{ "id": 4260301, "name": "In re GUSTAVO H. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellants (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner, v. Rocio T. et al., Respondents-Appellees)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rocio T.", "decision_date": "2005-11-23", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20142033", "first_page": "802", "last_page": "815", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 802" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 812", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570612 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "818" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0812-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2945747 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719126 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2435767 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "705" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383240 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "minor appealed trial court's order that she remain in referred placement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5365983 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "minor appealed trial court's order on petition for wardship, returning her to her parents" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 981", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45778 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "minor appealed trial court's determination that a goal of long-term relative care, rather than adoption, was appropriate" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0981-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222628 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "minor appealed trial court's refusal to find that mother's former paramour was the perpetrator of sexual abuse" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 1089", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910204 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "minor appealed trial court's finding that he was neglected but not abused" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/1089-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2409603 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/275/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872589 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "parenthetical": "minor appealed trial court's dismissal of petition for adjudication of wardship" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "424" }, { "page": "425" }, { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29948 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236934 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6" }, { "page": "8-9" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 978, "char_count": 30837, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.790743725180195e-08, "percentile": 0.45681775269523434 }, "sha256": "859f4508408793f58c3856b9616406b05fb26d49146da335ed0aab6491db4c9e", "simhash": "1:232ba18e1354d571", "word_count": 5102 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:25.526171+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re GUSTAVO H. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellants (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner, v. Rocio T. et al., Respondents-Appellees)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a temporary custody hearing, the trial court found that there was no probable cause to believe that minor siblings Gustavo H. and Krystal C. had been abused or neglected. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed petitions for the adjudication of wardship of the minors filed by the State pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2004)). The Office of the Public Guardian (Public Guardian), the minors\u2019 court-appointed attorney and guardian ad litem, appealed on behalf of the minors. On appeal, the Public Guardian contends that the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the petition was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, which established probable cause that Gustavo and Krystal were abused and neglected. The Public Guardian further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Public Guardian\u2019s motion to reconsider its ruling because the motion demonstrated that the Public Guardian had exercised due diligence and that certain newly discovered evidence was not cumulative. Though the State does not join the Public Guardian as an appellant, it filed a brief in support of the Public Guardian\u2019s contention that the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the petitions for adjudication of wardship was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondents, Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., contend that this appeal should be dismissed because only the State may prosecute a petition for adjudication for wardship and appeal its dismissal.\nOn April 6, 2005, the State filed petitions asking the court to adjudge Gustavo and Krystal wards of the court and scheduling a temporary custody hearing for April 27, 2005. The petition regarding Gustavo alleged that he was neglected pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3(l)(b) of Act, because he was a minor whose environment was injurious to his welfare, and that he was abused pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3(2Xi) of the Act, because his parents, Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., inflicted, caused to be inflicted or allowed to be inflicted physical injury upon him, and section 2 \u2014 3(2)(ii) of the Act, because his parents created a substantial risk of physical injury to him. In support of these allegations, the State cited the following facts:\n\u201cOn or about February 4, 2005, this minor presented at St. Anthony\u2019s Hospital with a large hematoma on the right side of his head. This minor was diagnosed with a right parietal skull fracture, healing rib fractures and a healing fracture of the wrist. Medical personnel indicate that this minor\u2019s skull fracture may be consistent with the explanation provided by the natural parents. Further, medical personnel indicate that in the absence of any history, the other injuries sustained by this minor are suspicious for abuse. Natural parents reside together and were custodial at all relevant times.\u201d\nThe petition regarding Krystal alleged that she was abused pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3(2)(ii) of the Act and neglected pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3(l)(b) of the Act. In support of these allegations, the State cited the fact that Krystal\u2019s sibling had suffered skull, wrist and rib fractures.\nPrior to the temporary custody hearing, Gustavo, Sr., admitted to being Gustavo\u2019s father. Gustavo, Sr., and Rocio, the minors\u2019 mother, denied that Gustavo, Sr., was Krystal\u2019s father. Immediately before the custody hearing on April 27, 2005, the trial court appointed the Public Guardian to represent Gustavo and Krystal as their attorney and guardian ad litem, the public defender to represent Rocio and attorney Michael Kozubek to represent Gustavo, Sr. The court called a recess to allow the attorneys to speak with their clients and then recalled the case.\nAt the hearing, Rocio testified that she was the mother of Gustavo, born August 26, 2004, and Krystal, born July 1, 2001. Rocio, the minors and Gustavo, Sr., lived with Rocio\u2019s parents, three sisters and brother. In general, while Rocio worked during the day, her mother and Gustavo, Sr., would care for Gustavo. According to Rocio, Gustavo was a happy baby who was occasionally fussy but cried a normal amount for a baby of his age. Rocio testified that in January 2005, she took Gustavo to his pediatrician, Dr. Glaab, for a checkup. Dr. Glaab examined Gustavo and found no indication of broken bones. Also in January 2005, Rocio took Gustavo to another doctor to treat a gum infection. That doctor also did not find any indication of broken bones.\nOn February 4, 2005, Gustavo, Sr., had been caring for Gustavo while Rocio was at work. When Rocio returned home, she gave Gustavo a bath. Rocio noticed a soft spot on the side of Gustavo\u2019s head. Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., took Gustavo to the emergency room at St. Anthony\u2019s Hospital. After examining Gustavo and performing tests, the emergency room doctors informed Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., that Gustavo had a fracture on the right side of his head and fractures in his wrist, leg and ribs. Rocio could not, at that time, explain what had caused the fractures.\nRocio\u2019s mother had left for a trip to Mexico on February 3, 2005. When she returned on February 5, 2005, she told Rocio that either the day before she left or the day she left, she had been caring for Gustavo, who was asleep on her bed, while Rocio was at work, when she heard Gustavo crying. Rocio\u2019s mother went into her room and found Krystal in the room and Gustavo on the floor. Rocio testified that Krystal was very large and active for her age. Krystal was three years old and weighed 62 pounds. On more than one occasion, Rocio had witnessed Krystal playing inappropriately with Gustavo. Specifically, Rocio had found Krystal jumping on the bed on which Gustavo was lying, jumping on Gustavo, squeezing his cheeks, hugging him extremely hard, throwing things at him and slapping him. Rocio repeatedly told Krystal that Gustavo was a small baby and that her behavior was inappropriate, but Krystal quickly forgot her mother\u2019s admonishments and continued to be rough with the baby. Rocio testified that she occasionally spanked Krystal but did not spank Gustavo and that Gustavo, Sr., did not spank either minor.\nDepartment of Children and Family Services (DCFS) caseworker Josephine Carrasco testified that on February 4, 2005, DCFS received a hot line telephone call indicating that Gustavo had been brought to the Saint Anthony\u2019s Hospital emergency room with trauma to the right side of his head. Carrasco was assigned to Gustavo and Krystal\u2019s case on February 7, 2005. In the course of her investigation, Carrasco spoke with Dr. Martinez, the emergency room doctor who had treated Gustavo. Dr. Martinez had examined Gustavo and had ordered bone surveys. The surveys showed that Gustavo had a fractured skull, three healing rib fractures, a healing wrist fracture and a healing leg fracture. Dr. Martinez opined that Gustavo had not been abused or neglected and that the injuries were accidental and may have been caused by Krystal.\nCarrasco also spoke with Dr. Glaab, the family\u2019s pediatrician who had treated both Gustavo and Krystal. Dr. Glaab indicated to Carrasco that she had told Rocio that Krystal should not be left alone with Gustavo because Krystal was rough and big for her age. Dr. Glaab opined that all of Gustavo\u2019s injuries could have all been caused by Krystal and that they were not caused by Rocio, Gustavo, Sr., or Ro-cio\u2019s mother.\nCarrasco testified that Chicago police department Detective Robert Seguess had also investigated the case. According to Carrasco, in the course of his investigation, Seguess was also told that on either February 2 or 3, 2005, Rocio\u2019s mother was caring for Gustavo, who was asleep in her bedroom, and that when Rocio\u2019s mother heard Gustavo crying, she went to her bedroom and found him on the floor. In Ro-cio\u2019s mother\u2019s bedroom, Seguess observed a dresser within a couple of feet of the bed. From his observation, Seguess opined that Gustavo had fallen out of the bed and hit his head on the dresser.\nCarrasco brought the case to the Multi-disciplinary Pediatric Education and Evaluation Consortium (MPEEC). She explained that when a child under investigation has sustained a head injury, the case is brought to the MPEEC. An MPEEC doctor is assigned to the case to assess medical records and films and to make a determination of whether the injuries are consistent with the explanations provided by the parents and whether the injuries are accidental or nonaccidental. Dr. Leonhardt was assigned to Gustavo\u2019s case. Dr. Leonhardt requested additional bone surveys from Children\u2019s Memorial Hospital. Those surveys, taken 20 days after Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., first took Gustavo to the Saint Anthony\u2019s Hospital emergency room, showed that Gustavo had a fractured skull, a fractured wrist and three fractured ribs. Carrasco testified that Dr. Leonhardt opined that the skull fracture could have been caused by Gustavo\u2019s fall from the bed, but that the rib and wrist fractures could not have been the result of the fall. According to Carrasco, Dr. Leonhardt believed that the rib injuries had been caused by squeezing, shaking or hitting and that they could not have been caused by a three-year-old. However, Dr. Leonhardt had never interacted with Krystal. Carrasco testified that Dr. Leonhardt recommended that the minors be returned home with close family services in place. A summary statement of Dr. Leonhardt\u2019s findings was admitted into evidence. The content of the statement was consistent with Carrasco\u2019s testimony regarding Dr. Leonhardt\u2019s opinions.\nCarrasco testified that from the time Gustavo was released from the hospital until early April 2005, the minors resided away from Ro-cio and Gustavo, Sr., with their maternal aunt. Since April 2005, Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., had moved out of the house they had formerly shared with Rocio\u2019s parents and siblings and Gustavo and Krystal had been residing in the house, cared for primarily by Rocio\u2019s mother. Carrasco had observed Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., interacting with the minors at the hospital and at the minors\u2019 aunt\u2019s house. She found Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., to be loving, caring parents. Carrasco testified that since Gustavo\u2019s release from the hospital, Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., had spent substantial time at the minors\u2019 aunt\u2019s house caring for them. Carrasco also screened the other members of the family who had been living with Gustavo and Krystal and determined that none of them were likely to abuse the minors. Carrasco had no concern for the health and safety of the minors should they be returned to the care of Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., and recommended that the court return the minors to the care of their parents, that it impose an order of protection and that it order Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., to participate in parenting classes and Krystal to participate in a Head Start program.\nFollowing the hearing, the court found that probable cause that Gustavo and Krystal were abused or neglected did not exist. The stated basis for the court\u2019s finding was:\n\u201cInsufficient evidence of non-accidental injury Land] insufficient evidence of neglect. Suspicion of abuse by reviewing physician [was] insufficient in [light] of [evidence] of treating M.D., Dr. Martinez, [and] treating M.D.[,] Dr. Glaab, [and] results of [defendants\u2019 and] Chicago police investigations.\u201d\nAccordingly, the court dismissed the State\u2019s petitions for adjudication of wardship of the minors.\nThe State and the Public Guardian filed motions for reconsideration. In their motions, the State and Public Guardian included an addendum to Dr. Leonhardt\u2019s summary statement. The addendum stated that Dr. Leonhardt was of the opinion that Gustavo was the victim of child abuse and that, in forming his opinions, he was aware that Krystal weighed 62 pounds. Despite her large size, Dr. Leonhardt believed that Krystal did not cause Gustavo\u2019s rib fractures. The State and Public Guardian argued that the court had applied the incorrect \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d standard, rather than a \u201cprobable cause\u201d standard, that the State had shown probable cause that the minors were abused or neglected, that they had used due diligence in investigating the matter and that the addendum was not cumulative.\nThe trial court denied the motions for reconsideration. It noted that it had applied the correct standard in finding that the evidence did not show probable cause that Gustavo and Krystal were abused or neglected. It further stated that it \u201cfound the mother, [Roc\u00edo!, to be a very credible witness. Her demeanor was appropriate. She was not evasive and she was not impeached. The DCFS investigator was also credible and professional.\u201d The court found that, though the State had proven a prima facie case of abuse or neglect, the State\u2019s case was overcome by the weight of the evidence presented. Specifically, the court cited the opinions of Dr. Martinez and Dr. Glaab, that Gustavo\u2019s head injury was a result of his fall from the bed and that Krystal caused his other injuries. With regard to the addendum, the court noted that the State filed its petition for wardship on April 6, 2005. The State then had until the temporary custody hearing on April 27, 2005, to investigate its case. During that time, the State was free to interview Dr. Leonhardt and could have called him as a witness at the hearing. Accordingly, the State had not demonstrated that it was unable to obtain Dr. Leonhardt\u2019s addendum prior to the hearing. Furthermore, the court found the addendum cumulative because Dr. Leonhardt\u2019s summary statement, which was admitted into evidence at the hearing, encompassed the opinions expressed in the addendum. The Public Guardian appealed.\nWe will first address Rocio and Gustavo, Sr.\u2019s contention that this appeal should be dismissed because the Public Guardian does not have the authority to prosecute an appeal of the trial court\u2019s dismissal of a petition for wardship. In support of their contention, Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., cite In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1 (1991), and In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309 (2001), which hold that only the State, not a guardian ad litem, may prosecute a petition for adjudication of wardship. The Public Guardian responds that In re J.J. actually supports its appeal because in that case, the party in interest on appeal was the minor\u2019s guardian ad litem. The Public Guardian further notes that under the Act, a minor has a right both to an attorney and to a guardian ad litem and has a right to \u201cbe present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, [and] to examine pertinent court files.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 5(1) (West 2004). Accordingly, argues the Public Guardian, a minor has a right to appeal through his attorney. Finally, the Public Guardian notes that, though the State is an appellee in this action and has not joined the notice of appeal, its brief supports the Public Guardian\u2019s position.\nIn all child custody proceedings under the Act, the court\u2019s primary concern is protecting the best interests of the children involved. In re Ashley F., 265 Ill. App. 3d 419, 424 (1994); 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2 (West 2004). Section 1 \u2014 5 of the Act provides that a minor who is the subject of proceedings under the Act has a right to be present, to be heard, to present material evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and records and to be represented by counsel. 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 5 (West 2004). Additionally, under the Act, immediately upon the filing of a petition alleging that a minor is abused or neglected, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 17(1) (West 2004). The guardian ad litem is charged with representing the best interests of the minor and with presenting recommendations to the court consistent with that duty. 705 ILCS 405/2- \u2014 17(1) (West 2004). \u201cIt has long been established that, upon the filing of a petition under the Juvenile Court Act, the \u2018people become the real party complainant and must prosecute the proceeding.\u2019 \u201d In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d at 322, quoting People v. Piccolo, 275 Ill. 453, 455 (1916); In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 6. Section 1 \u2014 6 of the Act provides that the State\u2019s Attorney \u201cshall represent the people of the State of Illinois in proceedings under this Act.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 6 (West 2004). By extension, a guardian ad litem does not have authority to prosecute a petition brought pursuant to the Act. In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d at 333.\nIn In re J.J., DCFS filed petitions for adjudication of wardship of three minors and the Public Guardian was appointed the minors\u2019 attorney and guardian ad litem. The State filed a motion to dismiss the petitions. Without considering the merits of the petitions or the motion, the trial court dismissed the petitions, noting that to compel the State to prosecute them would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. The minors, through the Public Guardian, appealed the dismissal. The appellate court reversed and remanded the matter for a hearing on the merits of the State\u2019s motion. On appeal, the supreme court acknowledged that in criminal matters, the State is afforded wide discretion in determining whether and what charges may be criminally brought against a defendant and that a court is not authorized to order the State to charge a defendant. However, the court noted, dependancy and neglect proceedings brought under the Act are civil, not criminal, in nature. Further, the court reasoned, both the trial court and the State are charged, under the Act, with protecting the best interests of the minor. Accordingly:\n\u201cThe evil of a court\u2019s attempting to invade the exclusive executive discretion of the constitutional office of the State\u2019s Attorney in controlling the initiation and management of criminal litigation is absent in dependency and neglect proceedings, where both the State\u2019s Attorney and the court are charged with the duty of ensuring that, at each step of the wardship adjudication process, the best interests of the minor, the minor\u2019s family and the community are served.\u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8-9.\nThe court, therefore, held that \u201cthe circuit court shall consider the merits of the motion and determine, on the record, whether dismissal is in the best interests of the minor, the minor\u2019s family, and the community.\u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 9. Finally, the court noted that the order dismissing the petitions was final and appealable and that \u201c[t]he public guardian has properly appealed.\u201d In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 12.\nIn In re D.S., the trial court determined that it was in the best interests of the minor to set a permanency goal of substitute care pending a court determination on a termination of parental rights petition. Relying on In re J.J., the supreme court held:\n\u201c[0]nce the circuit court found that this particular permanency goal was in the best interests of D.S., the court had the duty and the authority, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 28(3)(a) of the Act, to enter any order \u2018necessary to conform the minor\u2019s legal custody and status to the goal the court selected.\u2019 Therefore, under these circumstances, the circuit court appropriately ordered the State\u2019s Attorney to prosecute the termination petition as a means of accomplishing the permanency goal found to be in D.S.\u2019s best interests.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d at 327.\nThough in both cases the supreme court noted that only the State is granted the authority to prosecute a petition filed under the Act, neither In re J.J. nor In re D.S. directly addresses the issue raised here: whether a minor\u2019s court-appointed attorney and guardian ad litem may appeal a trial court\u2019s ruling on the merits of a petition brought pursuant to the Act. Additionally, the parties have not cited, nor has our research revealed, a case that addresses the relevant issue. However, we note that case law is replete with cases in which a minor, through his court-appointed attorney and guardian ad litem, has appealed a trial court\u2019s ruling entered pursuant to the Act. See, e.g., In re Marcus H., 297 Ill. App. 3d 1089 (1998) (minor appealed trial court\u2019s finding that he was neglected but not abused); In re A.M., 296 Ill. App. 3d 752 (1998) (minor appealed trial court\u2019s refusal to find that mother\u2019s former paramour was the perpetrator of sexual abuse); In re D.H., 295 Ill. App. 3d 981 (1998) (minor appealed trial court\u2019s determination that a goal of long-term relative care, rather than adoption, was appropriate); In re Ashley F., 265 Ill. App. 3d 419 (1994) (minor appealed trial court\u2019s dismissal of petition for adjudication of wardship); In re Monica S., 263 Ill. App. 3d 619 (1994) (minor appealed trial court\u2019s order on petition for wardship, returning her to her parents); L.F.H. v. People, 256 Ill. App. 3d 451 (1993) (minor appealed trial court\u2019s order that she remain in referred placement).\nWe find that the above-cited cases were properly allowed and that this appeal, too, should not be dismissed. Under the Act, the guardian ad litem, like the court and the State, is charged with protecting the best interests of the minor he or she represents. This responsibility would be compromised if the guardian ad litem were not permitted to appeal an order of the trial court that he or she believed was not in the best interest of the minor. Accordingly, we hold that, though the State has exclusive authority in the trial court to prosecute a petition brought under the Act, in order to fulfill their duty to protect the best interests of the minor they represent, the minor\u2019s attorney and guardian ad litem may appeal, on the minor\u2019s behalf, a trial court\u2019s order regarding a petition that they believe is contrary to the minor\u2019s best interests.\nWe now turn to the merits of the Public Guardian\u2019s contention, with which the State agrees, that the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the petitions was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence established probable cause that Gustavo and Krystal were abused and neglected.\nAs noted above:\n\u201cIn all child custody proceedings under the Juvenile Act, the juvenile court\u2019s primary concern is the best interests and welfare of the children involved. [Citation.] To that end, the juvenile court is vested with wide discretion. [Citations.] That court\u2019s opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and witnesses must be given great weight, and, upon review, its determinations will not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u201d In re M.B., 241 Ill. App. 3d 697, 705 (1992).\nSection 2 \u2014 10(2) of the Act provides that at a temporary custody hearing, a trial court first decides whether there is probable cause to believe that the minor is abused, neglected or dependent. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10(2) (West 2004); In re Ashley F., 265 Ill. App. 3d at 424. If the court finds probable cause, it is required to determine whether there is an urgent and immediate necessity for the protection of the minor to remove him from his home. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10(2) (West 2004); In re Ashley F., 265 Ill. App. 3d at 424. However, if the court finds that there is no probable cause to believe that the minor is abused, neglected or dependent, it must dismiss the petition. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 10(1) (West 2004); In re Ashley F., 265 Ill. App. 3d at 424.\nIn its petitions for adjudication of wardship, the State alleged that Gustavo was abused under sections 2 \u2014 3(2)(i) and (ii) and that Krystal was abused pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3(2) (ii) of the Act. Section 2 \u2014 3(2) defines an abused child as one whose\n\u201cparent or immediate family member ***\n(i) inflicts, causes to be inflicted, or allows to be inflicted upon such minor physical injury, by other than accidental means, which causes death, disfigurement, impairment of physical or emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function;\n(ii) creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such minor by other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement, impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily functionf.]\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(2) (West 2004).\nThe State additionally alleged that both minors were neglected under section 2 \u2014 3(l)(b) of the Act, which provides that a neglected child is one whose environment is injurious to his welfare. 705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 3(l)(b) (West 2004). Neglect is a failure to exercise the care that the circumstances justly deserve and can be either a willful or an unintentional disregard of a parental duty. In re Edward T., 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 794 (2003). An injurious environment is an amorphous concept that cannot be defined with particularity; accordingly, the specific circumstances of each case must be reviewed. In re B.M., 248 Ill. App. 3d 76, 79 (1993). Neglect of one minor may be taken as evidence of neglect of the minor\u2019s sibling. In re Jerome F., 325 Ill. App. 3d 812, 818 (2001).\nThe Public Guardian specifically contends that the trial court erred in failing to find the minors abused because Dr. Leonhardt\u2019s summary statement, which was admitted into evidence, was the only evidence that specifically addressed Gustavo\u2019s rib injuries. Dr. Leonhardt concluded that the rib injuries could not have been caused by mishandling by Krystal or by Gustavo\u2019s fall from Rocio\u2019s mother\u2019s bed. We disagree with the Public Guardian\u2019s characterization of the evidence. At trial, Carrasco\u2019s testimony established that Dr. Martinez had examined Gustavo\u2019s bone scans taken at Saint Anthony\u2019s Hospital. Those scans indicated that Gustavo had suffered fractured ribs. Carrasco testified that Dr. Martinez opined that Gustavo\u2019s injuries were not the result of abuse or neglect and that they could have been caused by Krystal. Carrasco also testified that the family\u2019s pediatrician, Dr. Glaab, who had interacted with Krystal several times and had advised Rocio, before Gustavo sustained his skull fracture, that Krystal should not be left alone with Gustavo, also opined that all of Gustavo\u2019s injuries could have been caused by Krystal. The court, therefore, was presented with conflicting opinions as to the cause of Gustavo\u2019s rib injuries. As the court pointed out, Dr. Leonhardt had not interacted with Krystal, who was described as a rough, active, large child, while Dr. Glaab had interacted with her several times in the past. Accordingly, we cannot say that the court\u2019s conclusion that the evidence did not establish probable cause that Gustavo and Krystal were abused was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe Public Guardian further contends that the trial court erred in failing to find the minors neglected because, assuming Krystal caused Gustavo\u2019s injuries, the evidence presented at trial established probable cause that the minors\u2019 environment was injurious to their welfare. The State agrees and additionally contends that the fact that Gustavo sustained several fractures in his first five months of life indicates that his environment was injurious. The State reasons that the evidence that Gustavo was neglected created an unrebutted presumption that Krystal was also neglected.\nIn this case, Rocio testified that she had witnessed Krystal exhibiting inappropriate behavior with Gustavo. Rocio testified that she had admonished Krystal that she could not treat Gustavo in such a manner. Nonetheless, Krystal continued to be rough with her brother. Dr. Glaab also observed Krystal\u2019s active demeanor and advised Rocio not to allow Krystal to be alone with Gustavo. Carrasco testified that she had observed Rocio and Gustavo, Sr., interact with the minors and had concluded that they were attentive, loving and caring parents. The trial court found Rocio and Carrasco to be credible witnesses. It further found that the evidence did not indicate that Gustavo, and by extension Krystal, had been neglected. Given the wide discretion afforded the trial court in making a determination regarding neglect and its ability to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and witnesses (In re Ashley F., 265 Ill. App. 3d at 425), in this case, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding that the evidence did not establish probable cause of neglect was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nFinally, the Public Guardian contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for reconsideration because the motion established that the Public Guardian had exercised due diligence in investigating the case and that the proposed addendum to Leonhardt\u2019s summary statement was not cumulative.\n\u201cThe purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court\u2019s attention changes in the law, errors in the court\u2019s previous application of existing law, and newly discovered evidence that was not available at the time of the hearing. | Citation.] To justify a rehearing on the basis of newly discovered evidence, there must be a showing of due diligence and a demonstration that justice has not been done. [Citation.] The trial court\u2019s decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d In re Ashley F., 265 Ill. App. 3d at 426.\nWhen the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship of Gustavo and Krystal on April 6, 2005, it set April 27, 2005, as the date of the temporary custody hearing on the matter. On April 27, 2005, the Public Guardian was appointed as the minors\u2019 attorney and guardian ad litem. Thereafter, the court allowed the parties a brief recess to speak with their clients and the available witnesses. When the court recalled the case and commenced the hearing, the Public Guardian did not object nor did it alert the court that it found Leonhardt\u2019s summary statement inadequate or that it would prefer to pass the case to enable it to interview or call Leonhardt as a witness. Accordingly, the Public Guardian did not demonstrate that it had exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain all pertinent opinions from Leon-hardt. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Public Guardian\u2019s motion for reconsideration.\nFor the above-stated reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and MURPHY, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert F. Harris, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Kass A. Plain and Mary Erigid Hayes, of counsel), for appellants.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Nancy Kisicki, and Yvette Loizon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago (Emily H. Eisner, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee Rocio T.", "Stephen Jaffe, of Chicago, for appellee Gustavo H., Sr." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re GUSTAVO H. et al., Minors, Respondents-Appellants (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner, v. Rocio T. et al., Respondents-Appellees).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20142033\nOpinion filed November 23, 2005.\nRobert F. Harris, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Kass A. Plain and Mary Erigid Hayes, of counsel), for appellants.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Nancy Kisicki, and Yvette Loizon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nEdwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago (Emily H. Eisner, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee Rocio T.\nStephen Jaffe, of Chicago, for appellee Gustavo H., Sr." }, "file_name": "0802-01", "first_page_order": 820, "last_page_order": 833 }