{ "id": 4261314, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM L. HINTON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Hinton", "decision_date": "2005-11-08", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201404\u20140690", "first_page": "229", "last_page": "234", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 229" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2599110 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "793" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780262 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "690 N.E.2d 1389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35379 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 N.E.2d 583", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147581 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098736 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456133 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 N.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3514909 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218603 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436102 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0255-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 466, "char_count": 11383, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.665651525889828e-08, "percentile": 0.4059070625353061 }, "sha256": "2afa96b0cab52ffa7792bd731e597e98909abad74e97e192c082bd7fd0685127", "simhash": "1:e8ea614c378fa9b6", "word_count": 1888 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:25.526171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM L. HINTON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARRY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, William L. Hinton, was charged with two counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(6) (West 2004)) and one count of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a)(2) (West 2004)). He waived his sixth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VI) right to counsel and proceeded pro se. The defendant then pled guilty to all three charges pursuant to a fully negotiated agreement. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two concurrent two-year terms of imprisonment for the aggravated battery counts.\nAt the sentencing hearing, the trial court admonished the defendant that if indigent, he would be appointed counsel regarding proceedings on a postplea motion. The defendant then filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Thereafter, the court did not appoint counsel for the defendant regarding the motion. The court dismissed the defendant\u2019s motion.\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court did not comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) because it failed to appoint counsel concerning his motion to withdraw the plea. The State contends that the defendant\u2019s earlier waiver of the right to counsel applied to the proceedings regarding his postplea motion. We hold that the defendant\u2019s previous waiver of the right to counsel was inapplicable to the postplea proceedings. Thus, we reverse and remand.\nBACKGROUND\nWhen the complaint was filed, the trial court appointed counsel for the defendant. Later, the court granted the appointed attorney\u2019s motion to withdraw from the case. The defendant stated that he did not wish to be represented by counsel and that he intended to proceed pro se to a jury trial. The judge questioned the defendant extensively concerning his waiver of the right to counsel and repeatedly admonished him regarding the consequences of proceeding pro se. The court then found that the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The defendant represented himself during jury selection.\nOn the date set for trial, the defendant announced to the court that he wished to speak with the prosecutor. After the defendant and the prosecutor conferred, the prosecutor informed the court that the parties had reached a plea agreement. The defendant agreed to plead guilty to the offenses in exchange for the State\u2019s recommendation of a two-year prison sentence. After hearing the State\u2019s factual basis, the court accepted the defendant\u2019s guilty plea.\nThe trial court imposed the two-year sentence, and the judge then admonished the defendant concerning the procedures necessary to perfect an appeal. Among these admonishments, the judge said, \u201c[Ilf you are indigent, *** [a]n attorney would be appointed *** to assist you in the preparation of [a postplea] motion.\u201d The defendant indicated that he understood the admonishments.\nThe trial court issued its sentencing order on August 2, 2004. On August 10, 2004, the defendant filed a pro se document with the court titled \u201cAffidavit.\u201d In this document, the defendant stated, \u201cI *** will like to withdraw, my \u2018plea of guilty,\u2019 to \u2018not guilty,\u2019 *** and will like to proceed, with a \u2018bench trial\u2019.\u201d The court construed the document as a motion to withdraw the guilty plea.\nThe trial court held a hearing on the defendant\u2019s motion on August 11, 2004, at which the defendant proceeded pro se. The judge asked the defendant to state the reason he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. The defendant said that he was waiving his right to a jury trial and wished to proceed with a bench trial. The judge explained to the defendant that he had previously waived his right to a jury trial when he pled guilty. When the judge asked the defendant again for the legal basis to withdraw his guilty plea, the defendant repeated his desire for a bench trial. The prosecutor asked the court to strike the defendant\u2019s motion because \u201c[i]t doesn\u2019t plead anything that you can grant relief upon.\u201d After further discussion among the judge, the prosecutor, and the defendant, the judge said, \u201cAt this moment the motion that [the defendant] has filed has been dismissed. You still have an opportunity to file a legal reason to allow me to withdraw your guilty plea and sentence imposed.\u201d The defendant appealed.\nANALYSIS\nThe defendant submits that the trial court failed to comply with Rule 604(d) because it did not appoint counsel regarding his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The State asserts that the defendant\u2019s earlier waiver of the right to counsel applied to the proceedings concerning the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.\nWe review a trial court\u2019s compliance with supreme court rules de novo. People v. Jones, 349 Ill. App. 3d 255, 812 N.E.2d 32 (2004).\nAt the time the trial court ruled on the defendant\u2019s motion, Rule 604(d) stated that \u201c[n]o appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court[,] *** if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d). When such a motion is filed, \u201c[t]he trial court shall then determine whether the defendant is represented by counsel, and if the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel.\u201d 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).\nIn People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 529 N.E.2d 218 (1988), the Illinois Supreme Court said that Rules 604(d) and 605(b) must be read together. Rule 605(b) states that after a defendant has pled guilty and has been sentenced, the trial court must give certain admonishments concerning how to perfect an appeal. Among other admonishments, the court must advise the defendant concerning the postplea motions he is to file. The court is also to admonish the defendant \u201cthat if the defendant is indigent, *** counsel will be appointed to assist the defendant with the preparation of the motions.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)(5).\nThe court in People v. Ledbetter, 174 Ill. App. 3d 234, 528 N.E.2d 375 (1988), observed that although Rule 604(d) contains language concerning whether an indigent defendant \u201cdesires counsel,\u201d Rule 605(b) lacks the \u201cdesires counsel\u201d language regarding appointing counsel. The Ledbetter court pointed out that, under Rule 605(b), the trial court was required to admonish a defendant that \u201ccounsel will be appointed\u201d for an indigent defendant. Reading the two rules together, the Ledbetter court held that a trial court is required to appoint counsel to an indigent defendant, unless the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel granted by Rule 604(d). Citing Ledbetter, this court said that \u201cthe trial judge is obligated to appoint counsel in postplea proceedings, even without a specific request from an indigent defendant, unless [the court] finds that the defendant knowingly waives the right to appointed counsel.\u201d People v. Barnes, 291 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550, 684 N.E.2d 416, 420 (1997).\nIn this case, the State contends that the defendant\u2019s earlier waiver of counsel was applicable to the proceedings regarding his postplea motion. In other words, the State argues that the defendant knowingly waived his right to postplea counsel by knowingly waiving his right to counsel at an earlier stage in his criminal proceedings. See Barnes, 291 Ill. App. 3d 545, 684 N.E.2d 416.\nThe State cites People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 440 N.E.2d 856 (1982), People v. Redd, 173 Ill. 2d 1, 670 N.E.2d 583 (1996), and People v. Cunningham, 294 Ill. App. 3d 702, 690 N.E.2d 1389 (1997), for the proposition that the defendant\u2019s waiver of the right to counsel carried through the proceedings concerning his postplea motion. Though Baker and Redd concerned whether a defendant\u2019s waiver of the right to counsel at trial carried through the sentencing hearing, these two cases did not concern guilty plea proceedings, Rule 605(b) admonishments, Rule 604(d) requirements, and postplea motion proceedings, as in the instant case. We find Baker and Redd to be procedurally distinguishable from the present case and therefore inapplicable.\nIn Cunningham, 294 Ill. App. 3d 702, 690 N.E.2d 1389, the defendant waived his right to counsel and proceeded pro se. The trial court accepted the defendant\u2019s guilty plea, and he was sentenced. Three days later, the defendant sent a pro se letter to the court asking for a copy of the type of motion an attorney would file in order to withdraw his guilty plea. In the letter, the defendant indicated that he wished to act as his own attorney regarding the motion to withdraw the plea. The Cunningham court ruled that, under the circumstances of the case, the trial court did not err by failing to ask the defendant if he wished to have counsel appointed for his motion to withdraw the plea.\nWe find Cunningham to be factually distinguishable from the present case. Unlike the defendant in Cunningham, the defendant in the instant case did not indicate to the trial court that he wished to act as his own attorney regarding the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Thus, we also find the holding of Cunningham to be inapposite to the present case.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has stated that, \u201c \u2018[bjecause of the strict waiver requirements of Rule 604(d) (any issue not raised by the defendant in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea is deemed waived), fundamental fairness requires that the defendant have the assistance of counsel in preparing and presenting his [postplea] motion.\u2019 \u201d People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 35, 630 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1994), quoting People v. Dickerson, 212 Ill. App. 3d 168, 171, 570 N.E.2d 902 (1991), with approval.\nIn this case, the record shows that the defendant knowingly waived his sixth amendment right to counsel and proceeded pro se through the sentencing hearing. However, after the defendant was sentenced, the trial court admonished him, according to Rule 605(b), that if he wished to appeal and was indigent \u201c[ajn attorney would be appointed for\u201d him regarding his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Because the trial court advised the defendant that counsel \u201cwould be appointed\u201d concerning his postplea motion, the defendant\u2019s earlier waiver of counsel was inapplicable. The trial judge was obligated to appoint counsel in the postplea proceedings, even without a specific request from the defendant, absent a finding that the defendant had knowingly waived the right to appointed counsel. See Barnes, 291 Ill. App. 3d 545, 684 N.E.2d 416. Because the court did not appoint counsel or obtain a knowing waiver of the defendant\u2019s right to counsel to assist him with his postplea motion, we hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to comply with Rule 604(d).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Will County circuit court dismissing the defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and remand the cause for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nLYTTON and SCHMIDT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARRY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Verlin R. Meinz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "James Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Lawrence M. Bauer and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM L. HINTON, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201404\u20140690\nOpinion filed November 8, 2005.\nVerlin R. Meinz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJames Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Lawrence M. Bauer and Judith Z. Kelly, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0229-01", "first_page_order": 247, "last_page_order": 252 }