{ "id": 4262193, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER B. McDONALD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. McDonald", "decision_date": "2006-02-16", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201405\u20140122", "first_page": "390", "last_page": "395", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 390" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "825 N.E.2d 1234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1240", "parenthetical": "stating that even if the law is against him, the defendant must raise the issue to preserve it for review" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3748636 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531", "parenthetical": "stating that even if the law is against him, the defendant must raise the issue to preserve it for review" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0524-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5464950 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229698 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "794 N.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1578278 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/206/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "794 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "376-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5572423 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538" }, { "page": "538" }, { "page": "535" }, { "page": "539" }, { "page": "536, 540" }, { "page": "535-36" }, { "page": "536" }, { "page": "536" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620-21", "parenthetical": "stating that in the context of a successive postconviction petition, the procedural bar of waiver is not merely a principle of judicial administration; it is an express requirement of the statute" }, { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456", "parenthetical": "stating that in the context of a successive postconviction petition, the procedural bar of waiver is not merely a principle of judicial administration; it is an express requirement of the statute" }, { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1083" }, { "page": "1083" }, { "page": "1083" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738560 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "273-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "831 N.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060088 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "789 N.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" }, { "page": "740" }, { "page": "740-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442050 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" }, { "page": "99" }, { "page": "99-100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3218417 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "808 N.E.2d 1089", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a direct appeal taking issue with the use of a stun belt on the defendant during trial" }, { "page": "1091-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126374 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0244-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 587, "char_count": 11511, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.308659383680718e-08, "percentile": 0.47983531086175296 }, "sha256": "edb8034000f322e8e946d104902c761682fbae8de2a377fa9fb0ba4b1b18f7f5", "simhash": "1:b3103592e75cbbc1", "word_count": 1897 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:36:54.493342+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER B. McDONALD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Christopher McDonald appeals from the trial court\u2019s order dismissing his motion to reconsider the summary dismissal of his second postconviction petition and summarily dismissing his amended second postconviction petition. We affirm the trial court.\nFACTS\nFollowing a jury trial, defendant Christopher McDonald was found guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(2) (West 1998)), two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.2(a)(1) (West 1998)), aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.2 (West 1998)), and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.1(a) (West 1998)). McDonald was sentenced to a total of 50 years\u2019 imprisonment. This court affirmed McDonald\u2019s conviction in People v. McDonald, 322 Ill. App. 3d 244, 749 N.E.2d 1066 (2001). McDonald filed a pro se postconviction petition which was summarily dismissed by the trial court. The trial court\u2019s order was affirmed by this court in a Rule 23 order, People v. McDonald, No. 3 \u2014 02\u20140650 (August 29, 2003).\nMcDonald filed a successive (second) postconviction petition on July 26, 2004. In his second petition, McDonald alleged due process violations; that his legs were shackled during the trial although the trial judge made no findings warranting shackling; that he was forced to testify while in shackles; and that his trial counsel failed to object to the shackling. This petition was summarily dismissed by the trial court as frivolous and without merit on September 15, 2004. On October 6, 2004, McDonald filed a motion to reconsider the summary dismissal of the July 26 petition. On October 13, 2004, McDonald filed an amended second postconviction petition with affidavits attached. The amended petition contained the allegations of the second petition with the additional allegation that the jury had observed McDonald shackled and that the successive petition satisfied the cause-and-prejudice test because McDonald became aware that his rights were violated only after this court issued the opinions in People v. Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d 418, 807 N.E.2d 697 (2004), and People v. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 808 N.E.2d 1089 (2004). On December 20, 2004, the trial court denied McDonald\u2019s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the second postconviction petition and summarily dismissed as frivolous and without merit the amended second postcon-viction petition. Appellate counsel was appointed for McDonald and he follows with this appeal.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, McDonald argues the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his second postconviction petition at the first stage of the postconviction proceedings because the petition adequately alleged the gist of a meritorious constitutional claim. Despite the absence of any indication in the record that he was shackled, McDonald asserts as evidence of this fact that the standard operating procedure of the Will County sheriff\u2019s department was to shackle felony defendants. He bases this assertion on a statement from People v. Allen, in which the court made a reference to the Will County sheriff\u2019s department\u2019s standard operating procedure of forcing all felony defendants in custody to wear a stun belt when appearing in court. People v. Allen, 354 Ill. App. 3d 442, 444, 821 N.E.2d 336, 337 (2004).\nThe Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2002)) provides a three-stage process for the adjudication of postconviction petitions. People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 99, 789 N.E.2d 734, 740 (2002). At the first stage, the circuit court determines whether the petition is \u201cfrivolous or is patently without merit.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2002); Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 99, 789 N.E.2d at 740. At this summary review stage, the circuit court is required to make an independent assessment whether the allegations in the petition, liberally construed and taken as true, set forth the gist of a constitutional claim. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 99-100, 789 N.E.2d at 740-41. If the petition is found to be frivolous or patently without merit, the court shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122- \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2002). Trial courts may summarily dismiss postconviction petitions as frivolous and patently without merit based on both res judicata and waiver. People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 442, 831 N.E.2d 604, 614 (2005). Where a petitioner has previously taken a direct appeal from a judgment of conviction, the judgment of the court of review is res judicata as to all issues that were actually decided by the court. People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274, 606 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (1992). Any other claims that could have been presented to the court of review, if not presented, are waived. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 274, 606 N.E.2d at 1083.\nFurther, a ruling on an initial postconviction petition has res judicata effect with respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the petition. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 274, 606 N.E.2d at 1083. Section 122 \u2014 3 of the Act provides that any claim of a substantial denial of a constitutional right not raised in a defendant\u2019s original postconviction petition is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 3 (West 2002); People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456, 793 N.E.2d 609, 620-21 (2002) (stating that in the context of a successive postconviction petition, the procedural bar of waiver is not merely a principle of judicial administration; it is an express requirement of the statute). Successive petitions elicit unique policy considerations that are not implicated by the filing of the first petition. People v. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d 530, 538, 794 N.E.2d 367, 376 (2003). There is less interest in providing a forum for the vindication of a defendant\u2019s constitutional rights in a successive proceeding because the defendant has already been afforded an opportunity to raise such allegations in his first petition. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 538, 794 N.E.2d at 376-77.\nA narrow exception to the rule prohibiting successive postconviction petitions holds that a claim presented in a successive petition may be considered when the proceedings on the initial petition were \u201c \u2018deficient in some fundamental way.\u2019 \u201d People v. Britt-El, 206 Ill. 2d 331, 339, 794 N.E.2d 204, 209 (2002), quoting Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 273-74. To determine whether the procedural hurdle to filing successive postconviction petitions should be lowered as required by fundamental fairness, a court reviews the claim within the petition under a \u201ccause and prejudice\u201d test. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 535, 794 N.E.2d at 374. The cause-and-prejudice test is itself a policy used in the interest of finality to narrow the window of opportunity to present successive postconviction petitions. See Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 539, 794 N.E.2d at 377. It is the defendant\u2019s burden to demonstrate both cause and prejudice for each claim raised in his successive petition. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 536, 540, 794 N.E.2d at 374, 378.\nCause is defined as an objective factor, external to the defense, that impeded the defendant\u2019s effort to raise the claim in an earlier proceeding. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 535-36, 794 N.E.2d at 374. Cause may include a showing that a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available to defendant\u2019s counsel. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 461, 793 N.E.2d at 622. Prejudice is defined as \u201c \u2018an error which so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.\u2019 \u201d Britt-El, 206 Ill. 2d at 339, 794 N.E.2d at 209, quoting People v. Jones, 191 Ill. 2d 194, 199 (2000). Other than meeting the requirements of the cause-and-prejudice test, a defendant will be excused for a failure to raise a claim in an earlier petition only if necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 536, 794 N.E.2d at 374. When a case does not involve the death penalty, to show a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a defendant must show actual innocence. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 536, 794 N.E.2d at 374.\nIn the instant case, McDonald does not claim actual innocence in his successive petition; therefore, the claims raised in his second and amended second petitions must be considered waived unless application of the cause-and-prejudice test indicates otherwise. McDonald asserts that the cause prong of the test is satisfied because until he read this court\u2019s decisions in Martinez and Doss, he assumed that shackling of felony defendants was legal. See People v. Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d 418, 807 N.E.2d 697 (2004); People v. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 808 N.E.2d 1089 (2004) (a direct appeal taking issue with the use of a stun belt on the defendant during trial). McDonald acknowledges that as early as 1977, in the case of People v. Boose, the supreme court stated that shackling of an accused had been held an undesirable practice unless the trial judge found such a restraint reasonably necessary to maintain order. People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 265-66, 362 N.E.2d 202, 305 (1977). In Doss, this court concluded that the trial court\u2019s statement that the judge believed the jurors could not see the shackles, as their view was obstructed by a table, was insufficient under Boose to satisfy the requirement that the trial court find compelling reason to shackle the defendant during trial. Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 428, 807 N.E.2d at 705.\nThe existence of the rulings in Doss and Martinez does not support McDonald\u2019s assertion that he was impeded in raising the issue of shackling in his earlier postconviction petition. The rulings of Doss and Martinez do not involve novel legal analysis. Although the use of stun belts may be relatively new, the guidelines and rationale the courts use to address the potential for stun belt abuse are the same principles used to safeguard against the abuse of shackling. See Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1003-04, 808 N.E.2d at 1091-92. Furthermore, McDonald does not allege he was subjected to a stun belt. As McDonald acknowledges, the use of shackles on a defendant during trial is an issue that has been raised in previous cases. Even if the issue lacked precedent, the lack of precedent in itself is not the same as cause for failing to raise an issue. People v. Purnell, 356 Ill. App. 3d 524, 531, 825 N.E.2d 1234, 1240 (2005) (stating that even if the law is against him, the defendant must raise the issue to preserve it for review). McDonald has failed to meet his burden of showing he was prevented by some objective external factor from presenting his claims in an earlier proceeding. For this reason, he has waived the right to bring the claims in a successive petition, and the trial court\u2019s summary dismissal of the petition was not error.\nFor these reasons the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOLDRIDGE and SLATER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark D. Fisher (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "James Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER B. McDONALD, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201405\u20140122\nOpinion filed February 16, 2006.\nMark D. Fisher (argued), of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJames Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0390-01", "first_page_order": 406, "last_page_order": 411 }