{ "id": 4259845, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHANIE M. THORNLEY, Petitioner-Appellee, and JASON P. THORNLEY, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Thornley", "decision_date": "2005-11-09", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201405\u20140178", "first_page": "1067", "last_page": "1075", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 1067" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 551", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524718 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 659", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" }, { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. App. 3d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3537097 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" }, { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/145/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "824 N.E.2d 177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188-89" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450779 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" }, { "page": "156" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 N.E.2d 1135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 371", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2866440 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "690-91" }, { "page": "691" }, { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 1146", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1153" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182713 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "813 N.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451597 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "690 N.E.2d 1023", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1029" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 768", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35432 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0768-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 829, "char_count": 19446, "ocr_confidence": 0.792, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5828155114230504e-08, "percentile": 0.2873540117589867 }, "sha256": "de3703b46b872fd02b6d2d73df68072da0ec19a308fa52fd479447a9726cc6ed", "simhash": "1:2978b53e7f47ce45", "word_count": 3184 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:43:20.596028+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHANIE M. THORNLEY, Petitioner-Appellee, and JASON P. THORNLEY, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn November 24, 2003, Stephanie Thornley filed a petition for dissolution of her marriage to Jason Thornley. A Sangamon County trial court found that the factors it considered in dividing the marital estate favored an unequal distribution to Stephanie and awarded a greater share of the marital property to her. The court also ordered Jason to pay Stephanie $18,000 maintenance in gross. Jason appeals, arguing that the court improperly distributed marital property and debt and lacked the authority to award Stephanie maintenance. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nStephanie and Jason Thornley married on June 30, 2001. They had no children as a result of the marriage. The couple separated in August 2003, and Stephanie filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on November 24, 2003. In the petition, she requested an order awarding her an equitable share of the marital property and \u201cdenying maintenance to the [petitioner and [respondent. \u201d The trial court held a hearing on October 13, 2004, at which the following was elicited.\nStephanie testified that during the marriage she was employed full time. She earned approximately $900 every two weeks. Jason was not employed, but attended Palmer College of Chiropractic. He periodically received money for living expenses. Stephanie believed that the amount averaged $2,500 on each occasion, but Jason testified that he received approximately $5,000 for living expenses per trimester, which he had to repay as part of his student loans. The couple had been married for seven trimesters before they separated, so Jason estimated that he had received about $35,000 for living expenses while they were together. However, Jason later stated that Palmer College charged him $120,000 for his 10 trimesters at the school, and he received $140,000 in student loans, including the money for living expenses.\nThe couple deposited Stephanie\u2019s paycheck and Jason\u2019s living expenses funds into a joint checking account. Jason acknowledged that the majority of the deposits into the account were from Stephanie\u2019s employment. They paid some of Jason\u2019s school expenses from the account, including $350 for Jason\u2019s board exam and $2,190 and $5,835 payments to Palmer College. On November 25, 2003, Stephanie withdrew $4,191.82 from the account, leaving a balance of $3,086.09.\nStephanie and Jason also had a Morgan Stanley brokerage account that they funded with money from their checking account. Stephanie testified that in June 2004 she withdrew the entire balance, $7,166.38, but had not cashed the check she received.\nStephanie stated that she had a City American Airlines MasterCard in her name and that Jason was a cardholder. She submitted statements reflecting various charges Jason made at the Palmer College bookstore. He did not reimburse her for those amounts.\nJason had opened a Verizon credit card prior to the marriage. Stephanie was not a signatory. Jason admitted that Stephanie had paid the balance on the card before the two married. He estimated that the amount had been $2,000, but Stephanie believed that it was about $3,000. After they married, the couple occasionally used the Verizon card, such as for some expenses from their trip to Fiji and Australia. Stephanie estimated that they charged $2,000 on the Verizon card together. Jason stated that the current balance on the Verizon card was $8,578.\nJason testified that he had opened an MBNA credit card after he and Stephanie separated. The balance at the time of the hearing was $5,284.\nStephanie testified that during their marriage she and Jason paid two loans that Jason had obtained prior to their marriage, estimating a $2,000 payment to Illinois State University and a $1,000 payment to Monmouth College. However, Jason testified that the couple had only paid a Monmouth College loan for $500. He stated that he had sent a check for $1,660 to Illinois State University, but the University sent the check back without cashing it because the loan had been consolidated into his other loans.\nStephanie and Jason had two cars, a 2001 Malibu and a 2002 Yukon. Stephanie testified that her parents had given her the Malibu as a gift prior to her marriage to Jason. The car had been titled to \u201cStephanie M. Seitz and Jason R Thornley\u201d because they had been engaged to be married at the time. Jason had that car in his possession at the time of the hearing. Stephanie\u2019s parents had given her the Yukon while she was married to Jason. Both Stephanie\u2019s and Jason\u2019s names were on the title. Stephanie had that car at the time of the hearing.\nJason offered into evidence Kelly Blue Book estimates of each car\u2019s value. The trade-in value for the Malibu was $2,670, private party value was $4,710, and retail value was $8,090. However, it had some damage from an accident that Jason and Stephanie had agreed not to repair. The trade-in value for the Yukon was $14,805, private party value was $18,285, and retail value was $23,360.\nDuring the marriage, Stephanie and Jason opened a Sears credit card to purchase a washer and dryer for about $800. They had paid off the account. Jason had possession of the washer and dryer at the time of the hearing, but stated that he did not object to them going to Stephanie.\nJason\u2019s affidavit of income and expenses estimated his expenses as $345 per month. He testified that he lived with his girlfriend, who contributed to his living expenses. Jason\u2019s school loans were in forbearance for a year, but he believed that he will eventually have to pay about $596 per month.\nJason stated that he had finished his education and was employed as a teacher by Metropolitan Community College. He was teaching because he was waiting for the results of his board exam and license. His gross income was $2,143.76 per month. Jason stated that a new chiropractor can earn between $10,000 and $50,000 a month. He planned to work for an individual after he received his license but had made no agreements with anyone.\nOn January 31, 2005, the trial court entered a memorandum of opinion stating in part, \u201cIn dividing the marital estate, the court must consider the contribution each party made to the accumulation of the assets and liabilities of the marriage; the ability of each party to accumulate assets in the future; and the relative economic circumstances of the parties. Each factor favors an unequal distribution to Ms. Thornley.\u201d The court awarded the proceeds from the brokerage account, the washer and dryer, and the Yukon to Stephanie. It awarded Jason the Malibu. Each party received the other personal property in his or her possession and bank accounts in his or her name. Each had the responsibility to pay the financial obligations in his or her name.\nCiting section 504(a)(10) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/504(a)(10) (West 2004)), the trial court then considered Stephanie\u2019s contributions to Jason\u2019s education, training, career or career potential, and license. It awarded Stephanie $18,000 maintenance in gross, to be paid in 24 monthly installments of $750, beginning January 1, 2005.\nOn February 16, 2005, the trial court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage consistent with and incorporating its memorandum of opinion. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Distribution of Marital Property Jason first argues that the trial court improperly distributed marital property and debt. He contends that the court\u2019s decision to award Stephanie property worth more than $30,000, while it awarded him property worth only $5,000, was arbitrary and without reason. He also challenges the court\u2019s division of debt. Jason must pay the MBNA credit card balance of $5,284 for purchases he made after he separated from Stephanie, the Verizon credit card balance of $8,579, and his student loans from chiropractic college, totaling over $140,000. Stephanie must pay the American Airlines MasterCard balance, but neither party presented evidence regarding the amount owed.\nSection 503(d) of the Dissolution Act requires a trial court to divide marital property \u201cin just proportions considering all relevant factors.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2004). \u201cThe touchstone of proper and just apportionment is whether it is equitable in nature,\u201d which does not require mathematical equality. In re Marriage of Dunlap, 294 Ill. App. 3d 768, 778, 690 N.E.2d 1023, 1029 (1998). We will not disturb a trial court\u2019s division of marital assets unless it has clearly abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Crook, 211 Ill. 2d 437, 453, 813 N.E.2d 198, 206 (2004).\nFactors relevant in determining the just apportionment of marital property include the contributions of each party, the duration of the marriage, the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse, and the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of assets and income. 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(l), (d)(4), (d)(5), (d)(ll) (West 2004). Though Stephanie and Jason\u2019s marriage was relatively short, the trial court found that other factors favored an unequal distribution to Stephanie. It noted that, during the marriage, Jason relied on Stephanie for support while he attended school, stating that \u201c[tjhere was very little, if any, money from the loan proceeds over and above the cost of tuition and other school expenses. *** In addition, Ms. Thornley directly paid some of the chiropractic college expenses Mr. Thornley incurred.\u201d The court also found that when Jason receives his license, \u201che anticipates that his income will increase to $10,000 to $50,000 per month.\u201d The court\u2019s apportionment of marital property and debt admittedly favors Stephanie, but it did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the court\u2019s judgment distributing marital property and debt.\nB. Maintenance\nJason next argues that the trial court improperly awarded Stephanie maintenance. He contends that the court exceeded its authority because Stephanie\u2019s petition specifically requested an order \u201cdenying maintenance to the [petitioner and the [respondent. \u201d Stephanie claims that Jason forfeited this issue by not objecting at the hearing or filing a motion to reconsider. However, the evidence presented at the October hearing was pertinent to the division of marital assets as well as maintenance; Jason could not be expected to object to such testimony. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(b)(3)(ii) (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(b)(3)(h)) permits our review of substantive matters in nonjury cases even if the appellant has not filed a postjudgment motion. See In re Marriage of Steadman, 283 Ill. App. 3d 703, 712, 670 N.E.2d 1146, 1153 (1996).\nIn In re Marriage of Hochleutner, 260 Ill. App. 3d 684, 685, 633 N.E.2d 164, 165 (1994), the petitioner asked that the trial court bar the respondent from maintenance, distribute the parties\u2019 property, and for \u201c \u2018such other and further or different relief the [cjourt may deem just.\u2019 \u201d The respondent appeared at an evidentiary hearing but did not file a response. Hochleutner, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 687, 633 N.E.2d at 166. When the court awarded the respondent maintenance, the petitioner appealed. He argued that, because the respondent never requested maintenance, the issue was never raised, and he was never placed on notice so as to challenge such an award; therefore, the court exceeded its authority in granting it. Hochleutner, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 689, 633 N.E.2d at 167. He conceded, however, that \u201ca judgment of the court can be upheld if the relief was generally prayed for and was supported by the evidence.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Hochleutner, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 689, 633 N.E.2d at 168.\nThe appellate court found that the trial court did not exceed its authority because the petitioner raised the issue of maintenance in his prayer for relief by asking that the court bar the respondent from receiving it. Hochleutner, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 690, 633 N.E.2d at 168. It further found that \u201cin addition to raising the issue of maintenance generally, petitioner also prayed for \u2018such other and further or different relief the [c]ourt may deem just.\u2019 *** No more specific pleading was required under the circumstances.\u201d Hochleutner, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 690-91, 633 N.E.2d at 169. The court noted that where a marriage dissolution statute authorizes maintenance under just or equitable terms, \u201call that is required to sustain the award is that the recipient be entitled to it and the award be equitable.\u201d Hochleutner, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 691, 633 N.E.2d at 169.\nIn In re Marriage of Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d 390, 792 N.E.2d 452 (2003), the trial court originally ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent rehabilitative maintenance, which was reviewable on a specific date \u201c \u2018without the necessity of either party filing further pleadings.\u2019 \u201d Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 393, 792 N.E.2d at 454. Following the review, the court awarded the respondent permanent maintenance. Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 393-94, 792 N.E.2d at 455. On appeal, that petitioner argued \u201cthe trial court lacked the authority to modify the maintenance award to one of permanent maintenance sua sponte,\u201d citing In re Marriage of Cantrell, 314 Ill. App. 3d 623, 732 N.E.2d 797 (2000). Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 394-95, 792 N.E.2d at 456. The Second District held in Cantrell that the trial court had erred by awarding the recipient permanent maintenance where she had only requested a continuation of rehabilitative maintenance, in part, because the court had exceeded the relief requested in her pleadings. Cantrell, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 628, 732 N.E.2d at 801-02.\nIn Culp, this court found:\n\u201c[T]he Cantrell court did not hold a trial court may never exceed the relief requested by parties in their pleadings; the court merely held the record in the case before it lacked circumstances to justify an award of permanent maintenance absent a request in the pleadings for such relief.\u201d Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 395, 792 N.E.2d at 456, citing Cantrell, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 628, 732 N.E.2d at 801-02.\nThis court also noted that \u201ca trial court may exceed the relief requested by a party as an exercise of its discretion in determining the appropriate duration of a maintenance award.\u201d Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 397, 792 N.E.2d at 458.\nLike the petitioner in Hochleutner, Stephanie raised the issue of maintenance. She alleged in her petition that \u201cthere is no agreement or understanding as to the maintenance of either party\u201d and prayed for an order denying maintenance and \u201csuch other and further relief as the [cjourt deems equitable and just.\u201d Pursuant to Culp and In re Marriage of Cheger, 213 Ill. App. 3d 371, 571 N.E.2d 1135 (1991), the trial court in this case had the authority to exceed the relief Stephanie requested and, like the courts in those cases, exercised its discretion in doing so. Therefore, the only remaining issue is whether the award is supported by the evidence. Hochleutner, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 689, 633 N.E.2d at 168.\nThe supreme court recently refused to allow a spouse to retract her waiver of maintenance simply because the circuit court did not accept her valuation of her ex-husband\u2019s dental practice. In re Marriage of Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d 152, 172, 824 N.E.2d 177, 188-89 (2005). In Schneider, however, there was a clear waiver of maintenance, along with a stipulation as to gross and net income from the dental practice. Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d at 156, 824 N.E.2d at 179. The ex-wife did not dispute that she had waived maintenance, arguing instead that the court abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte declare her waiver of maintenance unconscionable when it excluded goodwill and/or accounts receivable from the valuation of the dental practice. Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d at 172, 824 N.E.2d at 188.\nIn the present case, however, no formal waiver of maintenance occurred, only a suggestion to the trial court in the pleadings that it was best to resolve the matter by a distribution of property rather than an award of maintenance. The suggestion did not deprive the court of its discretion to award maintenance. The parties were aware that an award of maintenance was possible. Even if the pleadings were not technically correct, a pleading may be amended at any time, before or after judgment, to conform the pleadings to the proofs. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 616(c) (West 2004).\nSection 504 of the Dissolution Act sets out a number of factors a trial court may consider in determining whether a maintenance award is appropriate. 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2004). The section lists as relevant the income and property of each party, including marital property apportioned to the party seeking maintenance, the present and future earning capacity of each party, the duration of the marriage, and the contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education, training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse. 750 ILCS 5/504(a)(l), (a)(3), (a)(7), (a)(10) (West 2004). Though professional licenses and scholastic degrees do not constitute a property interest subject to division as a marital asset, \u201cthe contributing spouse must receive some form of compensation for the financial effort and support provided to the student spouse in the expectation that the marital unit will prosper in the future.\u201d In re Marriage of Rubinstein, 145 Ill. App. 3d 31, 39, 495 N.E.2d 659, 664 (1986). \u201cThere are three principal methods of affording compensation: (1) distribution of marital assets; (2) some form of maintenance or alimony; or (3) an equitable monetary award based on some equitable principle.\u201d Rubinstein, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 39, 495 N.E.2d at 664. An award of maintenance in gross may be proper where one spouse has supported the other as he obtained his license or degree. See In re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, 245, 470 N.E.2d 551, 559-60 (1984). \u201cIn any event, the propriety of a maintenance award is within the discretion of the trial court and the court\u2019s decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d Schneider, 214 Ill. 2d at 173, 824 N.E.2d at 189.\nAt the hearing, the trial court heard evidence regarding Jason\u2019s present and future earning capacity, the duration of the marriage, and the contributions Stephanie made toward Jason\u2019s education during that time. In its memorandum of opinion, the court wrote:\n\u201cThe entire focus of this marriage was getting Mr. Thornley through chiropractic school. While much of the expense was borrowed, and this court has directed Mr. Thornley to pay those student loans, and while the court has disproportionately distributed the majority of the assets to Ms. Thornley, the allocation of property falls short of that which is needed to equitably divide the marital estate and recognize Mr. Thornley\u2019s career potential when he becomes Dr. Thornley.\u201d\nAccordingly, the court awarded Stephanie $18,000 as maintenance in gross. Because the court properly considered relevant factors and ordered maintenance consistent with the principles set forth in Rubinstein, the court did not abuse its discretion.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nAPPLETON and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Matthew J. Maurer, of Springfield, for appellant.", "James Alexander Pappas, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF STEPHANIE M. THORNLEY, Petitioner-Appellee, and JASON P. THORNLEY, Respondent-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201405\u20140178\nOpinion filed November 9, 2005.\nMatthew J. Maurer, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJames Alexander Pappas, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1067-01", "first_page_order": 1085, "last_page_order": 1093 }