{ "id": 5766113, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF MARVIN E. MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, and BRENDA J. MILLER, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Miller", "decision_date": "2006-03-10", "docket_number": "No. 4-05-0475", "first_page": "906", "last_page": "916", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 906" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "580 N.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "621" }, { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5797754 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" }, { "page": "65" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "64-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" }, { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122735 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" }, { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 N.E.2d 1263", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ill. App. 3d 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3586656 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/170/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "757 N.E.2d 117", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570790 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 N.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841-42" }, { "page": "842" }, { "page": "842" }, { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3492761 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "604 N.E.2d 378", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5162577 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/237/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2928080 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "833 N.E.2d 379", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "a reviewing court may affirm on any basis warranted by the record" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 1122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5730832 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1124", "parenthetical": "a reviewing court may affirm on any basis warranted by the record" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/1122-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 N.E.2d 166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" }, { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "revestment doctrine applies in dissolution cases and outside parameters of Code section 2 - 1401 time constraints" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "174-75" }, { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 759", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261308 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764" }, { "page": "767" }, { "page": "766" }, { "page": "766" }, { "page": "767-68" }, { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0759-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200-01", "parenthetical": "it is a motion's substance, not its title, that determines the motion's character" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477026 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102", "parenthetical": "it is a motion's substance, not its title, that determines the motion's character" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0095-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 878, "char_count": 24939, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.170997825831295e-08, "percentile": 0.47510781516605793 }, "sha256": "29925ffad81e9639c8b5c7031128f53f501246bb173f886f289dd6c539896498", "simhash": "1:342a757ad7048c85", "word_count": 4067 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:25:30.372916+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF MARVIN E. MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, and BRENDA J. MILLER, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe question presented by this appeal is whether a trial court has jurisdiction to vacate and reopen a final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered some six years earlier. The question arose when, in 2001, petitioner, Marvin E. Miller, asked the court to enforce the July 1995 judgment of dissolution that had awarded him, inter alia, the marital home. In January 2002, respondent, Brenda J. Miller, asked the court to set aside the 1995 final judgment, claiming that neither she nor petitioner knew the judgment of dissolution had been entered until March 2001. She claimed that since 1995, the two had been living together as husband and wife and, as a result, had jointly acquired additional property and financial obligations.\nIn April 2003, the trial court set aside its July 1995 judgment and entered a new judgment. In May 2003, petitioner sought to vacate the new judgment as void, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief it did. In May 2005, the trial court denied petitioner\u2019s request to vacate the order. Petitioner appeals from that denial. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPetitioner filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on March 21, 1995, and respondent filed an answer and cross-petition on April 13, 1995. Each party was represented by separate counsel. On May 15, 1995, the trial court, Judge Thomas P Carmody presiding, conducted a hearing on grounds for the dissolution. The docket entry for that date stated:\n\u201cPresent in court the petitioner, Marvin E. Miller, and his attorney, J. Richard Meno. The respondent does not appear but is represented by attorney William Katich. Respondent [sic] and his attorney agree to proceed on grounds today. Witness sworn; evidence heard. Based upon the testimony presented, the [c]ourt finds that the parties are entitled to a dissolution of their marriage on grounds of extreme and repeated mental cruelty. Court further finds that the property settlement agreement entered into between the parties!,] including a waiver of maintenance!,] is fair and reasonable and not unconscionable. Attorney Meno is to prepare the written judgment and submit the same to opposing counsel for his approval and then to the [c]ourt for entry.\u201d\nOn July 13, 1995, Judge Carmody entered the written judgment of dissolution tendered by counsel, which had been signed as \u201capproved by\u201d both attorneys. Neither party personally signed the judgment indicating their approval nor was there a written settlement agreement in the file bearing their signatures. The clerk was directed to send file-marked copies to the attorneys. The court directed the case to be closed and the cause stricken.\nAlmost six years passed before petitioner, through attorney Larry Clark, in May 2001, filed a petition for rule to show cause why respondent should not be held in contempt of court for failing to comply with the property distribution set forth in the 1995 judgment of dissolution. On July 26, 2001, the trial court allowed attorney Clark\u2019s motion to withdraw as counsel for petitioner. The record does not indicate any further action was taken on petitioner\u2019s request for contempt.\nOn January 28, 2002, attorney Robert Watson on behalf of respondent filed a \u201cpetition for declaratory judgment,\u201d requesting a determination of the ownership and distribution of both marital and nonmarital assets. The petition alleged that until March 2001, neither party was aware that a final judgment of dissolution of marriage had been entered. Respondent had not complied with any of the property distribution provisions set forth in the judgment because (1) she was not familiar with the content of the provisions, and (2) she assumed the dissolution proceedings remained pending. Respondent alleged that until March 2001, she and petitioner had resided together as husband and wife, acquired personal property together, and filed joint income tax returns each year. Respondent asked the trial court to redistribute the marital and nonmarital assets in light of the couple\u2019s actions since July 1995.\nAlthough not part of the record before us, we discern from the testimony and argument presented to the trial court at the various hearings in the instant proceedings that the following occurred. In May 2001, respondent obtained an order of protection against petitioner. At one of the hearings related to the order of protection, the trial court, Judge Diane Brunton presiding, entered a temporary order awarding respondent the marital home. It was in relation to the order of protection proceedings that the parties discovered they had been divorced since 1995. Because the final judgment of dissolution awarded petitioner the home, Judge Brunton amended the temporary order and ordered respondent to vacate the home.\nOn June 20, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on respondent\u2019s \u201cpetition for declaratory judgment.\u201d Petitioner appeared pro se, and respondent appeared personally and with attorney Watson. Petitioner testified first as an adverse witness for respondent. He said in May 1995 he had appeared in court and testified regarding his request for temporary possession of the marital home. He said his request was granted that day. He could not recall whether respondent or her attorney was present in court. In an uncooperative and argumentative manner, petitioner testified that he was not sure whether he and respondent had filed joint income tax returns since 1995, and he denied receiving any increased veteran\u2019s benefit as a result of being married. He said respondent moved back into the marital home sometime in 1995 and remained there through 2001. He said he had discovered only a year ago that he and respondent were no longer married. He presented no testimony or evidence as to whether he and his attorney had negotiated and entered into a marital settlement agreement in 1995. Petitioner then testified as to his assets and debts acquired since 1995.\nRespondent testified that in May 1995, petitioner, his attorney, her attorney, and she attended a meeting at the courthouse to discuss temporary possession of the marital residence. She said that was the only occasion she had gone to the courthouse with regard to the dissolution. It was her opinion that the only issue decided that day was that petitioner would receive temporary possession of the home. She said after the meeting they \u201cwere going to decide what [they] were going to do.\u201d She said she had never appeared before a judge in relation to the dissolution.\nAt this courthouse meeting, the parties had agreed that, due to petitioner\u2019s disability, he could have temporary possession of the home. Despite this agreement, respondent had not moved out of the house for any extended period since 1995. On occasion, she would spend a \u201ccouple days\u201d with her daughter. She and petitioner continued to live as husband and wife. Since 1995, they had made joint purchases and acquired joint debt. She moved out of the home for the last time in May 2001. She did not know that a final judgment of dissolution had been entered in 1995 and had not signed any documents agreeing to a property settlement. She further disclaimed knowledge that petitioner had agreed to any final division of property.\nThe common-law record indicates that for approximately one year, the parties bickered about when, by whom, and how the court-ordered appraisals of certain marital property should be conducted and paid. On November 19, 2002, petitioner filed a pro se motion to dismiss, and on December 2, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing and denied petitioner\u2019s motion. We have before us no record of this hearing and no transcript or bystander\u2019s report (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(c)) or agreed statement of facts (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(d)).\nOn April 15, 2003, Judge Carmody resumed the evidentiary hearing on respondent\u2019s petition for declaratory judgment. Respondent again testified that (1) she and petitioner had not realized that a final judgment of dissolution of marriage had been entered; (2) they had, for the most part, continuously resided together; (3) they had filed joint income tax returns; and (4) petitioner had received a monthly marital benefit from the Veteran\u2019s Administration.\nPetitioner was not represented by counsel during this hearing, so Judge Carmody questioned him. Petitioner said he and respondent separated in 1995 and resided together \u201coff and on\u201d since that time. Petitioner described the nature of the personal property, real property, and debt that he and respondent had acquired before and after 1995. Neither attorney Meno nor attorney Katich testified at the evidentiary hearings (June 20, 2002, or April 15, 2003) about the circumstances of the purported \u201csettlement agreement\u201d presented to the court on May 15, 1995.\nOn April 30, 2003, Judge Carmody entered an order vacating the July 1995 final judgment, which dissolved anew the parties\u2019 marriage and distributed their marital and nonmarital assets. Petitioner appealed to this court from that order. On May 20, 2003, attorney Rick Verticchio, on behalf of petitioner, filed an entry of appearance and a motion to dismiss petitioner\u2019s appeal. On May 21, 2003, Judge Car-mody entered an order dismissing petitioner\u2019s appeal without prejudice.\nOn May 22, 2003, attorney Verticchio, on petitioner\u2019s behalf, filed a motion to dismiss respondent\u2019s \u201cdeclaratory judgment\u201d action, citing section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2002)) and claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its April 30, 2003, order. In the alternative, petitioner requested the court reconsider its order.\nThe case lingered for another year, during which time respondent replaced attorney Watson with attorney Kathy Baker-Bowen. Finally, on October 25, 2004, the trial court, Judge Theodis Lewis presiding (due to the retirement of Judge Carmody), conducted a hearing on petitioner\u2019s motion to dismiss. Again, we have no record of that testimony and no transcript or bystander\u2019s report (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(c)) or agreed statement of facts (166 Ill. 2d R. 323(d)). Thereafter, each party submitted legal memoranda for the court\u2019s consideration.\nOn May 16, 2005, Judge Lewis found the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its April 2003 order and denied both petitioner\u2019s motion to dismiss and his motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nInitially, we will attempt to simplify and clarify procedurally what occurred in the trial court. Despite the labels placed on the various motions and petitions before the trial court, we find the substance of those motions and petitions indicate the following occurred procedurally in this case since 1995. See Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 102, 776 N.E.2d 195, 200-01 (2002) (it is a motion\u2019s substance, not its title, that determines the motion\u2019s character).\nIn May 2001, petitioner, after discovering he was awarded sole ownership of the marital residence in the 1995 final judgment of dissolution, filed a petition to hold respondent in contempt for (1) failing to execute a deed conveying her interest in the residence to him as ordered, (2) representing to another judge in an order of protection case that she should be entitled to possession, and (3) removing items of personal property from the residence in defiance of a court order. This pleading was never addressed by the trial court.\nInstead, in January 2002, eight months after petitioner filed his contempt petition, respondent filed a petition to vacate the 1995 final judgment of dissolution and make another, different equitable distribution of the marital assets and debts acquired and incurred before and after 1995. In June 2002, the trial court heard some evidence on respondent\u2019s petition but then continued the hearing to allow the parties to obtain appraisals on certain property. In November 2002, petitioner filed a pro se motion to dismiss respondent\u2019s petition to vacate. The court denied petitioner\u2019s pro se motion to dismiss.\nIn April 2003, after hearing additional testimony, the trial court vacated the original judgment of dissolution of marriage, entered a new judgment, and redistributed the assets and liabilities of the parties. In May 2003, petitioner, through counsel, moved to vacate (even though petitioner\u2019s motion stated he was moving to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 2002))) that April 2003 order, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction. He claimed, because respondent\u2019s request for relief was filed more than two years after the entry of the judgment, respondent\u2019s petition was untimely under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2002)). Alternatively, petitioner asked the court to reconsider its April 2003 order.\nIn May 2005, Judge Lewis found the trial court properly had jurisdiction to consider the matter and denied petitioner further relief. Judge Lewis held that because Judge Carmody, in his April 2003 order, specifically found that neither party had agreed to the terms of the judgment (despite the May 15, 1995, docket entry that stated that the parties had agreed to the property distribution), equity and fairness justified a new property distribution. \u201cOur review of a trial court\u2019s determination of subject[-]matter jurisdiction is de novo.\u201d In re Marriage of Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764, 721 N.E.2d 166, 172 (1999).\nThe relevant portions of Judge Lewis\u2019s order, for the purposes of this appeal, set forth that (1) respondent\u2019s \u201cpetition for declaratory judgment\u201d was, in reality, a section 2 \u2014 1401 petition \u2014 a proper vehicle for respondent\u2019s attack on the judgment; (2) petitioner had not waived his right to challenge the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction by participating in the proceedings; and (3) the 1995 final judgment was entered without knowledge of either party, and therefore the two-year limitation period under section 2 \u2014 1401 was tolled. Although we do not agree with the basis of Judge Lewis\u2019s order, we nevertheless affirm. See Reyes v. Walker, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 1124, 833 N.E.2d 379, 381 (2005) (a reviewing court may affirm on any basis warranted by the record).\nPetitioner first claims that respondent\u2019s \u201cpetition for declaratory judgment\u201d cannot legally be construed as a section 2 \u2014 1401 petition (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2002)). He claims that because respondent (1) did not reference section 2 \u2014 1401 in her petition, (2) filed her petition more than two years after entry of the final judgment, and (3) did not allege legal disability, duress, or fraudulent concealment so as to toll the two-year time limit, Judge Lewis erred in ruling that her petition was, in substance, a section 2 \u2014 1401 petition.\nPetitioner further claims that respondent\u2019s suggestion that the two-year limit was tolled on the basis of a mutual mistake is in error. While respondent argued in the trial court, relying on In re Marriage of Breyley, 247 Ill. App. 3d 486, 617 N.E.2d 243 (1993), that a mutual mistake of fact was a proper ground for relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 (an argument not adopted by her brief on appeal), petitioner argues that Judge Lewis \u201caccepted the suggestion\u201d posed by respondent and relied on Breyley as well. Our reading of Judge Lewis\u2019s order reveals that not to be the case. Judge Lewis distinguished Breyley, finding the disputed issue in this case arose not from the terms of an agreement but, rather, from whether the parties had entered into an agreement at all.\n\u201cA \u2018mutual mistake of fact\u2019 exists for purposes of the reformation of a written instrument, when the contract has been written in terms which violate the understanding of both parties.\u201d In re Marriage of Johnson, 237 Ill. App. 3d 381, 394, 604 N.E.2d 378, 388 (1992). Because the parties did not enter into a written agreement or claim the terms of an agreement were not what they had intended, the mutual mistake argument, as a basis for relief, is not applicable.\nAlthough she does not argue the \u201cmutual mistake\u201d theory on appeal, respondent does claim that \u201c[a]s long as the substance of the [section] 2 \u2014 1401 [m]otion is present, it need not be titled a [section] 2 \u2014 1401 [m]otion.\u201d She further claims that she should be entitled to relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code because \u201cfairness and equity\u201d so require. Unfortunately for respondent, \u201cfairness and equity\u201d alone do not constitute sufficient reasons to grant relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 when the petition was filed more than two years after the judgment was entered.\nWe agree with petitioner that section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code did not provide the proper authority for respondent\u2019s requested relief. We find no basis in this case to toll the two-year limitations period required by section 2 \u2014 1401. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to reopen a final judgment of dissolution six years after its entry on some other basis.\nSection 510(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/510(b) (West 2002)) provides that \u201c[t]he provisions as to property disposition may not be revoked or modified, unless the court finds the existence of conditions that justify the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this State.\u201d (Emphasis added.) The Fifth District in King v. King, 130 Ill. App. 3d 642, 654, 474 N.E.2d 834, 841-42 (1985), held that this statutory section should be construed under the confines of section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code \u2014 that a petition filed after two years must allege legal disability, duress, or fraud to be considered timely. The court held that since the wife had not sought relief within two years after the entry of the judgment, and in the absence of legal disability, duress, or fraud, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the wife\u2019s petition for relief and the \u201cnew\u201d judgment must be vacated. King, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 654, 474 N.E.2d at 842.\nIn King, the wife had claimed that her husband\u2019s personal injury settlement proceeds should have been part of the final judgment of dissolution. The court ruled that because the wife did not request relief until more than two years after the judgment was entered and because she knew of the lawsuit during the dissolution proceedings, the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify the judgment absent allegations of legal disability, duress, or fraud. King, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 654, 474 N.E.2d at 842.\nThe court in King noted, however, that the provision set forth in section 510(b) of the Act \u2014 that courts may reopen a property-division judgment if it finds \u201cthe existence of conditions\u201d that would so justify \u201cunder the laws of this State\u201d (750 ILCS 5/510(b) (West 2002)) \u2014 could provide trial courts the ability to revisit judgments under the \u201cadditional modes of post-30-day relief,\u201d not just under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code. Those \u201cadditional modes\u201d include (1) the application of the revestment doctrine, (2) finding the judgment is void, (3) by agreement of the parties, or (4) the entry of an order nunc pro tunc. King, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 655, 474 N.E.2d at 842.\nWe find, of the above \u201cadditional modes,\u201d the doctrine of re-vestment applies to the case before us. See Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 721 N.E.2d at 174 (revestment doctrine applies in dissolution cases and outside parameters of Code section 2 \u2014 1401 time constraints). \u201c[T]he revestment doctrine allows the parties to revest a court with jurisdiction when the parties \u2018actively participate in proceedings which are inconsistent with the merits of the prior judgment.\u2019 \u201d People v. Watkins, 325 Ill. App. 3d 13, 17, 757 N.E.2d 117, 120 (2001), quoting People v. Hubbard, 170 Ill. App. 3d 572, 576, 524 N.E.2d 1263, 1265-66 (1988); People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237, 241, 456 N.E.2d 11, 14 (1983); accord Elmore v. Elmore, 219 Ill. App. 3d 61, 64, 580 N.E.2d 619, 622 (1991).\nOnce the trial court loses jurisdiction through the passage of 30 days after the entry of its judgment, it may nevertheless be subsequently revested with jurisdiction over the cause under the doctrine of revestment. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d at 240, 456 N.E.2d at 14; Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 766, 721 N.E.2d at 174. \u201cThe parties\u2019 conduct is inconsistent with a prior order if the conduct reasonably can be construed as an indication that the parties do not view the prior order as final and binding.\u201d Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 766, 721 N.E.2d at 174.\nAlthough petitioner, in these proceedings, does not agree that the original judgment should have been reopened, he does admit that he did not knowingly enter into an agreement in 1995, and he did not realize a final judgment of dissolution had been entered. Only subsequent to his realization that he was originally awarded the marital home did he seek to enforce the 1995 judgment. He openly admits that he and respondent lived as if they were married between 1995 and 2001. He admits they made purchases and acquired debt since 1995. Therefore, despite his opposition to reopening the judgment, petitioner\u2019s conduct between 1995 and 2001 can be construed as an indication that he, along with respondent, did not view the 1995 judgment as final and binding. Neither knew the 1995 judgment had been entered.\nOther Illinois courts have applied the revestment doctrine in similar situations. In Adamson, the Second District relied upon the doctrine to affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment, which modified the original final judgment of dissolution entered four years earlier when the parties had agreed to the modification. Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 767-68, 721 N.E.2d at 174-75. The court found that the agreement revested the trial court with jurisdiction despite the passage of more than two years. Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 721 N.E.2d at 174.\nLikewise, the Third District affirmed the trial court\u2019s denial of the wife\u2019s petition to vacate a stipulated judgment, which modified the original judgment of dissolution. Elmore, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 65, 580 N.E.2d at 622. The wife filed her petition to vacate four years after the modified judgment was entered. Citing section 510(b) of the Act, the wife claimed the modified judgment was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because there were no allegations that the original judgment was procured by fraud or coercion or that any facts existed to entitle them to postjudgment relief under section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code. Elmore, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 64, 580 N.E.2d at 621. The trial court ruled that jurisdiction had revested by agreement of both parties. The reviewing court agreed, holding that the judgment of modification was binding. Elmore, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 64-65, 580 N.E.2d at 622.\nJudge Carmody entered the July 1995 final judgment of dissolution based upon the representation that the parties had agreed to the property distribution presented. Presumably, during the June 2002 hearing, Judge Carmody learned the parties, in fact, had not agreed to the distribution as presented. Based upon the apparent misunderstanding, Judge Carmody vacated the 1995 final judgment. We find the trial court had jurisdiction to do so based upon the doctrine of revestment in light of the parties\u2019 testimony that neither had entered into a property settlement agreement nor realized the final judgment had been entered.\nRespondent testified that she did not agree to any division of property in 1995, never testified in court, did not sign any property settlement agreement, and did not realize that a final judgment of dissolution had been entered in 1995. Petitioner likewise testified that he did not realize a final judgment of dissolution had been entered in 1995. He also stated that the only time he testified in court was related to his request for temporary possession of the marital home.\nThe record before us supports the view that Judge Carmody proceeded under the belief that both parties had discussed and agreed to the terms of a marital settlement agreement, when, in fact, they had not. Although we are puzzled by the lack of evidence pertaining to the respective attorney-client relationships between 1995 and 2001, we find the record before us supports Judge Carmody\u2019s April 2003 order vacating the 1995 judgment and redistributing the parties\u2019 assets and debt. Because we find Judge Carmody had jurisdiction to set aside the 1995 final judgment, we affirm Judge Lewis\u2019s order denying petitioner\u2019s \u201cmotion to dismiss.\u201d\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rick Verticchio, of Verticchio & Verticchio, of Gillespie, for appellant.", "Douglas L. Jarman, of Douglas L. Jarman, P.C., of Hillsboro, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF MARVIN E. MILLER, Petitioner-Appellant, and BRENDA J. MILLER, Respondent-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-05-0475\nArgued February 16, 2006.\nOpinion filed March 10, 2006.\nRehearing denied April 10, 2006.\nRick Verticchio, of Verticchio & Verticchio, of Gillespie, for appellant.\nDouglas L. Jarman, of Douglas L. Jarman, P.C., of Hillsboro, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0906-01", "first_page_order": 924, "last_page_order": 934 }