{
  "id": 2633909,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JOHN JONES, Petitioner-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones",
  "decision_date": "1976-03-10",
  "docket_number": "No. 60496",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:53.941211+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JOHN JONES, Petitioner-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. JUSTICE ADESKO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner appeals from an order dismissing his petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 1 et seq.) without an evidentiary hearing. He contends that a constitutional violation of due process resulted when the court accepted his plea of guilty to the charge of armed robbery without determining whether the plea was voluntary.\nOn September 14, 1972, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of armed robbery and was sentenced to a term of five years to five years and a day. Petitioner\u2019s privately retained counsel informed the court in petitioner\u2019s presence that he had had conversations with petitioner and petitioner\u2019s mother and brothers. Petitioner had advised counsel that he wished to enter a plea of guilty. The trial judge then questioned petitioner as to his understanding of the proceedings and informed him of his right to a jury trial, his right to confront witnesses against him, his right against self-incrimination, and his waiver of these rights if he were to plead guilty. The court then told petitioner the sentence it would impose should his plea of guilty be accepted. The trial judge said, \u201cI wouldn\u2019t want you to plead guilty to any offense merely to receive a certain sentence if you were not in fact guilty.\u201d To each of the court\u2019s questions as to whether he understood his rights, whether he understood the consequence of his waiver of t\u00edrese rights, and whether he understood Iris sentencing, petitioner answered, \u201cYes.\u201d\nThe pro se post-conviction petition and the supplemental petition for post-conviction relief filed through appointed counsel essentially alleged that the court did not determine whether any force or threat or any promises, apart from the plea agreement, were used to obtain the plea. The court, however, granted the State\u2019s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the guilty plea was in substantial compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402.\nThe Federal Constitution requires that the record show the defendant to have entered a plea of guilty intelligently and voluntarily. (Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709.) Subsequent to Boykin our supreme court enacted Supreme Court Rule 402 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110A, par. 402) to preserve a record which reflects an intelligent and voluntary plea as required by due process of law. (People v. Reeves (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 28, 276 N.E.2d 318.) Reeves, however, found nothing in Boykin to require specific admonitions and waivers for a plea of guilty to be intelligently, understandingly, and voluntarily made. Furthermore, Rule 402 requires substantial, not literal compliance. People v. Krantz (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 187, 317 N.E.2d 559; People v. Ellis (1974), 59 Ill. 2d 255, 329 N.E.2d 15.\nPetitioner in the case at bar stood in open court and listened to his privately retained counsel inform the court of conversations with petitioner and his family and of petitioner\u2019s desire to plead guilty to the charge of aimed robbery. Petitioner said he understood his right to a jury trial, his right to confront witnesses against him, and his right against self-incrimination. He said he understood the sentence he would receive. Only then did he plead guilty. We conclude that the voluntary and understanding nature of the plea is apparent from the whole record. The failure of the court t\u00f3 inquire specifically whether the plea was voluntary does not raise the issue to a constitutional level.\nThe trial court\u2019s dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nJOHNSON, P. J\u201e and DIERINGER, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. JUSTICE ADESKO"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (William D. Trade and Edmund B. Moran, Jr., Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Mary Ellen Dienes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee, v. JOHN JONES, Petitioner-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 60496\nOpinion filed March 10, 1976.\nJames J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (William D. Trade and Edmund B. Moran, Jr., Assistant Public Defenders, of counsel), for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and Mary Ellen Dienes, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0884-01",
  "first_page_order": 910,
  "last_page_order": 912
}