{ "id": 4260124, "name": "GOODRICH CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J. ANTHONY CLARK, Director, the Department of Insurance, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Goodrich Corp. v. Clark", "decision_date": "2005-10-31", "docket_number": "Nos. 4\u201405\u20140040, 4\u201405\u20140148 cons.", "first_page": "1033", "last_page": "1046", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 1033" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "484 F.2d 820", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3592114, 238373 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us-app-dc/157/0340-01", "/f2d/484/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 N.E.2d 1330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1338" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 1013", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5783896 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/1013-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2542134 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 N.E.2d 1344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1352" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. App. 3d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498786 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/218/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1114" }, { "page": "1114" }, { "page": "1114" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3539754 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/151/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 60", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3497359 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395-96" }, { "page": "396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" }, { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544890 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407-08" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780263 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "605 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603065 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 N.E.2d 1299", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1310" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 1007", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887238 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/1007-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2607376 ], "year": 1869, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/50/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 F.2d 969", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1207102 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/644/0969-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "297" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564516 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261-62" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "260-61" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "844 F.2d 126", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10542587 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129-30" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/844/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 1053", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5573906 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1058" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/1053-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1077, "char_count": 30096, "ocr_confidence": 0.792, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.822123157029673e-08, "percentile": 0.4974593113343674 }, "sha256": "096d643fec268463f6778d432678e06983e61fbdeff04fbc5d3892cdcca46eb0", "simhash": "1:3d2f5d3c124e7874", "word_count": 4922 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:43:20.596028+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GOODRICH CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J. ANTHONY CLARK, Director, the Department of Insurance, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn March 2004, plaintiff, Goodrich Corporation (Goodrich), filed a cause of action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 through 11 (West 2002)) against defendant, J. Anthony Clark, Director of the Illinois Department of Insurance, demanding documents concerning Kemper Insurance Company (Kemper). After the initiation of the cause of action, the Illinois Department of Insurance became the Division of Insurance under the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (Division), and Deirdre K. Manna replaced J. Anthony Clark as acting Director. The Division appeals the circuit court\u2019s two respective December 2004 orders (1) denying the Division\u2019s motion to vacate the trial court\u2019s order to index Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request and (2) granting Goodrich\u2019s partial summary judgment motion requiring the Division to turn over to Goodrich the records requested in Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request as well as the \u201cnonexamination\u201d documents the Division identified in the first 26 pages of an index it created in response to Goodrich\u2019s FOIA request. The Division argues the court erred in ordering the Division to index documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request and in granting Goodrich\u2019s partial summary judgment motion ordering the Division to release documents requested in Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request and other \u201cnonexamination\u201d documents because disclosure of the records is prohibited by law. Goodrich argues (1) this court does not have jurisdiction to review the circuit court\u2019s order refusing to vacate the trial court\u2019s indexing order and whether the indexing order was proper and (2) the trial court did not err in granting Goodrich\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment. We dismiss appeal No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140040. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand appeal No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140148.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn December 2003, Goodrich served the Division with an FOIA request, seeking copies of records in 20 specified categories. Later that month, the Division responded to the request, stating it was unable to locate any records in response to seven of Goodrich\u2019s requests but would make some of the documents requested in eight of Goodrich\u2019s requests available for inspection. However, the Division informed Goodrich that the remaining records responsive to the eight requests and all documents responsive to five other Goodrich requests were exempt from public disclosure. Goodrich filed an administrative appeal of the Division\u2019s nondisclosure determinations. In February 2004, the Director of the Division affirmed the Division\u2019s decision.\nIn March 2004, Goodrich filed suit under the FOIA, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Division. In July 2004, the Division agreed to provide Goodrich with a document-by-document index of the documents the Division had found exempt from disclosure for all but Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request.\nAt a July hearing before the trial court, the Division argued it had no obligation to index or even disclose the existence of documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request. The Division contended it was statutorily prohibited by section 35A \u2014 50 of the Insurance Code (Code) (215 ILCS 5/35A \u2014 50 (West 2002)) from either confirming or denying the existence of corrective orders or risk-based capital plans that might be responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request. The court disagreed and ordered the Division to prepare and provide to Goodrich an index of all the documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth request by August 2, 2004.\nOn August 2, 2004, the Division supplied Goodrich with an index of the documents Goodrich asked for in its FOIA request, including a list of some documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request that the Division determined did not fall within the purview of section 35A\u2014 50(a) of the Code (215 ILCS 5/35A \u2014 50(a) West 2002)). However, with regard to any other documents the Division possibly possessed responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request, the Division filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the trial court\u2019s indexing order.\nOn August 26, 2004, Goodrich filed a motion for partial summary judgment and for an expedited in camera review, requesting the trial court order the Division (1) to disclose all documents listed on pages 1 through 26 of its FOIA index, which the Division labeled as \u201cnonexamination\u201d documents, and all nonindexed documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request and (2) submit a cross section of 50 of what the Division labeled as \u201cexamination\u201d documents listed on pages 27 through 115 of the Division\u2019s FOIA index for in camera review. Goodrich also filed a memorandum in opposition to the Division\u2019s motion to reconsider and vacate and in support of its motion for partial summary judgment and expedited in camera review.\nOn December 13, 2004, the trial court entered an order denying the Division\u2019s motion to reconsider and vacate the court\u2019s order requiring the Division to index documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request. Judge Graves signed and dated this order on December 8, 2004. In addition, on December 13, 2004, the court entered another order granting Goodrich\u2019s (1) motion for partial summary judgment ordering the Division to turn over to Goodrich all documents listed on the first 26 pages of its FOIA index and any documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request and (2) motion for expedited in camera review of 50 documents listed in pages 27 through 115 of the Division\u2019s FOIA index.\nOn January 12, 2005, the Division filed a notice of interlocutory appeal, No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140040, under Supreme Court Rule 307(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)), from the trial court\u2019s two orders filed on December 13, 2004. On February 1, 2005, Goodrich filed a motion to dismiss the Division\u2019s interlocutory appeal in this court. In the motion, Goodrich argued the appeal is time-barred, jurisdictionally barred, and frivolous. On February 7, 2005, the Division filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of interlocutory appeal if this court determines the trial court\u2019s order requiring the Division to index any documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request was entered on December 8, 2004, instead of December 13, 2004, which was the date the order was file stamped. On February 16, 2005, the Division filed an objection to Goodrich\u2019s motion to dismiss the Division\u2019s interlocutory appeal. That same day, Goodrich filed a memorandum in opposition to the Division\u2019s motion for leave to file late notice of interlocutory appeal, arguing not only that the appeal was untimely but also jurisdictionally barred. This court has taken both of these motions with the case. Goodrich is no longer pursuing the untimeliness argument pursuant to its appellee\u2019s brief. As a result, we need not address the Division\u2019s motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal because that issue has been abandoned by Goodrich.\nOn or about February 7, 2005, the Division filed a motion for entiy of a Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding in the trial court with regard to the court\u2019s December 13, 2004, order granting Goodrich\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment and expedited in camera review. On February 15, 2005, the court entered a Rule 304(a) finding with regard to its December 13, 2004, order granting Goodrich\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment and expedited in camera review.\nOn February 16, 2005, the Division filed its second notice of appeal, No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140148, seeking to challenge the partial summary judgment order pursuant to Rule 304(a). On February 18, 2005, the Division filed motions with this court to (1) extend the briefing schedule in its first appeal and (2) consolidate the two appeals. This court granted both of those motions as well as the Division\u2019s motion for a stay pending appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Jurisdiction Over Appeal No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140040\nIn its motion to dismiss the Division\u2019s interlocutory appeal, Goodrich argues this court does not have jurisdiction over the trial court\u2019s decision not to vacate its indexing order and that this appeal is frivolous. The Division filed its appeal regarding the trial court\u2019s refusal to vacate its indexing order pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1). Rule 307(a)(1) states:\n\u201cAn appeal may be taken to the Appellate Court from an interlocutory order of the court:\n(1) granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction!.]\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1).\nWhen determining jurisdiction under Rule 307, a motion to vacate an injunction is treated as the equivalent of a motion to dissolve an injunction. Doe v. Department of Professional Regulation, 341 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1058, 793 N.E.2d 119, 123 (2003).\nHowever, according to Goodrich, the trial court\u2019s indexing order was not \u201cinjunctive\u201d within the meaning of Rule 307. Goodrich argues that an order requiring an FOIA defendant to produce an index provided for under section 11(e) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/11(e) (West 2002)) is purely \u201cministerial\u201d and \u201cadministrative.\u201d Goodrich claims the indexing order was a \u201cprocedural ruling, much like an order compelling the production of a privilege log, or any other routine discovery order; it does not adjudicate any rights, or alter or affect the legal relationship between the parties.\u201d\nGoodrich cites Hinton v. Department of Justice, 844 F.2d 126, 129-30 (3d Cir. 1988), for the proposition that an FOIA index is only \u201ca simple means to an end\u201d and that it does not accord a requestor any of the substantive relief he seeks, nor does it protect the substance of the matter, in the usual injunctive sense of preserving the status quo. Instead, the index is a tool for determining the requestor\u2019s substantive rights. Hinton, 844 F.2d at 130. Goodrich argues if an order to produce an FOIA index is enough to qualify as an injunction, then any administrative or discovery order would qualify for an immediate interlocutory appeal. Discovery orders ordinarily are not subject to interlocutory appeal because they only regulate the procedural aspects of the case before the court. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 261-62, 537 N.E.2d 292, 298 (1989).\nThe Division argues the trial court\u2019s indexing order regarding Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request went beyond the procedural aspects of this case. Citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 644 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1981), the Division contends the court\u2019s order requiring the Division to prepare an index will have irreparable consequences and can only be effectively challenged by immediate appeal. According to the Division, turning the index over to Goodrich would effectively give information to Goodrich that it seeks through its FOIA request.\nTo determine if an order is injunctive for purposes of Rule 307, we look to the substance, not the form, of the order. A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 260, 537 N.E.2d at 297. Courts broadly construe the meaning of the word \u201cinjunction\u201d for Rule 307(a)(1) purposes. A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 260-61, 537 N.E.2d at 298. Our supreme court has described an injunction as a:\n\u201c \u2018judicial process, by which a party is required to do a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing, according to the exigency of the writ, the most common sort of which operate as a restraint upon the party in the exercise of his real or supposed rights.\u2019 \u201d A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 261, 537 N.E.2d at 298, quoting Wangelin v. Goe, 50 Ill. 459, 463 (1869).\nHowever, our supreme court has also stated that orders properly characterized as \u201cministerial\u201d or \u201cadministrative\u201d cannot be the subject of an interlocutory appeal because they only concern the procedural details of the case before the court. A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 262, 537 N.E.2d at 298.\nWe find we do not have jurisdiction over the trial court\u2019s indexing order under Rule 307(a). The court\u2019s indexing order only concerned the procedural aspects of this case. To appeal the court\u2019s indexing order, the Division could have waited until a final judgment had been entered, obtained a Rule 304(a) finding concerning the indexing order from the court, or been found in contempt of court. The Division did not do any of these things. Therefore, we grant Goodrich\u2019s motion to dismiss appeal No. 4 \u2014 05\u2014-0040.\nHowever, even if we had jurisdiction, we would not have found the trial court erred in ordering the Division to prepare an index of any documents it possessed with regard to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request. Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request asked for the following:\n\u201cAll [r]ecords that constitute, refer to, or relate to the commutation or termination of reinsurance agreements between Kemper and affiliates of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., as announced in the June 23, 2003[,] press release of Kemper.\u201d\nThe Division did index nine records responsive to this request. However, the Division argued section 35A \u2014 50 of the Code precludes the Division from confirming or denying the existence of risk-based capital reports (RBC Reports), risk-based capital plans (RBC Plans), or corrective orders that would be responsive to this request if they existed. The dispute over the indexing order in this case is whether the Division has to confirm or deny the existence of the above-mentioned categories of RBC-related records by indexing the records, if it has any.\nSection 35A \u2014 50(a) of the Code states as follows:\n\u201cAll RBC Reports, to the extent the information therein is not required to be set forth in a publicly available annual statement schedule, and RBC Plans, including the results or report of any examination or analysis of an insurer performed under this [a]rticle and any [clorrective [o]rder issued by the Director pursuant to the examination or analysis, with respect to any domestic insurer or foreign insurer that are filed with the Director constitute information that might be damaging to the insurer if made available to its competitors and shall be kept confidential by the Director. This information shall not be made public or be subject to subpoena, other than by the Director and then only for the purpose of enforcement actions taken by the Director under this Code or other provisions of the insurance laws of this [s]tate.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/35A \u2014 50(a) (West 2002).\nThe Division misinterprets the language of section 35A \u2014 50 of the Code in arguing that section 35A \u2014 50 contains an exception to the indexing requirements established in section 11(e) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/11(e) (West 2002)). Courts have rejected the idea that an agency can determine for itself what to withhold pursuant to the FOIA. See Cooper v. Department of the Lottery, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1024, 640 N.E.2d 1299, 1310 (1994). Section 11(e) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/11(e) (West 2002)) states:\n\u201cOn motion of the plaintiff, prior to or after in camera inspection, the court shall order the public body to provide an index of the records to which access has been denied. The index shall include the following:\n(i) A description of the nature or contents of each document withheld, or each deletion from a released document, provided, however, that the public body shall not be required to disclose the information which it asserts is exempt; and\n(ii) A statement of the exemption or exemptions claimed for each such deletion or withheld document.\u201d\nThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intention and meaning of the legislature. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 540-41, 605 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1992). The language of the statute is the best indicator of that intent, and aids for construing a statute will only be resorted to if the language of the statute is not clear. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1994).\nBased on the plain language of section 35A \u2014 50, we find the statute does not make the mere existence of RBC Reports, RBC Plans, and corrective orders confidential. Section 35A \u2014 50(a) only makes the information contained in RBC Reports confidential \u201cto the extent the information therein is not required to be set forth in a publicly available annual statement schedule.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/35A \u2014 50(a) (West 2002). Likewise, the section only makes information in RBC Plans confidential \u201cincluding the results or report of any examination or analysis of an insurer performed under this [ajrticle and any [corrective [ojrder issued by the Director pursuant to the examination or analysis.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/35A \u2014 50(a) (West 2002). Contrary to the Division\u2019s assertion, section 35A \u2014 50 applies equally to RBC Reports and RBC Plans. The Division has admitted the existence of RBC Reports is not confidential because the Code requires \u201cevery domestic insurer\u201d to prepare and file an RBC Report each year (see 215 ILCS 5/35A \u2014 10(a) (West 2002)). We find section 35A \u2014 50 also did not intend to make the mere existence of RBC Plans or corrective orders confidential.\nThe documents themselves are also not per se exempt under Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request. Our supreme court has stated:\n\u201cWhen a public body receives a proper request for information, it must comply with that request unless one of the narrow statutory exemptions applies. [Citation.] *** If the public body seeks to invoke one of the exemptions in section 7 as grounds for refusing disclosure, it is required to give written notice specifying the particular exemption claimed to authorize the denial. [Citations.] If the requesting party subsequently challenges the denial in circuit court [citation], the public body has the burden of proving that the records in question fall within the exemption it has claimed. [Citation.]\nMost of the exemptions set forth in section 7 of the Act [citation] are specific, identifying the particular public records that are not subject to disclosure. Where the public body claims that a requested document falls within one of these specifically enumerated categories and is able to prove that claim, no further inquiry by the court is necessary. The documents \u2018shall be exempt from inspection and copying.\u2019 [Citation.] This per se rule applies to the specific exemptions set forth in the subsections of section 7(l)(b) of the Act [citation], which pertains to \u2018[information that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,\u2019 just as it does to the other exemptions in section 7.\u201d Lieber v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 176 Ill. 2d 401, 407-08, 680 N.E.2d 374, 377 (1997).\nThe Division relies on Roulette v. Department of Central Management Services, 141 Ill. App. 3d 394, 490 N.E.2d 60 (1986), and Smith v. Cook County Probation Department, 151 Ill. App. 3d 136, 502 N.E.2d 1157 (1986), to support its argument that the documents are per se exempt pursuant to section 35A \u2014 50 of the Code, which is incorporated by section 7(l)(a) of the FOIA (5 ILCS 140/7(l)(a) (West 2002)). However, the situation in the case at bar is distinguishable from the situations in Roulette and Smith.\nIn Roulette, the plaintiff demanded pursuant to the FOIA that the defendant produce two records, an interviewing psychologist\u2019s handwritten notes from the psychologist\u2019s interview with plaintiff and the psychologist\u2019s evaluation of the plaintiffs Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), that were part of his application for state employment. Roulette, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 395-96, 490 N.E.2d at 61. The trial court ordered the defendant and the psychologist to release this material to the plaintiff. Roulette, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 490 N.E.2d at 61. The appellate court reversed, finding the documents requested were not subject to disclosure because \u201c \u2018test questions, scoring keys[,] and other examination data used to administer an academic examination or determine the qualifications of an applicant for a license or employment\u2019 \u201d are exempt pursuant to section 7(j) of the FOIA. Roulette, 141 Ill. 2d at 396, 490 N.E.2d at 61, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 116, par. 207(j) (now 5 ILCS 140/7(j) (West 2002)). In essence, the Roulette court found the records per se exempt because the records requested fell within the scope of the exemption.\nIn Smith, the issue on appeal was \u201cwhether the trial court erred in granting [the] defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss on the ground that probation records held by the Cook County probation department *** are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.\u201d Smith, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 137, 502 N.E.2d at 1157. The appellate court affirmed, finding that section 7 of the FOIA:\n\u201cspecifically exempts from inspection and copying \u2018[information specifically prohibited from disclosure by [fjederal or [s\u00edtate law or rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto.\u2019 With respect to the facts of this case, section 12 of \u2018An Act providing for a system of probation ***\u2019 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Probation Act) [citation], is the [s]tate law which specifically prohibits disclosure of probation records except for \u2018inspection by any judge or by any probation officer pursuant to order of court\u2019 or by further \u2018order of court\u2019 and expressly states that probation records are not public records.\u201d Smith, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 138, 502 N.E.2d at 1158.\nThe Smith court found the records per se exempt because the records were not only within the scope of a statutory exemption but mirrored a statutory exemption.\nIn the case at bar, Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request neither mirrors nor falls within the scope of the exemptions listed in section 35A \u2014 50 of the Code. Because Goodrich\u2019s tenth request does not fall within the scope of the exemptions listed in section 35A \u2014 50 of the Code, the Division must identify and prove the records it possesses responsive to this request are exempt from disclosure. The Division must identify these records, including any RBC-related records, and fulfill its burden of proving the records are exempt. See Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408, 680 N.E.2d at 377.\nB. Appeal No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140148\nThe Division filed its second appeal, No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140148, seeking to challenge the trial court\u2019s partial summary judgment order pursuant to Rule 304(a). In its partial summary judgment order, the court ordered the Division to (1) turn over all of the \u201cnonexamination\u201d records listed on the first 26 pages of the Division\u2019s 115-page index, (2) turn over to Goodrich all documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request, and (3) submit to the court a specified sampling of the \u201cexamination\u201d records listed on pages 27 through 115 of the Division\u2019s index. The Division argues the court erred in granting summary judgment with regard to the \u201cnonexamination documents\u201d and the documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request. The Division does not appeal the court\u2019s order to submit a specified sampling of the \u201cexamination\u201d documents. As a result, we do not consider the merits of that particular order.\nRegarding the turnover orders at issue, the trial court stated that it agreed with Goodrich that (1) the Division had not borne its \u201cburden of providing a proper and sufficiently detailed factual showing\u201d to justify its nondisclosures and (2) \u201cthe Division\u2019s interpretation and application of the statutory [ejxemptions on which it has relied is demonstrably invalid and misreads the statutory provisions in question.\u201d\nAppellate courts review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Illinois Education Ass\u2019n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 459, 791 N.E.2d 522, 524 (2003). Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 278, 292, 757 N.E.2d 481, 491 (2001). Summary judgment is only proper when the moving party\u2019s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1992). The trial court must construe the record before it strictly against the party moving for judgment. Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 536, 548 N.E.2d 1110, 1114 (1989). \u201cSummary judgment is a drastic remedy and, as such, must be granted only when the movant\u2019s right to judgment as a matter of law is clear and free from doubt.\u201d Baudin, 192 Ill. App. 3d at 536, 548 N.E.2d at 1114. However, \u201c[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must come forward with evidentiary material that establishes a genuine issue of fact.\u201d Weil, Freiburg & Thomas, P.C. v. Sara Lee Corp., 218 Ill. App. 3d 383, 394, 577 N.E.2d 1344, 1352 (1991). The nonmoving party cannot simply deny the moving party\u2019s factual allegations. Purdy Co. of Illinois v. Transportation Insurance Co., 209 Ill. App. 3d 519, 529, 568 N.E.2d 318, 324 (1991).\nWe address the trial court\u2019s turnover orders regarding the \u201cnonexamination\u201d documents listed on pages 1 through 26 of the Division\u2019s index and the records responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request in turn.\n1. \u201cNonexamination\u201d Records\nThe Division failed to come forward with any evidentiary material to establish a question of fact. While the Division tries to rely on its FOIA index, we cannot take the index into consideration because it is not admissible evidence. See Harris Bank Hinsdale, N.A. v. Caliendo, 235 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1025, 601 N.E.2d 1330, 1338 (1992). Not only are most of the index entries insufficient to describe what is being withheld, the Division did not swear to the accuracy of the index. As a result, the index amounts to inadmissible evidence.\nThe only evidence the Division presented in opposition to Goodrich\u2019s motion for summary judgment were the affidavits of Jack Mess-more, the Division\u2019s Chief Deputy Director, and Susan Anders, the Division\u2019s FOIA officer and paralegal. Messmore\u2019s affidavit does not discuss the index or any of the documents the Division withheld. It only addresses why the Division should not have to index documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request. Anders\u2019s affidavit also does not aid the Division\u2019s argument, as it only discusses the length of time and manpower it took the Division to create the index.\nBecause the Division failed to come forward with any admissible evidence creating a question of fact, the trial court did not err in granting Goodrich\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment concerning the \u201cnonexamination\u201d documents listed on pages 1 through 26 of the Division\u2019s index.\n2. Goodrich\u2019s Tenth FOIA Request\nThe trial court filed its order denying the Division\u2019s motion to vacate the indexing order on the same day it filed an order granting Goodrich\u2019s motion for partial summary judgment, ordering the Division to turn over all responsive documents not listed on the Division\u2019s FOIA index to Goodrich. This would include the documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth request. By filing the order requiring the turnover of the documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth request on the same day it denied the Division\u2019s motion to vacate the court\u2019s earlier order to index, the court did not give the Division an opportunity to begin the process of bearing its burden of providing a proper and sufficient factual showing to justify its nondisclosures of any records it possessed responsive to this request by indexing those documents. As a result, we vacate this portion of the court\u2019s partial summary judgment order.\nOn remand, the Division must create an index of the documents requested in Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request pursuant to the court\u2019s indexing order unless the Division appeals the order through one of the methods of appeal described above. As a result, we take this opportunity to remind the Division what is required in an FOIA index.\nOur supreme court has stated that an agency must provide a detailed justification for its refusal to turn over the requested document or documents. Illinois Education Ass\u2019n v. Illinois State Board of Education, 204 Ill. 2d 456, 464, 791 N.E.2d 522, 527 (2003). The index must address requested documents specifically and in a manner that allows for adequate adversary testing. Baudin v. City of Crystal Lake, 192 Ill. App. 3d 530, 537, 548 N.E.2d 1110, 1114 (1989). The index should include the following: (1) the title of the document or the category of documents, (2) the date the document was created or at least an estimate thereof, (3) the name of the author and recipient, (4) a detailed factual description, and (5) the claimed statutory exemption. See generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 1 J. O\u2019Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure \u00a7 8:16, at 257 (3d ed. 2000). If the requesting party finds the index inadequate, it can move for the agency to provide a more detailed index. The court can also sua sponte order the agency to provide a more detailed index.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we dismiss appeal No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140040 for lack of appellate jurisdiction. As for appeal No. 4 \u2014 05\u20140148, we affirm the trial court\u2019s summary judgment order requiring the Division to turn over the \u201cnonexamination\u201d documents to Goodrich, vacate the court\u2019s summary judgment order requiring the Division to turn over any documents responsive to Goodrich\u2019s tenth FOIA request, and remand.\nNo. 4 \u2014 05\u20140040, Dismissed.\nNo. 4 \u2014 05\u20140148, Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.\nTURNER and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Deborah L. Ahlstrand (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Stephen R. Kaufmann, of Burroughs, Hepler, Broom, MacDonald, Hebrank & True, of Edwardsville, and William F. Greaney, Allan B. Moore (argued), and Kelly M. Jaske, all of Covington & Burling, of Washington, D.C., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GOODRICH CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J. ANTHONY CLARK, Director, the Department of Insurance, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNos. 4\u201405\u20140040, 4\u201405\u20140148 cons.\nArgued June 22, 2005.\nOpinion filed October 31, 2005.\nRehearing denied December 1, 2005.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Deborah L. Ahlstrand (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nStephen R. Kaufmann, of Burroughs, Hepler, Broom, MacDonald, Hebrank & True, of Edwardsville, and William F. Greaney, Allan B. Moore (argued), and Kelly M. Jaske, all of Covington & Burling, of Washington, D.C., for appellee." }, "file_name": "1033-01", "first_page_order": 1051, "last_page_order": 1064 }