{ "id": 4262466, "name": "DANIEL MABIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Mabie v. Village of Schaumburg", "decision_date": "2006-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20142457", "first_page": "756", "last_page": "762", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 756" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "201 N.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "injury must occur \" 'within the period of employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be in the performance of his duties, and while he is fulfilling those duties' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2832038 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "injury must occur \" 'within the period of employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be in the performance of his duties, and while he is fulfilling those duties' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 N.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 Ill. App. 3d 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2837146 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/3/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 703", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "courts interpret the causal test under the Pension Code as similar to the test under the Workers' Compensation Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487167 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551", "parenthetical": "courts interpret the causal test under the Pension Code as similar to the test under the Workers' Compensation Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3134628 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" }, { "page": "85-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/107/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "640 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5367871 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "831 N.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5732223 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "502-03" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "503-04" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "706 N.E.2d 979", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "firefighter who injured his knee during a training course was entitled to benefits under the Pension Code" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583", "parenthetical": "firefighter who injured his knee during a training course was entitled to benefits under the Pension Code" }, { "page": "583", "parenthetical": "tests should be interpreted similarly" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "839 N.E.2d 670", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260204 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" }, { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "840 N.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260152 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499048 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "838 N.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 916", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4259488 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" }, { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0916-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 659, "char_count": 14481, "ocr_confidence": 0.803, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1637080265654095e-07, "percentile": 0.5846630440616422 }, "sha256": "d0ad086daab74c993cbe9ef1146332e0f94479105bd423207f3ee0700d3e726f", "simhash": "1:4b6c3fc60f26dc6b", "word_count": 2427 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:36:54.493342+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DANIEL MABIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDaniel Mabie, a fireman, sues the Village of Schaumburg (the Village) for sick leave and vacation benefits he did not receive while recovering from injuries incurred at the fire station. He says he is entitled to those benefits under the Public Employee Disability Act (PEDA) (5 ILCS 345/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)).\nThe Village claims it does not have to pay the benefits because the plaintiffs injury did not occur \u201cin the line of duty\u201d under PEDA.\nThis case requires us to construe and apply PEDA\u2019s use of the words \u201cline of duty.\u201d The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. We affirm the trial court.\nFACTS\nPlaintiff was employed by the defendant as a full-time firefighter when he was injured on April 12, 1999. He fell down fire station stairs on his way to roll call. He was unable to perform his duties as a firefighter from April 13, 1999, to August 5, 1999. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the plaintiff on his workers\u2019 compensation claim, finding the plaintiff suffered \u201ca compensable injury arising out of and in the course of his employment.\u201d The Illinois Industrial Commission and the trial court confirmed the arbitrator\u2019s decision. The Village appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, Industrial Commission Division. While the Village\u2019s appeal was pending, the parties agreed to settle the workers\u2019 compensation claim. The settlement awarded the plaintiff $32,500 for medical expenses, permanent disability, and interest. The parties agreed to dismiss the Village\u2019s appeal.\nFollowing the settlement, the plaintiff filed a complaint for injunc-tive relief pursuant to PEDA seeking an order directing the Village to reinstate his sick leave and vacation benefits. Under PEDA, a firefighter who suffers an injury \u201cin the line of duty\u201d shall continue to be paid by his employer on the same basis as before his injury, with no deduction from sick leave credits, overtime accumulation, or vacation. 5 ILCS 345/1 (West 2000). The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the plaintiff waived his right to ask for additional benefits outside the settlement agreement. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint.\nOn appeal, this court reversed, finding the language of the settlement agreement was limited to those claims that could be enforced by the Industrial Commission. Mabie v. Village of Schaumburg, 1 \u2014 04\u2014 1709 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The plaintiff could not have waived his right to bring his PEDA claim, and the agreement did not have any res judicata effect as to plaintiffs claim. Mabie, slip op. at 6.\nOn remand to the trial court, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on two alternative theories: (1) he suffered an injuiy in the line of duty that was compensable under PEDA; and (2) the Village was barred from challenging the cause of plaintiffs disability and its legal effect based on the res judicata or judicial estoppel effect of the settlement agreement and prior Industrial Commission decisions.\nThe trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.\nDECISION\nSummary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2000); Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Marchwiany, 361 Ill. App. 3d 916, 919, 838 N.E.2d 172 (2005). Our review is de novo. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 361 Ill. App. 3d at 919.\nCollateral estoppel, a branch of res judicata, prohibits the re-litigation of an issue actually decided in an earlier proceeding between the same parties. McCulla v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 232 Ill. App. 3d 517, 520, 597 N.E.2d 875 (1992). In order to apply collateral estoppel, (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the issue in the current action; (2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party in the prior action; and (3) the prior adjudication must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Dowrick v. Village of Downers Grove, 362 Ill. App. 3d 512, 516, 840 N.E.2d 785 (2005).\nThe question is whether the prior decision in the workers\u2019 compensation case that the injury \u201carose out of and in the course of employment\u201d collaterally estopped the defendant from relitigating the issue of causality in the PEDA case. PEDA provides compensation for a firefighter who \u201csuffers any injuiy in the line of duty which causes him to be unable to perform his duties.\u201d 5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2000).\nBecause there is no definition of \u201cline of duty\u201d in PEDA, and no cases directly on point, the parties rely on cases comparing workers\u2019 compensation claims with line-of-duty disability pension claims.\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides for compensation for accidental injuries \u201carising out of and in the course of the employment\u201d of the injured employee. 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2000). The applicable section of the Illinois Pension Code (Pension Code) allows a pension board to grant a line-of-duty disability pension for \u201csickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effects of acts of duty.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 110 (West 2000).\nThere is no definition of \u201cact of duty\u201d in the section of the Pension Code applying to firefighters in municipalities with populations of 500,000 and under. However, this court has held the definition in the Pension Code for cities with populations over 500,000 applies equally to all firefighters. See Jensen v. East Dundee Fire Protection District Firefighters\u2019 Pension Fund Board of Trustees, 362 Ill. App. 3d 197, 204, 839 N.E.2d 670 (2005). That section defines an \u201cact of duty\u201d as:\n\u201cAny act imposed on an active fireman by the ordinances of a city, or by the rules or regulations of its fire department, or any act performed by an active fireman while on duty, having for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of another person.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 110 (West 2000).\nIf a firefighter is injured while performing an act imposed on him by the ordinances of a city or the rules and regulations of the fire department, he is not required to prove the act had for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of another person. O\u2019Callaghan v. Retirement Board of Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 302 Ill. App. 3d 579, 583, 706 N.E.2d 979 (1998) (firefighter who injured his knee during a training course was entitled to benefits under the Pension Code).\nThe defendant contends the court in Demski v. Mundelein Police Pension Board, 358 Ill. App. 3d 499, 831 N.E.2d 704 (2005), made clear that whether an accident arose \u201cout of and in the course of employment\u201d for purposes of workers\u2019 compensation is a different issue than whether an accident occurred during an \u201cact of duty\u201d under the Pension Code. There, the plaintiff, a police officer, injured her back during a routine physical fitness agility examination. Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 500. The Illinois Industrial Commission determined her injury arose out of the course of her employment. The pension board denied her application for a line-of-duty pension, finding her disability was not caused by the performance of an act of duty. Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 502. The court held collateral estoppel did not apply. The pension board was not bound by the Industrial Commission\u2019s determination because the issue in the two cases was not identical. Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 502-03.\nThe issue before the pension board was whether the accident occurred during an \u201cact of duty,\u201d as defined by section 5 \u2014 113 of the Pension Code. Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 503. Section 5 \u2014 113, applicable to police officers in cities with populations over 500,000, defines an \u201cact of duty\u201d as:\n\u201cAny act of police duty inherently involving special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life, imposed on a policeman by the statutes of this State or by the ordinances or police regulations of the city in which this Article is in effect or by a special assignment; or any act of heroism performed in the city having for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of a person other than the policeman.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 113 (West 2000).\nThe court held the issue of whether Demski was injured while performing an act of duty never had been litigated. Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 503. That is, the workers\u2019 compensation case did not decide whether Demski was performing an act involving a special risk not ordinarily shared by a citizen. Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 503-04. The issues were \u201csubstantially different.\u201d Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 504.\nThe specialized definition of \u201cact of duty\u201d in Demski does not apply here. In Jensen, the court found the language in section 5 \u2014 113 of the Pension Code defining an act of duty for police officers is different than the language defining the term \u201cact of duty\u201d as it relates to firefighters. Jensen, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 203. Because the pension board improperly applied the definition of the term \u201cact of duty\u201d in section 5 \u2014 .113, the court held the board never addressed the issue of whether the plaintiffs injury was incurred in or resulted from \u201cacts of duty\u201d within the meaning of section 4 \u2014 110 of the Pension Code. Jensen, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 204-05.\nWhen we look at cases not involving the \u201cspecial risk\u201d definition in Demski, it is clear the courts treat the causal test under the Pension Code as equivalent to the test under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. In Wilfert v. Retirement Board of Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 263 Ill. App. 3d 539, 543, 640 N.E.2d 1246 (1994), the court held the Pension Code \u201cserves an equivalent purpose to the objectives of workers\u2019 compensation\u201d and is to be liberally construed in favor of the applicant to achieve its beneficent purpose. Moreover, the \u201cline of duty\u201d test in pension cases is the same as the general test of \u201carising out of and in the course of the employment\u201d applied in workers\u2019 compensation cases. Wilfert, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 544, citing Unger v. Continental Assurance Co., 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85, 481 N.E.2d 684 (1985). See also Luchesi v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 333 Ill. App. 3d 543, 551, 776 N.E.2d 703 (2002) (courts interpret the causal test under the Pension Code as similar to the test under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act); O\u2019Callaghan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 583 (tests should be interpreted similarly).\nIn McCulla, a firefighter appealed the denial of workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Previously, the pension board had awarded him a \u201cnot in duty\u201d pension, meaning he was disabled \u201c \u2018as a result of any cause other than an act of duty.\u2019 \u201d McCulla, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 521, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. IO8V2, par. 4 \u2014 111. The court held that under collateral estoppel, the pension board\u2019s decision barred the firefighter from relitigating the issue of whether his injuries were causally connected to his employment. McCulla, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 521. The court said:\n\u201cWe find no difference between the issue adjudicated before the pension board and the issue of causation subsequently before the Commission. The claimant had a full opportunity to adjudicate the issue of the work-related nature of his disability before the pension board. The pension board found his disability did not arise out of his duties as a fire fighter. He did not appeal this determination. Therefore, he is collaterally estopped from relitigating that issue before the Commission.\u201d McCulla, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 521.\nSimilarly, in Dempsey v. City of Harrisburg, 3 Ill. App. 3d 696, 698, 279 N.E.2d 55 (1971), the court held the issues in proceedings under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and the policemen\u2019s pension fund were \u201csufficiently alike that it would be a pointless quibble to deny that they are identical.\u201d The statute governing the pension fund in Dempsey provided benefits in the event \u201c \u2018a policeman loses his life in the performance of duty.\u2019 \u201d Dempsey, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 698, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. IO8V2, par. 3 \u2014 118. The court held the Industrial Commission\u2019s decision was res judicata and binding on the defendants in the pension action. Dempsey, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 698.\nWe see no meaningful difference between the \u201cline of duty\u201d standard in PEDA and the causation test in workers\u2019 compensation claims \u2014 that the injury \u201carose out of and in the course of employment.\u201d There is no reason to require a firefighter to provide different proof that he was injured in the line of duty under PEDA than he would in a \u201cline-of-duty\u201d pension case. Accordingly, we find the defendant is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of causation, based on the finding in the workers\u2019 compensation claim that plaintiffs injury arose out of the course of his employment.\nThe defendant contends a material issue of fact remains as to whether plaintiff tripped on an aerosol can or whether he slipped for some other reason. In an affidavit attached to his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff said he stepped on an aerosol can and fell down the fire station stairs. The defendant refers to statements made by the plaintiff, his captain, and his doctor that indicate plaintiff fell down the stairs but do not mention an aerosol can. Can or no can, the plaintiff was on his employer\u2019s premises and proceeding to work at the direction of his employer when the accident occurred. Precisely how the plaintiff slipped or tripped does riot matter. See Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 85-86, quoting Chmelik v. Vana, 31 Ill. 2d 272, 278, 201 N.E.2d 434 (1964) (injury must occur \u201c \u2018within the period of employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be in the performance of his duties, and while he is fulfilling those duties\u2019 \u201d). No issue of material fact remains.\nCONCLUSION\nWe affirm the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff.\nAffirmed.\nGARCIA, P.J, and SOUTH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert B. Ulrich and Eric S. Grodsky, both of Maciorowski, Sackmann & Ulrich, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Gilbert Feldman, of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DANIEL MABIE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20142457\nOpinion filed March 31, 2006.\nRobert B. Ulrich and Eric S. Grodsky, both of Maciorowski, Sackmann & Ulrich, of Chicago, for appellant.\nGilbert Feldman, of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0756-01", "first_page_order": 772, "last_page_order": 778 }