{ "id": 4260691, "name": "ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission", "decision_date": "2005-12-13", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201404\u20140911", "first_page": "652", "last_page": "663", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 652" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "817 N.E.2d 463", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444474 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 U.S. 519", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6158216 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" }, { "page": "1652" }, { "page": "1392" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "1652" }, { "page": "1392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/331/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536" }, { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505-06" }, { "page": "506" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 1264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1269" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 2d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550589 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/123/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "832 N.E.2d 472", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5730469 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "690 N.E.2d 1058", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 755", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35385 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0755-01" ] }, { "cite": "752 N.E.2d 1112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1120" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351263 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "774 N.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034201 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 N.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147575 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 1349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544480 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1121-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738801 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476980 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "162" }, { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "779 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442040 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6209106 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "2781" }, { "page": "843" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "2782" }, { "page": "842-45" }, { "page": "702-04" }, { "page": "2781-83" }, { "page": "843-44" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "2782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65", "parenthetical": "\"As we find that the statute is not ambiguous, we decline to defer to the [agency's] interpretation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57346 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "\"As we find that the statute is not ambiguous, we decline to defer to the [agency's] interpretation\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 U.S. 354", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1775193 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., concurring" }, { "page": "344", "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., concurring" }, { "page": "2444", "parenthetical": "Scalia, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/487/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 F.2d 483", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 3579048, 2106324 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/392/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "300" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "299-300" }, { "page": "299-300" }, { "page": "300" }, { "page": "300-01" }, { "page": "300" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112244 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" }, { "page": "145-46" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "152-53" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "153-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "804 N.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462961 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "809 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4021926 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 1373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3557744 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 Ill. App. 3d 957", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2583499 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/203/0957-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. Reg. 12083", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "eff. September 1, 2004" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1182, "char_count": 27635, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.210956212517322e-07, "percentile": 0.5959538567692556 }, "sha256": "e11feffa12ffcd7e6bd760fd42dd8d6006f3b5dea895aec3e73d34ebd34f081b", "simhash": "1:333628e26bfc0f80", "word_count": 4380 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:25.526171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn 2004, in administrative rule-making proceedings, the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) adopted a rule entitled \u201cWholesale Service Quality for Telecommunication Carriers\u201d (83 Ill. Adm. Code pt. 731 (2004), as adopted at 28 Ill. Reg. 12083 (eff. September 1, 2004)). In this new rule, the Commission regulates a type of wholesale telecommunications service called \u201cspecial access.\u201d 83 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 731.310 (2004), as adopted at 28 Ill. Reg. 12083, 12101-02 (eff. September 1, 2004). Petitioner, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, appeals on two grounds. First, the statute from which the Commission claims to derive its regulatory authority, section 13 \u2014 712(g) of the Public Utilities Act (Act) (220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 712(g) (West 2004)), confers no authority to regulate special access. Second, by classifying telecommunications carriers into four levels (83 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 731.110 (2004), as adopted at 28 Ill. Reg. 12083, 12095-96 (eff. September 1, 2004)) and regulating only the special access provided by \u201cLevel 1 carriers\u201d (83 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 731.310 (2004), as adopted at 28 Ill. Reg. 12083, 12101-02 (eff. September 1, 2004)), the Commission violates section 13 \u2014 712(a) of the Act (220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 712(a) (West 2004)).\nWe find section 13 \u2014 712(g) to be ambiguous on the question of whether the Commission has authority to regulate special access. Because the legislature has charged the Commission with the task of administering and enforcing section 13 \u2014 712, we defer to the Commission\u2019s interpretation of subsection (g), an interpretation we find to be reasonable. As for petitioner\u2019s second contention, the Commission\u2019s four-tiered classification of carriers does not offend section 13 \u2014 712(a). On its face, subsection (a) applies to \u201cbasic local exchange service,\u201d not special access. 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 712(a) (West 2004). Therefore, we affirm the denial of petitioner\u2019s application for rehearing, and we uphold the challenged rule. See 220 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 201(e)(v) (West 2004).\nI. BACKGROUND\nPetitioner is a \u201clocal exchange carrier.\u201d A \u201ccarrier\u201d is a provider of \u201ctelecommunications services between points within the State which are specified by the user.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 2004). A \u201clocal exchange carrier\u201d provides local, \u201cswitched\u201d telephone service. 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204, 13 \u2014 206 (West 2004). A \u201cswitch\u201d is a computer that routes calls to their destination. An \u201cexchange\u201d is the geographical area \u2014 usually a city, town, or village \u2014 in which calls are deemed local under the \u201ctariff,\u201d or schedule of rates, of the carrier. 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204, 13 \u2014 206 (West 2004). (Long-distance or \u201cinterexchange telecommunications service\u201d is service between two or more exchanges. 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 205 (West 2004).)\nRespondents are the Commission and an alliance of wireless carriers, the Wireless Coalition. From the standpoint of a wireless carrier, wireless telecommunication is not entirely wireless. When someone makes a call on a cellular (cell) phone \u2014 whether it be a local, toll, or long-distance call \u2014 the wireless carrier receives the signal at a cell site (an antenna mounted on a tall structure such as a tower or building) and then transmits the signal, at high speed, to the wireless carrier\u2019s switch. To transmit the signal from its cell site to its switch, the wireless carrier uses special-access circuitry maintained by a local exchange carrier such as petitioner.\nSpecial access differs from basic local exchange service in two ways. First, special access does not pass through the switches of the local exchange carrier; instead, it uses \u201ca dedicated non-switched transmission path\u201d to reach the switch of the wireless carrier. 83 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 731.105, as adopted at 28 Ill. Reg. 12083, 12095, eff. September 1, 2004 (definition of \u201cwholesale special access\u201d); cf. 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204 (West 2004) (defining \u201clocal exchange telecommunications service\u201d as \u201cswitched telecommunications services\u201d). Second (and this distinction is perhaps just another aspect of the first), special access enables telecommunications to travel outside rather than inside the local exchange \u2014 or \u201ccarrier! ]to[ jearrier\u201d as the rule puts it (83 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 731.105 (2004), as adopted at 28 Ill. Reg. 12083, 12095 (eff. September 1, 2004) (definition of \u201cwholesale special access\u201d)). Thus, special access can never be basic local exchange service, the very purpose of special access being to bypass the local exchange.\nAlthough wireless carriers bypass the local exchange, they cannot bypass the local exchange carrier. They depend on the special access that the local exchange carrier provides. To the extent that special access fails, the wireless service fails, resulting in dropped calls, an inability to make or receive calls, and poor call quality.\nAfter workshops with industry stakeholders, evidentiary hearings, and briefing, the Commission found a need to regulate the quality of special access. Several witnesses from wireless carriers testified that local exchange carriers provided poor wholesale special access and thereby impaired their companies\u2019 ability to compete. The Commission found these witnesses to be credible.\nIn Illinois, the Commission found, the vast majority of special access came from three local exchange carriers: petitioner; Verizon North, Inc.; and Verizon South, Inc. (we will call the latter two \u201cVerizon,\u201d collectively). The rule divides carriers into four levels on the basis of differing size and characteristics (83 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 731.110 (2004), as adopted at 28 Ill. Reg. 12083, 12095-96 (eff. September 1, 2004)) and regulates special access provided by \u201cLevel 1 carriers,\u201d i.e., those with 400,000 or more access lines (83 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 731.310 (2004), as adopted at 28 Ill. Reg. 12083, 12101-02, eff. September 1, 2004), but not special access provided by the (smaller) carriers in the remaining three levels. Petitioner and Verizon are the only two carriers in Illinois that meet the description of a \u201cLevel 1 carrier,\u201d and therefore they are the only ones whose special-access services the Commission regulates.\nOn August 4, 2004, having received a certification of no objection from the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules (JCAR), the Commission adopted the rule over petitioner\u2019s objection. Petitioner filed an application for rehearing, arguing, as it did before JCAR, that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to regulate special access. The Commission denied the application on September 22, 2004. This appeal followed. See 220 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 201(a) (West 2004).\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Standard of Review\nIn this appeal, petitioner does not challenge the Commission\u2019s factual findings or its evidentiary basis for adopting the rule. Instead, this appeal presents two narrow issues, both of which require nothing more than statutory construction. First, does section 13 \u2014 712(g) of the Act empower the Commission to regulate special access? Second, does section 13 \u2014 712(a) allow the Commission to limit its regulation of special access to that provided by \u201cLevel 1 carriers\u201d?\nAs a creature of statute, an administrative agency such as the Commission has only the powers that the statute confers. People ex rel. Kilquist v. Brown, 203 Ill. App. 3d 957, 961, 561 N.E.2d 234, 237 (1990). An agency may adopt a rule and regulate an activity only insomuch as a statute empowers the agency to do so. Popejoy v. Zagel, 115 Ill. App. 3d 9, 11, 449 N.E.2d 1373, 1374 (1983). An administrative rule unauthorized by statute is invalid, and we must strike it down. Illinois RSA No. 3, Inc. v. Department of Central Management Services, 348 Ill. App. 3d 72, 76, 809 N.E.2d 137, 140 (2004); 220 ILCS 5/10\u2014 201(e)(iv)(B), (e)(iv)(C) (West 2004).\nBecause the meaning of a statute is a question of law, we generally construe statutes de novo. Quad Cities Open, Inc. v. City of Silvis, 208 Ill. 2d 498, 508, 804 N.E.2d 499, 505 (2004). We say \u201cgenerally\u201d because if the legislature has charged an agency with administering and enforcing a statute, we \u201cwill give substantial weight and deference\u201d to the agency\u2019s resolution of any ambiguities in that statute\u2014 even if the ambiguity concerns the extent of the agency\u2019s jurisdiction under that statute. Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 95 Ill. 2d 142, 152, 447 N.E.2d 295, 300 (1983). In Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 145-46, 447 N.E.2d at 296, for instance, the issue was whether the definition of \u201cpublic utility\u201d in section 10.3(b) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 1112/3, par. 10.3(b)) gave the Commission authority to regulate radio paging. On appeal, the Commission interpreted section 10.3(b) to exclude radio paging (Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 145, 447 N.E.2d at 296), and the supreme court deferred to that interpretation (Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 152, 447 N.E.2d at 299-300). The court said: \u201cIn reaching the judgment that [the radio-paging company] was not a [\u2018(public utility^] and was not within the jurisdiction of the Commission, we have considered and given weight to the interpretation the Commission gives to the *** Act.\u201d Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 152, 447 N.E.2d at 299-300. As the court made clear in that case, \u201c \u2018the general principle of judicial deference to administrative interpretation applies in full strength where such interpretation involves resolution of jurisdictional questions.\u2019 \u201d Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 152-53, 447 N.E.2d at 300, quoting Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 392 F.2d 483, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1968); see also Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381, 101 L. Ed. 2d 322, 344, 108 S. Ct. 2428, 2444 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).\nThus, if reasonable readers of a statute could differ over the extent of the regulatory authority it confers, we defer to the agency\u2019s interpretation if the interpretation is defensible. That rule holds true even if the agency only recently arrived at the interpretation. Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 154, 447 N.E.2d at 300-01. The longer an agency has adhered to an interpretation of the statute, the more weight the interpretation deserves; but consistency and duration are not prerequisites to our duty of deference. Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co., 95 Ill. 2d at 153-54, 447 N.E.2d at 300.\nAmbiguity is, however, a prerequisite: the statute must be ambiguous. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 171 Ill. 2d 230, 239, 664 N.E.2d 61, 65 (1996) (\u201cAs we find that the statute is not ambiguous, we decline to defer to the [agency\u2019s] interpretation\u201d). If the legislative intent is clear, \u201cthat is the end of the matter.\u201d Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 703, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1984). But if the statute is ambiguous \u2014 if reasonably well-informed persons could understand it in more than one sense (People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 36, 46, 779 N.E.2d 875, 881 (2002)) \u2014 \u201cthe court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, *** the question for the court is whether the agency\u2019s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.\u201d Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 703, 104 S. Ct. at 2782. \u201cA court will not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation adopted by the agency charged with the statute\u2019s administration.\u201d Church v. State, 164 Ill. 2d 153, 162, 646 N.E.2d 572, 577 (1995), citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 702-04, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-83.\nThe Commission\u2019s interpretation of section 13 \u2014 712 does not \u201cbind\u201d us in the sense that we must accept it unconditionally, regardless of its reasonableness (see Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 97-98, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1121-22 (1992)), but if the Commission\u2019s interpretation is a permissible one, the fact that we ourselves might have interpreted the statute differently will not justify reversal (Church, 164 Ill. 2d at 162, 646 N.E.2d at 577; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 703, 104 S. Ct. at 2782).\nB. The Scope of \u201cCarrier[-]to[-]Carrier Wholesale Service\u201d\nSection 13 \u2014 712 of the Act reads as follows:\n\u201c\u00a7 13 \u2014 712. Basic local exchange service quality; customer credits.\n(a) It is the intent of the General Assembly that every telecommunications carrier meet minimum service quality standards in providing basic local exchange service on a non-discriminatory basis to all classes of customers.\n(b) Definitions:\n(2) 'Basic local exchange service\u2019 means residential and business lines used for [\u2018]local exchange telecommunications service!\u2019] as defined in [sjection 13 \u2014 204 of this Act [(220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204 (West 2004))] ***.\n(c) The Commission shall promulgate service quality rules for basic local exchange service ***. ***\n(d) The rules shall, at a minimum, require each telecommunications carrier to do all of the following:\n(1) Install basic local exchange service within 5 business days after receipt of an order from the customer ***. *** A telecommunications carrier offering basic local exchange service utilizing the network or network elements of another carrier shall install new lines for basic local exchange service within 3 business days after provisioning of the line or lines by the carrier whose network or network elements are being utilized is complete. ***\n(2) Restore basic local exchange service for a customer within 24 hours of receiving notice that a customer is out of service. ***\n(3) Keep all repair and installation appointments for basic local exchange service ***.\n(4) Inform a customer when a repair or installation appointment requires the customer to be present.\n(e) The rules shall include provisions for customers to be credited by the telecommunications carrier for violations of basic local exchange service quality standards ***. *** At a minimum, the rules shall include the following:\n(1) If a carrier fails to repair an out-of-service condition for basic local exchange service within 24 hours, the carrier shall provide a credit to the customer. ***\n(2) If a carrier fails to install basic local exchange service as required under subdivision (d)(1), the carrier shall waive 50% of any installation charges ***. ***\n(3) If a carrier fails to keep a scheduled repair or installation appointment when a customer premises visit requires a customer to be present, the carrier shall credit the customer $50 per missed appointment. ***\n(4) If a violation of a basic local exchange service quality standard is caused by a carrier other than the carrier providing retail service to the customer, the carrier providing retail service to the customer shall credit the customer as provided in this [s]ection. The carrier causing the violation shall reimburse the carrier providing retail service the amount credited the customer. When applicable, an interconnection agreement shall govern compensation between the carrier causing the violation, in whole or in part, and the retail carrier providing the credit to the customer.\n(f) The rules shall require each telecommunications carrier to provide to the Commission, on a quarterly basis and in a form suitable for posting on the Commission\u2019s website, a public report that includes performance data for basic local exchange service quality of service. ***\n(g) The Commission shall establish and implement carrier[-]to[-] carrier wholesale service quality rules and establish remedies to ensure enforcement of the rules.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 712 (West 2004).\nRespondents reason that because special access is a \u201ccarrier[-]to[-] carrier wholesale service,\u201d section 13 \u2014 712(g), by its plain terms, empowers the Commission to regulate special access. Petitioner complains that respondents are lifting subsection (g) out of its context. According to petitioner, the title of section 13 \u2014 712 and the declaration of intent in subsection (a) make clear that by \u201ccarrier[-]to[-] carrier wholesale service,\u201d the legislature did not mean all carrier-to-carrier wholesale service (including special access) but only that used to provide basic local exchange service.\nPetitioner offers a reasonable interpretation of section 13 \u2014 712(g). The heading of section 13 \u2014 712\u2014\u201cBasic local exchange service; customer credits\u201d \u2014 is part of the statute that the General Assembly enacted, and we should give it some consideration when resolving ambiguities in the text. See Hansen v. Caring Professionals, Inc., 286 Ill. App. 3d 797, 805, 676 N.E.2d 1349, 1354 (1997). Interpreting a statute as a whole means interpreting a specific provision in the context of other parts of the statute, including the heading under which the provision appears. People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 357, 671 N.E.2d 700, 705 (1996). Special access is, as we have explained, fundamentally different from basic local exchange service and is an important service in the telecommunications industry: the efficient functioning of wireless telecommunications depends on it. Therefore, it could strike one as strange that the legislature would provide for the regulation of special access in a section ostensibly devoted to basic local exchange service.\nArguably, the heading of section 13 \u2014 712 is indeed a faithful guide to the meaning of subsection (g) because, subsection by subsection, section 13 \u2014 712 explicitly pertains to basic local exchange service\u2014 until we reach subsection (g). In statutes and other forms of discourse, people rely on context to tacitly limit the scope of statements that, taken in isolation, would be too broad. R. Dickerson, Interpretation & Application of Statutes 200-01 (1975). Even though subsection (g) does not explicitly refer to basic local exchange service, one could reasonably infer that subsection (g) continues the thought in subsections (d)(1) and (e)(4). In those subsections, the statute refers to two carriers: Carrier No. 1, which provides basic local exchange service to retail customers, and Carrier No. 2, which provides wholesale service to Carrier No. 1 \u2014 i.e., lets Carrier No. 1 use its \u201cnetwork\u201d \u2014 so that Carrier No. 1 can in turn provide the basic local exchange service. 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 712(d)(1), (e)(4) (West 2004). The legislature intended that \u201cevery telecommunications carrier meet minimum service quality standards in providing basic local exchange service.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 712(a) (West 2004). In subsections (d)(1) and (e)(4), the legislature recognized that inefficient carrier-to-carrier service on the wholesale level could lead to inefficient basic local exchange service on the retail level and thereby frustrate the legislative intent in subsection (a). One could fairly read subsection (g) with the tacit assumption that the only type of \u201ccarrier[-]to[-]carrier wholesale service\u201d the legislature had in mind, in this context, was wholesale service used to provide basic local exchange service \u2014 since, after all, basic local exchange service does appear to be what section 13 \u2014 712 is about.\nAs respondents argue, however, the problem with so limiting subsection (g) is the limitation has no basis in the language of subsection (g) itself. Contrary to petitioner\u2019s repeated assertion in its brief, the legislature did not \u201cexpressly limit\u201d subsection (g) to wholesale service used to provide basic local exchange service; rather, petitioner infers that limitation from other parts of section 13 \u2014 712. \u201cIf the meaning of any particular phrase or section!,] standing aLie!,] is clear!,] no other section or part of the act may be applied create doubt.\u201d 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction ; 47:02, at 211 (6th ed. 2000). The meaning of subsection (g), standing alone, is crystal-clear. It says: \u201cThe Commission shall establish and implement carrier[-]to[-]carrier wholesale service quality rules ***.\u201d 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 712(g) (West 2004). Special access is indisputably a carrier-to-carrier wholesale service. Reading a provision in context does not give one a license to disregard the clear language of the provision itself. Statutes are highly deliberative utterances (section 13 \u2014 712 certainly appears to be, with its definitions, sub-definitions, and exceptions). Thus, we should normally assume that whenever the legislature intended a limitation, it expressed that limitation; conversely, if the limitation is absent from the text, the legislature presumably did not intend the limitation. The utility of statutes depends on the reader\u2019s being able to rely on the plain meaning of the text.\nPetitioner relies on context, but so do respondents. Subsections (d)(1) and (e)(4) demonstrate that the legislature knew how to use the term \u201cbasic local exchange service\u201d in conjunction with a discussion of carrier-to-carrier wholesale service. 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 712(d)(1), (e)(4) (West 2004). The legislature did not use that term in subsection (g) \u2014 an omission one could consider to be significant. 220 ILCS 5/13\u2014 712(g) (West 2004). \u201c[If] the legislature uses certain words in one instance and different words in another, it intends different results.\u201d Divane v. Smith, 332 Ill. App. 3d 548, 553, 774 N.E.2d 361, 365 (2002). Unless an improbably absurd construction results, we should be reluctant to second-guess the plain, unqualified language of a statutory provision (In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 418-19, 752 N.E.2d 1112, 1120 (2001)), especially if, elsewhere in the statute, the legislature demonstrates an ability to state the qualification (In re Perona, 294 Ill. App. 3d 755, 760, 690 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (1998); Community Unit School District 200 v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1063, 832 N.E.2d 472, 479 (2005)).\nWe do not find it improbable that the legislature intended the Commission to regulate all \u201ccarrier[-]to|.-]carrier wholesale service.\u201d Arguably, it is improbable that the legislature used that term without realizing what it entailed. The legislature could have decided that while regulating wholesale service used to provide basic local exchange service, the Commission might as well regulate wholesale special access, too, since many consumers use cell phones to make local calls and one of the purposes of article 13 of the Act is to enhance the quality of \u201ctelecommunications services\u201d in general (220 ILCS 5/13\u2014 103(a) (West 2004)). This is not to equate basic local exchange service with wireless local calls but merely to point out that if the legislature cared about one, it probably was not indifferent to the other. \u201cStatutes must be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to oppose prejudice to public interests.\u201d Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District, 123 Ill. 2d 303, 313, 527 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (1988).\nAlthough one might have thought that the topic of special access deserved a heading and section of its own, case law warns against putting undue emphasis on such organizational devices. Headings cannot \u201c \u2018limit the plain meaning of the text.\u2019 \u201d Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 505-06, 732 N.E.2d 528, 536 (2000), quoting Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529, 91 L. Ed. 1646, 1652, 67 S. Ct. 1387, 1392 (1947); see also 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes \u00a7 45 (2001). If a general statutory provision and a specific statutory provision relate to the same subject, the specific provision prevails. People v. Botruff, 212 Ill. 2d 166, 175, 817 N.E.2d 463, 468 (2004). \u201cAs a rule[,l the words of the heading!,] being more general[,J will not control the more specific words of the act ***.\u201d 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction \u00a7 47:14, at 256 (6th ed. 2000).\nNot only are headings \u201cmere catchwords\u201d (2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction \u00a7 47:14, at 256-57 (6th ed. 2000); see also Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 506, 732 N.E.2d at 536), but as catchwords, they tend not to be rigorously complete summaries of everything in the substantive text (see E. Crawford, Construction of Statutes \u00a7 207, at 360 (1940) (noting that h\u00e9adings have a \u201cprobability of inaccuracy\u201d). The United States Supreme Court has explained:\n\u201c[H]eadings and titles are not meant to take the place of the detailed provisions of the text. Nor are they necessarily designed to be a reference guide or a synopsis. Where the text is complicated and prolific, headings and titles can do no more than indicate the provisions in a most general manner; to attempt to refer to each specific provision would often be ungainly as well as useless. As a result, matters in the text which deviate from those falling within the general pattern are frequently unreflected in the headings and titles.\u201d Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 331 U.S. at 528, 91 L. Ed. at 1652, 67 S. Ct. at 1392.\nIn summary, good arguments can be made for and against the opposing interpretations of section 13 \u2014 712(g) in this case. The parties cite cases interpreting other statutes. Because the statutes in those cases bear little resemblance to the Act, we do not find those cases to be very relevant except for the canons of statutory construction which they invoke and which we have applied to section 13 \u2014 712. Depending on the canons one chooses and how one deploys them, one could agree with either petitioner or respondents. Our duty, then, is clear: we defer to the Commission\u2019s interpretation. See Church, 164 Ill. 2d at 162, 646 N.E.2d at 577.\nC. Regulation of Only Some Providers of Wholesale Special Access\nPetitioner contends that by regulating only the special access provided by \u201cLevel 1 carriers,\u201d the Commission violates section 13\u2014 712(a) of the Act. That subsection provides: \u201cIt is the intent of the General Assembly that every telecommunications carrier meet minimum service quality standards in providing basic local exchange service on a non-discriminatory basis to all classes of customers.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 220 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 712(a) (West 2004). In subsection (a), the General Assembly never declared an intent that every telecommunications carrier meet minimum service quality standards in providing special access. Therefore, regulating special access provided only by \u201cLevel 1 carriers\u201d does not violate subsection (a).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the denial of petitioner\u2019s application for rehearing, and we uphold part 731 of Title 83 of the Illinois Administrative Code.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Theodore A. Livingston, John E. Muench, and Demetrios G. Metropoulos (argued), all of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, L.L.P., and John T. Lenahan and Nancy J. Hertel, both of SBC Illinois, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "John P. Kelliher (argued), Special Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, for appellee Illinois Commerce Commission.", "Owen E. MacBride, of Schiff Hardin, L.L.P., and William A. Davis II and David J. Chorzempa, both of AT&T Legal Department, both of Chicago, for appellee AT&T Communications of Illinois, Inc.", "John W. McCaffrey and Kathleen R. Pasulka-Brown (argued), both of Foley & Lardner, L.L.P., of Chicago, for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ILLINOIS BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201404\u20140911\nArgued September 22, 2005.\nOpinion filed December 13, 2005.\nTheodore A. Livingston, John E. Muench, and Demetrios G. Metropoulos (argued), all of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, L.L.P., and John T. Lenahan and Nancy J. Hertel, both of SBC Illinois, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn P. Kelliher (argued), Special Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, for appellee Illinois Commerce Commission.\nOwen E. MacBride, of Schiff Hardin, L.L.P., and William A. Davis II and David J. Chorzempa, both of AT&T Legal Department, both of Chicago, for appellee AT&T Communications of Illinois, Inc.\nJohn W. McCaffrey and Kathleen R. Pasulka-Brown (argued), both of Foley & Lardner, L.L.P., of Chicago, for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0652-01", "first_page_order": 670, "last_page_order": 681 }