{ "id": 4260345, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ODELL FORT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Fort", "decision_date": "2005-11-15", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201404\u20141937", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "11", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "354 F.3d 675", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9296486 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/354/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "824 N.E.2d 287", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 845", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436528 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" }, { "page": "854" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0845-01" ] }, { "cite": "816 N.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 537", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5458219 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0537-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 1110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3365123 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 1152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 1002", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5456185 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007-08" }, { "page": "1004-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/1002-01" ] }, { "cite": "818 N.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3364329 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "819 N.E.2d 1133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3217714 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 564", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3216148 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0564-01" ] }, { "cite": "828 N.E.2d 1206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 256", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4136423 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260629 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 979", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "an argument relying on matters outside the record may not be considered on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 385540 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204", "parenthetical": "an argument relying on matters outside the record may not be considered on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/178/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609692 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "imposing a suspension of a driver's license as a penalty for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance and not other crimes that could be furthered by driving was an arbitrary decision of the legislature." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2561314 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624", "parenthetical": "imposing a suspension of a driver's license as a penalty for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance and not other crimes that could be furthered by driving was an arbitrary decision of the legislature." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 829", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563871 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179-80" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "181" }, { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963706 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "827 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451214 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-99" }, { "page": "399" }, { "page": "399" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134711 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "795 N.E.2d 990", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 842", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473525 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3142311 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 N.E.2d 427", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3277987 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 929", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5602819 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192926 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "811 N.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "The $5-per-day credit \"may be applied against either the statutory assessment or the street value fine, but not both\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436650 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "The $5-per-day credit \"may be applied against either the statutory assessment or the street value fine, but not both\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "610 N.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Defendant's \"$5-per-day credit for pretrial incarceration which is allowed by section 110 - 14 should have been used to offset his $500 assessment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5119256 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466", "parenthetical": "Defendant's \"$5-per-day credit for pretrial incarceration which is allowed by section 110 - 14 should have been used to offset his $500 assessment\"" }, { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 N.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "The $5-a-day credit for each day incarcerated on a bailable offense when defendant did not supply bail is applicable to a street value fine \"and to a statutory drug offense assessment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 949", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2987272 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951", "parenthetical": "The $5-a-day credit for each day incarcerated on a bailable offense when defendant did not supply bail is applicable to a street value fine \"and to a statutory drug offense assessment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0949-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 215", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "The mandatory drug assessment \"is in the nature of a fine and is properly offset by the presentence credit created by section 110 - 14 of the Code\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 522010 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620", "parenthetical": "The mandatory drug assessment \"is in the nature of a fine and is properly offset by the presentence credit created by section 110 - 14 of the Code\"" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "$5-per-day credit may be applied against either the $2,000 statutory assessment or the street value fine, but not both" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5368773 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287", "parenthetical": "$5-per-day credit may be applied against either the $2,000 statutory assessment or the street value fine, but not both" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 699", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a defendant is entitled to a $5-a-day credit for each day incarcerated on a bailable offense when he does not supply bail, \"and this credit is applicable to a statutory drug offense assessment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927692 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41", "parenthetical": "a defendant is entitled to a $5-a-day credit for each day incarcerated on a bailable offense when he does not supply bail, \"and this credit is applicable to a statutory drug offense assessment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "678 N.E.2d 1009", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544909 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477019 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4258994 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588617 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059981 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" }, { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 N.E.2d 935", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295830 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25407 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" }, { "page": "283" }, { "page": "284", "parenthetical": "\"Pursuant to section 110 - 14, the defendant should be awarded a credit of $1,360 against his drug assessment fines, his street-value fines, the trauma center fine and the crime stoppers fine\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "800 N.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778382 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 1152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1162-63", "parenthetical": "Hall, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 1002", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5456185 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013-14", "parenthetical": "Hall, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/1002-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1187, "char_count": 24253, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5741264128017418e-07, "percentile": 0.6792114134839522 }, "sha256": "df7aa5e138a2a93af5937daa19a620ba0b8501f39f43c0e83ba81aff4a555bbf", "simhash": "1:aa0e0cd69ff556e4", "word_count": 3980 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:25.526171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ODELL FORT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe trial judge convicted defendant, Odell Fort, of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced him to 30 months\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant does not challenge the conviction or the sentence. He does raise issues concerning other orders that flowed from the conviction.\nDefendant contends: (1) it was error to impose a $500 assessment without first determining whether he had the ability to pay it; (2) he was entitled to a credit against the assessment based on the days he spent in custody before sentencing; (3) the statute mandating a $5 fee for deposit in the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund is unconstitutional; and (4) the compulsory extraction of his blood and perpetual storage of his DNA violate his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.\nWe agree defendant is entitled to the credit against the assessment and we agree the imposition of the $5 fee violates his right to due process of law. We reject his other contentions.\nFACTS\nSince defendant does not challenge his conviction, there is no need to go into facts that led to it. Suffice it to say a police officer saw him throw six baggies into a garbage can and the baggies were found to contain crack cocaine.\nAt the sentencing hearing, after reviewing the presentence investigation report and hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court sentenced defendant to 30 months\u2019 imprisonment. The court noted defendant spent 37 days in custody before the conviction, but did not credit those days against the assessment.\nA form in the record lists the \u201cfines, fees, assessments, penalties, and reimbursements\u201d imposed by the court on defendant. They total $1,224. The following boxes are marked on the form:\n\u201cCosts and Fees\nFelony Complaint Filed-Clerk*** $190\nFelony Complaint Conviction \u2014 State\u2019s Attorney*** $60\nPreliminary Hearing \u2014 State\u2019s\u2014Attorney*** $20\nState DNA ID System*** $200\nViolent Crime Victim Assistance*** $20\nCriminal/Traffic Conviction Surcharge-Additional Penalty*** $4\nAutomation-Clerk* * * $5\nDocument Storage-Clerk* * * $5\nCourt Services-Sheriff* * * $15\nControlled Substance/ Cannabis/ Hypodermic Needles Offenses\nAssessment Controlled Substance*** $500\nCrime Lab Drug Analysis-Northern*** $100\nTrauma Fund*** $100\nTrauma Fund Spinal Cord*** $5\nTOTAL*** $1224.\u201d\nDECISION\nI. The Drug Assessment\nDefendant was ordered to pay the $500 assessment pursuant to section 411.2(a)(4) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Act) (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a)(4) (West 2002)). He makes two claims concerning the assessment.\nFirst, he contends the assessment really is a fine and should not have been imposed without a finding of his ability to pay it as required by section 5 \u2014 9\u20141(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141(d) (West 2002)). Section 5 \u2014 9\u20141(d) provides:\n\u201cIn determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, *** the court shall consider:\n(1) the financial resources and future ability of the offender to pay the fine[.]\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141(d) (West 2002).\nSecond, he contends section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2002)) entitles him to a $185 credit against the drug assessment because of the 37 days he spent in presentence incarceration. Section 110 \u2014 14 provides:\n\u201cAny person incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom a fine is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each day so incarcerated upon application of the defendant.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2002).\nTo resolve the issues raised by defendant, we first must determine whether the legislature intended the assessment to be a fine, that is, a pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence, or something else, like a fee or court cost, which is a charge taxed by a court, compensatory in nature. People v. Elizalde, 344 Ill. App. 3d 678, 682, 800 N.E.2d 339 (2003); People v. Littlejohn, 338 Ill. App. 3d 281, 283, 788 N.E.2d 339 (2003). If it is a fine, defendant is entitled to the $185 setoff.\nContrary to the State\u2019s contention, the credit issue was not forfeited by defendant\u2019s failure to raise it at sentencing or in a post-sentencing motion. The normal rules of forfeiture do not apply to a sentence credit request. A defendant has the right to raise it for the first time on appeal. People v. Woodward, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 457, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997).\nThat brings us to the tricky thicket of statutory interpretation. First and foremost, we must ascertain and give purpose to the legislature\u2019s intent. People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 324, 830 N.E.2d 556 (2005). We first look to the language of the statute we are attempting to construe. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318, 547 N.E.2d 437 (1989). The best indication of legislative intent is the \u201cplain and ordinary meaning of the language used.\u201d Littlejohn, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 283. We are permitted \u201cto turn to a dictionary when determining the meaning of an otherwise undefined word or phrase.\u201d People v. Skillom, 361 Ill. App. 3d 901, 909 (2005), citing Ward, 215 Ill. 2d at 325.\nThere are times when courts cannot determine the meaning of a statute by examining its plain language or when the statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses, thus creating statutory ambiguity. People v. Purcell, 201 Ill. 2d 542, 549, 778 N.E.2d 695 (2002). Where ambiguity is present, we are allowed to resolve the statute\u2019s ambiguity by considering its legislative history and debates, and by examining the statute\u2019s purposes and underlying policies. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996).\nThe word that commands our attention is \u201cassessment,\u201d as used in section 411.2. Section 411.2(a) provides: \u201cEvery person convicted of a violation of this Act [Illinois Controlled Substances Act] *** shall be assessed for each offense a sum fixed at: *** (4) $500 for a Class 3 or Class 4 felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 570/411.2(a) (West 2002).\nSection 411.2 makes no reference to the sentence credit provisions of section 110 \u2014 14. Nor does it contain any requirement that the trial judge consider a defendant\u2019s ability to pay the assessment. It does contain provisions for defendants to reduce or suspend payment of the assessment by entering community service (subsection (e)) or entering an approved substance abuse intervention or treatment program (subsection (f)). 720 ILCS 570/411.2(e), (f) (West 2002). The assessments collected are used for alcohol and drug treatment and care programs, State and Cook County.\nThe State, pointing to the wording and placement of section 411.2, contends the assessment is something other than a fine, making incarceration credits and inquiries into ability to pay inapplicable.\nSeveral courts from other appellate districts have decided the credit issue. They represent a shutout against the State. No reported decision supports the State\u2019s position. We summarize the relevant decisions:\n(1) Second Appellate District: People v. Rodriguez, 276 Ill. App. 3d 33, 41, 657 N.E.2d 699 (1995) (a defendant is entitled to a $5-a-day credit for each day incarcerated on a bailable offense when he does not supply bail, \u201cand this credit is applicable to a statutory drug offense assessment\u201d); People v. Otero, 263 Ill. App. 3d 282, 287, 635 N.E.2d 1073 (1994) ($5-per-day credit may be applied against either the $2,000 statutory assessment or the street value fine, but not both);\n(2) Third Appellate District: Littlejohn, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 284 (\u201cPursuant to section 110 \u2014 14, the defendant should be awarded a credit of $1,360 against his drug assessment fines, his street-value fines, the trauma center fine and the crime stoppers fine\u201d); People v. Gathing, 334 Ill. App. 3d 617, 620, 778 N.E.2d 215 (2002) (The mandatory drug assessment \u201cis in the nature of a fine and is properly offset by the presentence credit created by section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code\u201d); People v. Reed, 255 Ill. App. 3d 949, 951, 627 N.E.2d 729 (1994) (The $5-a-day credit for each day incarcerated on a bailable offense when defendant did not supply bail is applicable to a street value fine \u201cand to a statutory drug offense assessment\u201d); People v. Brown, 242 Ill. App. 3d 465, 466, 610 N.E.2d 776 (1993) (Defendant\u2019s \u201c$5-per-day credit for pretrial incarceration which is allowed by section 110 \u2014 14 should have been used to offset his $500 assessment\u201d);\n(3) Fifth Appellate District: People v. Haycraft, 349 Ill. App. 3d 416, 430, 811 N.E.2d 747 (2004) (The $5-per-day credit \u201cmay be applied against either the statutory assessment or the street value fine, but not both\u201d).\nThe First and Fourth Appellate Districts have not yet spoken on the sentence credit issue. Defendant relies primarily on Gathing. The State contends Gathing and all the other cases cited above were wrongly decided.\nAdmittedly, the cases do not contain in-depth analysis of legislative intent. Gathing relies on two points. The first is Black\u2019s Law Dictionary definitions of \u201cassessment\u201d \u2014 \u201c \u2018[imposition of something, such as a tax or fine, according to an established rate\u2019 \u201d \u2014 and \u201cfine\u201d\u2014 \u201c \u2018[a] pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the public treasury.\u201d Gathing, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 620, quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 111, 647 (7th ed. 1999). The second point relied on in Gathing is that payment of the assessment is to a special treatment fund \u201c \u2018within the State Treasury.\u2019 \u201d Gathing, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 620, quoting 720 ILCS 570/411.2(h) (West 2000).\nBrown supplies another reason for holding the credit applies: \u201cHad the legislature clearly intended to exclude section 411.2 from such credits, the legislature could have specifically made such an exclusion.\u201d Brown, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 466.\nWe would add that the legislature has demonstrated it knows how to make the $5-per-day credit inapplicable to a special fund. It did so in 1985 when it amended the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Act to provide fines imposed for certain listed offenses are \u201cnot subject to the provisions of section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 510(b)). See People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 449-50, 519 N.E.2d 879 (1988).\nWe decline the State\u2019s invitation to reject the consistent line of appellate decisions that allows the sentence credit against the drug assessment.\nWe are instructed:\n\u201c[O]ne district of the State appellate court is not always bound to follow the decisions of other districts, although there may he compelling reasons to do so when dealing with similar facts or circumstances. [Citation.] Otherwise, such decisions have only persuasive value for the appellate court.\u201d In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 398, 604 N.E.2d 929 (1992).\nWe are persuaded.\nA strong case can be made that section 411.2 is ambiguous on the question of fine versus fee. It is in a section separate from the fines provision for convictions under the Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/411.1 (West 2002)). Section 411.2 does not use the word \u201cfine,\u201d and subsection (b) reads: \u201cThe assessment under this section is in addition to and not in lieu of any fines, restitution costs, forfeitures or other assessments authorized or required by law.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 570/411.2(b) (West 2002). Still, in subsection (f) the statute refers to the assessment as a \u201cpenalty\u201d (\u201cThe court shall not reduce the penalty under this subsection unless :::**\u201d) and concludes: \u201cNothing in this Section shall be deemed to affect or suspend any other fines, restitution costs, forfeitures or assessments imposed under this or any other Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 570/411.2(0 (West 2002).\nAssuming the existence of ambiguity, we believe there are two sound reasons for adopting the results reached by the appellate court decisions.\nFirst, we take note of the Senate debate on July 18, 1991. Referring to the proposed section 411.2, Senator Cullerton asked: \u201cI\u2019m just curious, though, if \u2014 does this reallocate money which is now being sent somewhere, or does it purport to increase the fines for people who are charged with drug offenses?\u201d (Emphasis added.) 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, July 18, 1991, at 186 (statements of Senator Cullerton). Senator Barkhausen, a sponsor of the bill, answered:\n\u201cYes, it\u2019s an increase. It\u2019s a new fine-, although, we had amended the bill a second time through, and I believe the provisions are here again \u2014 I was just looking for them \u2014 to give the court some discretion to require community service work for those who can\u2019t pay fines. But this is new money. It\u2019s not a reallocation of any old money.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, July 18, 1991, at 187 (statements of Senator Barkhausen).\nWhen we construe a statute, \u201cit is instructive to consider relevant statements by legislatures concerning the nature and effect of the proposed law.\u201d Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555, 591 N.E.2d 427 (1992). Nothing in the Senate debates indicates an intent that the drug assessment was to be anything other than a species of fine.\nThe second reason for following the appellate decisions has to do with a well-established rule of legislative construction. Our supreme court has held: \u201c[W]hen the legislature amends a statute, but leaves unchanged portions which have been judicially construed, the unchanged position will retain the construction given prior to the amendment.\u201d People v. Agnew, 105 Ill. 2d 275, 280, 473 N.E.2d 1319 (1985).\nSection 411.2 was amended in 1994, 1995, and 1997. None of the amendments referred to the credit-against-assessment issue. Brown was decided in 1993, Reed in 1994, Otero in 1994, and Rodriguez in 1995. The legislature is presumed to know how courts have interpreted a statute and may amend the statute if it intended a different construction. People ex rel. Department of Labor v. Tri State Tours, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 842, 847, 795 N.E.2d 990 (2003). We assume the legislature saw no need to change the results reached in the appellate decisions.\nWe conclude defendant was entitled to a credit of $185 against the $500 assessment. Although we agree the assessment is a kind of fine, we see no need to remand for an inquiry into defendant\u2019s ability to pay it. The assessment is mandatory. The legislature provided for ways to eliminate or reduce it. Defendants convicted of drug offenses are given the opportunity to improve their lives and the lives of others (subsections (e) and (f)). That is the statutory plan set out in section 411.2 and it tells us why the legislature placed it in its own section, separate from traditional fines.\nII. Spinal Cord Research Fund Fee\nDefendant contends his due process rights were violated by the trial court\u2019s imposition of a $5 fee for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund (Spinal Cord Fund). 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) (West 2002). Defendant contends collecting a $5 Spinal Cord Fund fee from a person convicted of a drug-related offense is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the State\u2019s police power. See People v. Wick, 107 Ill. 2d 62, 63, 481 N.E.2d 676 (1985). He says the statute bears no rational relationship to the public interest intended to be protected.\nAll statutes are presumed to be constitutional. People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 394, 398-99, 827 N.E.2d 416 (2005). The party challenging the statute\u2019s validity bears the burden of clearly demonstrating a constitutional violation. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d at 399. If reasonably possible, a court should construe a statute so as to confirm its constitutionality and validity. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d at 399. Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000). Where the statute under consideration does not affect a fundamental constitutional right, we ask whether the statute \u201c \u2018 \u201cbear[s] a reasonable relationship to the public interest intended to be protected,\u201d \u2019 \u201d and whether \u201c \u2018 \u201cthe means adopted [are] a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective.\u201d \u2019 [Citations.]\u201d People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174, 179-80, 535 N.E.2d 829 (1989).\nDefendant compares the statute in this case to that in Lindner, where the defendant challenged two sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code that provided for mandatory revocation of the offender\u2019s driver\u2019s license on conviction of certain sex offenses. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 176, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95 \u00bd, pars. 6 \u2014 204(a)(1), 6 \u2014 205(b)(2). The court held the penalty of license revocation bore no relationship to the offense, whether the purpose of the statute was the safe operation of motor vehicles or the punishment or deterrence of the defendants. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 181. There was no rational basis for choosing to punish some particular offenses not involving a vehicle with revocation while excluding others. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 185. See also People v. Lawrence, 206 Ill. App. 3d 622, 624, 565 N.E.2d 322 (1990) (imposing a suspension of a driver\u2019s license as a penalty for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance and not other crimes that could be furthered by driving was an arbitrary decision of the legislature.)\nIn response, the State contends the legislature reasonably determined that drug offenders cause traffic accident injuries to members of the community and should be made to contribute to the research and care of those injured. The State relies on Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142, 147-48, 787 N.E.2d 786 (2003), where the court held a tax on tobacco products was reasonably related to the State\u2019s interest in preserving the health of its citizens by providing for long-term medical care. The State contends the $5 fee is reasonably related to the State\u2019s interest in funding spinal cord injury research because drug offenders are likely to drive under the influence of drugs and cause spinal cord injuries. The State attaches statistics to its brief showing the number of spinal cord injuries caused by drunk drivers. We do not consider these statistics as they were not introduced into evidence in the trial court. See People v. Woolley, 178 Ill. 2d 175, 204, 687 N.E.2d 979 (1997) (an argument relying on matters outside the record may not be considered on appeal).\nRecently, another division of this court examined the statute at issue and found it to be unconstitutional. People v. Rodriguez, 362 Ill. App. 3d 44 (2005). The court said:\n\u201cWhile driving under the influence of a controlled substance arguably bears a rational relationship to spinal cord research, we cannot say that the simple possession of a controlled substance, an offense that does not involve or require the use of a motor vehicle, is reasonably related to spinal cord research. Furthermore, the parties have not called to our attention any other statutes that impose a fee earmarked for the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund upon defendants whose crimes did not involve motor vehicles. Accordingly, we find the relationship between possession of a controlled substance and the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund simply too attenuated to survive defendant\u2019s due process challenge.\u201d Rodriguez, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 54.\nGiven the State\u2019s virtually identical argument for constitutionality in this case, we see no reason to depart from the holding in Rodriquez. We find the imposition of the $5 fee violated defendant\u2019s substantive due process rights. We reverse the order that defendant pay a $5 fee to the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund.\nIII. DNA\nDefendant contends the compulsory extraction and perpetual storage of his DNA violate his fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 6. Section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Unified Code of Corrections mandates DNA sampling from any person convicted or found guilty \u201cof any offense classified as a felony under Illinois law.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143(a) (West 2002).\nThis court repeatedly has addressed this issue and rejected defendant\u2019s position. See People v. Redmond, 357 Ill. App. 3d 256, 264, 828 N.E.2d 1206 (2005); People v. Foster, 354 Ill. App. 3d 564, 571, 821 N.E.2d 733, 740 (2004); People v. Butler, 354 Ill. App. 3d 57, 68-69, 819 N.E.2d 1133 (2004); People v. Edwards, 353 Ill. App. 3d 475, 486, 818 N.E.2d 814 (2004); People v. Peppers, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1007-08, 817 N.E.2d 1152 (2004); People v. Ramos, 353 Ill. App. 3d 133, 154, 817 N.E.2d 1110 (2004); People v. Hall, 352 Ill. App. 3d 537, 549-50, 816 N.E.2d 703 (2004); People v. Garvin, 349 Ill. App. 3d 845, 856 (2004), appeal allowed, 212 Ill. 2d 541, 824 N.E.2d 287 (2004). Every state and federal court that has addressed the constitutionality of a similar DNA statute has upheld the statute. Peppers, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1004-05, citing Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004), and Garvin, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 854.\nWe find, consistent with virtually unanimous authority, that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 is constitutional and defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were not violated by the order to extract his DNA.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we amend the Costs and Fees order to reflect a credit of $185 against the $500 \u201cAssessment Controlled Substance,\u201d and we strike from the order the $5 fee for the \u201cTrauma Fund Spinal Cord.\u201d We affirm the trial court\u2019s order that blood be extracted from the defendant for storage of his DNA.\nAffirmed as modified.\nGARCIA, P.J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HALL,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part:\nI concur with the majority\u2019s decision except for its conclusion that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143 (West 2002)), as amended by Eublic Act 92 \u2014 829, effective August 22, 2002, is constitutional. I continue to believe that the compulsory collection and storage of DNA evidence from convicted felons is unconstitutional because it violates the offender\u2019s fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See People v. Peppers, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1013-14, 817 N.E.2d 1152, 1162-63 (2004) (Hall, J., dissenting); People v. Zhani, No. 1 \u2014 03\u20142326 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) (Hall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).\nI believe that requiring DNA samples from convicted felons cannot be justified under either the special needs exception or the balancing test. In regard to the special needs exception, the mandatory collection of DNA evidence from convicted felons cannot be considered a special need since it does not serve any need above and beyond law enforcement purposes.\nUnder the balancing test, the court is charged with balancing the privacy interests of the prisoner in remaining free of bodily invasion against the State\u2019s interest in carrying out the search. However, in light of the State\u2019s predominate law enforcement interests compared to the subject prisoner\u2019s greatly reduced privacy rights, one would be hard-pressed to find a case in which the balance would not be struck in favor of the government. The balancing test favors the government to such an extent that it cannot fairly determine if the compulsory collection of DNA evidence from a prisoner, based solely on the prisoner\u2019s status as a convicted felon, is a permissible exception to the fourth amendment\u2019s requirements of probable cause and individualized suspicion. A balancing test that always favors one side is not actually a test at all. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE HALL," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Ahmed A. Kosoko, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, Sally Dilgart, and Paula Borg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ODELL FORT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201404\u20141937\nOpinion filed November 15, 2005.\nHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Ahmed A. Kosoko, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Annette Collins, Sally Dilgart, and Paula Borg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 19, "last_page_order": 29 }