{ "id": 5766334, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOVORIE K. GRAY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Gray", "decision_date": "2006-03-14", "docket_number": "No. 4-05-0470", "first_page": "897", "last_page": "905", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 897" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "442 N.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" }, { "page": "858" }, { "page": "857" }, { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3103110 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160-61" }, { "page": "162-63" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192395 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 416", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474979 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" }, { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 914", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "915-17" }, { "page": "916" }, { "page": "916" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3193168 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539-42" }, { "page": "541" }, { "page": "540" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "838 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "935" }, { "page": "936" }, { "page": "936" }, { "page": "936" }, { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875175 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 N.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2627334 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 N.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173628 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" }, { "page": "44" }, { "page": "47-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260439 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517", "parenthetical": "stating \"jurisdiction is vested in the courts, not in the judges\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "374 Ill. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2532814 ], "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "stating \"jurisdiction is vested in the courts, not in the judges\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/374/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 N.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "706", "parenthetical": "stating that a statute that removes a case from a judge sitting in the juvenile division to a judge sitting in the criminal division of the same circuit is not a divestiture of jurisdiction as the circuit court retains jurisdiction over the minor defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596066 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "stating that a statute that removes a case from a judge sitting in the juvenile division to a judge sitting in the criminal division of the same circuit is not a divestiture of jurisdiction as the circuit court retains jurisdiction over the minor defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0209-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 791, "char_count": 19572, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.201320608085977e-08, "percentile": 0.32587015690876187 }, "sha256": "787a527afc4759592c2681cd6059aee8055e6b67a5d7a2f0420c9e62ff2706dd", "simhash": "1:1974b4747144dcf6", "word_count": 3223 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:25:30.372916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOVORIE K. GRAY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn March 15, 2005, defendant, Tovorie K. Gray, admitted and stipulated to a petition to revoke his probation in front of Judge Jeffrey Ford. Judge Ford set a date to resentence defendant. Before the date set by Judge Ford, Judge Thomas Difanis, when sentencing defendant on two other matters, resentenced defendant based on his admission and stipulation to the petition to revoke his probation. Judge Difanis sentenced defendant to three years in prison pursuant to an agreement between defendant and the State. Judge Ford later vacated Judge Difanis\u2019s sentence, finding Judge Difanis did not have jurisdiction. Judge Ford resentenced defendant to TLh years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing he is entitled either to the original three-year sentence or at least a lesser sentence. We reverse and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn July 11, 2002, defendant was indicted in Champaign County case No. 02 \u2014 CF\u20141051 (cause 1051) for aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(8) (West 2002)). On August 20, 2003, defendant pleaded guilty in front of Judge Ford and was sentenced to 30 months\u2019 probation. On June 30, 2004, the State filed a petition to revoke probation alleging that defendant failed to fulfill conditions of his probation.\nOn March 15, 2005, Judge Ford presided over the hearing on the petition to revoke defendant\u2019s probation. After Judge Ford properly admonished defendant, defendant admitted and stipulated to the State\u2019s petition. Judge Ford set the matter for resentencing on April 25, 2005.\nOn April 4, 2005, Judge Difanis called cause 1051 for negotiated disposition along with two other cases involving defendant, case Nos. 01 \u2014 CF\u20141301 (cause 1301) and 04 \u2014 CF\u2014974 (cause 974). Defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to aggravated battery in cause 974 and admitted to the State\u2019s petition to revoke his probation for a burglary charge in cause 1301 in exchange for three sentences in cause 1051, cause 1301, and cause 974 of three years in prison, with all three sentences to run concurrently.\nOn April 25, 2005, Judge Ford called defendant\u2019s cause 1051; neither defendant nor his attorney was present. Judge Ford determined that Judge Difanis had no jurisdiction to sentence defendant in cause 1051, so Judge Ford vacated the three-year sentence in cause 1051. Judge Ford continued the case for a sentencing hearing.\nOn May 4, 2005, defendant filed a motion to reinstate the negotiated sentence or other relief. Defendant argued (1) the sentence was not void and could not be vacated by the trial court sua sponte; (2) the State did not move to vacate the sentence; (3) defendant\u2019s attorney did not receive notice that the sentence would be vacated; (4) vacating the sentence violates defendant\u2019s right against double jeopardy; (5) Judge Difanis had jurisdiction; and (6) the provision in section 5 \u2014 4\u20141 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20141 (West 2004)) that states that the same judge should try a case and impose a sentence is unconstitutional as it violates the separation-of-powers clause of the Illinois Constitution (111. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1). That same day, Judge Ford denied counsel\u2019s motion, finding that he took the original admission and stipulation and the parties incorrectly went before Judge Difanis for sentencing.\nOn June 1, 2005, Judge Ford called defendant\u2019s cause 1051 for resentencing. The State asked for a sentence of not less than three years in prison. After noting defendant\u2019s extensive and violent criminal history, Judge Ford sentenced defendant to an extended-term sentence of 7V2 years in prison with credit for 91 days to be served concurrently with cause 974 and cause 1301. Defendant immediately filed a motion to reconsider sentence, alleging that the sentence was excessive. The court denied the motion, stating that \u201cthe agreed sentence in front of Judge Difanis was something that should never have been done.\u201d This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant argues this court should compel specific performance of the original sentence entered by a court of lawful jurisdiction, and the court should afford defendant the benefit of his bargain with the State wherein he was induced to plead guilty and admitted to a petition to revoke in exchange for a three-year sentence in this case that would run concurrently with two other three-year sentences. Alternatively, defendant argues this court should reduce defendant\u2019s sentence based on his acceptance of responsibility, factors in mitigation, the State\u2019s recommendation, and undue prejudice resulting from his earlier resentencing.\nDefendant first argues Judge Difanis had jurisdiction to sentence him, as jurisdiction is vested in the courts, not in a particular judge. Further, Judge Difanis was the presiding judge, so he had the authority to assign defendant\u2019s case to his own docket call.\nWe agree that jurisdiction is vested in courts, not in individual judges. See People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 222, 582 N.E.2d 700, 706 (1991) (stating that a statute that removes a case from a judge sitting in the juvenile division to a judge sitting in the criminal division of the same circuit is not a divestiture of jurisdiction as the circuit court retains jurisdiction over the minor defendant); Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Legg, 374 Ill. 306, 309, 29 N.E.2d 515, 517 (1940) (stating \u201cjurisdiction is vested in the courts, not in the judges\u201d). Further, the determination of which judge will hear a particular case is generally an administrative matter. Blair v. Mackoff, 284 Ill. App. 3d 836, 842-43, 672 N.E.2d 895, 899 (1996). Supreme Court Rule 21(b) states that \u201c[tjhe chief judge of each circuit may enter general orders in exercise of his general administrative authority, including orders providing for assignment of judges, general or specialized divisions, and times and places of holding court.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 21(b). \u201cRule 21(b), adopted pursuant to section 7(c) of article VI of our constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 7(c)), *** confers power on each chief judge to enter general orders for the assignment of judges, free from any express legislative limitations.\u201d People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 46, 495 N.E.2d 501, 506 (1986). In the Sixth Circuit Court of Illinois, the circuit of which Champaign County is part, the chief judge appoints one circuit judge within each county as presiding judge of that county (6th Jud. Cir. Ct. R. 1.3(a) (eff. November 1, 1992)) and that presiding judge shall \u201cadminister the [\u00a1judicial [djepartment of the county in which he is presiding\u201d and \u201cshall assign judicial duties to the circuit and associate judges.\u201d 6th Jud. Cir. Ct. Rs. 1.3(b), 1.4(b) (eff. November 1, 1992). A presiding judge may personally assign judges to individual cases. See People v. Hattery, 183 Ill. App. 3d 785, 801, 539 N.E.2d 368, 379 (1989).\nAs Judge Difanis was sitting in a court with jurisdiction over defendant\u2019s case, and as he had the power to assign defendant\u2019s case to his own docket, he had jurisdiction to resentence defendant in cause 1051.\nThe State responds, though, that section 5 \u2014 6\u20144(h) of the Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 6\u20144(h) (West 2002)) provides that sentencing after probation revocation shall be governed by section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) of the Code, and section 5 \u2014 4:\u20141(b) of the Code provides a mandatory requirement that \u201c[tjhe judge who presided at the trial or the judge who accepted the plea of guilty shall impose the sentence unless he is no longer sitting as a judge in that court\u201d (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) (West 2002)). According to the State, only Judge Ford could sentence defendant because he was the judge who accepted the stipulation and admission to the petition to revoke probation, and he continued to sit as a judge in the court that was to sentence defendant.\nDefendant acknowledges section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) of the Code but argues that the section\u2019s mandate is not one to which courts must strictly adhere. If courts were forced to comply with section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) of the Code, that section would violate the separation-of-powers clause of the Illinois Constitution.\nIn determining whether courts must strictly adhere to section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b), the issue is whether section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) of the Code is mandatory or directory. The Supreme Court of Illinois has noted as follows:\n\u201c[T]he mandatory-permissive dichotomy concerns whether the language of a statute has the force of a command that imposes an obligation, or is merely a grant of permission or a suggestion, which therefore imposes no obligation. The mandatory-directory dichotomy *** concerns the consequences of a failure to fulfill an obligation.\u201d People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43, 52, 838 N.E.2d 930, 935 (2005).\nIf section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) of the Code is mandatory, only Judge Ford, the judge who accepted the stipulation and admission, may sentence defendant, and Judge Difanis\u2019s sentence should be vacated. If section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) of the Code is directory, Judge Difanis\u2019s sentence was not properly vacated and should be reinstated.\nIn determining whether a statutory obligation is mandatory or directory, this court applies the de novo standard of review. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 54, 838 N.E.2d at 936.\nTo decide the issue, we must determine the legislature\u2019s intent by first looking to the statute\u2019s language. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 54, 838 N.E.2d at 936. When determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory, statutory language that prescribes a result for failure to fulfill an obligation provides strong evidence that the statute is mandatory. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 54, 838 N.E.2d at 936. In this case, the legislature did not prescribe a specific result for failure to provide the same sentencing judge as the one who presided over the trial or guilty plea. The statute states that the judge who presided at the trial or accepted the plea shall impose the sentence, but when the issue is whether a statute is mandatory or directory as opposed to mandatory or permissive, use of the word \u201cshall\u201d is not determinative. See Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d at 54, 838 N.E.2d at 936. The statutory language is otherwise ambiguous as to whether the legislature intended that the requirement of a specific judge be mandatory. We, therefore, look to the purpose of the statute.\nThe council commentary to section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) of the Code states that section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) \u201cmakes explicit former Illinois practice of having the trial judge pass sentence. Its purpose is to provide for sentence selection by the judge most informed of the facts in the case.\u201d 730 ILCS Ann. 5/5 \u2014 4\u20141, Council Commentary, at 356 (Smith-Hurd 1997). The primary concern in section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b), then, is that the judge issuing the sentence be fully informed.\nIn People v. Easley, 119 Ill. 2d 535, 519 N.E.2d 914 (1988), the Supreme Court of Illinois addressed whether section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) of the Code required that a judge, sitting in the same circuit but different county, travel to a former county to sentence a defendant over whose trial that judge presided. The court determined that section 5 \u2014 4\u2014 1(b)\u2019s exception that the sentencing judge does not have to be the judge who presided at the trial if that judge is no longer sitting as a judge \u201cin that court\u201d applied. The court held that the phrase \u201cin that court\u201d refers to a particular division or county, not the entire circuit. Easley, 119 Ill. 2d at 539-42, 519 N.E.2d at 915-17. While the court expressly stated that it did not address whether section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) was mandatory or permissive, or whether it was constitutional (Easley, 119 Ill. 2d at 541, 519 N.E.2d at 916), the court acknowledged that it found \u201cno injustice in having a sentence imposed by a judge other than the one who conducted the trial, provided that the sentencing judge [had] access to the full record.\u201d Easley, 119 Ill. 2d at 540, 519 N.E.2d at 916. The court recognized, therefore, that the importance of section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) is to ensure that the sentencing judge is fully informed.\nIn this case, neither party suggests Judge Difanis was inadequately informed when he sentenced defendant. As Judge Difanis was sentencing defendant in two other causes while sentencing defendant on cause 1051, he was informed of defendant\u2019s extensive criminal and often violent history. Further, defendant waived presentence investigation and report by the court services department as well as a formal sentencing hearing. As he was fully informed, Judge Difanis\u2019s sentence did not jeopardize the purpose of section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) of the Code.\nSupreme Court of Illinois cases addressing whether certain statutory provisions were mandatory or violations of the separation-of-powers clause of the Illinois Constitution are instructive in determining whether section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) is mandatory.\nIn People v. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d 556, 561, 413 N.E.2d 416, 419 (1980), the supreme court held that the presentence investigation and report were mandatory legislative requirements that could not be waived absent agreement between the parties as to the sentence to be imposed. The court determined that the mandatory presentence-report requirement did not constitute a legislative infringement on the judicial function because \u201c[t]he aspect of the sentencing function involved in this section relates solely to a presentencing procedure.\u201d Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d at 560, 413 N.E.2d at 419.\nIn People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465, 519 N.E.2d 890 (1988), the supreme court held that an automatic-substitution-of-judge provision did not violate the separation-of-powers provision. The court noted that \u201cit is not within the legislature\u2019s power to enact statutes solely concerning court administration or the day-to-day business of the court[ ].\u201d Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 475, 519 N.E.2d at 893. If a statute expresses a public-policy determination, \u201chaving as its basis something other than the promotion of efficient judicial administration,\u201d the court will reconcile any conflicts between the rules of the court and the statute. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 475, 519 N.E.2d at 893. If a statute \u201cdirectly and irreconcilably conflicts with a rule of this court on a matter within the court\u2019s authority, the rule will prevail.\u201d Walker, 119 Ill. 2d at 475, 519 N.E.2d at 893. Ultimately, the court determined that the legislation in question did not conflict with Rule 21(b) as the automatic-substitution-of-judge provision could be invoked only after assignment is made and Rule 21(b) provides for initial assignment.\nThe case at issue is not like Youngbey and Walker, where the statutory provision mandates what information must be available to a judge before a sentencing determination or ensures a party\u2019s right to an impartial judge after a particular judge has been assigned to that party\u2019s case. Section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) purports to mandate which judge must be assigned to sentence a particular defendant. Section 5 \u2014 4\u2014 1(b) directly affects the sentencing by mandating who may sentence a defendant.\nIn People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 442 N.E.2d 855 (1982), the supreme court addressed whether requirements in sections 5 \u2014 4\u20141(c) and 5 \u2014 8\u20141(b) of the Code that command trial courts to state their reasons for imposing particular sentences were mandatory requirements. Unlike in Youngbey, the section under consideration in Davis involved \u201cattempts to dictate the actual content of the judge\u2019s pronouncement of sentence.\u201d Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 160-61, 442 N.E.2d at 857. The court held that the sections were directory because interpreting the sections to be mandatory would make them constitutionally invalid based on principles of separation of powers. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 162-63, 442 N.E.2d at 858. The court noted that the power to impose a sentence is exclusively a function of the judiciary and to construe the sections as mandatory would \u201cpermit a legislative infringement upon the exercise of the judicial function of imposing sentence.\u201d Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 161, 442 N.E.2d at 857.\nFinally, in People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 495 N.E.2d 501 (1986), the supreme court determined that a section of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 122 \u2014 8) requiring that postconviction proceedings be conducted by a judge not involved in the original proceeding violated the separation-of-powers clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, \u00a7 1). The court found that the section violated the separation-of-powers clause because it encroached on the court\u2019s administrative and supervisory authority. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d at 44, 495 N.E.2d at 505. The court further held that the section conflicted with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21(b), and a rule of the court adopted pursuant to constitutional authority prevails over a statute that conflicts with that rule. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d at 47-48, 495 N.E.2d at 507.\nThe provision at issue in this case is more closely analogous to the provisions in Davis and Joseph. Section 5-4-1(b) outlines which judge must be assigned to impose a particular sentence on a specific defendant. This directly conflicts with the judiciary\u2019s administrative power to assign cases and impose a sentence. It also conflicts with Rule 21(b), which provides for the assignment of judges. As section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) conflicts with a supreme court rule and encroaches on the court\u2019s administrative responsibilities, the statute must be directory in order to avoid determining that the section is unconstitutional.\n\u20221 Determining section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) is directory, rather than mandatory, ensures that section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) will not be deemed unconstitutional under the separation-of-powers clause of the Illinois Constitution. Reviewing courts have a duty to construe acts of the legislature so as to affirm their constitutionality and validity when those acts\u2019 constructions are doubtful. See Davis, 93 Ill. 2d at 161, 442 N.E.2d at 858. Section 5 \u2014 4\u20141(b) does not unduly encroach upon the inherent powers of the judiciary if it merely instructs the courts on a common practice rather than mandates a particular assignment.\nFinally, allowing Judge Ford\u2019s increased sentence would violate section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Code. Section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) of the Code states \u201c[a] motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 30 days after the sentence is imposed. *** However, the court may not increase a sentence once it is imposed.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(c) (West 2004). Judge Difanis had jurisdiction to impose the sentence. Judge Ford did not have authority to vacate that lawful sentence and impose a new sentence. Judge Difanis\u2019s sentence of three years should, therefore, be reinstated.\nAs we determined defendant is entitled to the three-year sentence, we need not address defendant\u2019s remaining allegations of error.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand to the Champaign County circuit court with instructions to reinstate defendant\u2019s original three-year sentence.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nMcCULLOUGH and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COOK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Keleigh L. Biggins, both of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Julia Rietz, State's Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TOVORIE K. GRAY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-05-0470\nOpinion filed March 14, 2006.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Keleigh L. Biggins, both of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJulia Rietz, State's Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0897-01", "first_page_order": 915, "last_page_order": 923 }