{ "id": 4261222, "name": "DAWN JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. URBAN INVESTMENT PROPERTY SERVICES, a/k/a Urban Investment Trust, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Jackson v. Urban Investment Property Services", "decision_date": "2005-11-18", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201403\u20143001", "first_page": "88", "last_page": "93", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 88" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833049 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443949 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 751", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511370 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0751-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463476 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 F. Supp. 2d 775", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9169982 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/350/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140195 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" }, { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0620-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 583, "char_count": 11740, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3186328623792352 }, "sha256": "9aca0f9b7fbf45f789a01a8b849418ab28857a0ec54e0a797773d9e4c943ee61", "simhash": "1:ba3a112b6db2c730", "word_count": 1849 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:25.526171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DAWN JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. URBAN INVESTMENT PROPERTY SERVICES, a/k/a Urban Investment Trust, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Dawn Jackson sued Urban Investment Property Services (Urban) and Designed Equipment Corporation (Designed) in negligence to recover for injuries she sustained when part of a scaffolding Urban leased from Designed fell on plaintiff outside of Urban\u2019s property. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the fire fighter\u2019s rule (sometimes called the inherent risk principle) barred plaintiff from recovering for her injuries because she was injured while performing her duties as a public officer. The trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion and plaintiff appealed. We hold that when an officer responds to a call about a scaffold falling, the landowner is not liable in negligence to the officer for injuries caused by the scaffold falling on the officer. However, since Designed presented no evidence that it performed any activity on Urban\u2019s premises, the record does not support application of the fire fighter\u2019s rule to reheve Designed from liability Therefore, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s ruling as to defendant Urban and reverse as to defendant Designed.\nBACKGROUND\nOn April 7, 2001, plaintiff, a Chicago police sergeant, responded to a call that scaffolding was falling around a theater, damaging cars parked nearby. Defendant Urban owns the theater and defendant Designed leased the scaffolding equipment to Urban for renovations.\nWhen she arrived at the scene, plaintiff observed debris, including plywood boards, scattered across the four-lane street. She also noticed a board flapping in the wind. After she spoke to another officer to determine what damage had occurred, plaintiff called for a building inspector. Plaintiff also radioed for additional police units to help her keep traffic off the street.\nWhen the building inspector arrived at the scene, he discussed the situation with plaintiff and asked for some additional information. Plaintiff walked toward her squad car to retrieve the information. When she was about 15 feet from her car, a board flew off the scaffolding and struck her, injuring her severely. Plaintiff sued Urban and Designed, alleging that defendants negligently constructed and maintained the scaffolding.\nIn the motion for summary judgment, defendants asserted that the fire fighter\u2019s rule barred plaintiff\u2019s claim because plaintiff was performing her official duties when she suffered the injury Plaintiff replied that the fire fighter\u2019s rule did not apply because she was never on defendants\u2019 premises. Plaintiff also argued that, because courts have not extended the fire fighter\u2019s rule beyond the context of owner and occupier liability, Designed could not use the rule to protect itself from liability.\nThe trial court found that the fire fighter\u2019s rule relieved defendants of liability because the plaintiff \u201cwas not merely a traffic officer injured by a hazard unassociated with her duties.\u201d She was a police officer on duty, responding to a call of debris falling from scaffolding, and \u201cshe was injured by that same debris from that property owned and or occupied by the Defendants, including Designed which was engaged in construction activity vis-a-vis the scaffold on Urban\u2019s property on behalf of Urban.\u201d (Emphasis in original). The trial court therefore granted defendants summary judgment.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, plaintiff asserts that defendants cannot avail themselves of the fire fighter\u2019s rule because she was not on defendants\u2019 premises when she was injured. Additionally, plaintiff contends that contested issues of fact, especially issues concerning the relation between her work and her injury, preclude summary judgment.\nA trial court should grant summary judgment only if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Boswell Memorial Hospital v. Bongiorno, 314 Ill. App. 3d 620, 621 (2000). We review de novo the decision to grant summary judgment. Bongiorno, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 621.\nUnder the fire fighter\u2019s rule, \u201cpublic officers may not recover from those whose negligence caused the emergency that required their presence when their injuries were caused by that emergency.\u201d Knight v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 775, 780 (N.D. Ill. 2004). For example, \u201cwhile a landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to maintain his property so as to prevent injury occurring to a fireman from a cause independent of the fire[,] he is not liable for negligence in causing the fire itself.\u201d Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 Ill. 2d 103, 108 (1976).\nPlaintiff argues that we should apply the fire fighter\u2019s rule narrowly because the legislature recently amended the Fire Investigation Act to state that \u201cftjhe owner or occupier of the premises and his or her agents owe fire fighters who are on the premises in the performance of their official duties *** a duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of the premises.\u201d 425 ILCS 25/9f (West 2004). Plaintiff claims that the legislature, with this amendment, has rejected the fire fighter\u2019s rule. As plaintiff concedes, the amendment on its face does not apply to this case as it addresses only the owner\u2019s or occupier\u2019s duty to fire fighters and not to police officers. The amendment does not affect the binding precedent concerning application of the fire fighter\u2019s rule to police officers.\nOur supreme court followed precedent involving the fire fighter\u2019s rule in Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 1Ill. 2d 552 (1975). In Fancil, burglars concealed on the defendant\u2019s premises, outside its store, killed a police officer during the officer\u2019s security check. The officer\u2019s estate sued the store owner, alleging that the owner failed to provide adequate lighting for the store\u2019s exterior. Our supreme court applied section 343 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:\n\u201cA possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition of the land *** only if *** the condition *** involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees ***.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 343 (1965).\nThe court, interpreting the phrase \u201cunreasonable risk\u201d in light of the fire fighter\u2019s rule, held that a police officer conducting a security check should reasonably expect to encounter dangers like those created by the conditions on the defendant\u2019s premises. Fancil, 60 Ill. 2d at 558. The court concluded that the danger was therefore \u201cnot an unreasonable risk for a police officer\u201d and that the \u201cofficers realized the danger inherent in their occupation and protected themselves against it.\u201d Fancil, 60 Ill. 2d at 558. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision dismissing the officer\u2019s complaint.\nHere, plaintiff did not actually enter onto defendant\u2019s premises. She correctly argues that section 368 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and not section 343, governs Urban\u2019s liability. Section 368 provides:\n\u201cA possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an excavation or other artificial condition so near an existing highway that he realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others accidentally brought into contact with such condition while traveling with reasonable care upon the highway, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to persons who\n(a) are traveling on the highway, or\n(b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course of travel.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 368 (1965).\nSee Largosa v. Ford Motor Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 751, 754 (1999). This section makes a landowner liable for any unreasonable risks he creates for those traveling on adjacent highways, just as section 343 makes landowners liable for unreasonable risks imposed on invitees. The court in Fancil used the fire fighter\u2019s rule to interpret the risks that count as unreasonable for a policeman in the performance of his duties. We hold that the same principles apply to the interpretation of \u201cunreasonable risk\u201d in the context of section 368. We do not apply the fire fighter\u2019s rule \u201cbeyond its limited context of landowner/occupier liability\u201d (Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 151 (1978)), because section 368, like section 343, describes only the duties of owners and occupiers of land.\nUnder section 368, we must decide whether the negligently erected scaffolding created an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff. We hold that a negligently constructed scaffolding does not present an unreasonable risk to a police officer responding to a call about falling scaffolding. Therefore, the risk Urban allegedly created on its land does not qualify as an \u201cunreasonable risk\u201d for plaintiff under the circumstances of this case. We affirm the decision granting summary judgment to defendant Urban.\nPlaintiff separately argues that we should reverse the judgment in favor of Designed because it neither owned nor occupied Urban\u2019s theater. Designed claims that section 383 of Restatement (Second) of Torts entitles it to the same immunity Urban enjoys. Section 383 provides:\n\u201cOne who does an act or carries on an activity upon land on behalf of the possessor is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom from liability, for physical harm caused thereby to others upon and outside of the land as though he were the possessor of the land.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 383 (1965).\nSee Randich v. Pirtano Construction Co., 346 Ill. App. 3d 414, 424 (2004). Defendant Designed states in its brief that it erected scaffolding on Urban\u2019s property, but it does not cite to the record to substantiate its claim. The trial court found that \u201cDesigned *** was engaged in construction activity vis-a-vis the scaffold on Urban\u2019s property on behalf of Urban,\u201d but the court did not explain what evidence supported the finding. No witness stated in any deposition or affidavit that any employee of Designed ever performed any act for Urban on Urban\u2019s land. No contract in the record shows that Designed had a duty to carry on any activity on Urban\u2019s land. The record on appeal includes no evidence to help resolve the factual issue of whether Designed \u201c[did] an act or carrie[d] on an activity upon land on behalf of\u2019 Urban. Therefore, we cannot say that the depositions, admissions and affidavits on file show that section 383 entitles Designed to judgment in its favor.\nBecause plaintiff suffered injury from a falling scaffold in the course of her duties as a police officer responding to a call concerning a falling scaffold, the fire fighter\u2019s rule and section 368 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts bar her from recovering from Urban for negligence. Under section 383 of the Restatement, Designed could share Urban\u2019s immunity from an action in negligence for activities it undertook on Urban\u2019s land and on Urban\u2019s behalf. Because Designed has presented no evidence that it undertook any such activities, it has not shown grounds for judgment in its favor. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in favor of Urban, we reverse the summary judgment granted to Designed, and we remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nTULLY and O\u2019MALLEY, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY" } ], "attorneys": [ "A. Leo Wiggins, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Yolanda M. Kielar, of Maisel & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee Urban Investment Property Services.", "Robert E. O\u2019Malley and Robert J. McLaughlin, both of Segal, McCam-bridge, Singer & Mahoney, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee Designed Equipment Corporation." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DAWN JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. URBAN INVESTMENT PROPERTY SERVICES, a/k/a Urban Investment Trust, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20143001\nOpinion filed November 18, 2005.\nA. Leo Wiggins, of Chicago, for appellant.\nYolanda M. Kielar, of Maisel & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee Urban Investment Property Services.\nRobert E. O\u2019Malley and Robert J. McLaughlin, both of Segal, McCam-bridge, Singer & Mahoney, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee Designed Equipment Corporation." }, "file_name": "0088-01", "first_page_order": 106, "last_page_order": 111 }