{ "id": 4263418, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JASON A. MURRAY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Murray", "decision_date": "2006-04-25", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201403\u20140632", "first_page": "999", "last_page": "1008", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 999" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "204 N.E.2d 741", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2838755 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480573 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "780 N.E.2d 669", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442057 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "413 N.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475117 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 646", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295771 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "396 N.E.2d 855", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 Ill. App. 3d 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3291686 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/77/0775-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 N.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Ill. App. 3d 1093", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3071922 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1097" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/102/1093-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 N.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3146320 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345-46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 N.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. App. 3d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5552286 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/83/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 1361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "1363" }, { "page": "1362-63" }, { "page": "1363" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "1364" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778581 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "253-54" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "250-51" }, { "page": "251-52" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "253-54" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254-55" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "828 N.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "\"a court will avoid determining a constitutional question if the case can be resolved on other, nonconstitutional grounds\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 476", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451345 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482", "parenthetical": "\"a court will avoid determining a constitutional question if the case can be resolved on other, nonconstitutional grounds\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0476-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 982, "char_count": 22340, "ocr_confidence": 0.792, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14278901974593886 }, "sha256": "3ece8cd00df50f952809d1383df6c3070b16f64f3b0d71474e63af1687d8e223", "simhash": "1:ca29f5faf344b826", "word_count": 3702 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:36:54.493342+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JASON A. MURRAY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Jason A. Murray, appeals from his conviction of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(5) (West 2002)). He makes a twofold argument. First, the trial court misstated the law when answering a question by the jury during deliberations. Second, the enhanced penalty of 25 years\u2019 imprisonment for home invasion involving great bodily harm caused by the discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 11(c) (West 2002)) is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the penalty for another offense with identical elements, namely, armed violence predicated on trespass to a residence and involving great bodily harm caused by the discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/33A \u2014 2(c), 33A\u2014 3(b \u2014 10), 19 \u2014 4(a)(2), (b) (West 2002)). See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711.\nWe find reversible error in the instructions and, therefore, do not reach the constitutional issue. See People v. Lee, 214 Ill. 2d 476, 482, 828 N.E.2d 237, 243 (2005) (\u201ca court will avoid determining a constitutional question if the case can be resolved on other, nonconstitutional grounds\u201d). We reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand this case for a new trial.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe State proceeded to trial on two counts: aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4.2(a)(1) (West 2002)) and home invasion involving great bodily harm caused by the discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(5) (West 2002)). Both counts arose out of the same incident: the shooting of Charles Gizzarelli on April 2, 2002. Defendant pleaded self-defense.\nAt trial, Gizzarelli testified he lived at 814 West Front Street in Bloomington. Thomas Monte owned the house. The afternoon of April 2, 2002, defendant stopped by and delivered to Gizzarelli, in clear plastic wrapping, what was supposed to be crack cocaine. Instead, it was chunks of drywall plaster. Gizzarelli refused to pay. Defendant accused him of substituting the plaster for the genuine cocaine he had delivered. They argued, and defendant left. A half hour to an hour later, Gizzarelli received a call on his cellular telephone: it was defendant, and \u201che wanted to come over.\u201d Gizzarelli said okay; he assumed that defendant wanted to \u201cstraighten out his little error.\u201d Upon returning to the house, defendant telephoned Gizzarelli again so he \u201ccould let him in.\u201d When Gizzarelli opened the back door, he was surprised to see a vehicle parked a couple of feet from the door, but no one in sight. Defendant, who \u201cwas on the side of the door,\u201d then \u201crushed into the house,\u201d and, to Gizzarelli\u2019s further surprise, another man was with him. This other man followed defendant inside and closed the door. Defendant \u201cstarted waving [a pistol] and saying he wanted money.\u201d Gizzarelli still refused to pay. They argued. Defendant struck Gizzarelli in the side of the face with the pistol and stepped back. \u201cThe fellow with him *** said[,] [\u2018S]hoot him[,] J Rock, shoot him.[\u2019]\u201d (J Rock was defendant\u2019s nickname.) Defendant pointed the pistol at Gizzarelli\u2019s groin and fired. The bullet went through Gizza-relli\u2019s penis and thigh. He fell. Defendant and his friend dashed out of the house and drove away.\nAnother resident of the house, Brandy Stine, came downstairs and called 9-1-1. She never actually saw Gizzarelli get shot, but she saw a vehicle speed away. Monte testified he was in the basement at the time of the shooting.\nUpon their arrival, the police did a \u201cprotective sweep\u201d of the house and found a bong, a scale, and individually wrapped bags of cocaine upstairs as well marijuana plants growing in the basement. At trial, Gizzarelli admitted he had a conviction of criminal drug conspiracy from 1994 and a pending charge of delivery of a controlled substance.\nDefendant testified he was a seller of marijuana and Gizzarelli was his supplier. Gizzarelli had delivered to him some marijuana to sell, and defendant had sold some of it and smoked the rest. He owed Gizzarelli $250 of the sale proceeds but had only $40. On April 2, 2002, he went to 814 West Front Street to work out a payment plan with Gizzarelli. They got into an argument, and Gizzarelli and his \u201croommate,\u201d Monte, began pummeling defendant in the face. Defendant landed a blow on Gizzarelli\u2019s face. Monte grabbed defendant, and the three of them \u201cgot to tussling.\u201d A pistol fell out of someone\u2019s jacket pocket \u2014 either Gizzarelli\u2019s or Monte\u2019s, defendant did not know which. At that point, defendant began fearing for his life. He scrambled for the pistol, aimed it at the floor, and fired \u201ca warning shot\u201d \u2014 intending merely to scare his assailants and \u201cback them up,\u201d not to shoot anyone. Then he ran out the door. He threw the pistol into a garbage can outside his sister\u2019s house. The police arrested him 16 days later in Chicago.\nThe trial court gave the jury Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.54 (4th ed. 2000) (IPI Criminal 4th), which set forth the elements of the offense of home invasion, including entry of someone else\u2019s dwelling place \u201cwithout authority.\u201d The court also gave the jury IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53A, which stated as follows:\n\u201cThe defendant\u2019s entry into a dwelling of another is \u2018without authority\u2019 if, at the time of entry into the dwelling, the defendant has an intent to commit a criminal act within the dwelling!,] regardless of whether the defendant was initially invited into!,] or received consent to enter!,] the dwelling.\nHowever, the defendant\u2019s entry into the dwelling is \u2018with authority\u2019 if the defendant enters the dwelling without criminal intent and was initially invited into!,] or received consent to enter!,] the dwelling, regardless of what the defendant does after he enters.\u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53A.\nDuring deliberations, the jury sent the trial court the following handwritten note, signed by the foreperson:\n\u201cCharge of Home Invasion The Phrase\n\u2018The defendant has an intent to commit a criminal act!.]\u2019\nQuestion\n[I]s \u2018intent to commit a criminal act\u2019 limited to the particular crime in question!,] or [does] \u2018intent to commit a criminal act\u2019 encompass other crimes!,] such as a [d]rug [d]eal[?]\u201d\nThe prosecutor recommended answering \u201cthere [was] no such limitation in this instruction and leav[ing] it at that.\u201d\nDefense counsel argued:\n\u201cI think it is the intent of the statute that it refers to crime that he is committing ***. [The jury is] talking about a drug deal that had occurred sometime earlier!,] and I don\u2019t think that is what the statute does intend. [I]f he comes in to make payment for selling drugs for them! ] [and] a fight breaks out later, that doesn\u2019t make it home invasion. He has entered with a purpose that was approved by the home owner!,] and the home invasion charge is not designed to address that issue. The question they are asking is[,] does it mean did he intend to enter the home with the intention of shooting him or robbing him!?] That is what the statute is meant to address. [T]hey seem to be saying if he intended to come in and pay off the drug deal he\u2019d made earlier, that would he participating in a crime. But that is not the crime against the home owner[,] and that is not what the statute intends to address, so I think we can delineate that for them.\u201d\nThe prosecutor responded: \u201cI don\u2019t think it is for the lawyers or the court to speculate as to the motive the jury has for sending out this question. *** They have asked a straightforward question, [I]s there such a limitation in this instruction!?]\u201d The text of the pattern instruction contained no such exception, and, therefore, the answer was no. The prosecutor recommended replying that \u201cthere [was] no such limitation in that particular phrase in the instruction.\u201d\nThe trial court followed the prosecutor\u2019s recommendation. It typed the following answer on the back of the jury\u2019s note: \u201cThere is no such limitation.\u201d\nThe jury found defendant guilty of both charges: aggravated battery and home invasion involving great bodily harm caused by the discharge of a firearm. The trial court vacated the conviction for aggravated battery and, on the remaining charge of home invasion, imposed the minimum enhanced sentence of 31 years\u2019 imprisonment (6 years for home invasion plus the mandatory 25-year enhancement for inflicting great bodily harm with a firearm). See 720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 11(c) (West 2002).\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. The Error in the Instructions\nIn People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248, 254, 623 N.E.2d 1361, 1364 (1993), the supreme court held that if an invitee entered someone else\u2019s residence with the intent to commit a crime therein, the entry was \u201cwithout authority\u201d within the meaning of the home-invasion statute. The supreme court gave the following rationale for this limited-authority doctrine. Generally, the occupant and invitee have an implicit understanding that criminal activity is outside the scope of the invitation. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 254, 623 N.E.2d at 1364. A visitor would normally expect to be turned away if the occupant believed the visitor had a criminal intent. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 253-54, 623 N.E.2d at 1364. An invitee, who, at the time of entry, has \u201cconcealed criminal purposes\u201d effectively gains admission by \u201cmisrepresentation and subterfuge\u201d \u2014 a fraud by silence \u2014 rather than \u201cin accordance with the will of the occupant!].\u201d People v. Fisher, 83 Ill. App. 3d 619, 622-23, 404 N.E.2d 859, 862-63 (1980). In such a case, the occupant\u2019s consent to the entry is \u201cvitiated because the true purpose for the entry exceeded the limited authorization granted.\u201d Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 254, 623 N.E.2d at 1364. If, however, the invitee enters the residence with an innocent intent and only later develops a criminal intent once he or she is inside, this does not change the fact that the entry itself was with an innocent intent and, therefore, was with the occupant\u2019s authorization. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 254, 623 N.E.2d at 1364.\nDuring deliberations, the jury asked whether the \u201cintent to commit a criminal act,\u201d in the trial court\u2019s instruction on the meaning of the phrase \u201cwithout authority\u201d (IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53A), was \u201climited to the particular crime in question\u201d or whether it also \u201cencompass[ed] other crimes[,] such as a [d]rug [d]eal.\u201d Defendant argues that, in this quezy the jury \u201cclearly indicated [its] belief that the defendant entered Gizzarelli\u2019s home with [the] intent to engage in a drug deal with Gizzarelli, but not to threaten Gizzarelli with a gun or to shoot him.\u201d He argues that by responding with an instruction suggesting that \u201ca drug deal\u201d could be a \u201ccriminal act\u201d within the meaning of IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53A, the court erred: \u201c[a] defendant who visits a homeowner, by invitation, with the intent to commit a crime[,] such as a drug dealt,] in which the homeowner is a full and knowing participant does not exceed the scope of the homeowner\u2019s authorization to enter.\u201d\nThe State argues that the trial court\u2019s answer to the jury\u2019s question was correct because Bush laid down a \u201cbright-line rule\u201d without expressing any exception: entry with criminal intent equals entry without authority. According to the State, defendant is \u201cconfusing] a homeowner\u2019s invitation with another\u2019s authority to enter,\u201d and \u201cBush does not state that [those] two concepts necessarily converge.\u201d Moreover, the State argues that under defendant\u2019s interpretation of the limited-authority doctrine, the occupant of a residence could \u201ceffectively waive another occupant\u2019s protection\u201d by consenting to a visitor\u2019s entry of the residence for the purpose of committing an act of violence against the other occupant. Such an outcome, the State argues, would be an absurdity the legislature did not intend.\nThe State\u2019s hypothetical facts are not the facts before us in the present case. The record contains no evidence that Gizzarelli consented to defendant\u2019s entry of 814 West Front Street with the understanding that defendant would victimize another occupant of the house. Therefore we need not \u2014 and do not \u2014 decide whether the entry would be \u201cwith authority\u201d under such circumstances.\n\u201c[T]he precedential scope of a decision is limited to the facts before the court.\u201d People v. Palmer, 104 Ill. 2d 340, 345-46, 472 N.E.2d 795, 798 (1984). We should read Bush as \u201cauthority only for that which the court decided under the particular facts there presented\u201d (Department of Transportation v. La Salle National Bank, 102 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1097, 430 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1981)) rather than mechanically apply its holding to a significantly different set of facts. In Bush, the defendant and five or six other men entered Joyce Fay\u2019s home for the purpose of getting back their money from one of her guests, Mike Ferraro. They had given Ferraro $900 to buy drugs for them, but he had never returned. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 251, 623 N.E.2d at 1363. At trial, some witnesses testified that the defendant and his friends barged into the house uninvited and beat up Ferraro. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 250-51, 623 N.E.2d at 1362-63. Other witnesses testified that an occupant of the house let the defendant and his friends inside for the purpose of seeing whether Ferraro was present in the house and, if so, merely talking with him. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 251-52, 623 N.E.2d at 1363. Our point is this: no one claimed that an occupant of Fay\u2019s house invited the defendant and his friends inside for the purpose of committing a crime. Therefore Bush does not stand for the proposition that a criminal intent shared by the occupant and invitee negates the invitee\u2019s authority to enter the residence. In a basic, commonsense way, the inquiry always remains whether the occupant authorized the defendant\u2019s entry.\nBush addressed a discrepancy between two persons\u2019 intentions at the time of entry into the dwelling place: the intention of the occupant and the intention of the invitee. The occupant was the one who could confer authority to enter the dwelling place. We are puzzled by the State\u2019s assertion that defendant is \u201cconfus[ing] a homeowner\u2019s invitation with another\u2019s authority to enter\u201d \u2014 as if the two concepts were unrelated. (Emphasis added.) The lack of authority would be owing to the discrepancy between the occupant\u2019s intention in extending the invitation and the invitee\u2019s intention in accepting it: all along, the invitee harbored a secret intent to commit a crime; the occupant intended that the invitee not do so (or such would have been the occupant\u2019s intent if the matter had come up).\nThe State quotes language from Bush that, taken out of context, might suggest that even a consensual crime, such as a \u201cdrug sale,\u201d negates authority. The supreme court said: \u201c[T]he determination of whether an entry is unauthorized depends upon whether the defendant possessed the intent to perform a criminal act therein at the time entry was granted.\u201d Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 254, 623 N.E.2d at 1364. But, again, that holding, expressed in IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53A, derives from a rationale quoted in the committee note to that instruction: \u201c \u2018[I]f such intentions had been communicated to the owner at the time of entry, it would have resulted in the individual\u2019s being barred from the premises ab initio.\u2019 \u201d IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53A, Committee Note, quoting Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 253-54, 623 N.E.2d at 1364. If, under the facts of a case, the rationale in Bush would not hold true \u2014 if the communication of the visitor\u2019s criminal intent would have led the occupant to invite the visitor inside rather than bar the visitor from the premises \u2014 then, obviously, the holding of Bush is inapplicable with respect to that particular criminal intent, and the pattern instruction may require modification or qualification for purposes of the case at hand (see 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 451(a), (f)). \u201c[T]he [pattern] instructions were never meant to state the law of Illinois in all possible situations. As a consequence, any trial court faced with a unique factual situation or point of law should not give any instructions, whatever their source, without carefully evaluating their individual accuracy and their cumulative effect upon the jury.\u201d Dezort v. Village of Hinsdale, 77 Ill. App. 3d 775, 777, 396 N.E.2d 855, 857 (1979).\n\u201cVery slight evidence upon a given theory of a case will justify the giving of an instruction\u201d (People v. Jones, 175 Ill. 2d 126, 132, 676 N.E.2d 646, 649 (1997)), but we find no evidence at all, not even \u201cvery slight evidence,\u201d that defendant had a unilateral criminal intent to engage in a drug deal when he entered 814 West Front Street. Gizzarelli testified he consented to defendant\u2019s entry, on both occasions, for the express purpose of procuring cocaine from defendant. It was true, as the trial court instructed the jury, that the criminal intent need not have been limited to the \u201ccrime in question,\u201d aggravated assault. Defendant could have entered the residence, for instance, with the intention of merely threatening Gizzarelli or waving the pistol in his face. In its answer, however, to the jury\u2019s query, the court should have disabused the jury of the notion that defendant\u2019s intent to engage in \u201ca drug deal\u201d counted as an \u201cintent to commit a criminal act\u201d within the meaning of IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.53A. Defendant entered the dwelling without authority if, at the time of entry, he intended to commit a crime therein and, had Gizzarelli known of that intent, he would have barred defendant from the premises. Gizzarelli would not have barred defendant from the premises because of defendant\u2019s intention to sell him narcotics; by Gizzarelli\u2019s own admission, that was precisely why he let defendant in.\nB. The Availability of a Remedy\nThe trial court gave the jury some instructions that conflicted with each other. On the one hand, the court instructed the jury that \u201c[t]o sustain the charge of home invasion, the State [had to] prove the following proposition[ ],\u201d among others: \u201c[t]hat the defendant knowingly and without authority entered the dwelling place of another.\u201d (Emphasis added.) IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.54. One would reasonably understand the phrase \u201cwithout authority\u201d as meaning that no occupant of 814 West Front Street had authorized defendant to come into the house. The court further instructed the jury that entering a residence with a criminal intent negated one\u2019s authority to enter. As we have explained, the assumption undergirding that instruction is that the occupant would have turned the visitor away had the occupant known of the visitor\u2019s criminal intent.\nOn the other hand, by its answer to the jury\u2019s note, the trial court at least impliedly assented to the proposition that defendant\u2019s intent to engage in \u201ca drug deal,\u201d a consensual transaction, made his entry of Gizzarelli\u2019s residence an entry \u201cwithout authority.\u201d This latter proposition created a contradiction in the instructions. Regardless of whom one chooses to believe \u2014 Gizzarelli or defendant \u2014 Gizzarelli wanted to conduct a drug-related transaction with defendant and authorized his entry into the residence for that very purpose. The net effect of these instructions is that, on the one hand, the court told the jury that the entry had to be \u201cwithout authority,\u201d but, on the other hand, suggested that the entry could be \u201cwith authority.\u201d\n\u201c[TJhe giving of conflicting instructions, one of which is a correct statement of law and the other an incorrect statement of law, is not harmless error.\u201d Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 254, 623 N.E.2d at 1364. \u201c \u2018Such contrary instructions prevent the jury from performing its constitutionally appointed function because it has not been properly informed of the law to be applied in a particular case.\u2019 \u201d Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 254-55, 623 N.E.2d at 1364, quoting People v. Haywood, 82 Ill. 2d 540, 545, 413 N.E.2d 410, 413 (1980); see also People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 212, 780 N.E.2d 669, 682 (2002).\nApart from the line of cases holding that the giving of conflicting instructions is per se reversible error, we do not find the error to be harmless in light of the evidence in the record. \u201c \u2018Even though error may have been committed in giving or refusing instructions[,] it will not always justify reversal when the evidence of [the] defendant\u2019s guilt is so clear and convincing that the jury could not reasonably have found him not guilty.\u2019 \u201d People v. Jones, 81 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 405 N.E.2d 343, 346 (1979), quoting People v. Ward, 32 Ill. 2d 253, 256, 204 N.E.2d 741, 743 (1965). We do not find it \u201cblatantly evident from the circumstances\u201d that defendant entered Gizzarelli\u2019s residence, the second time, with a criminal intent unapproved by Gizzarelli. See Jones, 81 Ill. 2d at 10, 405 N.E.2d at 346. A reasonable jury could have found that defendant entered 814 West Front Street with the intent of assaulting Gizzarelli \u2014 but that finding was not inevitable. A reasonable jury could have alternatively found that defendant routinely carried a firearm (as many drug dealers do) and that he entered Gizzarel-li\u2019s residence with the intent merely to have a nonviolent argument with him, but that offending words were spoken and the argument escalated into intimidation and violence. This trial was mostly a swearing contest between Gizzarelli and defendant.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment and remand this case for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nKNECHT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent from the majority\u2019s determination that the trial court did misstate the law regarding the limited-authority doctrine in its response to the jury question. I believe the arguments made by the State in its brief and its application of Bush are appropriate. The trial court did not commit reversible error with respect to the jury instructions. Because the majority did not address the constitutional issue, it will not be addressed in this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Robert N. Markfield, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JASON A. MURRAY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201403\u20140632\nOpinion filed April 25, 2006.\nMcCULLOUGH, J., dissenting.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Robert N. Markfield, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Anastacia R. Brooks, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0999-01", "first_page_order": 1015, "last_page_order": 1024 }