{ "id": 4261328, "name": "NEGRO NEST, LLC, d/b/a Servpro of Springfield, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MID-NORTHERN MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Negro Nest, LLC v. Mid-Northern Management, Inc.", "decision_date": "2005-12-01", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201404\u20140333", "first_page": "640", "last_page": "651", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 640" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "410 Pa. Super. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa. Super.", "case_ids": [ 903243 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627-29" }, { "page": "963-64", "parenthetical": "\" 'costs of collection' \" in a homeowners association covenant allows the association to recover its attorney fees upon suit to recover association dues; noting the phrase is synonymous with \"attorney fees\" in the context of promissory notes and negotiable instruments law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa-super/410/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 S.E. 666", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "provision in note providing for \" 'costs of collection' \" refers not to the costs of suit, which are allowed by law, but to attorney fees expended in attempting to collect on the note" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Va. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 11281112 ], "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680", "parenthetical": "provision in note providing for \" 'costs of collection' \" refers not to the costs of suit, which are allowed by law, but to attorney fees expended in attempting to collect on the note" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/va/125/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 F.2d 1185", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 349176 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/767/1185-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 N.E.2d 995", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "997", "parenthetical": "indemnity agreement providing defendants \" 'further agree to indemnify [plaintiff] *** from any claim of [third-party plaintiffs]' \" was not specific enough to support an award of attorney fees because the agreement did not mention attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 773", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3592766 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777", "parenthetical": "indemnity agreement providing defendants \" 'further agree to indemnify [plaintiff] *** from any claim of [third-party plaintiffs]' \" was not specific enough to support an award of attorney fees because the agreement did not mention attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 N.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill. App. 3d 994", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3394652 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "995-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/53/0994-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 N.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "\"costs\" when used in express indemnity agreements does not include attorney fees and other expenses" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "5 Ill. App. 3d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2525593 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457-58", "parenthetical": "\"costs\" when used in express indemnity agreements does not include attorney fees and other expenses" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/5/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "757 N.E.2d 1271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1279" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570906 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 N.E.2d 260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "court held Commission's order for payment of attorney fees under the Fair Employment Practices Act was void absent specific language and not within limited exceptions to the American Rule" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "34 Ill. App. 3d 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2963332 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117", "parenthetical": "court held Commission's order for payment of attorney fees under the Fair Employment Practices Act was void absent specific language and not within limited exceptions to the American Rule" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/34/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "absent specific language, \" 'disbursements' [(710 ILCS 5/14 (West 2000))]\" cannot be interpreted to include attorney fees under the Arbitration Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5434323 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552", "parenthetical": "absent specific language, \" 'disbursements' [(710 ILCS 5/14 (West 2000))]\" cannot be interpreted to include attorney fees under the Arbitration Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 N.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "606-08", "parenthetical": "statutory provision providing liability for an amount \" 'not limited to loss of income and costs incurred therein' [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. 24 - 12)]\" for \"cost of prosecution\" does not include attorney fees" }, { "page": "606-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 Ill. App. 3d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5412803 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331-33", "parenthetical": "statutory provision providing liability for an amount \" 'not limited to loss of income and costs incurred therein' [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. 24 - 12)]\" for \"cost of prosecution\" does not include attorney fees" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/28/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 N.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "award of attorney fees proper only when specifically provided for in statute; improper for court to enlarge \" 'cost of the prosecution' [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 112, par. 14)]\" to include attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 2d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1601101 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135-36", "parenthetical": "award of attorney fees proper only when specifically provided for in statute; improper for court to enlarge \" 'cost of the prosecution' [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 112, par. 14)]\" to include attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/104/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "error to award attorney fees as \" 'hearing costs' [(Ill. Rev. Stat 1991, ch. IIIV2, par. 1042(b)(4))]\" under Environmental Protection Act absent specific language" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333109 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171-72", "parenthetical": "error to award attorney fees as \" 'hearing costs' [(Ill. Rev. Stat 1991, ch. IIIV2, par. 1042(b)(4))]\" under Environmental Protection Act absent specific language" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "Mo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 610.027.5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mo. Rev. Stat.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "951 S.W.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11906798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" }, { "page": "373-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/951/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "203 S.W.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 Mo. App. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo. App.", "case_ids": [ 1854507 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197-98" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "197" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "197" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "197-98" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "197" }, { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo-app/239/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.E. 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Mass. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 85186 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" }, { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/215/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ga. App. 866", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1076193 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "867-68" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/255/0866-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 N.E.2d 297", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 10948713 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" }, { "page": "298-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/536/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Md. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 1762322 ], "year": 1867, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "582", "parenthetical": "attorney fees properly awarded under terms of a deed of trust providing for recovery of \" 'all just and reasonable expenses, costs, charges[,] and commissions' \" attending the due execution of the trust" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/27/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Idaho 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 4557194 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169", "parenthetical": "attorney fees recoverable under escrow agreement providing for reimbursement for \" 'all expenses and liabilities incurred in connection with the escrow agreement' \"" }, { "page": "910", "parenthetical": "attorney fees recoverable under escrow agreement providing for reimbursement for \" 'all expenses and liabilities incurred in connection with the escrow agreement' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/70/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Idaho 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 8585295 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1912, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/22/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 A.2d 1039", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7895052 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1041", "parenthetical": "Maine court held the phrase \" 'costfs] of collection' \" in a guaranty contract to indemnify is essentially a promissory note, in which case it is synonymous with \"collection fees,\" \"expenses of collection,\" or \"attorneys' fees\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/525/1039-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 A. 194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "phrase \" 'costs[ ] and expenses' [(3 Comp. St. 1910, \u00a7 196, at 3884)]\" in Orphans Court Act includes attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.J. Eq. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Eq.", "case_ids": [ 584531 ], "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422-23", "parenthetical": "phrase \" 'costs[ ] and expenses' [(3 Comp. St. 1910, \u00a7 196, at 3884)]\" in Orphans Court Act includes attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-eq/113/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 Utah 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Utah", "case_ids": [ 8874634 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188", "parenthetical": "attorney fees recoverable as an expense under a contempt statute allowing for \" 'costs and expenses' [(Rev. Stat. 1898 \u00a7 3368)]\"" }, { "page": "744", "parenthetical": "attorney fees recoverable as an expense under a contempt statute allowing for \" 'costs and expenses' [(Rev. Stat. 1898 \u00a7 3368)]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/utah/29/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910519 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "statute giving insurer the right to reimbursement less the \" 'cost[s] of collection' [(Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23 - 89-207 (1987))]\" held the commonsense definition of the phrase includes, among other things, attorney fees" }, { "page": "61", "parenthetical": "statute giving insurer the right to reimbursement less the \" 'cost[s] of collection' [(Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23 - 89-207 (1987))]\" held the commonsense definition of the phrase includes, among other things, attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 544", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "495 A.2d 1286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court interpreted \" 'all reasonable costs of collection' [(N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 544 - A:2 (1985))]\" under a statute governing bad checks to include attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 N.H. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4407152 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "court interpreted \" 'all reasonable costs of collection' [(N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 544 - A:2 (1985))]\" under a statute governing bad checks to include attorney fees" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/126/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 N.E. 1004", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "attorney fees and costs recoverable as an \" 'expense' \" under a chattel mortgage" }, { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "1004" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 Mass. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 33607 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "attorney fees and costs recoverable as an \" 'expense' \" under a chattel mortgage" }, { "page": "263" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/219/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 A.2d 161", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Me. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Me.", "case_ids": [ 962506 ], "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/me/155/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "899 P.2d 1259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1262", "parenthetical": "\" 'costs of collection' \" clause in note presumably includes attorney fees and court costs" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Wash. 2d 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 433029 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394", "parenthetical": "\" 'costs of collection' \" clause in note presumably includes attorney fees and court costs" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/127/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 A. 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.", "year": 1934, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591", "parenthetical": "note allowing for recovery of \" 'all legal costs, and expenses of collection, including an attorney's fee' \" is still negotiable even though statute allows for \" 'costs of collection or an attorney's fee' [(56 Furd. Stat. \u00a7 2" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Mont. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 4819711 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "549-50" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "549" }, { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "note is negotiable even though it allows for \" 'attorney's fees and all costs of collection' \" because \" 'costs of collection' \" and \" 'attorney's fees' \" are synonymous under negotiable-instruments statute and note (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/71/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Okla. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Okla.", "case_ids": [ 6438605 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "816" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "817-18" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "818" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "817-18", "parenthetical": "provision in promissory note for \" 'collection fees' \" did not render it nonnegotiable because the phrase is synonymous with \"attorney's fees,\" \"costs of collection,\" and \"expenses of collection\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/okla/66/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Mont. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 5088673 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1943, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "258" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/114/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.Y.S.2d 948", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950" }, { "page": "951" }, { "page": "952" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Misc. 2d 878", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1145441 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" }, { "page": "881" }, { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/44/0878-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 N.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417-18" }, { "page": "418-19" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Ill. App. 3d 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5305916 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320-21" }, { "page": "321-22" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/35/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 F.3d 1419", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1527382 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1426" }, { "page": "1426" }, { "page": "1426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/15/1419-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596-97" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596-97" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "596-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5641258 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "272" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "273" }, { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "716 N.E.2d 1256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1260" }, { "page": "1260" }, { "page": "1260" }, { "page": "1260" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173575 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" }, { "page": "70" }, { "page": "70" }, { "page": "70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" }, { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5297776 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277-78" }, { "page": "277-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 1330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1336" }, { "page": "1336" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2553760 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" }, { "page": "502" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 1263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963681 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 N.E.2d 1160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1162" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 526", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872519 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0526-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1263, "char_count": 30853, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3874136702358946e-07, "percentile": 0.6417208107499703 }, "sha256": "858191946c86e6cb3f523175623ebd2a913eed7e9930b0dfe61026064395792e", "simhash": "1:3aad3ce0335ff4a3", "word_count": 4914 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:25.526171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "NEGRO NEST, LLC, d/b/a Servpro of Springfield, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MID-NORTHERN MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn October 2002, plaintiff, Negro Nest, LLC, doing business as Servpro of Springfield (Servpro), filed suit against defendant, Mid-Northern Management, Inc. (Mid-Northern), seeking payment for services rendered pursuant to a contract. In November 2003, the parties settled on the amount owed for the services provided but reserved the issues regarding interest, attorney fees, and costs for the trial court\u2019s determination. In March 2004, the trial court entered judgment in Servpro\u2019s favor, awarding $15,659.87 in attorney fees, costs, and interest.\nOn appeal, Mid-Northern argues the trial court erred in its award because (1) the parties\u2019 contract did not specifically provide a basis for awarding attorney fees and (2) the fees awarded were unreasonable. Because we agree with the first point, we reverse.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn February 2002, ServPro entered into a contract with Mid-Northern by which Servpro was to perform cleaning and restoration services on a multiunit apartment complex managed by Mid-Northern. The contract was prepared by ServPro and included a provision stating, \u201cIf the undersigned fails to pay for services rendered and collection efforts become necessary, the undersigned agrees to be responsible for all collection costs incurred.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Servpro performed pursuant to the contract and sent Mid-Northern an invoice for $7,860.66.\nBetween February and September 2002, Servpro sent six invoices to Mid-Northern. Mid-Northern did not pay the bill. In October 2002, Servpro filed suit seeking $8,744.50 plus interest, reasonable attorney fees, court costs, and all costs of collection. The parties settled in November 2003 for the full amount of the original invoice, $7,860.66, and the remaining issues regarding interest, attorney fees, and costs were left to be determined by the trial court.\nIn March 2004, the trial court heard oral arguments on the issues. The primary point of contention was whether the contract provision providing for \u201call collection costs\u201d allowed Servpro to collect for its attorney fees. The trial court held attorney fees are encompassed within \u201call collection costs.\u201d The court entered judgment in Servpro\u2019s favor, awarding $12,668.75 in attorney fees, $524.27 costs, and $2,467.85 interest for a total of $15,659.87. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nMid-Northern first contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Servpro because the court incorrectly found \u201call collection costs\u201d included attorney fees.\nA. Standard of Review\nThe construction of a contract is a question of law, and the standard of review is de novo. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co. v. Pavlick, 265 Ill. App. 3d 526, 529, 637 N.E.2d 1160, 1162 (1994).\nB. Illinois Is an American Rule Jurisdiction\nIllinois follows the \u201cAmerican Rule,\u201d which provides that absent statutory authority or a contractual agreement, each party must bear its own attorney fees and costs. Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzman, 193 Ill. 2d 560, 572, 739 N.E.2d 1263, 1271 (2000). Statutes permitting the recovery of costs are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. Calcagno v. Personalcare Health Management, Inc., 207 Ill. App. 3d 493, 502, 565 N.E.2d 1330, 1336 (1991). Similarly, contractual provisions providing for attorney fees should also be strictly construed. Helland v. Helland, 214 Ill. App. 3d 275, 277-78, 573 N.E.2d 357, 359 (1991). Successful litigants cannot recover attorney fees as costs unless expressly authorized by a statute or agreement using specific language. See Estate of Downs v. Webster, 307 Ill. App. 3d 65, 70, 716 N.E.2d 1256, 1260 (1999).\nA statute or contract must allow for attorney fees by specific language, such that one cannot recover if the provision does not specifically state that \u201cattorney fees\u201d are recoverable. See Downs, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 70, 716 N.E.2d at 1260; Qazi v. Ismail, 50 Ill. App. 3d 271, 273, 364 N.E.2d 595, 596-97 (1977).\nC. Seventh Circuit Boulevard Bank Opinion\nThe contract provision at issue calls for recovery of \u201call collection costs.\u201d The contract makes no mention of attorney fees. Plaintiff asks this court to include attorney fees under the umbrella of \u201ccollection costs.\u201d\nPlaintiff relies exclusively on a Seventh Circuit case, Boulevard Bank National Ass\u2019n v. Philips Medical Systems International B.V., 15 F.3d 1419 (7th Cir. 1994), which held \u201ccollection costs\u201d included attorney fees under Illinois law. The Boulevard court distinguished the general principle that attorney fees are not recoverable unless explicitly authorized by written contract, on the basis that those prior courts had only been construing the term \u201ccosts\u201d alone, and not when modified by another term such as \u201ccollection.\u201d Boulevard, 15 F.3d at 1426. The court reasoned that to give effect to the term \u201ccollection costs\u201d it was necessary to include attorney fees, the major cost incurred, and that if the parties wanted to exclude attorney fees they would have used the word \u201ccosts\u201d alone. Boulevard, 15 F.3d at 1426. The court found the term \u201ccollection\u201d modified the term \u201ccosts\u201d in such a way as to allow recovery under the contract. Boulevard, 15 F.3d at 1426. In coming to this conclusion, the court relied on Meeker v. Fowler, 35 Ill. App. 3d 313, 341 N.E.2d 412 (1976), which interpreted \u201ccollection charge\u201d under section 20 of \u201cAn Act in relation to retail installment sales\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 121V2, par. 243) (hereinafter 1965 Act) to include attorney fees.\nD. Meeker: An Anomaly Caused by the Interplay of Contracts and Statutory Penalty Provisions\nIn Meeker, the parties signed numerous instruments, during two transactions in 1965 and in 1968, representing the transfer of three grain bins. The trial court found each transaction constituted an installment sales contract that was governed by the version of the act in effect at the inception of each contract. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 12172, pars. 223 through 253; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 12172, pars. 501 through 533 (hereinafter 1967 Act). The trial court found the seller noncompliant with the acts and implemented sanctions under two provisions, including denying the seller recovery of his attorney fees because the court believed the fees constituted a \u201ccollection charge,\u201d forfeited under one of the statutory penalty provisions. The appellate court reversed the trial court in part, finding the 1968 transaction did not fall within the 1967 Act, but also remanded the cause for a determination of whether the 1965 transaction fell within the 1965 Act. Meeker, 35 Ill. App. 3d at 320-21, 341 N.E.2d at 417-18. The court, in dicta, went on to address whether, if the 1965 transaction did fall within the 1965 Act, the seller could be denied recovery of his attorney fees as a statutory penalty for his noncompliance.\nSection 20 of the 1965 Act stated in part, \u201c[a]ny person violating [certain provisions of the Act] *** is barred from recovery of any finance charge, delinquency],] or collection charge *** on the retail installment contract involved.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 12172, par. 243. The seller contended the trial court erred in denying him recovery for his attorney fees as a \u201ccollection charge\u201d under the provision. In support, the seller pointed to section 6 of the Act, which allowed the holder of the contract to include contract provisions allowing for recovery of delinquency and collection charges as well as reasonable attorney fees in the instance of default. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 12172, par. 228. The seller argued \u201ccollection charge\u201d in section 20 should not be interpreted to encompass attorney fees because the legislature clearly treated collection charges separately from attorney fees in section 6. The Meeker court rejected this argument, finding section 6 only applied when holders in compliance with the law were seeking to recover under their contracts. Meeker, 35 Ill. App. 3d at 321-22, 341 N.E.2d at 418-19.\nThe Meeker court emphasized the buyers were trying to recover under an additional statutory penalty provision, section 17, which allowed a monetary penalty plus recovery of the buyer\u2019s attorney fees if the seller failed to comply with the provisions of the act. Meeker, 35 Ill. App. 3d at 322, 341 N.E.2d at 419. Assuming the contract fell under the 1965 Act, the seller\u2019s violations would result in (1) the seller\u2019s forfeiture of any finance, delinquency, and collection charges; (2) a monetary penalty against the seller equal to the contract finance charge or 10% of the purchase price; and (3) the seller\u2019s payment of the buyer\u2019s attorney fees. Meeker, 35 Ill. App. 3d at 322, 341 N.E.2d at 419; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 121V2, pars. 240, 243. Given the penalty provisions and the seller\u2019s violation of the law, the court concluded it would be ironic to allow the seller to recover his attorney fees. Meeker, 35 Ill. App. 3d at 322, 341 N.E.2d at 419.\nIn support, the Meeker court stated, \u201c[tjhough the question seems not to have been considered in Illinois, we find authority from other jurisdictions to the effect that \u2018collection charge\u2019 includes attorney\u2019s fees.\u201d Meeker, 35 Ill. App. 3d at 322, 341 N.E.2d at 419, citing Ben Construction Corp. v. Snushall, 44 Misc. 2d 878, 254 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1964); General Finance Co. v. Powell, 114 Mont. 473, 138 P.2d 255 (1943); McClain v. Continental Supply Co., 66 Okla. 225, 168 P. 815 (1917). The Meeker court was attempting to give effect to the penalty provision within the context of the entire 1965 Act but in doing so, interpreted statutory language to include attorney fees absent express language. We find Meeker unpersuasive in the present case and contrary to prevailing Illinois law.\nE. Authorities Underpinning Meeker\nAs already noted, Meeker relied on authority from three other American Rule jurisdictions in reaching its conclusion. At issue in Ben Construction Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 878, 254 N.Y.S.2d 948, was a penalty provision in an act governing retail installment contracts. The plaintiff was seeking liquidated damages and attorney fees pursuant to a contract provision allowing for such in the event of defendant\u2019s breach. Ben Construction Corp., 44 Misc. 2d at 880, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The trial court found the plaintiff noncompliant with the governing act and applied the act\u2019s penalty provision. Ben Construction Corp., 44 Misc. 2d at 881, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 951. The court denied the plaintiff recovery, finding the damages and attorney fees were forfeited as delinquency and collection charges pursuant to the act. Ben Construction Corp., 44 Misc. 2d at 881, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 952.\nIn General Finance Co., 114 Mont. at 475, 138 P.2d at 256, at issue was a guaranty contract providing for \u201c \u2018all collection expenses.\u2019 \u201d The court held attorney fees were recoverable as a collection expense because the plaintiff was forced to file suit to collect. General Finance Co., 114 Mont. at 481, 138 P.2d at 258. The General Finance Co. court relied on Wood v. Ferguson, 71 Mont. 540, 230 P. 592 (1924), an earlier Montana case. General Finance Co., 114 Mont. at 481, 138 P.2d at 258. Wood held the negotiability of a note providing for \u201c \u2018attorney\u2019s fees and all costs of collection\u2019 \u201d was not destroyed even though the governing statute only allowed for \u201c \u2018costs of collection or an attorney\u2019s fee.\u2019 \u201d (Emphases in original.) Wood, 71 Mont. at 549, 230 P. at 594, quoting Rev. Codes 1921, \u00a7 8409. Relying in part on McClain, 66 Okla. 225, 168 P. 815, the Wood court held \u201c \u2018cost of collection\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018attorney\u2019s fees\u2019 \u201d were synonymous under the statute and note. Wood, 71 Mont. at 549-50, 230 P. at 594, quoting Rev. Codes 1921, \u00a7 8409.\nIn McClain, the court considered whether a promissory note allowing for \u201c \u2018collection fees\u2019 \u201d rendered the note nonnegotiable. McClain, 66 Okla. at 226, 168 P. at 816. The court held \u201c \u2018collection fees\u2019 \u201d was essentially synonymous with \u201cattorney\u2019s fees,\u201d \u201ccosts of collection,\u201d or \u201cexpenses of collection\u201d and did not render a note nonnegotiable. McClain, 66 Okla. at 228, 168 P. at 817-18. The court stated as follows:\n\u201cIn a strict legal sense \u2018collection fees\u2019 might be a broader term than \u2018attorney\u2019s fees,\u2019 for \u2018collection fees\u2019 might embody expenses involved in endeavoring to collect said note by some person other than a licensed attorney and so this might be true of \u2018costs of collection\u2019; however, the courts in determining the meaning of these stipulations, so far as we have been able to ascertain, have all treated them as synonymous terms when used in promissory notes and holding that it was a provision or stipulation to reimburse the payee and his assignees for an attorney\u2019s fee.\u201d McClain, 66 Okla. at 228, 168 P. at 818.\nF. Survey: Attorney Fee Recoverablity Under Broader Fhraseology\n1. Negotiable Instruments\nIn the context of negotiable instruments, particularly promissory notes, there appears to be general acceptance that provisions for \u201ccosts of collection\u201d are either synonymous with \u201cattorney fees\u201d or are sufficient to overcome the American Rule. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 373 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \u201ccosts of collection\u201d as \u201c[e]xpenses incurred in receiving payment of a note; esp., attorney\u2019s fees created in the effort to collect a note\u201d); Philadelphia National Bank v. Buchman, 314 Fa. 343, 348-49, 171 A. 589, 591 (1934) (note allowing for recovery of \u201c \u2018all legal costs, and expenses of collection, including an attorney\u2019s fee\u2019 \u201d is still negotiable even though statute allows for \u201c \u2018costs of collection or an attorney\u2019s fee\u2019 [(56 Furd. Stat. \u00a7 2)]\u201d because \u201cor\u201d in statute is not material and the phrases are synonymous); Paulman v. Filtercorp, Inc., 127 Wash. 2d 387, 394, 899 P.2d 1259, 1262 (1995) (\u201c \u2018costs of collection\u2019 \u201d clause in note presumably includes attorney fees and court costs); Cox v. Hagan, 125 Va. 656, 680, 100 S.E. 666, 674 (1919) (provision in note providing for \u201c \u2018costs of collection\u2019 \u201d refers not to the costs of suit, which are allowed by law, but to attorney fees expended in attempting to collect on the note); McClain, 66 Okla. at 228, 168 P. at 817-18 (provision in promissory note for \u201c \u2018collection fees\u2019 \u201d did not render it nonnegotiable because the phrase is synonymous with \u201cattorney\u2019s fees,\u201d \u201ccosts of collection,\u201d and \u201cexpenses of collection\u201d); Wood, 71 Mont. at 549, 230 P. at 594 (note is negotiable even though it allows for \u201c \u2018attorney\u2019s fees and all costs of collection\u2019 \u201d because \u201c \u2018costs of collection\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018attorney\u2019s fees\u2019 \u201d are synonymous under negotiable-instruments statute and note (emphasis in original)), quoting Rev. Codes 1921, \u00a7 8409); Pepperell Trust Co. v. Mehlman, 155 Me. 318, 319-21, 154 A.2d 161, 162-63 (1959) (note providing recovery of \u201c \u2018all cost and other expenses attendant to enforcing payment of this note\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018all expenses, if any are incurred, of foreclosure of this mortgage, together with all costs and other expenses attendant to enforcing payment of this note with interest on said sums\u2019 \u201d allows for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees incurred by the mortgagee in protecting his position); Haczela v. Krupa, 219 Mass. 261, 106 N.E. 1004 (1914) (attorney fees and costs recoverable as an \u201c \u2018expense\u2019 \u201d under a chattel mortgage).\n2. Outside Context of Negotiable Instruments\nSeveral American Rule jurisdictions have also considered whether attorney fees are recoverable under imprecise statutory and contractual language outside the context of negotiable instruments. Some of these jurisdictions have concluded \u201ccollection costs\u201d or other imprecise statutory language does include attorney fees. See Leavitt v. Hamelin, 126 N.H. 670, 495 A.2d 1286 (1985) (court interpreted \u201c \u2018all reasonable costs of collection\u2019 [(N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 544 \u2014 A:2 (1985))]\u201d under a statute governing bad checks to include attorney fees); Wenrich v. Crater, 315 Ark. 361, 364, 868 S.W.2d 60, 61 (1993) (statute giving insurer the right to reimbursement less the \u201c \u2018cost[s] of collection\u2019 [(Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23 \u2014 89\u2014207 (1987))]\u201d held the commonsense definition of the phrase includes, among other things, attorney fees); Davidson v. Munsey, 29 Utah 181, 188, 80 P. 743, 744 (1905) (attorney fees recoverable as an expense under a contempt statute allowing for \u201c \u2018costs and expenses\u2019 [(Rev. Stat. 1898 \u00a7 3368)]\u201d); In re Loudenslager, 113 N.J. Eq. 418, 422-23, 167 A. 194, 196 (1933) (phrase \u201c \u2018costs[ ] and expenses\u2019 [(3 Comp. St. 1910, \u00a7 196, at 3884)]\u201d in Orphans Court Act includes attorney fees).\nSome jurisdictions have interpreted similar contract provisions as including attorney fees. See Wrenfield Homeowners Ass\u2019n v. DeYoung, 410 Pa. Super. 621, 627-29, 600 A.2d 960, 963-64 (1991) (\u201c \u2018costs of collection\u2019 \u201d in a homeowners association covenant allows the association to recover its attorney fees upon suit to recover association dues; noting the phrase is synonymous with \u201cattorney fees\u201d in the context of promissory notes and negotiable instruments law); Top Line Distributors, Inc. v. Spickler, 525 A.2d 1039, 1041 (Me. 1987) (Maine court held the phrase \u201c \u2018costfs] of collection\u2019 \u201d in a guaranty contract to indemnify is essentially a promissory note, in which case it is synonymous with \u201ccollection fees,\u201d \u201cexpenses of collection,\u201d or \u201cattorneys\u2019 fees\u201d); Coast Lumber Co. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 22 Idaho 264, 272, 125 P. 185, 187 (1912) (provisions in insurance contract that insurance company will \u201c \u2018pay the expense of litigation\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018will, at its own cost, defend such suit in the name and on behalf of the Assured\u2019 \u201d were clear and express promises to pay the costs incurred in defending a suit against the assured and attorney fees are part of these costs); Terry v. Terry, 70 Idaho 161, 169, 213 P.2d 906, 910 (1950) (attorney fees recoverable under escrow agreement providing for reimbursement for \u201c \u2018all expenses and liabilities incurred in connection with the escrow agreement\u2019 \u201d); Brady v. Dilley, 27 Md. 570, 582 (1867) (attorney fees properly awarded under terms of a deed of trust providing for recovery of \u201c \u2018all just and reasonable expenses, costs, charges[,] and commissions\u2019 \u201d attending the due execution of the trust).\nAt the same time, some courts have rejected the notion \u201ccollection costs\u201d or \u201ccosts of collection\u201d encompasses attorney fees. In Capital Building Supplies, Inc. v. Miller, 536 N.E.2d 297 (Ind. App. 1989), an. Indiana court held the plaintiff could not recover attorney fees expended in defending a judgment on appeal as \u201ccollection costs\u201d under an Indiana small claims rule. The rule allowed for the recovery of \u201c \u2018reasonable collection costs\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018formal collection\u2019 \u201d fees. Capital Building Supplies, 536 N.E.2d at 298, quoting Small Claims R. 11(D). The majority based its holding on its interpretation of the American Rule, including that attorney fees are generally not regarded as \u201ccosts,\u201d and its belief as to the plain meaning of the phrase \u201ccollection costs.\u201d Capital Building Supplies, 536 N.E.2d at 298-99. In addition, a Georgia court found \u201c \u2018costs of collection\u2019 \u201d in a real estate covenant was insufficient language to overcome the American Rule and refused to award attorney fees. Arbor Station Homeowners Services, Inc. v. Dorman, 255 Ga. App. 866, 867-68, 567 S.E.2d 102, 104 (2002).\nAt least two jurisdictions have determined the word \u201cexpense\u201d varies depending on the context. In Sears v. Inhabitants of Nahant, 215 Mass. 234, 240, 102 N.E. 491, 493 (1913), after examining several prior decisions, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted \u201cexpense\u201d was capable of multiple meanings. In Sears, the court concluded the statute at issue did not allow the town to recover attorney fees absent clear legislative intent through unmistakable language. Sears, 215 Mass, at 241, 102 N.E.2d at 494. In Haczela v. Krupa, 219 Mass, at 263, 106 N.E. at 1004, the same court held attorney fees and costs incurred in defense of an equity suit were recoverable as \u201c \u2018expenses *** sustained *** in relation\u2019 \u201d to property as provided for by a chattel mortgage. The court stated, \u201c \u2018[ejxpense\u2019 is a word of somewhat varying significance. But, when used in mortgages, it has been held to be broad enough to include reasonable counsel fees.\u201d Haczela, 219 Mass, at 263, 106 N.E. at 1004.\nIn Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Goldsmith, 239 Mo. App. 188, 197-98, 192 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1945), the Missouri Court of Appeals held attorney fees were not recoverable under a bond provision allowing for \u201c \u2018loss, expense[,] and damage.\u2019 \u201d The court noted when \u201ccosts\u201d or \u201cexpenses\u201d is used in a statute it generally does not encompass attorney fees. Prudential, 239 Mo. App. at 197, 192 S.W.2d at 4. The court also stated that while attorney fees are generally not recoverable under a contract provision for the payment of \u201cexpenses,\u201d they have been held recoverable as an \u201cexpense of litigation\u201d under a liability insurance policy. Prudential, 239 Mo. App. at 197, 192 S.W.2d at 4. After observing \u201c[t]he decisions of the various states seem to allow or deny *** attorneys\u2019 fees under various facts and are not at all uniform,\u201d the court held attorney fees were not recoverable as an \u201cexpense\u201d under a strict construction of the contract at issue. Prudential, 239 Mo. App. at 197-98, 192 S.W.2d at 4.\nIn In re Mason, 203 S.W.2d 750 (1947), a Missouri Court of Appeals cited Prudential with approval for the proposition a contract provision for \u201c \u2018collection expense[s]\u2019 \u201d does not include attorney fees. However, the court did not make a dispositive finding on this issue because the facts did not warrant it. Mason, 203 S.W.2d at 759-60.\nIn City of Springfield v. Events Publishing Co., 951 S.W.2d 366, 374 (Mo. App. 1997), the Missouri Court of Appeals held the phrase \u201c \u2018at the expense of the public governmental body\u2019 [(Mo. Rev. Stat. \u00a7 610.027.5 (1994))]\u201d in the Missouri Sunshine Law required the public governmental body to pay its opponent\u2019s attorney fees. The court distinguished Prudential on the basis that the contract in that case was to be strictly construed while the Sunshine Law was to be liberally construed. City of Springfield, 951 S.W.2d at 373-74.\nG. Attorney Fee Recoverability Under Illinois Statutes\n\u201c[Sjtatutes permitting recovery of costs, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed [citation], and litigants should not be permitted to recover as costs items other than those specified in the statute authorizing such awards.\u201d Calcagno, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 502, 565 N.E.2d at 1336. Illinois courts generally refuse to allow recovery for attorney fees unless the statute specifically states that \u201cattorney fees\u201d are recoverable. Downs, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 70, 716 N.E.2d at 1260; see Miller v. Pollution Control Board, 267 Ill. App. 3d 160, 171-72, 642 N.E.2d 475, 485 (1994) (error to award attorney fees as \u201c \u2018hearing costs\u2019 [(Ill. Rev. Stat 1991, ch. IIIV2, par. 1042(b)(4))]\u201d under Environmental Protection Act absent specific language); People ex rel. Henderson v. Redfern, 104 Ill. App. 2d 132, 135-36, 243 N.E.2d 252, 254 (1968) (award of attorney fees proper only when specifically provided for in statute; improper for court to enlarge \u201c \u2018cost of the prosecution\u2019 [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 112, par. 14)]\u201d to include attorney fees); Waller v. Board of Education of Century Community Unit School District, 28 Ill. App. 3d 328, 331-33, 328 N.E.2d 604, 606-08 (1975) (statutory provision providing liability for an amount \u201c \u2018not limited to loss of income and costs incurred therein\u2019 [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 122, par. 24 \u2014 12)]\u201d for \u201ccost of prosecution\u201d does not include attorney fees); International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers v. Chicago Park District, 349 Ill. App. 3d 546, 552, 812 N.E.2d 407, 412 (2004) (absent specific language, \u201c \u2018disbursements\u2019 [(710 ILCS 5/14 (West 2000))]\u201d cannot be interpreted to include attorney fees under the Arbitration Act); City of Chicago v. Illinois Fair Employment. Practices Comm\u2019n, 34 Ill. App. 3d 114, 117, 339 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1975) (court held Commission\u2019s order for payment of attorney fees under the Fair Employment Practices Act was void absent specific language and not within limited exceptions to the American Rule).\nH. Attorney Fee Recoverablity Under Illinois Contracts\nIn this case, the language at issue is part of a contract and the court must determine the intention of the parties. J.B. Esker & Sons, Inc. v. Cle-Pa\u2019s Partnership, 325 Ill. App. 3d 276, 285, 757 N.E.2d 1271, 1279 (2001). The words used will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 272, 364 N.E.2d at 596. However, similar to their statutory counterparts, contractual fee-shifting provisions must be strictly construed. Helland, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 277-78, 573 N.E.2d at 359.\nWhen faced with cost or expense-shifting provisions in contracts, Illinois courts have consistently refused to read attorney fees into imprecise language. Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 5 Ill. App. 3d 450, 457-58, 283 N.E.2d 517, 522 (1972) (\u201ccosts\u201d when used in express indemnity agreements does not include attorney fees and other expenses); Singleton v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. App. 3d 994, 995-96, 369 N.E.2d 227, 228-29 (1977) (agreement to \u201c \u2018indemnify and save harmless\u2019 *** \u2018against all loss, damage!,] or expense *** as a result of any suits, actions!,] or claims of any character\u2019 \u201d is insufficient for recovery of attorney fees or expenses; noting \u201c[t]he agreement did not even refer to attorney\u2019s fees and costs, and those items are not recoverable\u201d); Nalivaika v. Murphy, 120 Ill. App. 3d 773, 777, 458 N.E.2d 995, 997 (1983) (indemnity agreement providing defendants \u201c \u2018further agree to indemnify [plaintiff] *** from any claim of [third-party plaintiffs]\u2019 \u201d was not specific enough to support an award of attorney fees because the agreement did not mention attorney fees); Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985) (federal court interpreting Illinois law held indemnity agreement releasing defendant \u201c \u2018from any and all obligations, claims, demands, liabilities, actions, and causes of action\u2019 \u201d that the plaintiff then had was insufficient to recover attorney fees in the present action because the contract \u201cmade no mention of attorney! ] fees or costs in the event of a breach\u201d).\nNotably, in Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d 271, 364 N.E.2d 595, the First District applied principles of statutory construction to interpret imprecise contractual language. In Qazi, the issue was whether attorney fees were recoverable under a contract provision stating as follows: \u201c \u2018In case of any legal action arising out of the above default, the party in violation will be responsible for all costs and consequences.\u2019 \u201d Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 272, 364 N.E.2d at 596. The plaintiff argued attorney fees should be recoverable because legal action was specifically contemplated by the contract and attorney fees are a natural \u201cconsequence\u201d of litigation. Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 272, 364 N.E.2d at 596. Seeking guidance from statutory fees provisions, the Qazi court stated:\n\u201c \u2018The legislature has in the past specifically provided for attorneys\u2019 fees where it wished to, and the courts have refused to interpret imprecise language as permitting attorneys\u2019 fees.\nThe legislature has determined when attorney\u2019s fees should be awarded. It has been done by specific language such as listing \u2018attorney\u2019s fees\u2019 to overcome the common!-]law rule. Where they have not used such specific language, the courts have consistently refused to give an expanded reading to the legislative language used.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 364 N.E.2d at 596-97, quoting Waller, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 331, 328 N.E.2d at 606-07.\nApplying the rule of statutory construction, the court found it could not award attorney fees as a matter of contractual construction absent specific language. Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 364 N.E.2d at 597. In Qazi, no evidence was presented as to the parties\u2019 meaning of the word \u201cconsequences,\u201d and the court refused to interpret it to include attorney fees. Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 364 N.E.2d at 597.\nOur survey of American Rule jurisdictions illustrates the uncertainty generated by imprecise cost and fee-shifting provisions. We agree with the Missouri court in its assessment that \u201cthe various states seem to allow or deny *** attorneys\u2019 fees under various facts and are not at all uniform.\u201d Prudential, 239 Mo. App. at 197, 192 S.W.2d at 4. While the majority of jurisdictions presented with this issue have taken an expanded view of these provisions, we take a narrower reading of statutory and contractual cost and fee-shifting provisions as we deem Illinois law requires strict construction of same.\nThe American Rule dictates that attorney fees are not recoverable absent express statutory or contractual language. Downs, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 70, 716 N.E.2d at 1260. The contract in this case provided for \u201call costs of collection,\u201d and no evidence was presented on the parties\u2019 meaning of this phrase. The contract did not specifically provide for attorney fees as required. See Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 273, 364 N.E.2d at 596-97. Contracting parties must make clear their desire to deviate from the rule so the parties have notice of their potential liability when entering into or disputing contracts. Expressly stating that \u201cattorney fees\u201d are recoverable is the clearest and easiest way to do this. Maintaining a bright-line rule is consistent with American Rule principles and strict construction of these provisions. In addition, it promotes certainty in the law, thereby putting parties on notice of their potential liability and reducing litigation.\nIII. EPILOGUE\nWe must therefore reverse the trial court. We find the contract provision allowing for \u201call collection costs\u201d was not sufficient to allow recovery for attorney fees. As this case illustrates, attorney fees can be a substantial expense and are an important consideration when entering into contracts. As the drafter of the contract and potential seeker of attorney fees, Servpro had the responsibility to clearly apprise Mid-Northern of its potential liability.\nSince we find the contract language does not provide for an award of attorney fees, we need not address the question of whether the incurred fees were reasonable.\nIV CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nReversed.\nSTEIGMANN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "John E. Kerley, of Kerley & Associates, P.C., of Springfield, for appellant.", "Samuel J. Witsman and Jason Anselment, both of Hart, Southworth & Witsman, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NEGRO NEST, LLC, d/b/a Servpro of Springfield, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MID-NORTHERN MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140333\nOpinion filed December 1, 2005.\nJohn E. Kerley, of Kerley & Associates, P.C., of Springfield, for appellant.\nSamuel J. Witsman and Jason Anselment, both of Hart, Southworth & Witsman, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0640-01", "first_page_order": 658, "last_page_order": 669 }