{ "id": 4260204, "name": "RAYMOND JENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE EAST DUNDEE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT FIREFIGHTERS' PENSION FUND BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Jensen v. East Dundee Fire Protection District Firefighters' Pension Fund Board of Trustees", "decision_date": "2005-11-18", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201405\u20140301", "first_page": "197", "last_page": "205", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 197" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5595243 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231-37" }, { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352921 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "reviewing board's determination that firefighter candidate drills constituted acts of duty as defined by section 6 - 110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 1066", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2977746 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1070" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/1066-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810424 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564612 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335", "parenthetical": "applying section 6 - 110 and not section 5 - 113 in concluding that firefighter's application for a line-of-duty disability pension should have been granted" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 975", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209183 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0975-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4023038 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" }, { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0554-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958150 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599056 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "978-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0974-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542355 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171624 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5458926 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" }, { "page": "599" }, { "page": "599" }, { "page": "601" }, { "page": "598", "parenthetical": "meaning of \"act of duty\" requires de novo review" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0595-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 810, "char_count": 21402, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.427506883037504e-08, "percentile": 0.5165947898892947 }, "sha256": "0acb7ef9fd33b947e155889f1fb3d76ce70bef59ff053e0d58c2593d3c12de79", "simhash": "1:436d87b8722694e8", "word_count": 3555 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:25.526171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RAYMOND JENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE EAST DUNDEE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT FIREFIGHTERS\u2019 PENSION FUND BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BYRNE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis administrative review action was brought by plaintiff, Raymond Jensen, from the denial of his application for a line-of-duty disability pension by defendants, the East Dundee Fire Protection District Firefighters\u2019 Pension Fund Board of Trustees and the East Dundee Fire Protection District Firefighter\u2019s Pension Fund (collectively the Board). The trial court reversed the Board\u2019s findings as against the manifest weight of the evidence in light of Aim v. Lincolnshire Police Pension Board, 352 Ill. App. 3d 595 (2004). The Board contends on appeal that the trial court erred in reversing its decision. We hold that, in determining whether plaintiff was entitled to a line-of-duty pension under section 4 \u2014 110 of the Illinois Pension Code (Pension Code) (40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 110 (West 2004)), the Board applied the wrong standard in considering whether plaintiffs injury was incurred in or resulted from the performance of an act of duty. In considering whether plaintiff\u2019s injuries were incurred in or resulted from acts of duty, both the Board and the trial court defined the term \u201cact of duty\u201d as it is applied to police officers under section 5 \u2014 113 (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 113 (West 2004)), which is not similar to the definition applied to firefighters under section 6 \u2014 110 (40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 110 (West 2004)). The Board and the trial court should have used section 6 \u2014 110 to define the term \u201cact of duty.\u201d Thus, the Board used the wrong standard in weighing the evidence. Because the Board failed to apply the proper standard in weighing the evidence and never addressed the question of whether the activities in which plaintiff was injured constituted acts of duty, we believe that the proper course is to reverse the trial court and remand the cause with directions for a new hearing before the Board to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension.\nFACTS\nThe facts are undisputed. Plaintiff became a full-time firefighter/ paramedic with the East Dundee Fire Protection District on October 1, 1987, and remained employed full-time until July 2003, when he stopped working due to an injury to his left knee. Plaintiff applied for a line-of-duty disability pension under section 4 \u2014 110, alleging that his disability resulted from acts of duty he performed as a firefighter.\nIn November 1991, while stepping into an ambulance, plaintiff injured his left knee as he was attending to a medical emergency. As a result of that injury, plaintiff was required to undergo surgery for torn cartilage in his left knee and was unable to return to work until March 1992. On August 15, 1997, plaintiff again injured his left knee while crawling on the floor during a required fire department training drill. He was treated with cortisone therapy and returned to work approximately six weeks later. On May 20, 2002, as he was arriving at a fire call, plaintiff reinjured his left knee when he stepped out of the fire engine and missed a step. The treatment for the injury required a second surgery on the knee, in September 2002. Plaintiff was able to return to work in January 2003. On July 23, 2003, plaintiff reinjured his left knee while on duty when he stepped out of an ambulance after performing required cleaning and maintenance on the ambulance. As a result of that injury, plaintiff underwent treatment including a third surgery and physical therapy. Plaintiff has not returned to work since July 2003.\nPlaintiff applied for a line-of-duty disability pension because of his injury to his left knee. The Board ordered that he be examined by three physicians. Each physician who examined plaintiff received from the president of the pension fund, Rainier Gallieano, a letter asking the physician for expertise and help in evaluating plaintiff\u2019s knee injury. The letter states that a firefighter is entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension under section 4 \u2014 110 if \u201ca firefighter, as the result of sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effect of acts of duty, is found, pursuant to Section 4 \u2014 112, to be physically or mentally permanently disabled for service in the fire department, so as to render necessary his or her being placed on disability pension ***. A firefighter shall be considered \u2018on duty\u2019 while on any assignment approved by the chief of the fire department, even though away from the municipality he or she serves as a firefighter, if the assignment is related to the fire protection service of the municipality.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 110 (West 2004). Also enclosed was a copy of the firefighter/ paramedic job description for the physician to review and a form containing the following two questions:\n\u201c1. Is the applicant disabled to a point that he is not able to perform his duties as a firefighter pursuant to the job description of the East Dundee Fire District?\n2. Is it medically possible that the applicant\u2019s injury/illness is a result of or caused by his or her line of duty or service as a firefighter?\u201d\nDr. John A. Elston examined plaintiff and submitted a certificate indicating that plaintiff was disabled and that the disability was caused by his line-of-duty or service as a firefighter. Dr. Lawrence B. Het-rick\u2019s certificate indicated that plaintiff was disabled and that the disability was caused by plaintiff\u2019s line-of-duty or service as a firefighter. Dr. Martin E Lanoff examined plaintiff and certified that plaintiff was disabled. However, next to the question whether plaintiffs disability was the result of or caused by his line-of-duty or service as a firefighter, Dr. Lanoff wrote, \u201cpossibly to a small extent.\u201d In his report, Dr. Lanoff indicated that plaintiffs injury to his knee in 1991, requiring surgery, could have contributed to osteoarthritic changes, although it was much more likely that the degenerative changes were simply due to aging and genetics as well as obesity and not to any work-related injuries.\nThe Board determined that plaintiffs injury did not arise from the performance of an \u201cact of duty\u201d as defined under section 4 \u2014 110 of the Tension Code. The Board believed that, for purposes of section 4 \u2014 110, an \u201cact of duty\u201d must \u201centail a special risk not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walk of life.\u201d The Board believed that the circumstances of plaintiffs injuries were similar to those in White v. City of Aurora, 323 Ill. App. 3d 733 (2001), wherein we found that a police officer who slipped and was injured while exiting his squad car to place a parking citation on a car windshield was not performing an act of duty, because it did not involve a special risk not ordinarily assumed by a citizen. The Board believed that, like the police officer in White, plaintiffs injuries were the result of stepping in and out of vehicles and crawling on the floor, and therefore, plaintiff was acting as an ordinary citizen in those situations. Moreover, because of the \u201cdepth\u201d of Dr. Lanoff s report, the Board believed that his finding of only a \u201csmall possibility\u201d that plaintiff\u2019s injuries were duty-related was the more credible finding. Accordingly, the Board denied plaintiff a line-of-duty disability pension and awarded plaintiff a not-in-the-line-of-duty disability pension pursuant to section 4 \u2014 111 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 111 (West 2002)).\nPlaintiff sought review of the Board\u2019s decision in the trial court, arguing that the factual findings were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and legally erroneous. Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the Board applied an incorrect meaning of the term \u201cact of duty.\u201d Plaintiff also argued, alternatively, that his injuries were the result of the performance of acts involving special risks not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walk of life. Plaintiff asserted that the Board incorrectly relied on White, because this court\u2019s more recent case of Alm, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 602, had criticized and rejected White for misapprehending the supreme court\u2019s decision in Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 114 Ill. 2d 518 (1986).\nJohnson expressly rejected the notion that the term \u201cspecial risk\u201d encompasses only inherently dangerous activities. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 521. We observed in Aim that Johnson teaches that, in determining whether an officer is entitled to line-of-duty benefits, \u201c \u2018[t]he crux is the capacity in which the officer is acting\u2019 rather than the precise mechanism of injury.\u201d Alm, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 599, quoting Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 522. We concluded that an officer performing duties involving special risks will be entitled to line-of-duty benefits even if the immediate cause of injury is an act involving only an ordinary risk. Alm, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 599. We distinguished White from Alm, in which the injury was not the result of any specific, identifiable, physical trauma but may have developed over the course of time. In Alm, the plaintiff established that he incurred a disabling injury in the course of pedaling his bicycle. The question was whether pedaling the bicycle was an act of duty. Mindful of Johnson, we concluded that, because he was on patrol, the plaintiff faced risks not ordinarily encountered by civilians. He was required to ride his bicycle at night over varying terrain, looking after his own personal safety while also remaining vigilant in the performance of his patrol duties. The plaintiff also carried a significant amount of additional weight. Under these conditions, the risks included falls and collisions as well as dangerous encounters with unsavory elements of society. We held that this particular duty had no clear counterpart in civilian life and that therefore the bicycle patrol performed by the plaintiff involved special risks amounting to an act of duty such that he was entitled to line-of-duty benefits. Alm, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 601.\nAfter briefing and hearing argument, the trial court found that the decision of the Board was against the manifest weight of the evidence in light of Alm. Although the trial court never stated its reasons for relying on Alm, the trial court apparently interpreted the term \u201cact of duty\u201d to encompass a firefighter\u2019s performance of duties involving special risks even if the immediate cause of an injury is an act involving only an ordinary risk. Defendants timely appeal.\nANALYSIS\nThe Board contends that, although plaintiff was disabled, he had not been injured in the performance of an \u201cact of duty\u201d within the meaning of section 4 \u2014 110 of the Pension Code and, therefore, he was not entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension. In arriving at its decision, the Board interpreted the term \u201cact of duty\u201d to mean \u201can act inherently involving a special risk not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walk of life,\u201d and it applied that meaning to the facts of the case.\nOn appeal, we review the decision of the administrative agency, not that of the trial court. Stec v. Board of Trustees of the Oak Park Police Pension Fund, 355 Ill. App. 3d 974, 978-79 (2005). The findings and conclusions of an administrative agency on questions of fact are deemed prima facie true and correct and may be set aside only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2002); Daily v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 251 Ill. App. 3d 119, 122 (1993). Our review of an administrative agency\u2019s determinations on questions of law is de novo. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). Where the facts are undisputed, our review is generally de novo. See Alm, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 598 (meaning of \u201cact of duty\u201d requires de novo review). However, where, as here, the case involves an examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts, it involves a mixed question of fact and law. Therefore, a \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d standard of review is appropriate to examine the Board\u2019s decision. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. \u201cA decision will be deemed clearly erroneous only where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is \u2018 \u201cleft with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Anderson v. Department of Professional Regulation, 348 Ill. App. 3d 554, 560 (2004).\nSection 4 \u2014 110 of the Pension Code provides in relevant part:\n\u201cIf a firefighter, as the result of sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effects of acts of duty, is found, pursuant to Section 4 \u2014 112, to be physically or mentally permanently disabled for service in the fire department, so as to render necessary his or her being placed on disability pension, the firefighter shall be entitled to a disability pension ***. A firefighter shall be considered \u2018on duty\u2019 while on any assignment approved by the chief of the fire department, even though away from the municipality he or she serves as a firefighter, if the assignment is related to the fire protection service of the municipality.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 110 (West 2004).\nPlaintiff contends that the Board improperly applied the definition of \u201cact of duty\u201d found under section 5 \u2014 113 of the Pension Code, a section that is applicable to police officers, not firefighters. Plaintiff further asserts that, had the Board applied the proper definition of \u201cact of duty\u201d pursuant to section 4 \u2014 110, a section applicable to firefighters, the Board would have granted plaintiffs application for a line-of-duty disability pension.\nWe agree with plaintiff that the Board improperly applied the wrong definition of the term \u201cact of duty.\u201d \u201cAct of duty\u201d is defined for police officers as \u201c[a]ny act of police duty inherently involving special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life, imposed on a policeman by the statutes of this State or by the ordinances or police regulations of the city in which this Article is in effect or by a special assignment.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 113 (West 2004). The Pension Code language relating to police officers under section 5 \u2014 113 is different from the language defining the term \u201cact of duty\u201d as it relates to firefighters under section 6 \u2014 110 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 110 (West 2004)). Section 6 \u2014 110 of the Pension Code defines an \u201cact of duty\u201d as \u201c[a]ny act imposed on an active fireman by the ordinances of a city, or by the rules or regulations of its fire department, or any act performed by an active fireman while on duty, having for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of another person.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 110 (West 2004).\nIn interpreting a statute, the court must ascertain the legislature\u2019s intent, the best evidence of which is the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute. Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 421 (2002). Where the statutory language is clear, the court will give that language effect without resort to other aids of construction. Martino v. Police Pension Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d 975, 980 (2002). It is clear that section 6 \u2014 110 applies because it defines acts of duty and it relates to firefighters. See Virden v. Board of Trustees of the Firefighters Pension Fund, 304 Ill. App. 3d 330, 335 (1999) (applying section 6 \u2014 110 and not section 5 \u2014 113 in concluding that firefighter\u2019s application for a line-of-duty disability pension should have been granted).\nWe note that section 6 \u2014 101 provides that each city of more than 500,000 inhabitants be allowed to create a firefighters\u2019 annuity and benefit fund. 40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 101 (West 2004). Section 4 \u2014 101 grants a similar fund for cities, like East Dundee, of inhabitants under 500,000. 40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 101 (West 2004). Contrary to the parties\u2019 contentions, merely because the term \u201cact of duty\u201d is found in Article 6 of the Pension Code does not mean that it is applicable only to statutes in Article 6. The terms defined in the Pension Code have the meaning ascribed to them and there is nothing in section 6 \u2014 110 or any other statute under Article 6 that prohibits a court from ascribing the definition in section 6 \u2014 110 to section 4 \u2014 110. Moreover, courts presume that statutes that relate to one subject are intended by the legislature to be consistent and harmonious with each other. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 111-12 (1993). The same words used in different sections of a statute should be given a consistent meaning unless legislative intent to the contrary is clearly evident. Clardy v. Rapistan Division of Lear Siegler, Inc., 254 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1070 (1993). Accordingly, we find that the Board, as well as the trial court, improperly applied the wrong definition of \u201cact of duty\u201d from section 5 \u2014 113 of the Pension Code to the facts of the case, because plaintiff is a firefighter and not a police officer, and, therefore, the Board applied the wrong standard in weighing the evidence. See Virden, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 335.\nBecause the Board applied the wrong definition of the term \u201cact of duty,\u201d any case law analyzing questions of specific \u201cacts of duty\u201d as they apply to police line-of-duty disability pensions are not relevant. Thus, the Board\u2019s reliance on White, as well as the trial court\u2019s reliance on Aim, was misplaced inasmuch as both resolutions concerned the Pension Code\u2019s definition of \u201cact of duty\u201d applicable to police officers and not the standard applicable to firefighters.\nBefore both the Board and the trial court, the parties focused on whether plaintiffs injuries were incurred in or resulted from \u201cacts of duty,\u201d and the Board and the trial court relied on the incorrect standard in weighing the evidence. While plaintiff points out that the Board had before it the East Dundee Fire Protection District\u2019s policy and procedures regarding the nature of his work when it considered whether the injuries he suffered were incurred in or resulted from \u201cacts of duty,\u201d the Board never reviewed this evidence based on the proper standard. Furthermore, the Board never determined whether the activities in which plaintiff was injured constituted acts of duty for purposes of section 4 \u2014 110. We review an administrative agency\u2019s decision under the \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d standard. Anderson, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 560. Consequently, before we review its decision, we believe that the Board should consider whether plaintiffs injury was incurred in or resulted from the performance of \u201cacts of duty\u201d within the proper meaning of section 4 \u2014 110. This is particularly appropriate because the Board never addressed the issue of whether the activities in which plaintiff was injured constituted acts of duty as defined by section 6 \u2014 110 of the Pension Code. See, e.g., O\u2019Callaghan v. Retirement Board of Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 302 Ill. App. 3d 579 (1998) (reviewing board\u2019s determination that firefighter candidate drills constituted acts of duty as defined by section 6 \u2014 110).\nThe Board argues that its decision to deny the line-of-duty disability pension should be upheld in any event because the Board chose to place greater credibility on Dr. Lanoff s report concerning the causation of plaintiffs injuries. Dr. Lanoff agreed with the other physicians that plaintiff was disabled. However, he agreed with the other physicians as to the cause of the disability, but only to a \u201csmall extent.\u201d We observe that section 4 \u2014 112 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 112 (West 2004)) requires that a disability pension shall not be paid until disability has been established by the board by examinations of the firefighter by three physicians selected by the board and such other evidence as the board deems necessary. Similar to the certificate provision of section 3 \u2014 115 (40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 115 (West 2002)), which we reviewed in Wade v. City of North Chicago Police Pension Board, 359 Ill. App. 3d 224, 231-37 (2005), section 4 \u2014 112 says nothing about the degree or cause of the applicant\u2019s incapacity. While the Board can find Dr. Lanoff s opinion to be more credible, we believe that, because all three physicians determined that plaintiff has a disability preventing him from performing any assigned duties, it is for the Board to determine whether the disability was caused by a covered act, based on all of the evidence presented at the hearing. See Wade, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 238. The Board cannot make that determination until it holds a new hearing based on the appropriate standard.\nAccordingly, for the preceding reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause to the Board for a new hearing as to whether plaintiff is entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension pursuant to section 4 \u2014 110.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nBOWMAN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BYRNE" } ], "attorneys": [ "John H. Kelly, Ericka J. Thomas, and Peter M. King, all of Ottosen, Trevarthen, Britz, Kelly & Cooper, Ltd., of Wheaton, for appellants.", "Andrew Y. Acker, of Kubiesa, Spiroff, Gosselar, Acker & Kern, P.C., of Elmhurst, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RAYMOND JENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE EAST DUNDEE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT FIREFIGHTERS\u2019 PENSION FUND BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201405\u20140301\nOpinion filed November 18, 2005.\nJohn H. Kelly, Ericka J. Thomas, and Peter M. King, all of Ottosen, Trevarthen, Britz, Kelly & Cooper, Ltd., of Wheaton, for appellants.\nAndrew Y. Acker, of Kubiesa, Spiroff, Gosselar, Acker & Kern, P.C., of Elmhurst, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0197-01", "first_page_order": 215, "last_page_order": 223 }