26e2e2c78a44f3ef10af9f7427d6cdbf707fae6", "simhash": "1:6251e89b65988dbf", "word_count": 1036 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:53.941211+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNEST A. JONES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE MEJDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court as modified upon denial of petition for rehearing:\nDefendant, Ernest A. Jones, pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawful use of weapons (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 24 \u2014 1(a)(4)) and was sentenced to 1 year\u2019s probation and fined $100. On appeal he initially contends that the trial court erred in accepting his waiver of the right to counsel. Since we agree, it is not necessary to consider defendant\u2019s remaining contentions.\nThe record reflects that when defendant\u2019s case was called he appeared without counsel. The following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: You ready for trial, Mr. Jones?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: You want to be tried by this Court without a lawyer and without a jury?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: You recognize if your [sic] unable to afford an attorney, you have a right to ask for a public defender?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes.\nTHE COURT: You\u2019re not asking for one?\nTHE DEFENDANT: No, sir.\nTHE COURT: Okay. Now, how do you plead to the charge of unlawful use of weapon?\nTHE DEFENDANT: I said I was going to work a few hours early and then I usually do.\nTHE COURT: So, your [sic] pleading not guilty.\nTHE DEFENDANT: I plead guilty, because recognize\u2014\nTHE COURT: You\u2019re pleading to what?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Unlawful use, I\u2019m\npleading guilty.\nTHE COURT: Your [sic] pleading guilty to it?\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes. (nodding)\u201d\nThereafter, the trial judge admonished the defendant pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, par. 402), and a plea of guilty was accepted.\nThe factual basis was supplied by a police officer in response to questioning by the prosecutor.\nIt is well established that an accused who is charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment has a right to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings unless he knowingly waives that right. (Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972), 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006.) A finding of such waiver should not be made unless it appears from the record that tire trial court \u201cspecifically offered, and the accused knowingly and understandingly rejected, the representation of appointed counsel\u201d (People v. Hessenauer (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 63, 68, 256 N.E.2d 791). In order that the court may be sure that an accused fully understands his right to counsel and intentionally relinquishes that right, something more than a routine inquiry by the court is required. (People v. Bush (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 484, 487-488, 207 N.E.2d 446); People v. Melvin (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 329 N.E.2d 890.\nSupreme Court Rule 401 which formerly specified \u201ca crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary\u201d was amended June 28, 1974, effective September 1, 1974, by deleting the words \u201cin the penitentiary\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1974 Supp., ch. 110A, par. 401). The Rule presently provides in part:\n\u201c(a) Waiver of Counsel. Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands tire following:\n(1) the nature of the charge;\n(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, # # #\n(3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court.\n# # #\n(c) Transcript Required. The proceedings required by this rule to be in open court shall be taken verbatim, transcribed, filed, and made a part of the common-law record.\u201d\nThe purpose of Rule 401 is to provide a procedure which will eliminate any doubt that the defendant understands the charge against him and its consequences, and to preclude a defendant from entering a plea of guilty or waiving the right to counsel without full knowledge and understanding. People v. Schrodt (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 660, 662, 289 N.E.2d 652; People v. Carle (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 709, 288 N.E.2d 878.\nIn the instant case, before the acceptance of defendant\u2019s waiver of counsel, there is nothing to indicate that defendant understood the nature of the charge by the mere recitation of \u201cunlawful use of weapons,\u201d or that he was advised on the minimum and maximum penalty prescribed by law.\nThe State argues that the trial court in subsequently accepting defendant\u2019s plea of guilty did adequately admonish him as to the nature of the charge and the penalty pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402. However, \u201c[t]he arraignment is nothing more than to call the prisoner to the bar of the court to answer the charge against him. * * * a beginning place in the trial where the charges must be made clear to the defendant. # # \u00ab The safeguards which are due a defendant should be afforded no later than at this time.\u201d (Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, art. 113, Committee Comments, at 6 (Smith-Hurd 1970).) The arraignment is a critical stage at which defendant has the right to counsel before being required to plead to the charge. The admonishments given defendant herein in accepting his plea of guilty cannot relate back to the waiver of counsel. Effect must also be given to the word \u201cfirst\u201d which appears in Rule 401(a). A valid waiver of counsel must precede a plea of guilty. The record required by Supreme Court Rule 401(c) fails to demonstrate the necessary compliance with Rule 401(a).\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction and remand the cause to the circuit court of Cook County with directions that defendant be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty and plead anew.\nReversed and remanded.\nMcNAMARA and McGLOON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE MEJDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Judith A. Stewart and Mary T. Woodward, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, John T. Theis, and Bertina E. Lampkin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNEST A. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 61883\nOpinion filed February 10, 1976.\nModified upon denial of rehearing March 18, 1976.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Judith A. Stewart and Mary T. Woodward, Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, John T. Theis, and Bertina E. Lampkin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0190-01", "first_page_order": 216, "last_page_order": 219 }