{ "id": 4258640, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CALANDRA HULITT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hulitt", "decision_date": "2005-10-26", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201404\u20140291", "first_page": "634", "last_page": "641", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 634" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "832 N.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5730849 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 981", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "987" }, { "page": "987" }, { "page": "987" }, { "page": "987" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209960 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" }, { "page": "250" }, { "page": "250" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 942", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569514 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 381", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3607933 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 878", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886" }, { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2921644 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 N.E.2d 1182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1190" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3215352 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" }, { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" }, { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5731594 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0400-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 776, "char_count": 17900, "ocr_confidence": 0.792, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.091175684914447e-08, "percentile": 0.3203740835855681 }, "sha256": "4efb6327781e3b9b09b8ac1aa6c17230f1f8f73ce8a9bf0e41ca5650dc3bae4c", "simhash": "1:9b72d4b63947c2d1", "word_count": 2965 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:43:20.596028+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CALANDRA HULITT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a jury found defendant Calandra Hulitt guilty of the first degree murder of her daughter Moneka Powell, the circuit court sentenced her to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment. The court denied defendant\u2019s posttrial motion for a new trial and defendant appeals, arguing that the court erred in barring defendant from presenting expert testimony that defendant suffered from postpartum depression at the time of the offense. We affirm.\nTwo-and-a-half-year-old Moneka died in the early morning of July 7, 1999. Defendant had delivered her third child, Moneka\u2019s brother, six days prior and wanted to get some rest, but Moneka was keeping her awake. In order to keep Moneka quiet and to \u201cteach her a lesson,\u201d defendant tied Moneka\u2019s hands and feet together, stuffed a sock in her mouth and wrapped tape around her mouth and neck. Moneka suffocated to death. Defendant admitted causing Moneka\u2019s death. The State charged defendant with two counts of first degree murder: acting with intent to kill or cause great bodily harm in violation of section 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 (the Code) (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1998)) and acting with the knowledge that her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm in violation of section 9 \u2014 1(a)(2) of the Code (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(2) (West 1998)).\nPrior to trial, defendant disclosed her intention to call Dr. Robert Smith, a psychologist, as a witness during her case in chief. Some three years after Moneka\u2019s death, Dr. Smith interviewed defendant, assorted relatives and Charles Powell (Powell), Moneka\u2019s father and defendant\u2019s former live-in boyfriend, regarding defendant\u2019s mental and physical condition at the time of the offense. Dr. Smith determined that, although defendant was not legally insane at the time of the offense, she did suffer from \u201ca mental disease, Postpartum Depression,\u201d at the time. It was his opinion that, \u201cas a result of her mental illness, she lacked the ability to cope with the stress of parenting three children and she was unable to appreciate the danger of her actions toward Moneka on the night of the offense.\u201d\nOn the basis of Dr. Smith\u2019s opinion, the State moved to bar defendant from presenting a defense of diminished capacity and/or postpartum depression since neither is a recognized defense in the State of Illinois. Defendant responded that she did not intend to raise an insanity defense or ask for a guilty but mentally ill instruction but, rather, intended to raise a reasonable doubt defense. She asserted that Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony related to defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the offense and was intended to show that defendant acted recklessly, in violation of the involuntary manslaughter statute (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(a) (West 1998)), rather than intentionally or knowingly in violation of the first degree murder statute.\nAfter hearing argument, the court determined that defendant was impermissibly trying to resurrect, through Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony, a section of the insanity defense statute struck by the legislature. At the time of defendant\u2019s offense, the insanity statute provided that \u201c[a] person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 2(a) (West 1998). Prior to August 20, 1995, the statute provided a defense where, as a result of mental disease or defect, a person lacked \u201csubstantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 2(a) (West 1994). The court found that Dr. Smith\u2019s opinion made it sound as if defendant was unable to appreciate the criminality of her conduct even though she was not insane and held that defendant should not have the right to bring before the jury \u201csomething that\u2019s not an affirmative defense as if it\u2019s an affirmative defense.\u201d\nThe court also found that defendant\u2019s postpartum depression was not relevant to the issue of intent. Given defendant\u2019s circumstances at the time of the offense, the court determined that \u201canyone with any sense\u201d could understand that she would be depressed and psychological evidence was not necessary to show that she was depressed. The court further noted that Dr. Smith had not opined that defendant\u2019s postpartum depression negated her ability to form the intent to kill. The court granted the State\u2019s motion to bar a diminished capacity and/or postpartum depression defense and did not allow Dr. Smith to testify.\nAt trial, the State presented the testimony of numerous witnesses regarding the circumstances of Moneka\u2019s death and the investigation thereof, as well as defendant\u2019s signed statement admitting that she caused Moneka\u2019s death and describing the circumstances leading thereto. Defendant presented no evidence. Following closing argument, the court instructed the jury regarding the first degree murder charges. Over the State\u2019s objection, the court also gave the jury an instruction regarding involuntary manslaughter, finding some evidence presented that defendant\u2019s conduct was reckless. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The court denied defendant\u2019s motion for a new trial. At sentencing, the State asked for the death penalty but the court sentenced defendant to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nDefendant now appeals her conviction, arguing solely that the court committed reversible error when it granted the State\u2019s motion in limine to exclude Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony regarding defendant\u2019s mental state and the effect of her postpartum depression on her mental state. We review the court\u2019s grant of the motion in limine and its decision to bar Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony under the abuse of discretion standard. Kimble v. Earle M. Jorgenson Co., 358 Ill. App. 3d 400, 408, 830 N.E.2d 814, 822 (2005). Accordingly, we will not reverse the court\u2019s ruling unless it is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or no reasonable person could take the same view as the court or the court applied an impermissible legal standard. Kimble, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 408, 830 N.E.2d at 822.\nDefendant asserts that, contrary to the court\u2019s finding, Dr. Smith\u2019s opinion was not an effort to revive the former insanity definition or an attempt to claim diminished capacity, which she acknowledges is not a recognized defense in Illinois. Rather, defendant urges that she sought to present Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony in order to support her theory of the case that, \u201cwhile she did perform the acts which caused her daughter Moneka\u2019s death, she lacked the mental state required for a murder conviction, and in fact had acted with the less culpable mental state of recklessness.\u201d In other words, defendant argues that her theory of the case is a defense based on the statutory elements of the offense rather than an affirmative defense based on insanity or diminished capacity. However, as the court found, an impermissible affirmative defense is exactly what Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony would raise.\n\u201c \u2018The question of [a] defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the crime [is] a question of fact to be determined by the jury.\u2019 \u201d People v. Raines, 354 Ill. App. 3d 209, 220, 820 N.E.2d 592, 601 (2004), quoting People v. Pertz, 242 Ill. App. 3d 864, 903, 610 N.E.2d 1321, 1346 (1993). \u201c \u2018Mental states, such as the intent to kill or to cause great bodily harm, are not commonly established by direct evidence and may be inferred from the character of the defendant\u2019s conduct and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.\u2019 \u201d Raines, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 220, 820 N.E.2d at 601, quoting People v. Adams, 308 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1006, 721 N.E.2d 1182, 1190 (1999).\nThe admissibility of psychiatric evidence regarding a defendant\u2019s intent or lack thereof, the ultimate issue in a murder prosecution, depends on whether the expert is to testify \u201c \u2018to facts requiring scientific knowledge not within the common knowledge of the jury.\u2019 \u201d People v. Denson, 250 Ill. App. 3d 269, 281, 619 N.E.2d 878, 886 (1993), quoting People v. Ambro, 153 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8, 505 N.E.2d 381, 385 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Chevalier, 131 Ill. 2d 66, 544 N.E.2d 942 (1989). Unless a subject is difficult to comprehend and understand, expert opinions may not be admitted on matters of common knowledge. Denson, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 281, 619 N.E.2d at 886, quoting Ambro, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 8, 505 N.E.2d at 385. Here, defendant\u2019s circumstances at the time of the murder were such that a jury would be more than capable of determining, based on their common knowledge, that defendant was depressed and/or overwhelmed at the time and whether she acted recklessly, rather than knowingly or intentionally, as a result.\nThe evidence showed that more than a year prior to Moneka\u2019s death, defendant suggested that the then DA-year-old child be sent to foster care because she had a bad attitude. At the time of Moneka\u2019s death, defendant lived in a small, dirty, unfurnished apartment, with the unemployed Powell, their three children, including the six-day-old newborn, Powell\u2019s mother and brother. The entire family slept on blankets on the floor, relied on takeout meals because there was no gas with which to cook, received only defendant\u2019s public assistance and Powell\u2019s mother\u2019s wages from working at Burger King as income and was soon to be evicted. Defendant was in pain from the recent delivery, was taking pain medication and was often alone with the children while the other adults went to work or to look for a job or an apartment. It does not require an expert to explain that defendant may have been depressed and had trouble coping with three children. It does not require an expert to explain that defendant was, to paraphrase defense counsel\u2019s closing argument, \u201cdesperate in tragic circumstances\u201d and unable to take care of one child, let alone three. The court did not err in barring Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony on that basis.\nFurther, \u201crecklessness is not a state of mind which requires expert testimony.\u201d Pertz, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 902, 610 N.E.2d at 1346. Rather, it is a determination well within a jury\u2019s common knowledge and thus it is for a jury, not an expert psychologist, to determine whether defendant appreciated the risk involved when she tied Moneka up, put a sock in her mouth and taped her mouth shut. Pertz, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 902-03, 610 N.E.2d at 1346. Moreover, notwithstanding defendant\u2019s argument to the contrary, Dr. Smith would not be able to testify as to defendant\u2019s state of mind at the time of the offense because he was not with her nor did he observe her when she performed her actions. Pertz, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 902, 610 N.E.2d at 1346. Instead, he would only be able to testify to an opinion formed some three years after the offense rather than from personal observation at or near the time of the offense.\nDefendant\u2019s assertion is that Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony bore directly on whether defendant\u2019s actions were intentional and/or knowing or were simply the reckless misconduct of a sick woman. The basic difference between involuntary manslaughter and first degree murder is the mental state that accompanies the conduct resulting in the victim\u2019s death, involuntary manslaughter requiring a less culpable mental state than first degree murder. People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 249, 700 N.E.2d 981, 987 (1998). Under sections 9 \u2014 1(a)(1) and 9 \u2014 1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code, a defendant commits first degree murder when she intentionally kills an individual without lawful justification or does so knowing that her acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998). In contrast, a defendant commits involuntary manslaughter when she performs acts that are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another and performs these acts recklessly. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(a) (West 1998); DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 250, 700 N.E.2d at 987.\n\u201cA person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, described by the statute defining the offense; and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 6 (West 1998). In general, therefore, a defendant acts recklessly when she is aware that her conduct might result in death or great bodily harm, although that result is not substantially certain to occur, and consciously disregards that risk. People v. Moore, 358 Ill. App. 3d 683, 688, 832 N.E.2d 431, 436 (2005); DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 250, 700 N.E.2d at 987. Dr. Smith\u2019s opinion does not state that defendant did any such thing, that she consciously disregarded the risk to Moneka when she tied her up, stuffed a sock in her mouth and taped her mouth shut. Instead, his opinion appears to state the exact opposite.\nDr. Smith opined that defendant, as a result of mental illness, \u201cwas unable to appreciate the danger of her actions toward Moneka on the night of the offense.\u201d In effect, it was his opinion that defendant was unable to form a conscious awareness of the danger of her actions. Where there is no conscious awareness of a danger, there can be no \u201cconscious disregard\u201d of that danger, of the strong probability that death or great bodily harm will result to Moneka if the actions are taken. In other words, where there is no such awareness, there can be no reckless conduct.\nMoreover, where there is no such awareness, there can be no intentional exploitation of that danger in order that death or great bodily harm result nor knowledge that the actions are practically certain to result in death or great bodily harm. Reckless conduct may generally involve a lesser degree of risk than conduct that creates a strong probability of death or great bodily harm (DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 250, 700 N.E.2d at 987), but the three states of mind, intentional, knowing and reckless, have in common a conscious awareness that a risk, and a concomitant result, exists, either an intended (720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 4 (West 1998)) or \u201cpractically certain\u201d (720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 5(b) (West 1998)) result, as in first degree murder, or \u201ca substantial and unjustifiable risk *** that a result will follow\u201d (720 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 6 (West 1998)), as in involuntary manslaughter. If there is no conscious awareness of a risk and attendant result, there can be no culpable state of mind for either first degree murder or involuntary manslaughter.\nDr. Smith\u2019s testimony would, indeed, bear directly on the ultimate question of defendant\u2019s mental state, whether defendant had any conscious awareness of the risks attendant to her actions. However, by eliminating the possibility that defendant was consciously aware of what could happen when she bound and gagged Moneka, Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony would impermissibly eliminate any possibility of the jurors determining for themselves whether defendant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly killed Moneka.\nDr. Smith\u2019s opinion, in fact, sounds more like a statement of diminished capacity than of recklessness. The doctrine of diminished capacity, also known as the doctrine of diminished or partial responsibility, allows a defendant to offer evidence of her mental condition in relation to her capacity to form the mens rea or intent required for commission of the charged offense. 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law \u00a7 38 (1998). Similar to the insanity defense in that it calls into question the mental abnormality of a defendant, it differs in that it may be raised by a defendant who is legally sane. 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law \u00a7 38 (1998). Diminished capacity is considered a partial defense because it is not presented as an excuse or justification for a crime but, rather, as an attempt to prove that the defendant, because she was incapable of forming the requisite intent of the crime charged, is innocent of that crime but likely guilty of a lesser included offense. 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law \u00a7 38 (1998); 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide \u00a7 109 (1999). To show diminished capacity, there must be evidence that, at the time of the murder, the defendant did not appreciate the nature of her conduct or was incapable of conforming her conduct as a result of mental disease or defect. 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law \u00a7 38 (1998). As the trial court found, this is what Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony would show and sounds very much like the former insanity defense done away with by our legislature in 1995. Diminished capacity can mitigate murder to manslaughter (40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide \u00a7 109, n.2 (1999)) but it is a defense often deemed limited to specific intent crimes (40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide \u00a7 109 (1999)) and is not recognized in Illinois. The court was entirely correct when it stated that Dr. Smith\u2019s opinion appeared to raise the specter of a defense which does not exist under Illinois law. Defendant could not raise it as an affirmative defense and, therefore, should not be permitted to raise it in the guise of a reasonable doubt argument. The court did not abuse its discretion in barring Dr. Smith\u2019s testimony.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN, P.J., and ERICKSON, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Robert Hirschhorn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter D. Fischer, and Andrew Vrabel, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CALANDRA HULITT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201404\u20140291\nOpinion filed October 26, 2005.\nRehearing denied December 2, 2005.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Robert Hirschhorn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter D. Fischer, and Andrew Vrabel, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0634-01", "first_page_order": 652, "last_page_order": 659 }