{ "id": 4260238, "name": "LINDA FOSSE, Ex'r of the Estate of Robert Pace, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSEPH PENSABENE, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Fosse v. Pensabene", "decision_date": "2005-11-01", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201404\u20141267", "first_page": "172", "last_page": "190", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 172" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 567", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Colo. L. Rev.", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2980474 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ill. App. 3d 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2891938 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/257/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833806 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719540 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737-38", "parenthetical": "refusing to enter a sanction because plaintiff complied with discovery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259110 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 817", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1025892 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5462131 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "110-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 846", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487037 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0846-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3832304 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5369750 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.W.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" }, { "page": "919-20" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "919-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 Neb. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 93458 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778" }, { "page": "777-78" }, { "page": "779" }, { "page": "779" }, { "page": "779" }, { "page": "777-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/256/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307264 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "noting that a party cannot be found to have violated a discovery rule on a matter when the opposing party failed to present a question on the matter during discovery" }, { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "noting that a party cannot be found to have violated a discovery rule on a matter when the opposing party failed to present a question on the matter during discovery" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487250 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0803-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427873 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458-59", "parenthetical": "defining \"destructive testing\" as \"the physical testing of tangible objects such that the testing involves the alteration or partial destruction of the object\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821416 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115-16" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "119-23" }, { "page": "121-22" }, { "page": "122" }, { "page": "122-23" }, { "page": "129" }, { "page": "120" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 Ill. App. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2535265 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "holding that a court may authorize an exhumation and an autopsy in certain situations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/132/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2889094 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Ill. 2d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2724671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/10/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 503", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3330818 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/268/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261365 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 U.S. 495", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6158152 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/329/0495-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224788 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 C 3049", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "implicitly endorsing the district court's ruling from In re Certain Asbestos Cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 F.R.D. 427", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 7856869 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433", "parenthetical": "ruling that a decedent whose medical condition at death is \"in controversy\" is a \"person\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/frd/112/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29953 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44-45" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 204", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198894 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0204-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 992", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3739279 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998" }, { "page": "998-99" }, { "page": "998-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. App. 3d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5284808 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/217/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5732027 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 736", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3748805 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1419, "char_count": 45787, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.736962452649082e-08, "percentile": 0.5307293977370882 }, "sha256": "912711cfea50c732753a07613c1e46fac501a84128e3e18b104158f1c8c4c8a7", "simhash": "1:a52e958437a1f7e3", "word_count": 7382 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:25.526171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LINDA FOSSE, Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Robert Pace, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSEPH PENSABENE, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis matter comes before the court as an interlocutory appeal brought pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). Plaintiff, Linda Fosse, as executor of the estate of Robert Pace, deceased, appeals the trial court\u2019s order barring the introduction of the results or other evidence obtained from the autopsy performed upon the decedent. In so ruling, the trial court certified three questions for appeal:\n\u201cWhether an autopsy of the plaintiff\u2019s decedent performed during the pendency of litigation was discovery\u201d;\n\u201cIf the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, whether it is an abuse of discovery rules for a plaintiff to obtain an autopsy on the corpse of the plaintiffs decedent without notice to the defense\u201d; and\n\u201cIf the answer to each of the preceding questions is in the affirmative, whether barring introduction of evidence obtained from such autopsy is an appropriate sanction.\u201d\nIn an order dated January 21, 2005, this court denied plaintiffs application for interlocutory appeal. See Fosse v. Pensabene, No. 2\u201404\u2014 1267 (2005). Plaintiff then petitioned for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. In a supervisory order entered May 25, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court denied plaintiff\u2019s petition for leave to appeal, but ordered this court to vacate its January 21, 2005, order and to allow the interlocutory appeal. See Fosse v. Pensabene, 215 Ill. 2d 595 (2005). In compliance with our supreme court\u2019s directive, we entered such an order on June 24, 2005, and now enter this opinion. Having considered the merits of the present case, we answer the first certified question in the affirmative, we answer the second certified question in the negative, we decline to answer the third certified question, and we reverse and remand.\nThe record reflects that on May 6, 2003, the decedent, Robert Pace, underwent a medical procedure at SwedishAmerican Hospital in Rockford (the hospital). During the procedure, a cardiologist performed a cardiac catheterization and coronary angiography on Pace. Shortly thereafter, Pace experienced low blood pressure, low hemoglobin level, a firm and distended abdomen, and sweating. Defendant, Dr. Joseph Pensabene, was notified by telephone of Pace\u2019s symptoms, and he ordered a CT scan. After receiving the results of the scan, defendant ordered continued observation of Pace. Approximately one hour later, defendant was informed that Pace\u2019s hemoglobin level had continued to drop, and defendant ordered that Pace be transferred to the cardiac care unit. Pace died approximately one hour later.\nOn August 8, 2003, plaintiff, the decedent\u2019s daughter, initiated a cause of action against defendant for medical negligence. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint included one count brought pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/1 et seq. (West 2002)) and one count brought pursuant to the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27 \u2014 6 (West 2002)). Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that all of defendant\u2019s care and treatment of the decedent was via telephonic communication with the decedent\u2019s nurses and that defendant failed to see or physically examine the decedent until he was transferred to the cardiac care unit. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that defendant\u2019s failure to perform a proper physical examination of the decedent proximately caused his suffering and his death. Plaintiff named as respondents in discovery the hospital, Rockford Cardiology Associates, Ltd., Jagdeep Tung, Marc Whitman, Erik Englehart, and the cardiologist, Jagdeep Sagharwal. Defendant filed an answer, denying plaintiff\u2019s material allegations.\nOn August 19, 2003, defendant served \u201cWrongful Death Interrogatories\u201d requesting plaintiff to state \u201cwhether any autopsy was performed on the decedent and, if so, give the name and last known address of the person performing the said autopsy, the date it was performed, and the place it was performed.\u201d On September 15, 2003, plaintiff answered defendant\u2019s interrogatories. Plaintiff identified the decedent\u2019s family members, friends, and various hospital personnel as individuals who had knowledge of the facts concerning matters alleged in the complaint. Plaintiff also specifically responded that \u201c[ajn autopsy was not performed.\u201d\nOn October 3, 2003, plaintiff obtained a permit to exhume the decedent\u2019s body. The decedent\u2019s body was exhumed on October 6, 2003. On October 6, 2003, L.W. Blum, M.D., a forensic pathologist associated with the Winnebago County coroner\u2019s office, performed an autopsy on the decedent\u2019s body. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel was present at the autopsy and took photographs; the autopsy was also videotaped. On October 24, 2003, Dr. Blum prepared a seven-page report. The report reflects that Dr. Blum concluded that the cause of the decedent\u2019s death was \u201chemorrhagic shock due to retroperitoneal and intraperito-neal hemorrhage following arterial catheterizations for a coronary an-giogram and left ventriculogram.\u201d Dr. Blum retained sections of the decedent\u2019s internal organs for further examination.\nOn October 31, 2003, plaintiff supplemented her prior discovery responses to defendant. Plaintiff tendered to defendant a copy of Dr. Blum\u2019s report. The supplement advised defendant of the following:\n\u201c[0]n October 13, 2003, Dr. Larry Blum performed an autopsy on Mr. Pace\u2019s remains. The procedure took place at the Winnebago County Morgue, 240 West State Street, Rockford, Illinois. Photographs and a videotape were made during that procedure. Dr. Blum\u2019s report is attached hereto. If anyone would like to view the videotape and/or photographs, please advise. Of course, they may be copied as well. We hereby disclose Dr. Blum as a controlled expert witness.\u201d\nOn July 2, 2004, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s complaint pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219 (210 Ill. 2d R. 219) because of plaintiffs failure to provide advance notice of the exhumation and autopsy. In the alternative, defendant moved to bar all evidence of the autopsy and all evidence derived from the autopsy Defendant argued, inter alia, that the autopsy constituted destructive testing of the decedent\u2019s body and that plaintiff should be sanctioned for deliberately failing to provide defendant with any advance notice of the exhumation or the autopsy. On August 13, 2004, plaintiff responded, arguing that the defense had not made any request for an autopsy; the defense had not requested a protective order to preserve the body; there was no discovery order in place that plaintiff violated; and there was no statute, case law, or supreme court rule that imposed an affirmative duty to notify the defense that an autopsy would take place. Plaintiff concluded that the trial court could not sanction her because there was no discovery violation.\nThe parties briefed the motion, and on September 16, 2004, the trial court conducted a hearing on it. We note that the record on appeal does not contain a report of proceedings from the September 16 hearing. The trial court\u2019s written order reflects only that defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was denied but the motion for sanctions was granted. The written order also ordered that, as a sanction, the introduction of the autopsy results and any evidence obtained from the autopsy was barred. On September 17, 2004, plaintiff moved the trial court for an order to certify the question of law involved for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). On December 13, 2004, the trial court granted plaintiffs motion and certified the following questions:\n\u201cWhether an autopsy of the plaintiffs decedent performed during the pendency of litigation was discovery\u201d;\n\u201cIf the answer to the preceding question is in the affirmative, whether it is an abuse of discovery rules for a plaintiff to obtain an autopsy on the corpse of the plaintiffs decedent without notice to the defense\u201d; and\n\u201cIf the answer to each of the preceding questions is in the affirmative, whether barring introduction of evidence obtained from such autopsy is an appropriate sanction.\u201d\nDuring the pendency of this process, plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 5, 2005, naming as additional defendants the hospital, the cardiologist, and Rockford Cardiology Associates, Ltd.\n\u201cThis court\u2019s examination in an interlocutory appeal is strictly limited to the questions certified by the trial court and, as with all questions of law, is a de novo review.\u201d Thompson v. Gordon, 356 Ill. App. 3d 447, 451 (2005), appeal allowed, 216 Ill. 2d 736 (2005). We will ordinarily not expand the question under review to answer other questions that could have been included but were not. Dearing v. Baumgardner, 358 Ill. App. 3d 540, 542 (2005), citing Jones v. City of Carbondale, 217 Ill. App. 3d 85, 88 (1991). Our task is to answer the certified questions rather than to rule on the propriety of any underlying order. P.J.\u2019s Concrete Pumping Service, Inc. v. Nextel West Corp., 345 Ill. App. 3d 992, 998 (2004). \u201cIn the interests of judicial economy and reaching an equitable result, however, a reviewing court may go beyond the certified question[s] and consider the appropriateness of the order giving rise to the appeal.\u201d P.J.\u2019s Concrete Pumping Service, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 998-99, citing Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 208 (1995).\nIn the present case, the first question we are called upon to consider is whether the autopsy of plaintiffs decedent performed during the pendency of litigation was discovery. \u201c \u2018Discovery\u2019 is defined as \u2018the disclosure of facts, deeds, documents, or other things in the exclusive knowledge or possession of one party, which are necessary to the party seeking discovery as part of a cause of action or defense in an action pending.\u2019 \u201d Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d 21, 44-45 (2001), quoting 27 C.J.S. Discovery \u00a7 2(a) (1999). Thus, in order for \u201cdiscovery\u201d to occur, a legal action must be pending, and there must be a party to the action who seeks information from an opposing litigant or from a third party. Burger, 198 Ill. 2d at 45.\nIn the present case, neither party disputes that a legal action is pending, inasmuch as the certified question presented includes the phrase \u201cduring the pendency of litigation.\u201d Further, defendant is a party to the action and sought from plaintiff, through the use of interrogatories, information regarding an autopsy of plaintiffs decedent. Therefore, the parties were engaged in the process of \u201cdiscovery\u201d during the time the autopsy was performed on plaintiffs decedent.\nHowever, an autopsy, in and of itself, is not \u201cdiscovery\u201d; it is a \u201cdiscovery method.\u201d See 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(a). Supreme Court Rule 201(a) lists discovery methods by which a party may obtain information, including physical examination of a person. 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(a). An autopsy is a postmortem examination of an individual to ascertain the cause of death. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 145 (8th ed. 2004). We believe that an autopsy is a type of physical examination of a person, albeit a person no longer living, and thus fits within the methods of discovery listed in Rule 201(a). Cf. In re Certain Asbestos Cases, 112 F.R.D. 427, 433 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (ruling that a decedent whose medical condition at death is \u201cin controversy\u201d is a \u201cperson\u201d); Belkow v. Celotex Corp., No. 89 C 3049 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1989) (implicitly endorsing the district court\u2019s ruling from In re Certain Asbestos Cases). Therefore, we answer the first certified question as follows: an autopsy is a discovery method by which a party may obtain information regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.\nBoth plaintiff and amicus curiae, the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, argue that the autopsy of plaintiffs own family member is privileged work product information because it produced information that plaintiff gathered through her own efforts. Rule 201(b)(2) discusses privilege and work product as follows:\n\u201cAll matters that are privileged against disclosure on the trial, including privileged communications between a party or his agent and the attorney for the party, are privileged against disclosure through any discovery procedure. Material prepared by or for a party in preparation for trial is subject to discovery only if it does not contain or disclose the theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party\u2019s attorney.\u201d 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(b)(2).\n\u201cThe work product doctrine provides a broader protection than the attorney-client privilege and is designed to protect the right of an attorney to thoroughly prepare his case and to preclude a less diligent adversary attorney from taking undue advantage of the former\u2019s efforts.\u201d Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 189 Ill. 2d 579, 591 (2000), citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 91 L. Ed. 451, 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947).\nPlaintiff and amicus curiae do not explain how a postmortem examination procedure fits within the scope of Rule 201(b)(2), other than by characterizing the examination as an \u201cinvestigation.\u201d The certified question does not ask whether arranging for an autopsy is a discovery method or whether an attorney\u2019s observation of an autopsy being conducted is work product. We note that, on one hand, plaintiff asserts that arranging for an autopsy and having an autopsy conducted on her request is privileged work product. On the other hand, plaintiff is offering up a videotape of the entire examination and photographs to the defense upon request. Clearly, any mental impressions or theories plaintiff\u2019s counsel memorialized while observing the autopsy is work product (166 Ill. 2d R. 201(b)(2)), but no one is seeking the attorney\u2019s mental impressions or theories. Moreover, that plaintiff is offering the entire videotape to the defense suggests that plaintiff\u2019s counsel and the examiner performing the autopsy had no discussions that constituted investigation or were subject to the work product doctrine. Given the certified question posed by the trial court, we are unsure exactly what part of the autopsy examination plaintiff and amicus curiae are claiming to be privileged work product. We reiterate our answer to the first certified question; moreover, we decline to expand the question under review to answer other questions that could have been included but were not. See Dearing, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 542.\nThe second certified question presented asks \u201cwhether it is an abuse of discovery rules for a plaintiff to obtain an autopsy on the corpse of the plaintiff\u2019s decedent without notice to the defense.\u201d In short, the answer is that it depends upon whether there is an existing defense interrogatory requesting notice or whether there is a court order requiring such notice. And in this case, there is neither. Plaintiff argues that her conduct, i.e., arranging for a postmortem study of the decedent\u2019s remains without notice to the defense, cannot be deemed an unreasonable noncompliance with the rules because the rules themselves are silent on the entire practice of independent investigation. Plaintiff argues that no statute or case law exists that requires a plaintiff to give notice of an intent to exhume remains so that an autopsy can be performed.\nPlaintiff is only partially correct in stating that \u201cIllinois has not recognized the right of a defendant to attend, have notice of, or participate in the autopsy of a victim\u2019s remains.\u201d Actually, our workers\u2019 compensation statutes provide for such autopsies in appropriate cases. See 820 ILCS 310/12(b) (West 2004); see also Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 308 Ill. App. 3d 578 (1999). Section 12(b) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides in part:\n\u201cWhenever, after the death of an employee, any party in interest files an application for adjustment of claim under this Act, and it appears that an autopsy may disclose material evidence ***, the commission, upon petition of either party, may order an autopsy at the expense of the party requesting same, and if such autopsy is so ordered, the commission shall designate a competent pathologist to perform the same, and shall give the parties in interest such reasonable notice of the time and place thereof as will afford a reasonable opportunity to witness such autopsy in person or by a representative.\u201d 820 ILCS 310/12(b) (West 2004).\nMoreover, the Illinois Insurance Code features an autopsy provision through which an insured agrees that an autopsy will be conducted when necessary to resolve a claim or to gather other relevant information about the insured. See 215 ILCS 5/357.11 (West 2004); see also Schachner v. Employers\u2019 Liability Assurance Corp., 268 Ill. App. 503 (1932). Section 357.11 of the Illinois Insurance Code states:\n\u201cThe company at its own expense shall have the right and opportunity to examine the person of the insured when and as often as it may reasonably require during the pendency of a claim hereunder and to make an autopsy in case of death where it is not forbidden by law.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/357.11 (West 2004).\nThe present case, however, does not implicate any provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act or the Illinois Insurance Code. The present case concerns the performance of an evidentiary autopsy in a non-asbestos-related tort case and how a court should resolve discovery issues that arise when the individual who was allegedly maltreated is deceased. As we stated, our answer depends upon whether there is an existing defense interrogatory requesting notice or whether there is a court order requiring such notice. Although plaintiff argues that the rules are silent, we believe that one of the more appropriate discovery rules that should govern this case is Supreme Court Rule 215, pertaining to the physical and mental examination of parties and other persons. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 215(a); see also Belkow, No. 89 C 3049 (employing Fed. R. Civ. E 35(a)). Rule 215(a) provides in relevant part:\n\u201cIn any action in which the physical *** condition of a party or of a person in the party\u2019s custody or legal control is in controversy, the court, upon notice and on motion made within a reasonable time before the trial, may order such party to submit to a physical *** examination by a licensed professional in a discipline related to the physical *** condition which is involved. *** The order shall fix the time, place, conditions, and scope of the examination and designate the examiner. The party calling an examiner to testify at trial shall disclose the examiner as a controlled expert witness in accordance with these rules.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 215(a).\nThe rationale behind this rule is that, when one seeks to recover damages on the basis of one\u2019s physical injuries, the physical condition is at issue. People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288 (1957); see also 166 Ill. 2d R. 215, Committee Comments (stating that the rule was \u201cintended to provide an orderly procedure for the examination of civil litigants whose physical or mental condition is in controversy\u201d). Our supreme court explained the purpose and requirements of Rule 215 as follows:\n\u201cRule 215 is a rule of discovery, the purpose of which is to permit the discovery of facts which will assist the trier of fact to reach a correct determination of the issues before it. This rule does not permit unlimited and indiscriminate mental and physical examinations of persons but by its terms gives a trial court discretion to order such examinations only when certain requirements are met. The person sought to be examined must be a party (or a person in his custody or legal control), the physical or mental condition of that person must be in controversy, and good cause must be shown for the examination. Then, and only then, is discovery of that person\u2019s physical or mental condition authorized by this rule.\n*** Rule 215 contemplates that the trial court in its discretion may order the physical or mental examination under appropriate conditions when all requirements of the rule have been met ***.\u201d In re Conservatorship of the Estate of Stevenson, 44 Ill. 2d 525, 529-30 (1970).\nIn the present case, plaintiff is seeking to recover damages on the basis of the decedent\u2019s injuries, which allegedly led to his death, and therefore, the decedent\u2019s physical condition is at issue. See Noren, 10 Ill. 2d at 293. Because plaintiff placed the decedent\u2019s medical condition squarely at issue, defendant was entitled pursuant to Rule 215 to file a motion requesting the trial court to order an autopsy to be performed upon the decedent. See In re Exhumation of the Body of Bernardi, 132 Ill. App. 2d 186, 189 (1971) (holding that a court may authorize an exhumation and an autopsy in certain situations). Defendant, however, did not file a motion pursuant to Rule 215 requesting the trial court to order an examination of the decedent. Therefore, there was no court ord r requiring plaintiff to provide to the defense advance notice of an autopsy of the decedent.\nDefendant, however, asserts that an autopsy is \u201cdestructive testing\u201d and that, therefore, he was entitled to advance notice of the autopsy. In support of his assertion, defendant cites to Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112 (1998). In Shimanovsky, the plaintiffs filed suit against General Motors Corporation in June 1986, alleging that a defect in their vehicle caused a crash in which Mildred Shimanovsky suffered injuries. Before filing suit, however, the plaintiffs in 1985 retained a mechanical engineer to investigate whether the vehicle possessed a defect that may have caused the crash. The mechanical engineer determined that an internal inspection of the vehicle\u2019s power-steering mechanism was necessary, and in September 1985 he removed the power-steering mechanism from the vehicle and disassembled it. The mechanical engineer recommended that the plaintiffs retain a metallurgist to determine whether certain grooves he discovered in one of the power-steering components were a possible defect. The plaintiffs retained a metallurgist, who then sectioned some of the components and performed various tests to determine the cause of the grooves. The metallurgist concluded that the grooves were not caused by the crash but were the result of long-term wear. The mechanical engineer reviewed the metallurgist\u2019s findings and concluded that the wear in the power-steering mechanism caused the vehicle\u2019s power steering to fail. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 115-16.\nThe plaintiffs then in June 1986 initiated a products liability cause of action against General Motors Corporation. On the \u201ceve of trial,\u201d the defendant moved to dismiss the case or, in the alternative, bar any evidence of the condition of the power-steering mechanism. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 117. The defendant argued that it was entitled to such relief pursuant to Rule 219(c), as a sanction for the destruction of the power-steering components, without notice, by the plaintiffs\u2019 expert witness. The trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, and the plaintiffs appealed. The reviewing court determined that the trial court did not err when it imposed a sanction on the plaintiffs for the destructive testing, but that the trial court did abuse its discretion when it dismissed the complaint without first considering the degree of prejudice suffered by the defendant. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 118.\nThe two issues presented to the supreme court in Shimanovsky were (1) whether the trial court possessed the authority under Rule 219(c) to impose a sanction upon the plaintiffs for destructive testing of evidence prior to commencement of the lawsuit, and (2) if the trial court did possess the authority to impose a sanction, whether dismissal was the appropriate sanction. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 119-23. The plaintiffs did not dispute that the tests performed either altered the condition of or partially destroyed the power-steering components. The Shimanovsky court noted that a potential litigant owed a duty to take reasonable measures to preserve the integrity of relevant and material evidence, and it recognized the value of destructive testing as a discovery tool but only to the extent that the rights of the opposing party were not unduly prejudiced. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 121-22. The court recognized that Rule 201(b)(1) provided that both parties were entitled to full disclosure by discovery of any relevant matter, including matters that relate to the defense of a party. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 122, citing 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(b)(1). It concluded that the defendant had a right to perform tests on the power-steering components to formulate its defense to the products liability action but that the plaintiffs\u2019 destructive testing interfered with the defendant\u2019s right to such discovery. In determining that the trial court had the authority to impose a sanction on the plaintiffs for the destructive testing of evidence, the Shimanovsky court ruled, \u201c[u]nder the specific circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that plaintiffs\u2019 actions were an unreasonable noncompliance with discovery rules.\u201d Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 122-23.\nThe Shimanovsky court then addressed the propriety of the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiffs\u2019 case as an appropriate sanction and determined that the trial court\u2019s ruling was drastic and unreasonable. It thus remanded the case to the trial court to impose a sanction that did not \u201ctotally prevent plaintiffs from presenting evidence regarding the condition of the power-steering mechanism.\u201d Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 129.\nIn the present case, defendant argues that the Shimanovsky case supports his argument that the autopsy Dr. Blum performed on the decedent\u2019s body altered or partially destructed the decedent\u2019s body and therefore was destructive testing. Defendant concludes that, based on Shimanovsky, plaintiff\u2019s failure to provide defendant with advance notice of the autopsy was a sanctionable discovery violation.\nInitially, we note that Shimanovsky involved the destruction of evidence prior to the commencement of a lawsuit, whereas in the present case, the cause of action had already been initiated and the parties were engaged in discovery. Because Shimanovsky involved the presuit destruction of evidence, there were no discovery violations for which to sanction the plaintiffs. We further reject defendant\u2019s unsupported conclusion that the autopsy in the present case constituted \u201cdestructive testing\u201d merely because the decedent\u2019s body has been physically altered. See Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 120, citing Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware, Inc., 63 Ill. 2d 454, 458-59 (1976) (d\u00e9fining \u201cdestructive testing\u201d as \u201cthe physical testing of tangible objects such that the testing involves the alteration or partial destruction of the object\u201d). First, the record reflects that upon the death of the decedent, his body was embalmed and buried. Therefore, his body was physically altered even before the autopsy was performed. Second, an autopsy, by its very nature, involves an external and internal examination of the body of a deceased person, subject to the provisions of the Autopsy Act (410 ILCS 505/0.01 et seq. (West 2004)). Third, and more important, the examination was videotaped, photographs were taken, and, although some portions of the decedent\u2019s internal organs were retained by Dr. Blum for subsequent histologic examination, the record reflects that nothing was destroyed or disposed of to prevent defendant from seeking or having another autopsy performed on decedent. Therefore, it appears that plaintiff has taken \u201creasonable measures to preserve the integrity of relevant and material evidence,\u201d in this case, her decedent. See Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 121.\nWe also reject defendant\u2019s interpretation of Shimanovsky. Shimanovsky does not stand for the proposition that one party is entitled to advance notice before the other party undertakes testing of evidence. Indeed, the Shimanovsky court rejected the defendant\u2019s \u201cclaims of surprise\u201d and remarked that the defendant\u2019s claims served to highlight its own lack of diligence in seeking discovery of the automotive parts. Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 125. We believe that Shimanovsky supports our conclusion that defendant was entitled pursuant to Rule 215 to file a motion requesting the trial court to order an autopsy to be performed upon the decedent. It was not necessary for defendant to wait until plaintiff decided to have an autopsy of the decedent conducted or until plaintiff answered the interrogatories. See Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 125. Rather, at any time after defendant filed his appearance, he could have sought a postmortem medical examination of the decedent through a proper discovery request pursuant to Rule 215(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 215(a)). See Shimanovsky, 181 Ill. 2d at 125. Again, however, defendant never utilized the rule to request the trial court to order an autopsy to be performed on the decedent. Accordingly, because defendant never requested notice, we reject defendant\u2019s argument that he was entitled to advance notice of the autopsy that plaintiff arranged to have conducted on the decedent.\nThe other discovery rule that could appropriately govern in this case is Supreme Court Rule 213, pertaining to written interrogatories. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 213. Defendant, through the use of written interrogatories labeled \u201cWrongful Death Interrogatories\u201d and presumably pursuant to Rule 213, asked only \u201cwhether any autopsy was performed on the decedent and, if so, give the name and last known address of the person performing the said autopsy, the date it was performed, and the place it was performed.\u201d Under the well-known maxim of construction, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, or the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other, it is clear that defendant phrased his interrogatory in the past tense to request only information about an autopsy that had been conducted and not an invitation or demand to view or participate in a future exhumation and autopsy of the decedent. See, e.g., Fisher v. Burstein, 333 Ill. App. 3d 803, 807 (2002). Had defendant or defense counsel wished to participate in the decedent\u2019s exhumation and autopsy, the interrogatory could have been phrased to request as much. Because defendant did not seek or request in the interrogatory to be notified of a future autopsy, plaintiff cannot be charged with having violated discovery rules when she later arranged for an autopsy to be performed on the decedent. See, e.g., Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 104 (1995) (noting that a party cannot be found to have violated a discovery rule on a matter when the opposing party failed to present a question on the matter during discovery).\nBecause there was no court order requiring plaintiff to provide to the defense notice of an autopsy, and because defendant\u2019s interrogatories did not seek or request to be notified of a future autopsy, we conclude that plaintiff cannot be found to have violated discovery rules when she arranged to have an autopsy performed on the decedent without notifying defendant.\nDefendant counters, however, that plaintiff violated the rules of discovery because his interrogatories requested information regarding an autopsy of the decedent, and plaintiff failed to inform him in advance of the intent to perform an autopsy on the decedent. In support of his assertion that plaintiff violated discovery rules by knowingly concealing advance notice of the autopsy, defendant cites Schindler v. Walker, 256 Neb. 767, 592 N.W.2d 913 (1999), as being directly on point with the instant case.\nIn Schindler, the plaintiff\u2019s spouse suffered a neck fracture on July 10, 1992, and sought immediate medical treatment. The defendants treated the plaintiffs spouse, but he died approximately one week later. The plaintiff initiated a medical negligence action against the defendants, and beginning in May 1994 the defendants served interrogatories on the plaintiff, seeking information regarding each of her experts\u2019 opinions. In April 1996, the plaintiff supplemented her responses to the defendants\u2019 interrogatories to include the name of her expert, Okoye, and stated that his opinions were based on his \u201creview of the medical evidence.\u201d Schindler, 256 Neb. at 778, 592 N.W.2d at 919. In May 1996, the defendants served a request for production on the plaintiff seeking information regarding any autopsy or postmortem examination of the decedent. In June 1996, the plaintiff responded to the defendants\u2019 request for production and stated that she was \u201cnot aware of any autopsy or postmortem examination.\u201d Schindler, 256 Neb. at 777-78, 592 N.W.2d at 919-20. On September 16, 1996, the plaintiff applied for a disinterment permit, and Okoye performed an autopsy on September 26. The plaintiff amended her discovery responses on October 1, 1996, to notify the defendants of Okoye\u2019s findings resulting from the autopsy. This was the first notice the defendants had received of the autopsy; trial was scheduled to begin on October 15, 1996. Schindler, 256 Neb. at 779, 592 N.W.2d at 920.\nThe defendants brought a motion to strike Okoye\u2019s testimony and any evidence acquired from the autopsy. The trial court granted the defendants\u2019 motion to the extent that the plaintiff was prohibited from introducing any evidence relating to the autopsy. The plaintiff appealed this ruling, and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court\u2019s ruling. The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed its rules of discovery and the chronology of events, noting that no notice of the autopsy was provided to the defendants until October 1, \u201cseveral days after the autopsy was performed and about 2 weeks before trial.\u201d Schindler, 256 Neb. at 779, 592 N.W.2d at 920. The supreme court upheld the trial court\u2019s finding that the plaintiff failed to seasonably amend discovery responses that were no longer accurate, concluding that the plaintiffs failure to amend her discovery responses was \u201cin substance a knowing concealment.\u201d Schindler, 256 Neb. at 779, 592 N.W.2d at 920.\nWe disagree with defendant that Schindler is directly on point and compels the same conclusion. Initially, we note that this court is not bound to follow decisions from other states. North Pole Corp. v. Village of East Dundee, 263 Ill. App. 3d 327, 337 (1994). To the extent, though, that Schindler has a fact pattern that addresses the issue of evidentiary autopsies and there is no Illinois authority that speaks to this issue, we will look to Schindler as persuasive authority for our analysis. See In re Estate of Zenkus, 346 Ill. App. 3d 741, 746 (2004). We also note that Nebraska\u2019s rules of discovery expressly provide that a party has a duty to seasonably supplement his or her discovery responses and that, under some circumstances, the failure to amend would be \u201cin substance a knowing concealment.\u201d Neb. Ct. R. 26(e) (rev. 1996). Our supreme court\u2019s Rule 213 is dissimilar and provides only that \u201c[a] party has a duty to seasonably supplement or amend any prior answer or response whenever new or additional information subsequently becomes known to that party.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 213(i). Because the rules are different, we will look to our state\u2019s rules of interpretation and construction for guidance in our analysis.\nThe express purpose of Rule 213 is to discourage tactical gamesmanship and prevent surprise. Scassifero v. Glaser, 333 Ill. App. 3d 846, 854-55 (2002). Also pertinent to our discussion is Rule 218(c), which provides in part:\n\u201cAll dates set for the disclosure of opinion witnesses and the completion of discovery shall be chosen to ensure that discovery will be completed not later than 60 days before the date on which the trial court reasonably anticipates the trial will commence.\u201d 166 Ill. 2d R. 218(c).\n\u201cRules 213(g), 213(i), and 218(c) work together to ensure that, upon written interrogatory and no later than 60 days prior to the anticipated date of trial, the parties disclose the subject matter, conclusions, opinions, bases, qualifications, and all reports of a witness who will offer opinion testimony.\u201d Scassifero, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 855, citing 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 213(g), (i), and 166 Ill. 2d R. 218(c). We determine that defendant has no basis upon which he may claim \u201csurprise,\u201d as these events have occurred fairly early on in the discovery proceedings, and not on the eve of trial. Contra Schindler, 256 Neb. 767, 592 N.W.2d 913. Plaintiff filed suit in August 2003 and within three months of filing suit she informed defendant that she had had an autopsy performed on the decedent and she tendered to defendant a supplemental response to his interrogatories, notifying him of the autopsy and providing him with Dr. Blum\u2019s report and an offer to view the videotape and photographs. Plaintiff seasonably supplemented her discovery responses to defendant, as the record reflects that, within seven days of receiving Dr. Blum\u2019s report, she apprised defendant of the report, offered the photographs and videotape to defendant for viewing or reproducing, and named Dr. Blum as a controlled expert witness. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 213(i). The record further reflects that the case was still far from being tried, as defendant waited eight months before filing his motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint based on her failure to provide advance notice of the autopsy\nMoreover, based on the circumstances in the present case, we find no violation of Rule 213 on the part of plaintiff. We have already determined that defendant could have filed a Rule 215 motion requesting the trial court to order an autopsy to be performed upon the decedent. We have already determined that plaintiff was not required to provide defendant with advance notice of her intent to have an autopsy performed, because defendant did not request that information in his written \u201cWrongful Death Interrogatories\u201d to plaintiff nor did defendant request the trial court to order plaintiff to provide such advance notice. In Schindler, the plaintiff disclosed Okoye, the expert she had retained to either perform the autopsy or interpret the autopsy report, in April 1996; but then, in response to the defendants\u2019 May 1996 interrogatories, she stated that she was \u201cnot aware of any autopsy or postmortem examination.\u201d Schindler, 256 Neb. at 777-78, 592 N.W.2d at 919-20. In the present case, there was no concealment akin to Schindler, i.e., plaintiff did not disclose Dr. Blum as an expert and then disavow any knowledge of an autopsy. We, therefore, find the circumstances in Schindler distinguishable from the circumstances in the present case and decline to follow it.\nIn conclusion, we answer the second certified question as follows: based on the rules of discovery and based on the phraseology of defendant\u2019s interrogatories in the present case, plaintiff did not abuse the discovery rules when she obtained an autopsy on the corpse of her decedent without notice to the defense.\nThe third certified question asks, \u201c[i]f the answer to each of the preceding questions is in the affirmative, whether barring introduction of evidence obtained from such autopsy is an appropriate sanction.\u201d Under the facts of the present case, we answered the second certified question in the negative. Therefore, the third issue is moot because it is no longer applicable to the resolution of the case, and we decline to answer it. However, in the interests of judicial economy and reaching an equitable result, it is necessary that we go beyond the certified questions and consider the appropriateness of the order giving rise to the appeal. See P.J. \u2019s Concrete Pumping Service, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 998-99, citing Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 208. Here, the trial court implicitly found that plaintiff had abused the rules of discovery and, in its written order, sanctioned plaintiff by barring the autopsy results of the decedent and any other evidence obtained pursuant to the autopsy. Given our resolution of the certified questions, we will consider the propriety of the trial court\u2019s underlying order.\n\u201cThe admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 213 is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court\u2019s ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.\u201d Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 2d 100, 109 (2004), citing Susnis v. Radfar, 317 Ill. App. 3d 817, 828 (2000). It is well settled that a trial court may order sanctions against a party refusing to comply with discovery. 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(c); In re Estate of Andernovics, 197 Ill. 2d 500, 510 (2001). Upon a finding of a discovery violation, the decision whether to impose sanctions lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Sullivan, 209 Ill. 2d at 110-11. However, if a party has not committed a discovery violation, then an order of sanctions is not appropriate. See, e.g., Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 104 (noting that a party cannot be found to have violated a discovery rule on a matter when the opposing party failed to present a question on the matter during discovery); Morgan v. Rich ardson, 343 Ill. App. 3d 733, 737-38 (2003) (refusing to enter a sanction because plaintiff complied with discovery).\nHere, the order giving rise to the appeal arose from the trial court\u2019s decision to bar the autopsy results and any other evidence obtained pursuant to the autopsy, presumably because the trial court determined that defendant had a right to advance notice of the autopsy. As stated above, we noted that defendant could have sought a postmortem medical examination of the decedent with a proper discovery request pursuant to Rule 215(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 215(a)); however, defendant never utilized the rule to request the trial court to order an autopsy to be performed on decedent. We therefore rejected defendant\u2019s argument that he was entitled to advance notice of the autopsy that plaintiff arranged to have conducted on the decedent. We also determined that, based on the phraseology of defendant\u2019s interrogatories, defendant did not seek or request to be notified of a future autopsy. Therefore, plaintiff cannot be charged with having violated discovery rules when she later arranged for an autopsy to be performed on the decedent. We, therefore, hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted defendant\u2019s motion and barred the autopsy results of the decedent and any other evidence obtained pursuant to the autopsy. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court\u2019s order and vacate the sanction imposed upon plaintiff, and we remand for further proceedings.\nWe recognize that, on remand, defendant and the later added defendants may seek their own exhumation and postmortem medical examination of the decedent pursuant to Rule 215. The most important function of a court of review is to provide direction to the trial court as to how to address issues that are likely to arise on remand. See Clayton v. County of Cook, 346 Ill. App. 3d 367, 378 (2003). Consequently, we next address factors that a trial court should consider before authorizing a request for a person in a party\u2019s custody or legal control to submit to a physical examination for evidential purposes in a civil case.\nRule 215(a) vests broad discretion in the trial court to order examinations, but the trial court must insure that the statutory requirements are met and that indiscriminate examinations are not permitted. In re Estate of Silverman, 257 Ill. App. 3d 162, 171 (1993). Rule 215(a) requires that a motion be \u201cmade within a reasonable time before the trial\u201d and that it \u201cshall suggest the identity of the examiner and set forth the examiner\u2019s specialty or discipline.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 215(a). The trial court should also determine whether the party seeking the examination has shown \u201cgood cause\u201d for ordering a physical examination. See Thompson v. Palos Community Hospital, 254 Ill. App. 3d 836, 839-42 (1993).\nMoreover, \u201cevidentiary autopsy cases present a panoply of legal and emotional issues and problems. Courts should not order autopsy relief too lightly, nor should they hesitate to require it when it is needed. Courts should endeavor to balance the interests of the parties, continuing to do what justice requires for both.\u201d J. Jones, Evidentiary Autopsies, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 567, 624 (1990). In doing so, the trial court must have information upon which it may adequately evaluate a motion for an autopsy. For example, such information may include what the party demanding the autopsy wants to prove, whether a strong need supports the autopsy request, and whether an autopsy is likely to disclose what the party seeks. 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 598. Because the record reflects that defendant has not made a motion for examination pursuant to Rule 215, we make no decision as to how the trial court in the present case should rule in the event a motion is brought. Our discussion here should serve only to guide the trial court should defendant or a newly added defendant present such a motion.\nFirst certified question answered; second certified question answered; third certified question not answered; order reversed and cause remanded.\nMcLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HUTCHINSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "David F. Monteleone, of Schirger, Monteleone & Hampilos, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant.", "Marc F. Benjoya and Brian A. Schroeder, both of Cassidy, Schade & Gloor, L.L.P., of Chicago, for appellee.", "Alexandra De Saint Phalle, of Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C., of Springfield, for amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LINDA FOSSE, Ex\u2019r of the Estate of Robert Pace, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOSEPH PENSABENE, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201404\u20141267\nOpinion filed November 1, 2005.\nDavid F. Monteleone, of Schirger, Monteleone & Hampilos, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant.\nMarc F. Benjoya and Brian A. Schroeder, both of Cassidy, Schade & Gloor, L.L.P., of Chicago, for appellee.\nAlexandra De Saint Phalle, of Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C., of Springfield, for amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0172-01", "first_page_order": 190, "last_page_order": 208 }