{ "id": 5767159, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY STRICKLAND, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Strickland", "decision_date": "2006-02-10", "docket_number": "No. 4-04-0218", "first_page": "598", "last_page": "607", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 598" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "792 N.E.2d 468", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "finding further inquiry into the factual basis of defendant's pro se ineffective-assistance claims was unnecessary where the claims related to trial matters and the judge hearing the posttrial motion had presided over the trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5575773 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383", "parenthetical": "finding further inquiry into the factual basis of defendant's pro se ineffective-assistance claims was unnecessary where the claims related to trial matters and the judge hearing the posttrial motion had presided over the trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778578 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "797 N.E.2d 631", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974982 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "833 N.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 Ill. 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LARRY STRICKLAND, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn September 2003, the State charged defendant, Larry Strickland, with four counts of aggravated battery (Pub. Act 92 \u2014 841, \u00a7 5, eff. August 22, 2002 (2002 111. Laws 3050, 3053) (amending 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(6) (West Supp. 2001))). After a January 2004 trial, a jury found defendant guilty as charged. At a March 2004 sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to three concurrent terms of four years\u2019 imprisonment to run consecutive to defendant\u2019s six other prison terms.\nDefendant appeals, asserting (1) he was denied a fair trial because he was handcuffed to a table during his jury trial and (2) the trial court erred by not inquiring into his pro se ineffective-assistance-of-counsel contention. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn January 28, 2004, the trial court held a jury trial on the charges against defendant. Before the trial and outside the jury\u2019s presence, the following exchange took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: All right. Presently, you have both hands\u2014\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: \u2014handcuffed.\nTHE COURT: I typically allow, unless there is a reason not to\u2014 are you right-handed or left-handed[?]\nTHE DEFENDANT: Left-handed.\nTHE COURT: Left-handed. All right. I am going to direct that the correctional officers free your left hand, but handcuff your right hand to the table where we have an eyebolt.\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.\nTHE COURT: So that would allow you some freedom with your left hand to \u2014 you have papers there, I note, so you will have freedom of your left hand to look at your papers.\nTHE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Thank you. Will I pick a jury today, or what?\u201d\nAlso before trial, defendant presented a letter he had written to authorities at the Pontiac Correctional Center (Center) about problems he was experiencing. The trial court allowed defendant to discuss the letter with his attorney, who then explained to the court he was unaware of a manner in which to introduce the letter as evidence at trial. The court allowed the letter to be put in the record for appeal purposes only. Defendant again insisted he wanted his problems with prison officials brought out at trial and wanted to testify to those matters. The court stated it would allow defendant to talk with defense counsel some more.\nThe State presented the testimony of Bradley Knight, a correctional officer at the Center; Gary Kuhse, a sergeant at the Center; Anthony Harvey, who, at the time of the incident, was a captain at the Center; Joyce Friel, a nurse at the Center; and Karl Webber, a correctional officer in the Center\u2019s internal affairs division. Defendant did not present any evidence.\nKnight testified that on the morning of October 30, 2002, he was picking up breakfast trays at the Center when he noticed a liquid substance coming from the cracks of defendant\u2019s cell door. Knight then notified the command staff, and Harvey and Kuhse responded. Kuhse ordered defendant to turn his back to them so Kuhse could open the cuffing hatch and handcuff defendant. When Kuhse opened the hatch and attempted to handcuff defendant, defendant reached out with a toothpaste tube and squirted an unknown liquid in their direction. The substance, which smelled like a mix of feces and urine, hit Knight and Harvey on their right arms as they turned away. Knight observed that defendant\u2019s pulling away from Kuhse caused Kuhse\u2019s left ring finger to get scratched on the top of the cuffing hatch. Kuhse\u2019s finger was bleeding. After the incident, Knight went to the Center\u2019s health-care unit and saw Friel.\nDefense counsel cross-examined Knight about the location of the cuffing hatch on the cell door and other aspects of the door. He also asked questions regarding the cuffing procedure and each officer\u2019s position in relationship to the door and each other. Moreover, defense counsel inquired about how Kuhse\u2019s finger was injured.\nHarvey and Kuhse gave testimony similar to Knight\u2019s regarding the October 30, 2002, incident. Kuhse stated his finger was bleeding after his struggle with defendant in the cuffing hatch. Harvey indicated some of the substance landed on his right arm and right shirtsleeve. Defense counsel cross-examined both witnesses, bringing out the discrepancies in the officers\u2019 testimony about the incident\u2019s details and exploring how defendant was able to squirt the substance out of his cell directly at the officers.\nFriel testified she examined all three officers at the Center\u2019s health-care unit on October 30, 2002. Knight had a foreign substance on his right arm, and thus she had him wash and cleanse his arm. Kuhse had a cut on his wedding-ring finger, which she cleansed and disinfected, and to which she applied a triple antibiotic ointment. Harvey did not have any actual exposure when he arrived at the Center so she just took his vitals and checked him over.\nWebber testified he investigated the October 30, 2002, incident and talked to defendant on December 24, 2002. Defendant explained he received a juice carton that was leaking with his breakfast. He got angry about the leaky carton but did not talk to an officer about it. Webber also testified he asked defendant if he squirted the fecal matter on the officers as alleged and said defendant replied \u201cyes, he did.\u201d Webber then asked defendant what exactly was in the stuff he squirted, and defendant replied \u201c \u2018it is something bad.\u2019 \u201d\nAfter the State\u2019s witnesses testified, the trial court recessed the trial for lunch and allowed defendant to discuss with defense counsel the matters to which defendant wanted to testify. When the proceedings resumed, defendant stated he no longer wanted to testify.\nAfter hearing all of the evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of all four charges. On March 10, 2004, the trial court held a sentencing hearing at which defendant made an oral posttrial motion, asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The court denied the motion. It then sentenced defendant to three concurrent terms of four years\u2019 imprisonment on the first three counts to run consecutive to defendant\u2019s convictions in the following cases: (1) People v. Strickland, No. 85-C-13416 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.); (2) People v. Strickland, No. 92-CF-25 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.); (3) People v. Strickland, No. 94-CF-76 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.); (4) People v. Strickland, No. 94-CF-146 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.); (5) People v. Strickland, No. 01-CF-250 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.); and (6) People v. Strickland, No. 03-CF-177 (Cir. Ct. Livingston Co.). This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Fair Trial\nDefendant first argues he was denied a fair trial because the trial court ordered one of his hands to be handcuffed to the table during his jury trial. Defendant acknowledges he did not object to being handcuffed at trial but asserts this court should find the handcuffing resulted in plain error (134 Ill. 2d R 615(a)). The application of the plain-error 'doctrine and what should happen when plain error occurs are sources of contention among our sister courts. Thus, we will provide a thorough background of the case law in this area.\nIn People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 265, 362 N.E.2d 303, 305 (1977), the Supreme Court of Illinois found the shackling of an accused should be avoided if possible because it (1) tends to prejudice the jury against the accused, (2) restricts the accused\u2019s ability to assist counsel during trial, and (3) offends the dignity of the judicial process. However, the Boose court recognized a defendant may be restrained where the court reasonably believes (1) the defendant may try to escape, (2) the defendant may pose a threat to the safety of the people in the courtroom, or (3) restraint is necessary to maintain order during the trial. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266, 362 N.E.2d at 305. The determinations of whether to restrain a defendant and what restraints are most suitable are within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and a reviewing court will not overturn those decisions unless the trial court abused its discretion. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266-67, 362 N.E.2d at 305-06.\nIn making the determination whether to restrain a defendant, Boose directs the trial court to hold proceedings outside the presence of the jury. During those proceedings, the defense counsel should have the opportunity to present reasons why the defendant should not be restrained, and the trial court should state for the record the reasons for restraining the defendant in the courtroom. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266, 362 N.E.2d at 305. Additionally, the Boose court provided a nonexclusive list of 12 factors for the trial court to consider in making its determination. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266-67, 362 N.E.2d at 305-06.\nThat same year, our supreme court applied Boose to a bench trial, noting the shackling of an accused without clear cause jeopardizes the presumption of innocence\u2019s \u201cvalue and protection and demeans our justice.\u201d In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33, 37, 364 N.E.2d 72, 73 (1977). In both Boose and Staley, the supreme court affirmed the appellate courts\u2019 reversal of the trial courts\u2019 judgments. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 269, 362 N.E.2d at 307; Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 38, 364 N.E.2d at 74.\nTwo years later, the court addressed a defendant\u2019s contention his conviction should be reversed because he appeared before the venire in handcuffs, even though he did not object to the handcuffs at that time. People v. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41, 396 N.E.2d 6, 12 (1979). Our supreme court concluded the defendant had waived any error by failing to object to his appearance in handcuffs and thus affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at 12. In reaching that conclusion, it expressly distinguished Boose and Staley, noting the defendants in those cases had objected to appearing in handcuffs. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at 12.\nThe Hyche court found guidance in the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 96 S. Ct. 1691 (1976). Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at 12. There, without objection, the defendant appeared before the jury in prison attire. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 502, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 129-30, 96 S. Ct. at 1692. The Estelle Court began by recognizing the wearing of jail or prison attire could possibly impair the presumption of innocence and found compelling an accused to wear such attire violated the fourteenth amendment. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503-06, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 130-31, 96 S. Ct. at 1692-94. However, the Court concluded that \u201calthough the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.\u201d Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512-13, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 135, 96 S. Ct. at 1697.\nIn People v. McCue, 175 Ill. App. 3d 762, 765-66, 530 N.E.2d 271, 273 (1988), the Third District followed Hyche and concluded that since the defendants failed to object to being handcuffed, they waived any alleged error that occurred by them being handcuffed throughout their trial. The McCue court also found, in the alternative, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendants handcuffed based on the Boose factors. McCue, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 766, 530 N.E.2d at 273-74.\nDespite its application of Hyche in McCue, the Third District in People v. Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d 418, 428, 807 N.E.2d 697, 705 (2004), held the trial court\u2019s decision to keep on the defendant\u2019s leg shackles during the trial, to which the defendant did not object, was plain error since it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. There, the trial court had only indicated it believed the jury could not see the shackles, which the Third District found insufficient under Boose. The Doss court reversed the defendant\u2019s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 428, 807 N.E.2d at 705; see also People v. Allen, 354 Ill. App. 3d 442, 446, 821 N.E.2d 335, 339 (2004), appeal allowed, 214 Ill. 2d 537, 830 N.E.2d 4 (2005) (No. 99977) (stun belt); People v. Brown, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1091, 828 N.E.2d 351, 354 (2005) (shackles).\nIn other cases where the defendant has failed to object to the use of a stun belt at trial, the Third District has found a violation of constitutional rights but concluded the cases should be remanded to the trial court for a retrospective Boose hearing. See People v. Johnson, 356 Ill. App. 3d 208, 211-12, 825 N.E.2d 765, 767-68 (2005); People v. Buckner, 358 Ill. App. 3d 529, 532, 534, 831 N.E.2d 676, 679-80 (2005).\nIn People v. Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d 814, 825-26, 666 N.E.2d 899, 906-07 (1996), the First District reversed the conviction of a defendant, who was tried in shackles, under the plain-error doctrine. However, there, the defendant had requested the shackles be removed at trial but had forfeited the argument on appeal by failing to raise it in a posttrial motion (see People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1130 (1988)). Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 823, 666 N.E.2d at 905.\nIn People v. Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1022, 820 N.E.2d 507, 515 (2004), the Fifth District declined to apply the plain-error doctrine to a defendant\u2019s challenge to his wearing a stun belt during trial because the record clearly demonstrated the error did not contribute to his conviction. There, like Bennett, the defendant had objected to the stun belt at trial but had failed to raise the issue in a posttrial motion. Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 1021, 820 N.E.2d at 514. The Fifth District also reached the same conclusion in People v. DuPree, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1043-44, 820 N.E.2d 560, 565-66 (2004), where the defendant forfeited his stun-belt challenge by failing to object at trial.\nAfter considering the aforementioned case law, we decline to reverse defendant\u2019s conviction under the plain-error doctrine. Unlike the Third District cases that have found plain error, our supreme court has not applied Boose and Staley when a defendant has failed to object to appearing before a jury in restraints. See Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at 12. The Hyche court indicates it is the State\u2019s compelling the defendant to wear restraints before the jury that ere-ates the constitutional violation. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at 12. Thus, when a defendant fails to object to wearing restraints, the presence of compulsion is negated, and a constitutional violation has not been established. See Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241, 396 N.E.2d at 12.\nMoreover, we agree with the State that the United States Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision in Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 161 L. Ed. 2d 953, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005), does not warrant a different result. There, the defendant continuously objected to wearing the shackles. Deck, 544 U.S. at 625, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 960, 125 S. Ct. at 2010. Thus, the Deck Court did not address whether a defendant\u2019s constitutional rights are violated when the defendant does not object to the restraints at trial.\nEven if Deck provides a defendant\u2019s presence at trial in shackles without objection is a constitutional violation, defendant has not established plain error here. First, the Deck Court expressly states a defendant\u2019s due-process rights are violated by \u201cthe use of visible restraints.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Deck, 544 U.S. at 632, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 964, 125 S. Ct. at 2014. In this case, the trial court noted defendant\u2019s left hand was free and his right hand was handcuffed to an eyebolt attached to the table. In its brief, the State asserts defendant fails to argue and the record fails to show the single handcuff was visible to the jury. In his reply brief, defendant does not refute this contention. Under the plain-error doctrine, defendant has the burden of proving an error occurred (see People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187, 830 N.E.2d 467, 480 (2005)) and thus had the burden of demonstrating the handcuff was visible to the jury.\nSecond, even if the handcuff was visible to the jury, the State has proved \u201c \u2018beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.\u2019 \u201d Deck, 544 U.S. at 635, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 966, 125 S. Ct. at 2015-16, quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967). Here, the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt was overwhelming. See People v. Kennedy, 150 Ill. App. 3d 319, 326, 501 N.E.2d 1004, 1009 (1986) (finding that even if the defendant had not been wearing leg irons, the jury would have found him guilty where the evidence was overwhelming); see also People v. Barney, 363 Ill. App. 3d 590 (2006). Defendant was upset about a leaky juice carton and admitted to Webber he had squirted the fecal matter on the officers. Harvey, Kuhse, and Knight all testified Kuhse\u2019s finger was injured when he struggled with defendant in the cuffing hatch. Friel confirmed the injury to Kuhse\u2019s finger and the substance on Knight\u2019s arm.\nB. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nDefendant also contends his case must be remanded because the trial court failed to make an adequate inquiry into his pro se ineffective-assistance-of-counsel allegation. Whether the trial court made an adequate inquiry is a question of law, and thus our review is de novo. See People v. Savage, 361 Ill. App. 3d 750, 756, 838 N.E.2d 247, 252 (2005).\nWhen a defendant raises pro se a posttrial ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the trial court may, when warranted, appoint new counsel to assist the defendant with presenting his claim. People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 330, 333, 672 N.E.2d 65, 67 (1996); People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 189, 464 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (1984). Thus, when a defendant asserts such a claim, the court must first conduct an \u201cadequate inquiry\u201d to determine the factual basis for the claim. People v. Johnson, 159 Ill. 2d 97, 125, 636 N.E.2d 485, 497 (1994). If the court concludes the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then new counsel is unnecessary. However, if the inquiry indicates trial counsel\u2019s possible neglect of the case, then the court should appoint new counsel. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 333, 672 N.E.2d at 67.\nTherefore, we address \u201c \u2018whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry\u2019 into the allegations.\u201d People v. Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d 326, 339, 833 N.E.2d 396, 407 (2005), quoting People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78, 797 N.E.2d 631, 638 (2003). In conducting an inquiry, the trial court uses one or more of the following methods: \u201c(1) questioning the trial counsel, (2) questioning the defendant, and (3) relying on its own knowledge of the trial counsel\u2019s performance in the trial.\u201d Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 339, 833 N.E.2d at 407.\nDefendant\u2019s recitation of what occurred at his sentencing hearing is deficient. The following is a brief summary of what actually took place. The trial court invited defendant to talk about why he sought a trial in this case, and defendant began by stating the following:\n\u201cYour Honor, I think it was a grave misjustice that I was and that I have been convicted. I don\u2019t think I had the representation. I don\u2019t think I had the proper counsel to represent me. My counsel never asked me anything about the case. We never talked about any strategies about the case.\u201d\nDefendant asserted he was being harassed and poisoned by prison officers. He noted the things he believed he was being denied in prison and again stated, \u201cI am not being given the proper attorney. I am not being represented properly by counsel.\u201d\nDefendant later requested a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserted his attorney (1) did not communicate with him, except for asking him if he would take three years; (2) failed to present evidence he had a conflict with Center officials; (3) failed to show Friel did not have a record on Harvey; and (4) failed to argue the events could not have happened the way the officers testified they did. The trial court acknowledged defendant\u2019s oral motion for a new trial and denied it, noting it had recalled the trial.\nDefendant contends his case is similar to People v. Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d 68, 623 N.E.2d 352 (1993). There, the trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion without any inquiry at all. Our supreme court stated \u201cthe trial court should have afforded the defendant the opportunity to specify and support his complaints.\u201d Robinson, 157 Ill. 2d at 86, 623 N.E.2d at 361.\nUnlike Robinson, the trial court in this case did allow defendant to explain why he thought his counsel was ineffective. The court gave defendant ample opportunity to set forth and support his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, the court did not utterly fail to make an initial inquiry into his claims.\nHere, the trial court\u2019s inquiry into defendant\u2019s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims was adequate. The court allowed defendant to present his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and then relied on its own knowledge of the trial to deny defendant\u2019s post-trial motion that raised the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. The court\u2019s reliance on its recollection was adequate in this case where defendant\u2019s allegations were refuted by the trial record. See People v. Young, 341 Ill. App. 3d 379, 383, 792 N.E.2d 468, 472 (2003) (finding further inquiry into the factual basis of defendant\u2019s pro se ineffective-assistance claims was unnecessary where the claims related to trial matters and the judge hearing the posttrial motion had presided over the trial).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Erica R. Clinton, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Kathy Shepard, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY STRICKLAND, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-04-0218\nOpinion filed February 10, 2006.\nRehearing denied March 13, 2006.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Erica R. Clinton, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nThomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Kathy Shepard, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor's Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0598-01", "first_page_order": 616, "last_page_order": 625 }