{ "id": 4263095, "name": "ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS KURE et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Farmers Insurance v. Kure", "decision_date": "2006-04-03", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201405\u20140262", "first_page": "395", "last_page": "404", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 395" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963708 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "833 N.E.2d 971", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" }, { "page": "973" }, { "page": "980" }, { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5596452 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "139-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 N.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "415 Ill. 16", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2682181 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/415/0016-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 U.S. 100", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5698490 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1889, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/131/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 1071", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1074", "parenthetical": "each construing uninsured motorist insurance coverage" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3610688 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772", "parenthetical": "each construing uninsured motorist insurance coverage" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. App. 3d 1061", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3522768 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1067" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/122/1061-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 N.W.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "432 Mich. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 87229 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich/432/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 F. Supp. 886", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7397632 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889", "parenthetical": "defining 'an' as '[t]he English indefinite article'" }, { "page": "889" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/693/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 1345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1352" }, { "page": "1352" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927695 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979" }, { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.W.3d 185", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 11348608 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187, 191" }, { "page": "188" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/85/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349613 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "741 N.E.2d 253", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "194 Ill. 2d 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1096307 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/194/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "811 N.E.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721-22" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "721-22" }, { "page": "722" }, { "page": "723" }, { "page": "721-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435844 ], "weight": 12, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406-07" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "409" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "412" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "409" }, { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 N.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58897 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0281-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 839, "char_count": 22027, "ocr_confidence": 0.805, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1427720303384483 }, "sha256": "e6297291efca199c4b36d64a2c0f73fe2ec825c979bd8658d49ffe75cb5031b8", "simhash": "1:1e7c348f3c63bf56", "word_count": 3544 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:36:54.493342+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS KURE et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McDADE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff-appellant, Illinois Farmers Insurance Company (Farmers), filed a complaint seeking declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend or indemnify defendants-appellees, Matthew Kure and his parents, Thomas and Cindy Kure, against a negligence lawsuit against Matthew. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory judgment that Farmers does have a duty to defend and indemnify. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the circuit court of Will County granted Farmers\u2019 motion as to Matthew, denied its motion as to Thomas and Cindy, denied defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment as to Matthew and granted defendants\u2019 motion as to Thomas and Cindy. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nFarmers insures Matthew Kure and his parents Thomas and Cindy under a homeowner\u2019s liability policy. Kyle Signorelli and his parents filed a complaint against Matthew, Thomas, and Cindy Kure seeking damages for injuries he sustained as the result of an altercation between Kyle and Matthew. The complaint alleged that Matthew started an altercation with Kyle and that during the course of the altercation Matthew executed a \u201cpile-driver\u201d type of maneuver by lifting Kyle from the ground, then driving Kyle\u2019s head into the ground with the weight of his body. As a result Kyle is paralyzed from the neck down.\nCount I of the Signorelli complaint alleged that Matthew negligently injured Kyle. Count II alleged Thomas and Cindy Kure were negligent for providing Matthew with the vehicle he used to travel to Kyle\u2019s house and for failing to control their son. Count IV alleged willful conduct and battery against Matthew. The remaining counts of the Signorelli complaint are not at issue in this appeal.\nThomas and Cindy sought coverage for defense of the complaint and indemnity from Farmers. Farmers filed an action for declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Matthew, Thomas, or Cindy because (1) the Kures\u2019 policy covered occurrences, (2) the policy defined an \u201coccurrence\u201d as an accident, and (3) the injury did not result from an accident. Farmers also alleged it has no duty to defend or indemnify based on the policy\u2019s intentional conduct exclusion. Farmers argued that Thomas and Cindy did not have coverage for their allegedly \u201cnegligent\u201d conduct because Matthew\u2019s conduct was intentional. Thomas and Cindy responded that the allegations against them were based on negligence, not intentional conduct, and therefore the exclusion did not apply.\nFollowing argument the trial court found that Farmers has a duty to defend Thomas and Cindy. The court found that Farmers did not have a duty to defend or indemnify Matthew. The court granted Farmers\u2019 motion for summary judgment as to Matthew, denied Farmers\u2019 motion as to Thomas and Cindy, denied Matthew\u2019s motion for summary judgment, and granted Thomas and Cindy\u2019s motion for summary judgment. Finally, the court entered an order that no just reason existed to delay appeal of its order. Farmers appeals the court\u2019s order granting Thomas and Cindy\u2019s motion for summary judgment on its action seeking a declaratory judgment that Farmers has a duty to defend the complaint against Thomas and Cindy. Matthew did not file a cross-appeal of the court\u2019s order denying his motion for summary judgment.\nANALYSIS\nSummary judgment is proper where, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2000). \u201cThe standard of review for the entry of summary judgment is de novo.\u201d General Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281, 284, 769 N.E.2d 18, 20 (2002).\n\u201cIt is the general rule that the duty of the insurer is determined by the allegations of the underlying complaint. [Citation.] A duty to defend arises if the complaint\u2019s allegations fall within or potentially within the coverage provisions of the policy. *** The threshold requirements for the complaint\u2019s allegations are low. [Citation.] In a court\u2019s determination of the duty to defend, the underlying complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of the insured, and doubts and ambiguities are to be construed in favor of the insured. [Citation.] A determination regarding an exclusionary clause is subject to the same liberal standard. *** \u2018An insurer may not justifiably refuse to defend an action against its insured unless it is clear from the face of the underlying complaints that the allegations fail to state facts which bring the case within, or potentially within, the policy\u2019s coverage.\u2019 (Emphasis in original.) Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d at 73, 578 N.E.2d at 930.\u201d Lyons v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 404, 406-07, 811 N.E.2d 718, 721-22 (2004).\nThe sole issue before us is whether Farmers had a duty to defend Thomas and Cindy under their homeowner\u2019s liability policy. That policy states, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cWe will pay those damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury, property damage or personal injury resulting from an occurrence to which this coverage applies.\n\u2018Occurrence\u2019 means an accident, including exposure to conditions which result during the policy period in bodily injury or property damage. Repeated or continuous exposure to the same general conditions is considered to be one occurrence.\u201d\nOn appeal, Farmers raises two arguments. First, Farmers argues that Kyle\u2019s injury did not result from an \u201coccurrence\u201d as defined in the homeowner\u2019s policy and therefore the complaint does not make allegations that fall within the coverage provided by the policy. Second, Farmers argues that if the allegations of the complaint do fall within the policy\u2019s coverage, Matthew\u2019s intentional conduct would trigger the intentional act exclusion as it relates to Thomas and Cindy.\nIn support of its first argument, Farmers states that Kyle\u2019s injuries resulted from Matthew\u2019s intentional acts and the trial court found Matthew\u2019s actions resulting in Kyle\u2019s injuries were not accidental when it found Farmers has no duty to defend Matthew. Farmers argues that because \u201cthere is no separate bodily injury being claimed by [Kyle] which resulted] from the alleged negligent conduct of Thomas and Cindy Kure,\u201d Kyle\u2019s injuries were not the result of an \u201coccurrence\u201d and the policy does not apply.\nIn support of its second argument, Farmers cites, inter alia, North-brook Property & Casualty Co. v. Transportation Joint Agreement, 194 Ill. 2d 96, 741 N.E.2d 253 (2000). That case arose from an accident where \u201ca METRA train collided with a school bus operated jointly by the school districts. Several students were killed and many others were injured, resulting in numerous lawsuits against the school districts.\u201d Transportation Joint Agreement, 194 Ill. 2d at 97, 741 N.E.2d at 254. Northbrook insured the school districts under a commercial general liability policy. That policy contained the following exclusion:\n\u201c \u2018 \u201cBodily injury\u201d or \u201cproperty damage\u201d arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any aircraft, \u201cauto\u201d or watercraft owned or operated or rented or loaned to any insured. Use includes operation and \u201cloading or unloading.\u201d *** \u201cAuto\u201d means a land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer designed for travel on public roads, including any attached machinery or equipment.\u2019 \u201d Transportation Joint Agreement, 194 Ill. 2d at 98, 741 N.E.2d at 254.\nThe trial court held that Northbrook \u201chad no duty to defend the school districts against the students\u2019 lawsuits because the injuries arose out of the use or operation of a bus.\u201d The appellate court reversed, finding that \u201cthe students\u2019 lawsuits against the school districts adequately alleged that the injuries could have arisen from causes other than use or operation of the bus, such as failure of the school districts to adequately plan and inspect bus routes and warn bus drivers of potential hazards.\u201d Transportation Joint Agreement, 194 Ill. 2d at 98, 741 N.E.2d at 254. The supreme court reversed the appellate court, reasoning as follows:\n\u201cThe policy excludes injuries arising from the school districts\u2019 use or operation of a motor vehicle. Allegations that the school districts inadequately planned and inspected bus routes or failed to warn bus drivers of potential hazards along the routes are nothing more than rephrasings of the fact that the students\u2019 injuries arose from the school districts\u2019 use or operation of a motor vehicle. Contrary to the appellate court\u2019s holding, the students\u2019 complaints failed to allege that the injuries arose from events \u2018wholly independent of any negligent operation of the bus.\u2019 \u201d Transportation Joint Agreement, 194 Ill. 2d at 98-99, 741 N.E.2d at 254, quoting Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Transportation Joint Agreement, 309 Ill. App. 3d 261, 266 (1999).\nFarmers argues for a similar result here, where the policy excludes coverage for injuries arising from intentional acts and allegations that Thomas and Cindy failed to adequately supervise Matthew are nothing more than rephrasings of the fact that Kyle\u2019s injury arose from an intentional act by an insured.\nThomas and Cindy respond to both of Farmers\u2019 arguments by first asserting that, under this policy, \u201c[wjhether one who contributes to an injury is negligent is independent from the question of whether another who directly caused the injury acted intentionally.\u201d This is because the policy contains a severability clause that states \u201c[t]his insurance applies separately to each insured.\u201d Thomas and Cindy reason that because of the severability clause, the court is bound to determine whether an \u201coccurrence\u201d occurred as if Thomas and Cindy were the only insureds.\nIn support of that argument, they cite King v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187, 191 (Tex. 2002), a case decided by the Supreme Court of Texas. In King the insured\u2019s employee intentionally injured a third party. The injured party sued the insured for negligent hiring, training, and supervision. The issue in that case was \u201cwhether an employer\u2019s alleged negligent hiring, training, and supervision constitute[d] an \u2018occurrence\u2019 under the terms of the insurance policy although the injury was directly caused by the employee\u2019s intentional conduct.\u201d Similar to this case, the insurance company argued that the injury was the result of an intentional act, while the insured argued that, from his standpoint, the injuries resulted from an accident, i.e., his own negligence. King, 85 S.W3d at 188.\nThe policy in King contained language stating that the insurance applied as if each named insured were the only named insured and separately to each insured against whom a claim is made. The policy further provided that the court was to treat each named insured as if she were the only named insured. The court concluded that from the employer\u2019s standpoint the allegations of the complaint alleged an \u201coccurrence\u201d in part because to hold otherwise would impute the intentional actor\u2019s intent to the separate insured. The court found that at its core, the insurer\u2019s argument was that the insured\u2019s employee\u2019s intent should control whether there is a duty to defend the insured under the policy. The court held \u201cthat argument not only ignores the policy language that delineates between separate insureds, it also ignores the intended-injury exclusion provision. That exclusion, which excludes coverage for injuries \u2018intended from the standpoint of the insured,\u2019 would have no purpose if all intended injuries were excluded at the outset from coverage because they would not be an \u2018occurrence.\u2019 \u201d King, 85 S.W.3d at 189.\nFinally, Thomas and Cindy respond that Farmers is seeking to impute Matthew\u2019s intentional conduct to them and that Illinois \u201crefuses to impute the intentional conduct of one insured to another innocent insured.\u201d Farmers denies it is attempting to impute Matthew\u2019s conduct to Thomas and Cindy by arguing that because the policy uses the phrase \u201can insured\u201d in the intentional act exclusion, the exclusion is broadened to exclude Thomas and Cindy from coverage for injuries triggered by Matthew\u2019s intentional (and therefore excluded) conduct. For this argument, Farmers relies on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Smiley, 276 Ill. App. 3d 971, 659 N.E.2d 1345 (1995), where the insured ran a day-care business out of her home, and one of the children in her care was injured by the allegedly negligent act of her husband. The husband contended that because he was not engaging in the business, the exclusion in their policy for injuries related to business activities did not apply to him. The court held as follows:\n\u201cThe word \u2018an\u2019 is an indefinite article and is applied to more than one individual object. (Allstate Insurance Co. v. Foster (D. Nev. 1988), 693 F. Supp. 886, 889; see also Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 84 (6th ed. 1990) (defining \u2018an\u2019 as \u2018[t]he English indefinite article\u2019).) Also, the word \u2018an\u2019 is often used in the sense of \u2018any\u2019 (Foster, 693 F. Supp. at 889; see also Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 84 (6th ed. 1990) (stating that the word \u2018an\u2019 is \u2018equivalent to \u201cone\u201d or \u201cany\u201d \u2019)), and use of the phrase \u2018an insured\u2019 in an exclusionary clause unambiguously means \u2018any insured\u2019 (Allstate Insurance Co. v. Freeman (1989), 432 Mich. 656, 698-99, 443 N.W.2d 734, 753-54). In the present case, therefore, employing the words \u2018an\u2019 and \u2018any\u2019 broadened the exclusions to include injuries triggered by one insured in connection with the business activities of another insured.\u201d Smiley, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 979, 659 N.E.2d at 1352.\nThomas and Cindy respond Smiley is inapposite to the case at bar because, there, the court concluded that \u201cthe injuries allegedly caused by David Smiley\u2019s negligence were connected to his wife\u2019s business activities\u201d in that the duty arose because of the business. Smiley, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 980, 659 N.E.2d at 1352. On the contrary, in the present case, Thomas and Cindy played no role in Matthew\u2019s conduct.\nWith that background in mind, we turn to the issues Farmers raises in support of its appeal.\nA. Whether Matthew\u2019s Act Constitutes an \u201cOccurrence\u201d for Purposes of Thomas and Cindy\u2019s Insurance Coverage\nIn Illinois, as in Texas, whether an occurrence has occurred is determined from the insured\u2019s standpoint. See Country Cos. v. Bourbon, 122 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1067, 462 N.E.2d 526, 530 (1984) (\u201cwe think the better rule to be that which considers the injury from the standpoint of the [insured], rather than that which centers upon a characterization of the actions *** as intentional or accidental. *** Thus, when viewing the incident we have related from the standpoint of the [insured], there can be no doubt that insofar as he was concerned it was indeed an accident, despite the fact that the injuries he received were the result of an intentional and criminal act\u201d); Dyer v. American Family Insurance Co., 159 Ill. App. 3d 766, 772, 512 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (1987) (each construing uninsured motorist insurance coverage).\nWe find Lyons v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 404, 811 N.E.2d 718 (2004), instructive in this case. There, the insurer argued that the insured\u2019s act of building levees that allegedly damaged another\u2019s property \u201cwas intentional and therefore was not an \u2018occurrence\u2019 within the meaning of the policy, which define[d] \u2018occurrence\u2019 as \u2018an accident.\u2019 \u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 408, 811 N.E.2d at 722. The insured\u2019s policy excluded coverage for property damage \u201cthat \u2018is either expected or intended by the insured.\u2019 \u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 811 N.E.2d at 722. The Lyons court began by noting that \u201c[i]n determining what constitutes an accident, Illinois adheres to the rule of law promulgated by the United States Supreme Court more than a century ago in United States Mutual Accident Ass\u2019n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 33 L. Ed. 60, 9 S. Ct. 755 (1889).\u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 408, 811 N.E.2d at 723. The Illinois Supreme Court later summarized the Barry rule as follows:\n\u201c \u2018[I]f an act is performed with the intention of accomplishing a certain result, and if, in the attempt to accomplish that result, another result, unintended and unexpected, and not the rational and probable consequence of the intended act, in fact, occurs, such unintended result is deemed to be caused by accidental means.\u2019 \u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 409, 811 N.E.2d at 723, quoting Yates v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 415 Ill. 16, 19, 111 N.E.2d 516, 517-18 (1953).\n\u201cThe factual allegations of the complaint, rather than the legal theories, determine a duty to defend.\u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 811 N.E.2d at 722. Examining the allegations of the complaint, the Lyons court found that it contained no allegations the insured expected or intended to build his levees so that they extended onto the underlying plaintiff\u2019s property. The court concluded that \u201c[c]onstruing the policy and complaint liberally and resolving all doubts in favor of the insured, *** the allegations of the underlying complaint are potentially within the coverage under the policy\u201d (Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 412, 811 N.E.2d at 726) and therefore the insurer had a duty to defend.\nViewing the incident from Thomas and Cindy\u2019s point of view, we hold that the complaint makes allegations that are within the coverage provided by the policy. The underlying complaint in the present case alleges only negligence by Thomas and Cindy and makes no allegation that they intended that as a result of their alleged act of negligence, specifically, failing to control Matthew and providing him with the means of traveling to Kyle\u2019s home, that Matthew would injure Kyle.\nB. Whether the Intentional Act Exclusion Applies\nThe intentional act exclusion in the Kures\u2019 homeowner\u2019s liability policy reads as follows:\n\u201cWe do not cover bodily injury, property damage or personal injury which is either:\n(a) caused intentionally by or at the direction of an insured; or\n(b) results from any occurrence caused by an intentional act or any insured where the results are reasonably foreseeable.\u201d\nA duty to defend arises if the complaint\u2019s allegations potentially fall within the coverage provisions of the policy. See Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 811 N.E.2d at 721-22. Lyons found that the unintended consequences of the insured\u2019s intended act brought the underlying claim potentially within the policy\u2019s coverage. There, the policy excluded coverage for property damage that was \u201c \u2018either expected or intended by the insured.\u2019 \u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 811 N.E.2d at 722. Similarly, in the present case, the policy excludes coverage for bodily injury that \u201cresults from any occurrence caused by an intentional act *** [or] where the results are reasonably foreseeable.\u201d As the Lyons court noted, that language places the \u201cfocus of the inquiry in determining whether an occurrence is an accident [on] whether the injury is expected or intended by the insured, not whether the acts were performed intentionally.\u201d (Emphases in original.) Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 409, 811 N.E.2d at 723.\nIn Williams v. American Country Insurance Co., 359 Ill. App. 3d 128, 139, 833 N.E.2d 971, 980 (2005), the court construed a policy which excluded coverage for bodily injury expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. In Williams, a cab company sought coverage for its driver\u2019s traffic accident in which the driver struck the pedestrian. The policy\u2019s coverage exclusion for expected or intended injuries became an issue because the driver was convicted of battery as a result of the occurrence. Williams, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 130, 833 N.E.2d at 973. Williams held that the supreme court\u2019s holding in American Family Mutual Insurance Co v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 739 N.E.2d 445 (2000), precluded the driver from contesting the fact that his battery conviction established that his conduct was intentional. The Williams court held that the language of the policy allowed \u201ccoverage to be excluded as to one insured and remain in effect as to the other insured.\u201d Williams, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 139, 833 N.E.2d at 980. Coverage would be excluded as to the cab company \u201conly if [it] \u2018expected or intended\u2019 the injury.\u201d Williams, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 139-40, 833 N.E.2d at 980.\nThe trial court found that Matthew\u2019s acts were intentional. However, Thomas and Cindy did not commit an intentional act and did not participate in Matthew\u2019s conduct. \u201c[T]he duty of the insurer is determined by the allegations of the underlying complaint.\u201d Lyons, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 811 N.E.2d at 721-22. Again, the complaint against Thomas and Cindy contains no allegation that Thomas and Cindy intended or even expected that as a result of their alleged negligence Matthew would injure Kyle. Nor does the complaint allege that such a result was reasonably foreseeable from Thomas and Cindy\u2019s allegedly negligent acts. Accordingly, we hold the intentional act exclusion does not apply to Farmers\u2019 coverage of Thomas and Cindy.\nCONCLUSION\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the circuit court\u2019s order granting Thomas and Cindy\u2019s motion for summary judgment on its action seeking a declaratory judgment that Farmers has a duty to defend the complaint against them is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nBARRY and O\u2019BRIEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McDADE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mary F. Sitko (argued) and Danny L. Worker, both of Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Michael W Rathsack (argued), of Chicago, and Daniel J. Kaiser, of Hunt, Kaiser, Aranda & Subach, Ltd., of Bensenville, for appellees Thomas Kure and Cindy Kure.", "Charles J. Corrigan, of Dommermuth, Brestal, Cobine & West, Ltd., of Naperville, for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THOMAS KURE et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201405\u20140262\nOpinion filed April 3, 2006.\nMary F. Sitko (argued) and Danny L. Worker, both of Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMichael W Rathsack (argued), of Chicago, and Daniel J. Kaiser, of Hunt, Kaiser, Aranda & Subach, Ltd., of Bensenville, for appellees Thomas Kure and Cindy Kure.\nCharles J. Corrigan, of Dommermuth, Brestal, Cobine & West, Ltd., of Naperville, for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0395-01", "first_page_order": 411, "last_page_order": 420 }