{ "id": 4260629, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HECTOR RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rodriguez", "decision_date": "2005-11-03", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201404\u20143546", "first_page": "44", "last_page": "55", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 44" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609692 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3074828 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163327 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" }, { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542514 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828618 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563871 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778382 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487123 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" }, { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25407 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3218617 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" }, { "page": "561-62" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725359 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3500099 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 924", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5731714 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0924-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5593970 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 342", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4258897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "stipulation as to weight and nature of recovered items was matter of trial strategy because weight and nature were not contested and defendant's defense was that he was not in actual or constructive possession of the drugs" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600125 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745", "parenthetical": "stipulation as to weight and nature of recovered items was matter of trial strategy because weight and nature were not contested and defendant presented an alibi defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 867", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5458457 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0867-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462898 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963706 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609692 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3163327 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. App. 3d 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3500099 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295", "parenthetical": "\"We are unaware of a decision of a court of review in which the fact that the proceeds from a fine or penalty is earmarked for a particular fund serving a governmental purpose has affected the validity of the fine or penalty\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/144/0290-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1033, "char_count": 28643, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1752189038452253e-07, "percentile": 0.5873688002659615 }, "sha256": "86b2c08836e8e21bbf4f592fd27bed154d9276c59b48820baa7eb2340efe760d", "simhash": "1:f6ee39d07bd77c85", "word_count": 4770 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:25.526171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HECTOR RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Hector Rodriguez was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to three years in prison. On appeal, defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the record does not indicate that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right of confrontation when his attorney stipulated that a proper chain of custody was maintained over the items recovered from defendant and that the items tested positive for the presence of cocaine. Defendant further contends that the court\u2019s order, entered pursuant to section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) (West 2004)), that he pay $5 to the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund (the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund) violates his due process rights because the $5 assessment is not rationally related to the offense of possession of a controlled substance.\nAt trial, Officer Marad Haleem testified that at 10 p.m. on February 14, 2004, a Ford Aerostar minivan driven by defendant drove past his marked car. Officer Haleem observed that the minivan\u2019s taillight was broken and pulled the minivan over into a gas station parking lot. Officer Haleem approached the driver\u2019s side of the minivan and asked defendant to produce his driver\u2019s license and proof of insurance. Defendant could not produce either document. Officer Haleem asked that defendant get out of the minivan and defendant complied. As Officer Haleem and defendant were walking back to Officer Haleem\u2019s squad car, defendant dropped three small bags. Officer Haleem recovered the bags, which he suspected contained crack cocaine, arrested defendant and placed defendant in the back of his squad car. Meanwhile, Officer Haleem\u2019s partner had walked to the minivan in which several passengers were still seated. When backup officers arrived, the remaining passengers were ordered out of the van and to put their hands on the top of Officer Haleem\u2019s squad car. Officer Hal-eem transported the items that defendant had dropped to the police station, where he inventoried them and gave them to the desk sergeant.\nThe parties stipulated that, if called, forensic scientist Pat Junious-Hawkins would testify that the items defendant dropped were kept in a proper chain of custody at all times and that their contents tested positive for the presence of cocaine.\nDefendant\u2019s motion for a directed finding was denied.\nJackie Betancourt testified in defendant\u2019s case in chief that she and five other people were with defendant in the minivan at 10 p.m. on February 14, 2004. They were going to the gas station from defendant\u2019s house to buy cigarettes. Stephanie Ayala was in the front seat while Betancourt was in the back of the minivan. Defendant had pulled into the parking lot of the gas station and was outside of the minivan talking to a friend when a police car pulled up. One officer came up to the van and asked the passengers where they were going and what they were doing. A passenger named David Van \u201ctalked back\u201d to the officer. Thereafter the officer ordered the passengers out of the minivan and instructed them to place their hands on the squad car. Everyone was handcuffed except for Ayala. Betancourt observed Ayala doing something with her hands. The police arrested defendant and David Van and allowed the other passengers to leave.\nAyala testified that she was one of seven passengers in the minivan on the evening of February 14, 2004. The group had driven to the gas station to buy cigarettes and candy. When she got into the minivan, Ayala had in her possession three rocks of crack cocaine. After the group had arrived at the gas station, the police approached the minivan from behind. Ayala could not remember if defendant was already standing outside of the minivan when he was approached by the police. The passengers were ordered to exit the minivan and to put their hands on a squad car and were handcuffed and searched. Before Ayala was searched, she threw her three bags of cocaine, which she was holding in her hands, under the squad car. A man Ayala referred to as David Main and defendant were subsequently arrested, and the remaining passengers were allowed to leave. Ayala testified that she did not see anyone recover the cocaine bags and did not know what became of them.\nThe court remarked that defendant\u2019s witnesses\u2019 testimony was inconsistent and incredible and found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance. After considering arguments in mitigation and aggravation, the court sentenced defendant to three years in prison. Defendant was also ordered to pay various fines and fees, including a $5 assessment which was directed to the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund.\nOn appeal, defendant first contends that his federal and state constitutional confrontation rights were violated because the record is devoid of any indication that his attorney informed him of the legal consequences of entering a stipulation as to the composition of the recovered substance and as to the chain of custody.\nIn People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203, 220-21 (2003), our supreme court held:\n\u201c[Clounsel in a criminal case may waive his client\u2019s sixth amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence as long as the defendant does not object to or dissent from his attorney\u2019s decision, and where the decision to stipulate is a matter of legitimate trial tactics or prudent trial strategy. Where the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant or where the State\u2019s entire case is to be presented by stipulation, we find that a defendant must be personally admonished about the stipulation and must personally agree to the stipulation.\u201d\nIn People v. Phillips, 352 Ill. App. 3d 867, 871 (2004), appeal allowed, 213 Ill. 2d 571 (2005), a panel of the Third District interpreted the Campbell holding to require \u201csome affirmative showing or indication by the defendant in the record that he or she did not object to or dissent from the attorney\u2019s decision to stipulate.\u201d In People v. Scott, 355 Ill. App. 3d 741 (2005), another panel of the Third District found that Phillips had misinterpreted Campbell, and concluded that the record need not affirmatively show that the defendant was informed of and explicitly waived his confrontation rights. Several panels of this district have agreed with Scott. See People v. Orta, 361 Ill. App. 3d 342 (2005); People v. Foerster, 359 Ill. App. 3d 198 (2005); People v. Banks, 358 Ill. App. 3d 924 (2005).\nIn this case, nothing on the record indicates that defendant objected to the stipulation as to the chemical composition and chain of custody of the recovered items. The decision to stipulate to the forensic chemist\u2019s testimony was a matter of trial strategy because the weight and nature of the recovered items were not contested and because the defense at trial was instead that Ayala, rather than defendant, possessed the items. See Scott, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 745 (stipulation as to weight and nature of recovered items was matter of trial strategy because weight and nature were not contested and defendant presented an alibi defense); Orta, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 351 (stipulation as to weight and nature of recovered items was matter of trial strategy because weight and nature were not contested and defendant\u2019s defense was that he was not in actual or constructive possession of the drugs). Furthermore, the stipulation did not indicate that the stipulated evidence was sufficient to convict defendant nor did the State present its entire case through stipulation. Accordingly, we find that the requirements of Campbell have been satisfied and that defendant\u2019s confrontation rights were therefore not violated.\nDefendant next contends that his due process rights were violated when he was ordered to pay $5 to the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund because the fund to which the assessment is directed does not bear a reasonable relationship to the offense of possession of a controlled substance.\nThe State responds that the assessment is punitive, rather than compensatory, in nature and, therefore, should be characterized as a \u201cfine\u201d rather than a \u201cfee.\u201d Citing People v. Wilson, 144 Ill. App. 3d 290 (1986), the State argues that, therefore, no particular relationship between the offense and the fund for which proceeds of the fine are earmarked is required.\nIn Wilson, the defendant, who had been convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, contended that a statute requiring him to pay fines to a driver\u2019s education fund and a violent crime victim\u2019s fund violated his due process rights because the purposes for which the funds were earmarked did not bear a rational relationship to the offense of which she had been convicted. The appellate court noted that the legislature is granted substantial discretion in setting the nature and the extent of penalties for criminal conduct. The court noted:\n\u201cWe are unaware of a decision of a court of review in which the fact that the proceeds from a fine or penalty is earmarked for a particular fund serving a governmental purpose has affected the validity of the fine or penalty. *** No case has been called to our attention in which[,] as here, *** fines or penalties are earmarked for a fund and a particular relationship has been required to exist between the offense for which the fine is imposed and the use to be made of the fund.\u201d Wilson, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 295.\nThe court distinguished the case before it from cases in which fees or taxes were earmarked for a particular purpose, noting that, in those cases, a reasonable relationship was required. Accordingly, the court found that the fines did not violate the dictates of due process.\nThe State further responds that, even if a reasonable relationship between the offense and the fund is required, because the use of controlled substances is likely a primary cause of automobile accidents, which are the primary cause of spinal cord injuries, the $5 assessment to the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund is reasonably related to the offense of possession of a controlled substance.\nDefendant replies that statutory language and nature of the $5 assessment reflect the legislature\u2019s clear intent that it be regarded as a fee. Nonetheless, defendant argues, even if the assessment is deemed a fine, because all legislative enactments are subject to the dictates of due process, it must still bear a reasonable relationship to the offense for which it is imposed.\nBecause we agree with defendant that the legislature intended that the assessment be treated as a fee rather than a fine, we need not address the disputed issue of whether the use of the proceeds of a fine must bear a reasonable relationship to the offense for which the fine is imposed.\nOur determination of the nature of the assessment requires us to interpret the language of section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c). The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give meaning to the legislature\u2019s intent. People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001). The best means of determining legislative intent is to consider the statutory language. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 348. In interpreting a statute, a court must consider the entire statute and interpret each of its relevant parts together. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d at 348.\n\u201cAs a means of determining legislative intent, case law has examined the substance of various assessments to determine whether they are more nearly \u2018fines\u2019 or \u2018fees\u2019 or \u2018costs.\u2019 \u201d People v. Bishop, 354 Ill. App. 3d 549, 562 (2004). A \u201cfine\u201d is a pecuniary punishment imposed upon a defendant as part of his criminal sentence. People v. Littlejohn, 338 Ill. App. 3d 281, 283 (2003). A \u201ccost\u201d is a charge taxed by a court, such as a filing fee, a jury fee, a courthouse fee or a reporter fee. People v. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d 777, 781 (2002). A \u201cfee,\u201d on the other hand, is a charge for labor or services, especially professional services. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 781. A fee is not punitive; rather, it is a collateral consequence of a defendant\u2019s conviction which is compensatory in nature. People v. Elizalde, 344 Ill. App. 3d 678, 682 (2003). In interpreting statutory language, \u201can assessment\u2019s substantive character as being more nearly a \u2018f\u00edne\u2019 or a \u2018fee\u2019 or a \u2018cost\u2019 is relevant only to the extent that it is probative of legislative intent. Also relevant is the legislature\u2019s designation of the assessment as a \u2018fine,\u2019 \u2018fee,\u2019 or \u2018cost.\u2019 \u201d Elizalde, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 682.\nSection 5\u20149\u20141.1 provides:\n\u201c(a) When a person has been adjudged guilty of a drug related offense involving possession or delivery of cannabis or possession or delivery of a controlled substance *** a fine shall be levied by the court at not less than the full street value of the cannabis or controlled substance seized.\n(b) In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section, a fine of $100 shall be levied by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the Circuit Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer *** for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund ***.\n(c) In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section, a fee of $5 shall be assessed by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the Circuit Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer *** for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund. This additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1 (West 2004).\nThis court recently construed a similar statute. In Bishop, the defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of drugs. The defendant was ordered to pay $100 and $5 assessments pursuant to sections 5 \u2014 9\u2014l(c\u20145) and (c \u2014 7) of the Code, which provided, in relevant part:\n\u201c \u2018[(c \u2014 5)] In addition to the fines imposed by subsection (c), any person convicted or receiving an order of supervision for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs shall pay an additional $100 fee to the clerk. This additional fee, less 2Va% that shall be used to defray administrative costs incurred by the clerk, shall be remitted by the clerk to the Treasurer within 60 days after receipt for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund. This additional fee of $100 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. ***\u2019\n\u2018[(c \u2014 7)1 In addition to the fines imposed by subsection (c), any person convicted or receiving an order of supervision for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs shall pay an additional $5 fee to the clerk. This additional fee, less 2\u00bd% shall be used to defray administrative costs incurred by the clerk, shall be remitted by the clerk to the Treasurer within 60 days after receipt for deposit into the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund. This additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing.\u2019 \u201d Bishop, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 561-62, quoting 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u2014l(c\u20145), (c \u2014 7) (West 2002).\nBecause the quoted provisions were not in effect at the time of the defendant\u2019s offense, the defendant contended that the imposition of the assessments pursuant to those provisions was a violation of ex post facto laws. The appellate court noted that the \u201cban against ex post facto laws applies only to laws that are punitive in nature, and it does not apply to costs, which are compensatory in nature.\u201d Bishop, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 561. The court examined the provisions, noting:\n\u201cThe plain language of the statute refers to both as \u2018fees.\u2019 If these \u2018fees\u2019 were meant to be considered \u2018fines,\u2019 then the legislature\u2019s decision to call them \u2018fees\u2019 would have no meaning. As in Elizalde, this language, by its repeated use of the word \u2018fee,\u2019 indicates an intent on the part of the legislature that an assessment made under sections 5 \u2014 9\u2014l(c\u20145) and (c \u2014 7) be treated as a fee and not a fine. [Citation.] Therefore, the fees assessed to defendant under sections 5 \u2014 9\u2014l(c\u20145) and (c \u2014 7) are compensatory, not punitive in nature, and are not subject to ex post facto violations.\u201d Bishop, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 562.\nIn this case, we recognize that the legislature has inexplicably labeled the $100 assessment to the Trauma Center Fund in section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(b) a \u201cfine\u201d and labeled the $5 assessment to the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund a \u201cfee\u201d in the contested subsection while labeling both assessments \u201cfees\u201d in sections 5 \u2014 9\u2014l(c\u20145) and (c \u2014 7). However, we assume that the legislature\u2019s labeling of the assessments was deliberate and observe that the plain language of subsection (c) of section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1 labels the $5 assessment a fee. Furthermore, we are unconvinced by the State\u2019s arguments that the legislature intended the $5 assessment to be treated as a fine because section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1 falls under article 9 of chapter V of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141 through 5 \u2014 9\u20143 (West 2004)), which is entitled \u201cFines,\u201d and because the assessment is imposed only on defendants who have been convicted. Notably, other statutes falling under article 9 also impose fees, as opposed to fines, on only those defendants who are convicted of crimes. For example, section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.4 requires defendants convicted of drug-related offenses to pay a \u201ccriminal laboratory analysis fee of $100.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.4(b) (West 2004). Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the legislature intended that the $5 assessment to be treated as a fee and we will therefore treat it as such.\nWhere, as here, a defendant challenges \u00e1 legislative enactment that does not affect a fundamental constitutional right, the appropriate standard of review is the rational basis test. People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174, 179 (1989). To survive the rational basis test, legislation must be reasonably designed to remedy the evils that the legislature has determined threaten public health, safety and general welfare. People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 531-32 (2005); People v. Upton, 114 Ill. 2d 362, 373 (1986). In applying the rational basis test, \u201cwe identify the public interest that the statute is intended to protect, examine whether the statute bears a reasonable relationship to that interest, and determine whether the method used to protect or further that interest is reasonable.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180.\nThe parties agree that the legislature\u2019s interest in enacting section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) of the Code was to further the health of Illinois citizens by raising money for spinal cord injury research and that such is a legitimate public interest. However, defendant argues that the means the legislature has chosen to promote its interest are not reasonable.\nDefendant analogizes the facts of this case to Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444 (1984). As the State correctly points out, the plaintiff in Crocker challenged a fee statute, in part, on the grounds that it was an unreasonable or arbitrary classification for tax purposes which placed on some members of a class a burden not shared by others. Here, on the other hand, defendant challenges section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) as a violation of the legislature\u2019s police power. However, we note that under either analysis the means adopted to protect the legitimate state interest must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish such an objective. See City of Carbondale v. Brewster, 78 Ill. 2d 111, 116 (1979) (police power may be exercised to protect public health, safety, morals and general welfare and \u201cthe legislation must bear a reasonable relationship to one of the foregoing interests which is sought to be protected, and the means adopted must constitute a reasonable method to accomplish such objective\u201d); Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. Furthermore, the Crocker court considered both a police power and a power-to-tax challenge and specifically stated, in finding the statute unconstitutional, \u201c[wjhether the additional filing fee provided for by the statute is imposed under the police power or the power to tax, the result we reach is the same.\u201d Crocker, 99 Ill. 2d at 457. Accordingly, we find, contrary to the State\u2019s contention, that Crocker is controlling.\nIn Crocker, the challenged statute required petitioners for dissolution of marriage to pay a $5 fee to fund shelters and services for victims of domestic violence. The court found that the statute was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the litigants\u2019 constitutional right to obtain justice freely, denied the litigants equal protection and deprived the litigants of property without due process of law. The court focused on the means the legislature chose to fund the domestic violence \u00a1 belters and programs and found:\n\u201cThese services are available to all adults and their dependents who are the subjects of domestic violence, [Citation.] As defined by statute, domestic violence can occur between any family or household members. [Citation.] Not surprisingly, then, there is no requirement that the recipients of the services be either married or divorced. Nevertheless, the legislature chose a tax on petitioners for dissolution of marriage as a means of funding the shelters and programs. We consider this choice to be an arbitrary use of the police power, inconsistent with due process guarantees.\u201d Crocker, 99 Ill. 2d at 456.\nDefendant also compares the facts of this case to Lindner, in which the defendant, who had been convicted of criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, raised a due process challenge to a statute that prescribed the automatic revocation of his driver\u2019s license. The court stated that the public interest the State intended to protect was the promotion of safe and legal operation and ownership of motor vehicles. The court concluded that the method employed to further the interest did not bear a reasonable relationship to that interest because:\n\u201cKeeping off the roads drivers who have committed offenses not involving vehicles is not a reasonable means of ensuring that the roads are free of drivers who operate vehicles unsafely or illegally. To the contrary, the means chosen are arbitrary, not only because the offenses specified in [the statute prescribing automatic revocation] have no connection to motor vehicles, but also because the inclusion of those offenses and no others is arbitrary. That is, no reason suggests itself as to why the legislature chose the particular offenses enumerated [in that statute], as opposed to other offenses not involving a vehicle.\u201d Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 183.\nThe State responds that this case is more similar to Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142 (2003). In Arangold, the plaintiff tobacco distributor raised a due process challenge to the Tobacco Products Tax Act of 1995 (35 ILCS 143/10 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2000)), which provided that proceeds from a tax on tobacco sales would be used to fund governmental programs providing long-term care for people financially unable to meet their medical needs. The supreme court rejected the plaintiffs contention, finding that the State had a legitimate interest in preserving the health of its citizens and assisting the poor, that the General Assembly could have reasonably found that the use of tobacco products causes a need for long-term medical care and that those who supply the products should bear a measure of the costs associated with such care. The court distinguished the case before it from Crocker, noting that, in that case, the relationship between dissolution actions and domestic violence programs was too remote.\nThe State argues that, in enacting section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c), the General Assembly could have found that the possession of a controlled substance is related to driving under the influence of a controlled substance and that driving under the influence of a controlled substance causes automobile accidents, which are the primary cause of spinal cord injuries. The State argues, therefore, that the General Assembly could therefore have concluded that those who possess controlled substances should bear the costs of research to alleviate the injuries they cause. We disagree with the State\u2019s analysis. First, we note that the General Assembly presumably employed the reasoning propounded by the State in enacting section 5 \u2014 9\u2014l(c\u20147), which imposes a $5 fee, earmarked for the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund, upon defendants convicted of \u201cdriving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.\" (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u2014l(c\u20147) (West 2004). While driving under the influence of a controlled substance arguably bears a rational relationship to spinal cord research, we cannot say that the simple possession of a controlled substance, an offense that does not involve or require the use of a motor vehicle, is reasonably related .to spinal cord research. Furthermore, the parties have not called to our attention any other statutes that impose a fee earmarked for the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund upon defendants whose crimes did not involve motor vehicles. Accordingly, we find the relationship between possession of a controlled substance and the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund simply too attenuated to survive defendant\u2019s due process challenge.\nFor the above-stated reasons, we reverse the order that defendant pay a $5 fee to the Spinal Cord Injury Research Fund and affirm the remainder of the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed in part; reversed in part.\nMURPHY, J., concurs.\nIn Wilson, the parties agreed that the assessments to the driver\u2019s education fund and the violent crime victim\u2019s fund were fines as opposed to fees, taxes or costs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. I would hold that defendant has failed to meet his burden of establishing that section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) (West 2004)) is unconstitutional. Statutes are presumed constitutional, and a reviewing court has a duty to construe a challenged statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if it can be reasonably done. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).\nThe majority\u2019s thorough analysis makes it clear that if the $5 required by section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) is a \u201cfine\u201d as opposed to a \u201cfee,\u201d the section is constitutional. As recognized by the majority, \u201cthe legislature is granted substantial discretion in setting the nature and the extent of penalties for criminal conduct.\u201d 362 Ill. App. 3d at 48, citing People v. Wilson, 144 Ill. App. 3d 290, 295 (1986) (\u201cWe are unaware of a decision of a court of review in which the fact that the proceeds from a f\u00edne or penalty is earmarked for a particular fund serving a governmental purpose has affected the validity of the fine or penalty\u201d).\nReading section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1 as a whole demonstrates that its language is ambiguous. Section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1 is part of chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections, which chapter is entitled \u201cSentencing.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1 (West 2004). Article 9 of this chapter is entitled \u201cFines.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1 (West 2004). Further, section 5 \u2014 9\u2014 1.1 imposes charges only upon those convicted of a felony drug offense. Thus, the holding in Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444 (1984), is completely inapposite. Crocker struck down a filing fee required on all litigants filing dissolution petitions, finding that the fee was a burdensome litigation tax. In Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 204 Ill. 2d 142 (2003), cited by the majority, our supreme court pointed out that the fees at issue in Crocker were placed upon a constitutionally protected activity \u2014 filing a court case. The same certainly cannot be said of persons subject to pay $5 under section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c).\nBased on the above, I believe that section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) may reasonably be construed as a constitutionally permissible fine and therefore this court has a duty to so construe it and uphold its validity. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 418.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Laila M. Velkme, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, William Toffenetti, and Paula Borg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HECTOR RODRIGUEZ, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201404\u20143546\nOpinion filed November 3, 2005.\nQUINN, P.J., dissenting.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Laila M. Velkme, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, William Toffenetti, and Paula Borg, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0044-01", "first_page_order": 62, "last_page_order": 73 }