{ "id": 4259696, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES A. HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Henderson", "decision_date": "2005-11-09", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201404\u20140896", "first_page": "1055", "last_page": "1058", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 1055" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490", "parenthetical": "the trial court's decision whether to admit evidence is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060428 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204", "parenthetical": "the trial court's decision whether to admit evidence is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "831 N.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060088 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060246 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3874667 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "noting that \"parole\" is now called \"mandatory supervised release\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "1977 Ill. Laws 3264", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 526, "char_count": 9026, "ocr_confidence": 0.797, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14253649537096563 }, "sha256": "f0228f5f609369f9d3c5cbc380ea9eb3b6d535130353479f342ac0c83365de2d", "simhash": "1:c3517eaef3a59ce2", "word_count": 1490 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:43:20.596028+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES A. HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing an August 2004 stipulated bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Charles A. Henderson, guilty of failure to register as a sex offender (730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2002)). The court later sentenced him to 30 months\u2019 probation, subject to various conditions.\nDefendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by excluding evidence that he was not given 10 days to register following his release from confinement, as required by statute. We agree and reverse.\nI. BACKGROUND\nInitially, we note that although both parties refer to defendant as having been released on \u201cparole,\u201d he had in fact been released on mandatory supervised release. As part of Public Act 80 \u2014 1099 (Pub. Act 80 \u2014 1099, eff. February 1, 1978 (1977 Ill. Laws 3264)), which included sweeping changes to the Unified Code of Corrections, the concept of parole was eliminated and mandatory supervised release (MSR) was created. See 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20141 (West 2002) (setting forth the guidelines regarding the establishment and appointment of the Prisoner Review Board); see also 730 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 3\u20143(c) (West 2002) (providing that individuals sentenced after the effective date shall be released under MSR after serving their determinate sentence minus their accrued credit for good behavior); People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 188 (2005) (noting that \u201cparole\u201d is now called \u201cmandatory supervised release\u201d). Nonetheless, because both defendant and the State use the term \u201cparole\u201d in their appellate briefs, we will use that term as well.\nThe following facts are gleaned from the record and not disputed. On May 13, 2003, defendant, who previously had been convicted of (attempt) predatory criminal sexual assault and multiple counts of child pornography, was released on MSR from the Taylorville Correctional Facility. An Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC) employee met with defendant that day and notified him in writing of his obligation to register as a sex offender within 10 days of his release. DOC also issued defendant written instructions to proceed directly to his Bloomington residence and immediately check in by telephone with the \u201cparole control center.\u201d DOC also directed defendant that after making contact, he was to remain in his residence until his parole agent made an initial visit. The DOC reporting instructions concluded as follows: \u201cIf you do not comply with this reporting requirement, you will be considered to be in violation of your release agreement and a warrant may be issued for your arrest.\u201d\nAs instructed, defendant remained in his residence until 6 p.m. on May 15, 2003, when his parole officer visited him. Following this visit, defendant was free to leave his residence. On May 24, 2003, Blooming-ton police officer Brian Brown arrested defendant for failing to register as a sex offender within 10 days of his \u201cdischarge, parole[,] or release\u201d from DOC, in violation of section 3(a) of the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2002)).\nIn June 2003, defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing, in part, that he had not been given 10 days following his release from confinement in which to comply with the statute. In August 2003, following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion.\nIn August 2004, the State moved in limine to exclude evidence of the DOC order requiring defendant to remain in his residence until visited by his parole officer. The State argued that (1) the Act does not provide for an extension of the 10-day time period in which to register based on the reporting instructions given defendant by DOC, and (2) defendant thus had to register within 10 days of walking out of the Taylorville facility on May 13, 2003. Following a hearing that same day, the court granted the State\u2019s motion, upon determining that nothing in the statute provided for an extension of the time period for registration based on a DOC order. Defendant then waived his right to a jury, and the case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. The court found defendant guilty of failure to register as a sex offender and later sentenced him as stated.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. THE TRIAL COURT\u2019S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OF THE DOC ORDER\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the DOC order instructing him to remain in his residence until visited by his parole officer or risk being arrested. Specifically, he contends that under the Act, he was \u201cconfined\u201d until his parole officer\u2019s visit ended. Thus, because the statutory clock began to run when he was free to leave his residence following his parole officer\u2019s visit on the evening of May 15, 2003, his May 24, 2003, arrest was premature. We agree.\nThe Act requires an individual who has been convicted of a crime defining him as a sex offender or sexual predator to register with the chief of police in the municipality in which he resides. 730 ILCS 150/ 3(a) (West 2002). Section 3(c)(4) of the Act discusses the inability of an individual to register as a result of being in state custody, as follows: \u201cAny person unable to comply with the registration requirements of this [ajrticle because he or she is confined, institutionalized, or imprisoned *** shall register in person within 10 days of discharge, parole[,] or release.\u201d 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(4) (West 2002).\nOur primary objective when construing the language of a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, presuming that it did not intend to produce absurd or unjust results. In re Madison H., 215 Ill. 2d 364, 372, 830 N.E.2d 498, 503-04 (2005). If we can ascertain intent from the plain meaning of the statute itself, that intent must prevail. People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 442-43, 831 N.E.2d 604, 614 (2005).\nThe central question is whether defendant was \u201cconfined\u201d in his residence until he was \u201creleased\u201d following the visit by his parole officer. \u201cConfine\u201d is defined in the dictionary as \u201cto hold within a location.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 241 (10th ed. 2000). \u201cConfinement\u201d is defined as \u201cthe state of being imprisoned or restrained.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 294 (7th ed. 1999). \u201cRelease\u201d is defined as \u201cthe fact of being freed from restraint or confinement.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1292 (7th ed. 1999).\nGiving those words their plain and ordinary meaning, we conclude that defendant was \u201cconfined\u201d in his residence under threat of arrest from the time he arrived there on May 13, 2003, until his \u201crelease\u201d on May 15, 2003, following the visit from his parole officer. Thus, during that two-day period, defendant was \u201cunable to comply with the registration requirements\u201d of section 3(c)(4) of the Act (730 ILCS 150/ 3(c)(4) (West 2002)). In other words, the clock did not begin to run for the purpose of the Act until the evening of May 15, 2003, when defendant was first free to leave his residence. His arrest nine days later was thus premature. Accordingly, because the DOC order instructing defendant to remain in his residence until visited by his parole officer or risk being arrested was clearly relevant to the charge against him, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding that evidence. See People v. Cookson, 215 Ill. 2d 194, 204, 830 N.E.2d 484, 490 (2005) (the trial court\u2019s decision whether to admit evidence is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard). Had the DOC order been admitted, the State could not have met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the offense of failing to register as a sex offender. Thus, we reverse defendant\u2019s conviction.\nIn so concluding, we note that the legislature intended for individuals subject to the Act to have 10 days of freedom in which to fulfill their obligation to register. Our interpretation not only comports with common sense, but also avoids the potentially absurd result of a defendant\u2019s home confinement lasting more than 10 days and thus effectively denying him any opportunity to register under the Act.\nAs a final matter, we note that as a matter of policy, the interests of law enforcement were not served in this case, where defendant was subjected to conflicting orders. When DOC instructs a released inmate to remain in his residence until cleared to leave by his parole officer, the released inmate should be able to obey that order to the letter without fear that some other government agents will jail him for doing so.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nReversed.\nTURNER and APPLETON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Kathy Shepard, Norbert J. Goetten, and Robert J. Biderman, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES A. HENDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140896\nOpinion filed November 9, 2005.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Gary R. Peterson, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Kathy Shepard, Norbert J. Goetten, and Robert J. Biderman, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1055-01", "first_page_order": 1073, "last_page_order": 1076 }