{ "id": 4262416, "name": "JANNIE BROOKS, Mother and Best Friend of Rhonda Brooks, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, d/b/a Canadian National/ Illinois Central Railroad Company, et al., Defendants (Illinois Central Railroad Company, d/b/a Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad Company Counterplaintiff-Appellant; Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, d/b/a Metra/Metropolitan Rail, Counterdefendant-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Brooks v. Illinois Central Railroad", "decision_date": "2005-06-02", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201404\u20142607", "first_page": "120", "last_page": "124", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 120" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5516372 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307252 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598891 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92-93" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8447969 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442060 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536019 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 974992 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0263-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 496, "char_count": 9339, "ocr_confidence": 0.804, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.856319230494445e-08, "percentile": 0.3053830551510918 }, "sha256": "37c899a7a76df8f37971b781548ff746f10c496b5dccd75d064d8c510e03a329", "simhash": "1:d0ab3d899861743a", "word_count": 1437 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:36:54.493342+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JANNIE BROOKS, Mother and Best Friend of Rhonda Brooks, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, d/b/a Canadian National/ Illinois Central Railroad Company, et al., Defendants (Illinois Central Railroad Company, d/b/a Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad Company Counterplaintiff-Appellant; Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, d/b/a Metra/Metropolitan Rail, Counterdefendant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nCounterplaintiff Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad Company (Illinois Central) brings this interlocutory appeal seeking reversal of the circuit court\u2019s grant of counterdefendant Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation/Metra/Metropolitan Rail\u2019s (Metra) motion to dismiss Illinois Central\u2019s counterclaim for contribution. The circuit court certified the following issue on appeal: whether the one-year statute of limitations under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 2002)), or whether the two-year statute of limitations under the contribution provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (Contribution Act) (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204(a), (b) (West 2002)) applies to circumscribe a contribution action against a local public entity.\nOn October 4, 2002, Rhonda Brooks, minor daughter of plaintiff Jannie Brooks, walked through a dilapidated fence onto railroad tracks owned and operated by Illinois Central and Metra. Rhonda had her left leg amputated when a train operated by defendants approached and struck her. Plaintiff filed suit against Illinois Central and Metra sounding in negligence and premises liability, alleging that defendants owned and had failed to maintain the fence through which Rhonda gained access to the railroad tracks, and seeking damages for Rhonda\u2019s injuries.\nDuring discovery, Illinois Central denied that it owned or was responsible for maintaining the fence intended to block access to the tracks. In January 2003, Metra admitted that it owned and was responsible for maintaining the fence in question. In December 2003, Illinois Central filed a counterclaim for contribution against Metra, alleging that Metra\u2019s negligence was the proximate cause of Rhonda\u2019s injuries and that Illinois Central was not liable in any way. Illinois Central additionally alleged that it if were to be found liable, it would be entitled to contribution from Metra in an amount equal to Metra\u2019s relative culpability.\nMetra filed a motion to dismiss Illinois Central\u2019s complaint, arguing that Illinois Central had filed its claim beyond the one-year statute of limitations provided by the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8 \u2014 101 (West 2002)). Metra alleged that, as a local entity, it was immune from Illinois Central\u2019s claim for contribution because Illinois Central failed to file its complaint within one year of the date that its claim had accrued, specifically October 2002, when plaintiff filed her complaint and it was served on Illinois Central. In its response, Illinois Central argued that Metra\u2019s motion to dismiss should be denied because the Code of Civil Procedure allows a claimant two years from the time he or she was served with process in the underlying action or two years from the time he or she knew or reasonably should have known of the act or omission giving rise to a claim for contribution or indemnity, whichever occurs later. 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204(b) (West 2002). Illinois Central additionally argued that, even if the one-year limitation of the Tort Immunity Act applied, it would not be barred from bringing a claim for contribution because it did not become aware that it would have such a claim until Metra admitted to owning and having responsibility for the fence in January 2003.\nThe circuit court granted Metra\u2019s motion to dismiss Illinois Central\u2019s counterclaim for contribution and denied Illinois Central\u2019s subsequent motion to reconsider. Illinois Central thereafter filed a motion in this court to certify the statute of limitations issue for interlocutory appeal, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 111. 2d R. 308), and requesting reversal of the circuit court\u2019s order granting Metra\u2019s motion to dismiss. We granted leave to appeal and now answer the certified question as follows.\nIn this action for contribution, the statute of limitations provision of the Contribution Act (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204(a), (b) (West 2002)) applies, and the circuit court\u2019s order of dismissal was therefore in error.\nBecause this appeal concerns a question of law and presents a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill. 2d 263, 266 (2003). On appeal, Illinois Central maintains that the provisions of the Contribution Act supercede the statute of limitations provided by the Tort Immunity Act. The Contribution Act reads, in relevant part:\n\u201c(c) The applicable limitations period contained in subsection (a) or (b) shall apply to all actions for contribution or indemnity and shall preempt, as to contribution and indemnity actions only, all other statutes of limitation or repose ***.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 204(c) (West 2002).\nIllinois Central argues that, in the context of an action for contribution, the plain language of the statute dictates that it explicitly overrides the limitations of the Tort Immunity Act and that, as a result, Illinois Central was required to file its claim for contribution within two years from the time its cause accrued, not just one year. In response, Metra relies on our supreme court\u2019s decisions in Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186 (1999), Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304 (2001), and Paszkowski v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 1 (2004), which held that the legislative intent of section 8 \u2014 101 was that the Tort Immunity Act apply broadly to any possible claim against local government entities and their employees, and that the Tort Immunity Act necessarily controls over other statutes of limitation or repose. Paszkowski, 213 Ill. 2d at 12-13. In its reply brief, Illinois Central replies that the rules of statutory construction dictate that the statute of limitations under the Contribution Act controls and that the Tort Immunity Act contemplates only direct civil actions, not claims for contribution.\nWe are persuaded by the reasoning of this court\u2019s recent decision in Moore v. Chicago Police Department Officer Green, 355 Ill. App. 3d 81 (2004), issued subsequent to Paszkowski, which held that the limitation of actions provision in the Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS 60/ 305 (West 2002)), rather than that contained in the Tort Immunity Act, applied to an action brought on behalf of a domestic abuse victim against police officers for failure to investigate an incident that immediately preceded the victim\u2019s death. Applying the rules of statutory construction \u2014 namely, that courts should ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent, that statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent, that more specific provisions should be applied to specific subjects, and that later enactments prevail over earlier ones\u2014 and relying on the supreme court\u2019s decision in Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 168 Ill. 2d 312 (1995), this court concluded that the language of the Domestic Violence Act carved out specific duties and liabilities for law enforcement officials and that its limitation of actions provisions applied in the specific case of a domestic violence victim seeking damages against law enforcement officials. Moore, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 92-93.\nMoreover, our supreme court has found that the now-defunct notice provision of the Tort Immunity Act did not apply to an action for contribution. Stephens v. McBride, 97 Ill. 2d 515, 521 (1983). In that case, the court concluded that public policy militated against requiring a defendant seeking contribution from a local governmental entity to give the statutorily required notice within one year after its cause of action accrued, since a claim for contribution could accrue years after an accident occurred. Stephens, 97 Ill. 2d at 522. We believe the same logic applies here.\nThe plain language of the Contribution Act states that, in actions for contribution, its applicable limitations preempts all other statutes of limitation or repose. Furthermore, because contribution is a specific type of suit and because a party seeking contribution may not realize that it has a valid claim for contribution until well after the event giving rise to the original action has occurred, we find that the two-year statute of limitations applies in this instance and that II-linois Central\u2019s claim for contribution was therefore timely filed. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s order of dismissal.\nCertified question answered; reversed and remanded.\nREID, P.J., and THEIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Freeborn & Peters, LLP of Chicago (Richard T. Sikes, Jr., Anthony J. Car-ballo, and Marc H. Kallish, of counsel), for appellant.", "Jay S. Judge, Michael E. Kujawa, and Thomas N. Osran, all of Judge, James & Kujawa, Ltd., of Park Ridge, and Sue-Ann Rosen and Richard Capra, both of Metra Law Department, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JANNIE BROOKS, Mother and Best Friend of Rhonda Brooks, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, d/b/a Canadian National/ Illinois Central Railroad Company, et al., Defendants (Illinois Central Railroad Company, d/b/a Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad Company Counterplaintiff-Appellant; Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation, d/b/a Metra/Metropolitan Rail, Counterdefendant-Appellee).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201404\u20142607\nOpinion filed June 2, 2005.\nRehearing denied July 26, 2005.\nFreeborn & Peters, LLP of Chicago (Richard T. Sikes, Jr., Anthony J. Car-ballo, and Marc H. Kallish, of counsel), for appellant.\nJay S. Judge, Michael E. Kujawa, and Thomas N. Osran, all of Judge, James & Kujawa, Ltd., of Park Ridge, and Sue-Ann Rosen and Richard Capra, both of Metra Law Department, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0120-01", "first_page_order": 136, "last_page_order": 140 }