{ "id": 4258688, "name": "MARY ANN ROHRBACK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellants (The Department of Employment Security et al., Counter-Cross-Plaintiffs, v. The Civil Service Commission et al., Counter-Cross-Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Rohrback v. Department of Employment Security", "decision_date": "2005-09-22", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201404\u20140960", "first_page": "298", "last_page": "310", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 298" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. App. 3d 961", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2785601 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/26/0961-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 N.E.2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. App. 3d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5538157 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/89/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 1300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1303" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5477547 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill. App. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5256013 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/38/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 N.E.2d 865", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "867" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. App. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2578565 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/75/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2607420 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1869, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/50/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 N.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208059 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333141 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569862 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 561", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "567" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026056 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 N.E.2d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" }, { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 3d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3358949 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" }, { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/59/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 1021", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1024" }, { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520352 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" }, { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 N.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" }, { "page": "320" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. App. 3d 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2577220 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" }, { "page": "361" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/204/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 N.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" }, { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Ill. 2d 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5455514 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/69/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 N.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "558" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "558" }, { "page": "558" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 2d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2744491 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/19/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 N.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35368 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0520-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1063, "char_count": 28801, "ocr_confidence": 0.798, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.454858700363489e-07, "percentile": 0.8048588933177185 }, "sha256": "8b8f8902df78696fc26aacb7584920276d7faf55b1158014a477b2b3ddef98c2", "simhash": "1:fbb61090738f47e2", "word_count": 4711 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:43:20.596028+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MARY ANN ROHRBACK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellants (The Department of Employment Security et al., Counter-Cross-Plaintiffs, v. The Civil Service Commission et al., Counter-Cross-Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State fired plaintiffs, Mary Ann Rohrback and Virginia Wood, on the ground that they had obtained reappointments to new four-year terms through fraud. Plaintiffs appealed to the Civil Service Commission (Commission), which overturned the discharges but suspended plaintiffs for 90 days for improperly trying to extend their terms of employment. The Commission held the reappointments were invalid because plaintiffs had never effectively resigned from their unexpired terms.\nPlaintiffs then brought this action for administrative review. The employing agencies and the Department of Central Management Services (CMS) filed a counterclaim against the Commission and plaintiffs, asking the circuit court to find the charges to be proved in full and to order plaintiffs\u2019 discharge. The court reversed the Commission\u2019s decision in its entirety, finding it to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, and ordered defendants to restore plaintiffs to new four-year terms without the suspensions or any discipline whatsoever. The employing agencies and CMS appeal.\nBecause the State, with full knowledge of the facts, advised plaintiffs to enter into these precise transactions, we find the suspensions to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Further, we find no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that either plaintiff failed to effectively resign. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. Rohrback\nOn May 1, 2001, the State appointed Rohrback to the position of regional manager of the Department of Employment Security. This was a jurisdiction B position, meaning that after a six-month probationary period (see 20 ILCS 415/8b.6 (West 2000); 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 302.300(a)(1) (Conway Greene CD-ROM April 2001)), the State could fire her only for cause (see 20 ILCS 415/8b.l6, 8b. 19(a) (West 2000)). The appointment was for four years. See 20 ILCS 415/8b.l9(a) (West 2000); 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 302.830(a) (Conway Greene CD-ROM April 2001). At the end of the term (May 1, 2005), the Director of the Department of Employment Security was to decide whether to renew Rohrback\u2019s appointment for another four years. See 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 302.840(a) (Conway Greene CD-ROM April 2001). Allowing the term to expire without a renewal would have been tantamount to a termination. See 80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 302.840(b) (Conway Greene CD-ROM April 2001).\nOn March 28, 2003, the State fired Rohrback. According to the charges for discharge, she had \u201cengaged in\u201d \u201cmultiple employment transactions in September 2002 that were designed to restart [her] appointment and improperly lengthen the term of [her] employment.\u201d Those alleged transactions were as follows: (1) she resigned her position as regional manager on August 30, 2002; (2) she accepted a different position \u201cin Finance and Administration\u201d on September 1, 2002; (3) she resigned that position on September 12, 2002; and (4) she returned to her original position as regional manager on September 13, 2002, for a new four-year term. The charges accused Rohrback of making \u201cfalse statements and misrepresentations\u201d in that she \u201cauthorized two transaction documents attesting that [she] separated or resigned\u201d- \u2014 first from her original position and then from the second position. According to the charges, the representations in those \u201ctransaction documents\u201d were false in that Rohrback never really \u201cseparated or resigned\u201d from her original position and never \u201cactually reported] to\u201d the second position or \u201cassume[d] its duties.\u201d The charges further accused her of \u201cmanipulat[ing] the [personnel [r]ules of the State of Illinois and circumvent [ing] such rules for [her] own financial benefit and gain.\u201d The charges did not specify which personnel rules she had manipulated and circumvented.\nRohrback appealed to the Commission, and, after an evidentiary hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a recommended decision. Rohrback was the only witness to testify in the hearing. According to her testimony, she received a call from Antoinette Cross-grove, the human resources manager of the Department of Employment Security. Rohrback could not remember the date when Crossgrove called, but she remembered that Crossgrove called her only once. Crossgrove explained to Rohrback that even though Rohrback\u2019s current term had not yet expired, Rohrback could receive a new four-year term through a series of transactions suggested by the Governor\u2019s office. Rohrback had to resign her position of regional manager, accept an interim position, resign the interim position, and then accept another position (not necessarily that of regional manager) for a new term. Crossgrove advised her to write two letters and told her what to say in them.\nThe letters were plaintiffs exhibit Nos. 4 and 5. Both were addressed to the Director of the Department of Employment Security and signed by Rohrback. Rohrback testified she typed them on her computer at work. The first letter, dated August 30, 2002, reads: \u201cPlease allow this letter to serve as my resignation effective August 30, 2002. I am resigning to accept another job.\u201d That letter was to serve as her resignation from the original position and her acceptance of the interim position. The second letter, dated September 12, 2002, reads: \u201cPlease allow this letter to serve as notice of my resignation effective September 12, 2002. I am resigning to accept a term appointment.\u201d That letter was to serve as her resignation from the interim position and her acceptance of the new term appointment.\nIn the administrative hearing, the attorney for the Department of Employment Security asked Rohrback:\n\u201cQ. Okay, did you \u2014 when you prepared the letters, when you talked to Ms. Crossgrove and prepared the letters, did you prepare them \u2014 first of all, did you prepare them right after the conversation?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Does that mean that the conversation with Ms. Crossgrove must have taken place sometime around September 18th of 2002?\nA. Not necessarily.\n;\u00a1\u00ed t\u00a1; j|\u00ed\nQ. You would have faxed [the letters] to Ms. Crossgrove shortly after you prepared them, right?\nA. Yes.\nQ. Okay, so it would have been September 18th, right?\nA. It may have been \u2014 these may have been duplicates. Our Human Resources Department was absolutely notorious for losing paperwork.\nQ. Okay, did you send multiple copies to Ms. Crossgrove? Do you recall doing that?\nA. I don\u2019t.\nQ. Do you have any reason to doubt that you faxed the letters to\nher once and only once on September 18th?\n* * *\n[A.] No.\u201d\nIt appeared to the ALJ that despite the dates Rohrback had typed in the heading of the letters \u2014 August 30 and September 12, 2002 \u2014 she actually faxed the letters to Crossgrove at the same time, on September 18, 2002. Petitioner\u2019s exhibit Nos. 4 and 5 appeared to be fax copies of the letters, with the date of transmission, September 18, 2002, mechanically printed at the top of each. Rohrback remembered drafting and signing only one letter, although she conceded that both letters appeared to have her signature on them and she therefore must have prepared them both. She did not recall the dates when she actually signed the letters but could think of no reason why she would have put inaccurate dates on them.\nRohrback admitted that when signing the letters, she did not know what interim position she was accepting and from which she was resigning. Despite her submission of the resignation letters, she remained in the same office and kept working as before. No one assigned her different duties or told her to report to a different supervisor. She testified she would have done as she was told. She was aware of many employees in her region who worked outside their job classifications.\nEven though nothing changed for Rohrback in the workplace, CMS processed her resignation from the position of regional manager, her appointment to the interim position, her resignation from the interim position, and her reappointment to the position of regional manager. The corresponding personnel action forms bear the signature of Crossgrove, dated September 18, 2002; the signature of the Director of Employment Security, undated; and the signature of the Director of CMS, dated October 25, 2002. Next to the spaces for the \u201ctransaction name\u201d and \u201ctransLaction] code,\u201d the forms have a space for the \u201ceffective date\u201d of the transaction. The effective dates are as the State alleges in the charges for discharge.\nThe ALJ found that because the transactions, on their face, \u201cappear[ed] to meet the muster of [CMS] as it existed prior to January 14, 2003,\u201d they were not \u201cvoid or even voidable.\u201d To the ALJ\u2019s thinking, it was of no great consequence whether Rohrback knew \u201cwhere she would wind up and what position she would ultimately hold.\u201d She was acting at the direction of Crossgrove and, ultimately, the Governor\u2019s office, and she could have justifiably trusted them to lead her down the path of legality. The ALJ found no false statement by Rohrback and no attempt by her to improperly extend her employment or otherwise manipulate or circumvent the personnel rules. He recommended that Rohrback be returned to the position from which she was discharged, without any disciplinary action.\nOn February 19, 2004, the Commission issued the following decision:\n\u201cThe undersigned, having read the recommended decision of the [ALJ] dated February 6, 2004[,] hereby adopt said decision to the extent not inconsistent with the findings set forth below ***.\nWe do not agree with the [ALJ\u2019s] [\u2018]Conclusion and Recommendation.!\u2019] The totality of the evidence indicates that no resignation from the position of [Rregional [m]anager[,] as contemplated by the Personnel Code[,] occurred. The [petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the [Respondent did not intend to relinquish the position!;] nor did an unequivocal act of relinquishment occur. Therefore, the [Respondent was unable to be appointed to the second term from which she was discharged.\nAdditionally, we do not agree that the [Respondent did not knowingly attempt to improperly extend her term of employment.\nIt is determined that the written charges for discharge approved by the Director of [CMS], State of Illinois, have been proven in part. Said partially proven charges warrant a 90-day suspension and the return of the [Respondent to her initial term position that ends April! ] 2005.\u201d\nB. Wood\nOn March 16, 1999, the State appointed Wood to the position of general manager of North Point Marina. This was a jurisdiction B position in the Department of Natural Resources, and the term was four years.\nOn March 28, 2003, the State fired Wood for the same reasons it had fired Rohrback: \u201cfalse statements and misrepresentations\u2019 \u2019 and \u2018\u2018manipulat[ion]\u201d and \u201ccircumvention]\u201d of unspecified personnel rules \u201cfor [her] own financial benefit and gain.\u201d According to the charges for discharge, the State possessed documents attesting that Wood had (1) resigned her position of regional manager on August 9, 2002; (2) filled a position in the Office of the Director of Internal Investigations on August 12, 2002; (3) resigned that position on August 15, 2002; and (4) returned to her original position of regional manager on August 16, 2002, for a new four-year term. The alleged falsehood consisted of signing transaction documents attesting that she had resigned from the original position and from the second position when, in fact, she had never resigned from either position and had never reported to or assumed the duties of the second position.\nWood appealed to the Commission. She was the only witness to testify in the administrative hearing. According to her testimony, in July 2002, the Governor\u2019s Deputy Chief Legal Counsel, Rob Powers, telephoned her and said someone would get back with her about a reappointment to a new term. April Cook was the Director of Human Resources of the Department of Natural Resources. In August 2002, Cook telephoned Wood and explained to her how to obtain the promised reappointment. Wood was to submit two letters, and Cook told her what to say in them.\nThe ALJ admitted these letters into evidence as plaintiffs exhibit Nos. 5 and 6. Wood testified she wrote the letters on or about August 6, 2002, which was the date of transmission the fax machine had printed on them. The first letter, dated August 7, 2002, reads as follows: \u201cEffective Friday, August 9, 2002, I wish to resign my position[ ] as [gjeneral [mjanager of North Point Marina *** in order to accept another position with the State of Illinois.\u201d The other letter, undated, reads as follows: \u201cEffective August 15, 2002, I wish to resign my exempt position in order to accept another position with the State of Illinois.\u201d In personnel action forms signed by both the Director of the Department of Natural Resources and the Director of CMS, Wood was separated from her original position on August 9, 2002; moved into the interim position on August 12, 2002; separated from the interim position on August 15, 2002; and then moved back into the original position on August 16, 2002 \u2014 for a new term. It appears in these forms that both the original position and the interim position were called \u201csenior public service administrator,\u201d although the positions had different position numbers.\nWood testified that when submitting the two letters to Cook, she did not know what the interim position would be or if the State would reappoint her to the original position as opposed to some other term position. Some nine months after Wood sent the two letters, a state officer confirmed to her that she had indeed been appointed to an interim position and then reappointed to the original position.\nThis job change seemed unique to Wood in that no one assigned her different duties or told her to work in a different office. At all times, however, she was ready and willing to do whatever her employer asked. She kept coming to work and receiving paychecks. She had no expertise in personnel matters and, as the ALJ quoted her, she \u201c \u2018wouldn\u2019t [have] dream[ed] of questioning experts.\u2019 \u201d\nThe ALJ found that Wood had made no false statement, had not attempted to improperly extend her employment, and had not manipulated or circumvented the personnel rules. Rather, she \u201cwas acting the way she acted at the direction of her supervisors.\u201d The ALJ recommended that Wood be returned to her position as general manager of North Point Marina. The Commission agreed with the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision, with the same two exceptions as in Rohrback\u2019s case: (1) Wood did not resign from her position of manager and, therefore, was \u201cunable to be appointed to the second term from which she was discharged,\u201d and (2) she did in fact \u201cknowingly attempt to improperly extend her term of employment.\u201d\nC. Proceedings in Circuit Court\nPlaintiffs brought this action for administrative review. The employing agencies and CMS filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs and the Commission, asking the circuit court to find that the charges had been proved in full and that the charges warranted the discharge of plaintiffs. The court rejected the counterclaim and reversed the Commission\u2019s decision, finding that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court ordered the reinstatement of plaintiffs to new four-year terms, without suspension or any other discipline.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Rohrback\n1. The Effectiveness of Her Resignation\nThe Commission concluded that Rohrback never effectively resigned from her position as regional manager and, therefore, the State could not have appointed her to a new four-year term in that position. We consider the Commission\u2019s factual conclusions to be \u201cprima facie true and correct.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2004). If we find any evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Rohrback failed to resign, we will uphold that conclusion. See Merrifield v. Illinois State Police Merit Board, 294 Ill. App. 3d 520, 528, 691 N.E.2d 191, 198 (1997).\nCase law holds that if a public officer submits a resignation that, by its terms, is effective immediately or on a future date, the resignation is an unalterable fact and the officer cannot withdraw the resignation and cannot negate it by continuing to perform the job. People ex rel. Adamowski v. Kerner, 19 Ill. 2d 506, 512, 167 N.E.2d 555, 558 (1960); Chicago ex rel. Martin-Trigona v. O\u2019Malley, 69 Ill. 2d 474, 481, 372 N.E.2d 671, 674 (1978); Weber v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 204 Ill. App. 3d 358, 362, 562 N.E.2d 318, 320 (1990); People ex rel. Coker v. Owen, 116 Ill. App. 3d 506, 510, 451 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (1983); Stearns v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 59 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572, 375 N.E.2d 877, 880 (1978). The purpose of that rule is to prevent confusion as to who is and who is not a public officer. Kerner, 19 Ill. 2d at 512, 167 N.E.2d at 558. Defendants argue that because the period during which Rohrback purported to relinquish her original position (August 30 to September 12, 2002) had already passed when she faxed the letters to Crossgrove on September 18, 2002, Rohrback never truly resigned: the resignation was purely retroactive and, therefore, no resignation at all.\nWe find no evidence in the record that the resignation was retroactive. The letters that Rohrback faxed to Crossgrove on September 18, 2002, evidently memorialized an earlier oral agreement. The date of that oral agreement is unclear. Rohrback testified she \u201cprepared\u201d the letters to Crossgrove \u201cright after\u201d her telephone conversation with Crossgrove and faxed the letters to Crossgrove \u201cshortly after\u201d she prepared them. As Rohrback also testified, however, it does not necessarily follow that her conversation with Crossgrove occurred \u201caround September 18th.\u201d Having accepted the effective dates of resignation with full knowledge of the facts, the State of Illinois is in no position to question them. The effective dates must have been prospective at the time of the oral agreement, or else Crossgrove, the Director of the Department of Employment Security, and the Director of CMS surely would not have approved them. We conclude that Rohrback resigned from her original position and was reappointed to a new term. The Commission\u2019s conclusion to the contrary is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\n2. False Statements\nDefendants argue that by backdating the two letters that she faxed to Crossgrove on September 18, 2002, Rohrback falsified her employment records and, for that reason, deserves to be fired or, at a minimum, to be suspended for 90 days. All the date on a letter purports to represent is when the author signed the letter, nothing more. The date of signature on a letter of resignation is irrelevant to the State. The resignation takes effect not when the employee signs the letter of resignation but when the employee communicates to the employer, in writing or otherwise, an intent to unconditionally relinquish the position. Kerner, 19 Ill. 2d at 512, 167 N.E.2d at 558; Weber, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 361, 562 N.E.2d at 320. The record contains no evidence that Rohrback tried to falsify the date she actually transmitted the letters to Crossgrove. The backdating of the letters had no practical relevance to the State and was \u201cunrelated to the requirements of the service.\u201d Zaremba v. Department of Vehicle Services, 317 Ill. App. 3d 82, 89, 739 N.E.2d 561, 567 (2000).\n3. Attempt to Improperly Extend Her Term\nThe Commission suspended Rohrback for 90 days on the ground that she \u201cknowingly attempt[ed] to improperly extend her term of employment.\u201d Considering that the transactions were not criminal and they were recommended to Rohrback by her chain of command all the way up to the Governor\u2019s office, we consider the suspension to be arbitrary and unreasonable. No fair-minded employer could actively encourage an employee to take a course of action and then punish the employee for doing so. To defraud the State, Rohrback had to knowingly make a false representation to the State with the intent of inducing the State to act in reliance on the representation. See Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 452, 546 N.E.2d 580, 591 (1989). That is not what happened here. The State made a representation to Rohrback with the intent of inducing her to act in reliance. Invoking the authority of the Governor\u2019s office, Cross-grove pointed out a path through the dense thicket of personnel rules. Rohrback trusted her judgment and expertise and took that path. It is simply unrealistic to expect Rohrback, in such a situation, to second-guess the human resources manager, who claimed to have the Governor\u2019s approval.\nB. Wood\n1. The Effectiveness of Her Resignation\nThe legal effect of undisputed facts is a question of law, which we determine de novo. Fitzpatrick v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 267 Ill. App. 3d 386, 392, 642 N.E.2d 486, 491 (1994); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Doherty, 305 Ill. App. 3d 141, 147, 711 N.E.2d 799, 804 (1999). It is undisputed that on August 6, 2002, Wood faxed two letters to the human resources manager of the Department of Natural Resources: (1) a letter resigning the position of general manager effective August 9, 2002, for the purpose of accepting an interim state position and (2) a letter resigning the exempt position and accepting a reappointment to the position of general manager effective August 15, 2002. The letters do not specify what the interim position was or to which position Wood would be reappointed, but the personnel action forms, to which the letters were attached, specified the positions and position numbers.\nThe Commission erred in holding that Wood failed to resign from her position of general manager. On the contrary, she did, in fact, resign: she filed a letter of resignation, which was, as a matter of law, dispositive. The letter stated she resigned; therefore, by operation of law, she resigned \u2014 regardless of her subjective intentions and subsequent actions. See Kerner, 19 Ill. 2d at 512, 167 N.E.2d at 558; Pace v. People ex rel. McMeen, 50 Ill. 432, 434 (1869); Weber, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 362, 562 N.E.2d at 320; Stearns, 59 Ill. App. 3d at 572, 375 N.E.2d at 880. Wood could not negate the resignation by continuing to perform the duties of a general manager or by otherwise acting as if she had never resigned. See Owen, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 510, 451 N.E.2d at 1024; McMeen, 50 Ill. at 434; O'Malley, 69 Ill. 2d at 479, 372 N.E.2d at 673. Insomuch as she continued performing the same duties as before, she was working outside her job classification.\nThus, we disagree with the Commission\u2019s conclusion that Wood failed to resign and that her reappointment for a new term was ineffective. Because she successfully resigned and was reappointed to a new term, the suspension was arbitrary. As in Rohrback\u2019s case, one cannot reasonably punish Wood for a transaction that was legitimate and successful.\n2. Accepting Compensation to Which She Was Not Entitled\nDefendants argue the State had cause for discharging Wood because after unconditionally resigning her position as general manager of the North Point Marina, she stayed on the job and accepted \u201cthousands of dollars\u201d in compensation to which, having resigned, she was not entitled. That argument has two fatal weaknesses. First, Wood resigned her position as general manager not to be unemployed but to accept an unspecified interim position \u2014 which would, of course, have been a paying position. Because she did not know what the interim position would be, she essentially placed herself at her employer\u2019s disposal, to perform whatever job duties the employer assigned. Defendants cite no evidence that the compensation Wood received was greater than that which the State owed her for the duties she performed \u2014 or, more to the point, that she knew or should have known that the compensation was too high. Both the original position and the interim position were called \u201csenior public service administrator.\u201d In the cases defendants cite, the employees knew or should have known they had been overpaid. Rotella v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 75 Ill. App. 2d 81, 86, 220 N.E.2d 865, 867 (1966); Bruno v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 38 Ill. App. 2d 100, 107-08, 186 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1962). If Wood did not know the interim position she was accepting, it is unclear how she would have known the State was overpaying her (that is to say, if the State was overpaying her \u2014 a proposition that has not been proved).\nSecond, the State never charged Wood with accepting unearned compensation. Instead, the State charged her with signing documents \u201cattesting that [she had] separated or resigned from a position when, in fact, [she] did not do so.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Charges in an administrative proceeding need not be as exact and detailed as judicial pleadings, but they must contain a clear statement of the theory on which the agency intends to rely, so that the employee can prepare a defense. Burns v. Police Board, 104 Ill. App. 3d 612, 615, 432 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (1982); B. Schwartz, Administrative Law \u00a7 6.5, at 306 (3d ed. 1991); 2 C. Koch, Administrative Law & Practice \u00a7 5.32(2) at 123 (2d ed. 1997). On appeal, defendants pursue the theory that Wood did in fact resign from her position as general manager and that she thereafter accepted compensation to which she was not entitled, being no longer an employee. That theory is in diametric contradiction to the theory in the charges for discharge, i.e., that Wood falsely attested to resigning when in fact she did not resign but instead continued to occupy the position and accept pay. In the charges for discharge, the State alleged that Wood \u201ccircumvent[ed] [the personnel] rules for [her] own financial benefit and gain,\u201d but that allegation did not notify her that she accepted pay for a position she no longer occupied.\nDefendants represent to us that the argument they now make\u2014 that Wood should be punished because she continued to accept pay after resigning \u2014 was the \u201cprecise argument\u201d the State made, without objection, in its briefs to the administrative law judge, the Commission, and the circuit court. On the contrary, we have reviewed the pages of the briefs that defendants cite, and the State did not make \u201cprecisely\u201d the same argument it makes now. In the proceedings below, the State argued Wood never in fact resigned, as evidenced by her continuing to accept compensation. Due process bars defendant\u2019s present theory because it contradicts the basic premise of the charges for discharge. See Giampa v. Illinos Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 89 Ill. App. 3d 606, 611, 411 N.E.2d 1110, 1114 (1980).\n3. Fraudulently Resigning From an Interim Job She Never Had\nIn her second letter of resignation, which she apparently faxed to her employer on August 6, 2002 (the same day she faxed the first letter of resignation), Wood stated that effective August 15, 2002, she was resigning the interim position to accept another state job. Defendants argue that because Wood had no idea what the interim position would be and because she at all times continued to perform the duties of general manager, the second resignation letter was \u201cfraudulent\u201d and constituted cause for discharge or, \u201c[a]t the very least,\u201d for the 90-day suspension the Commission imposed. Defendant\u2019s argument is cursory and consists of little more than the conclusory assertion that the described conduct was fraud.\nA fraudulent statement is a statement one knew to be false when one made the statement. Polivka v. Worth Dairy, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 3d 961, 965-66, 328 N.E.2d 350, 354 (1974). Defendants cite no evidence that on August 6, 2002, Wood knew she would not occupy an interim position. Just because she did not know as of yet what the interim position would be, it does not follow that she committed fraud. She could have been relying on the employer to eventually tell her. As she testified, she was ready and willing to perform whatever duties the employer assigned.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nCOOK, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael L. Brody, Ivan Poullaos (argued), and Josh Goldberg, all of Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., of Chicago, and Carol Hansen Posegate, of Posegate & Denes, P.C., of Springfield, for appellants.", "John E. Kerley (argued) and George M. Monaco, both of Kerley & Associates, P.C., of Springfield, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARY ANN ROHRBACK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY et al., Defendants-Appellants (The Department of Employment Security et al., Counter-Cross-Plaintiffs, v. The Civil Service Commission et al., Counter-Cross-Defendants).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140960\nArgued May 25, 2005.\nOpinion filed September 22, 2005.\nMichael L. Brody, Ivan Poullaos (argued), and Josh Goldberg, all of Winston & Strawn, L.L.P., of Chicago, and Carol Hansen Posegate, of Posegate & Denes, P.C., of Springfield, for appellants.\nJohn E. Kerley (argued) and George M. Monaco, both of Kerley & Associates, P.C., of Springfield, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0298-01", "first_page_order": 316, "last_page_order": 328 }