{ "id": 4263155, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTWAN D. YOUNGBLOOD, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Youngblood", "decision_date": "2006-05-17", "docket_number": "No. 2-04-0987", "first_page": "210", "last_page": "215", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 210" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3598075 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25407 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283-84", "parenthetical": "holding that mandatory donation to a crime-stoppers organization was a fine against which the $5-per-day credit should apply" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 949", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2987272 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "951" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0949-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 416", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436650 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0416-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 867", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263515 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "adopting reasoning of Fort" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0867-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188110 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544496 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925", "parenthetical": "noting that when the legislature amends a statute but leaves unchanged a provision that has been judicially construed, the legislature's conduct indicates agreement with the judicial interpretation of the statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 548", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3277987 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555", "parenthetical": "noting that, in construing a statute, \"it is instructive to consider relevant statements by legislators concerning the nature and effect of the proposed law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0548-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260345 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5119256 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5368773 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" }, { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183321 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927692 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 522010 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "620" }, { "page": "620" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 487123 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that credit allowed by section 110 - 14 does not apply to court costs, probation fees, or lab analysis fees" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780-81" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "781" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 678", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3778382 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" }, { "page": "682-83", "parenthetical": "holding that $5-per-day credit did not apply to funds collected under section 5 - 1101(d) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5 - 1101(d) (West 2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0678-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 736, "char_count": 14977, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1018621831848293e-07, "percentile": 0.5685848866092194 }, "sha256": "3f2b5c7ba10ddd4fd2a89883faf3b88f8ed86ba5155e0e8c60a983f22850b1ee", "simhash": "1:892b3e22664376e4", "word_count": 2484 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:12:10.332814+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTWAN D. YOUNGBLOOD, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GROMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial in the circuit court of Du Page County, defendant, Antwan D. Youngblood, was convicted of the delivery of 1 gram or more but less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine. 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2002). The trial court sentenced defendant to six years\u2019 imprisonment, with credit for 342 days spent in presentence custody. The trial court also imposed a $2,000 drug assessment pursuant to section 411.2(a)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Act) (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a)(2) (West 2002)) and ordered defendant to submit a blood sample for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis pursuant to section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143 (West Supp. 2003)). Following the denial of his motion to reconsider his sentence, defendant filed a timely appeal raising two distinct issues.\nDefendant first argues that, pursuant to section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code of Criminal Procedure) (725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2002)), he is entitled to a $5-per-day credit toward the statutory drug assessment for the time he spent in custody prior to sentencing. The State argues that defendant is not entitled to the credit because section 110 \u2014 14 applies only to \u201cfines\u201d and the drug assessment levied pursuant to section 411.2 of the Act is a \u201cfee.\u201d\nSection 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant \u201cagainst whom a fine is levied\u201d shall be allowed a credit of $5 per day for each day incarcerated on a bailable offense when the defendant does not supply bail. 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2002). The $5-per-day credit created by section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies only to \u201cfines\u201d that are imposed pursuant to a conviction. People v. Elizalde, 344 Ill. App. 3d 678, 682 (2003); People v. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d 777 (2002) (holding that credit allowed by section 110 \u2014 14 does not apply to court costs, probation fees, or lab analysis fees). For this reason, it is essential to determine whether the statutory drug assessment created by section 411.2 of the Act is a \u201cfine\u201d or, as the State asserts, a \u201cfee.\u201d This issue presents a question of statutory interpretation. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 780. The best indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent is the plain language of the statute itself. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 780-81. We must not read into the plain language exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 781. Statutory interpretation is a question of law. White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 781.\nIn interpreting section 110 \u2014 14 in other contexts, we have defined the term \u201cfine\u201d as \u201ca pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense.\u201d White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 781. The term has also been defined as \u201c \u2018[a] pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the public treasury.\u2019 \u201d People v. Gathing, 334 Ill. App. 3d 617, 620 (2002), quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 647 (7th ed. 1999). In contrast, a \u201cfee\u201d is \u201ca charge for labor or services, especially professional services.\u201d White, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 781.\nOn previous occasions, this court has held that the $5-per-day credit is applicable to a statutory drug assessment imposed under section 411.2 of the Act. Admittedly, our decisions on this issue do not contain any in-depth analysis. See People v. Rodriguez, 276 Ill. App. 3d 33, 41 (1995), overruled on other grounds, People v. Dexter, 328 Ill. App. 3d 583 (2002); People v. Otero, 263 Ill. App. 3d 282, 287 (1994). However, other districts of this court have also determined that the statutory drug assessment is a \u201cfine\u201d against which the $5-per-day credit applies. The reasons for these courts\u2019 holdings vary. For instance, in People v. Brown, 242 Ill. App. 3d 465, 466 (1993), the court concluded that had the legislature intended to exclude the $5-per-day credit from the ambit of section 411.2, it could have easily done so, as it had with another statutory provision. In Gathing, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 620, the court held that the assessments imposed pursuant to section 411.2 are in the nature of a fine because the statute requires the funds to be forwarded to a public treasury.\nThe State disagrees with the reasoning of these decisions. It first asserts that the assessment described in section 411.2 is more akin to a \u201cfee\u201d than a \u201cfine\u201d because the statute does not refer to the assessment as a \u201cfine.\u201d See Elizalde, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 682-83 (holding that $5-per-day credit did not apply to funds collected under section 5 \u2014 1101(d) of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 1101(d) (West 2002)); statute repeatedly referred to the funds to be collected as a \u201cfee\u201d and the caption of the statute indicated that the purpose of collecting the funds was \u201cto finance the court system,\u201d a nonpunitive purpose). However, the fact that section 411.2 does not refer to the assessment as a \u201cfine\u201d is not dispositive. In People v. Fort, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1 (2005), the court held that the $5-per-day credit for presentence incarceration applied to offset assessments imposed under section 411.2 of the Act. While recognizing that section 411.2 does not expressly characterize the assessment as a fine, the Fort court pointed out that the provision does not preclude the notion that the assessment is in the nature of a fine. Notably, the court quoted subsection (f) (720 ILCS 570/411.2(f) (West 2002)), which refers to the assessment as a \u201cpenalty\u201d and states that \u201c \u00a3[n]othing in this Section shall be deemed to affect or suspend any other fines, restitution costs, forfeitures or assessments imposed under this or any other Act.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Fort, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 7. Moreover, to the extent that the language of section 411.2 is ambiguous regarding the nature of the assessment, the Fort court cited two reasons why it believed that the legislature intended the assessment to resemble a fine. First, lawmakers referred to the assessment as a \u201cfine\u201d during legislative debates. Fort, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 7, quoting 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, July 18, 1991, at 186-87 (statements of Senators Cullerton and Barkhausen). Second, several other courts had held that the $5-per-day credit applies to section 411.2 assessments, and legislative amendments to section 411.2 subsequent to the dates those cases were decided did not refer to the credit-against-assessment issue. Fort, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 8.\nWe find the reasoning of Fort and its precursors persuasive. The State, however, disagrees with the Fort court\u2019s rationales. The State suggests that it was merely fortuitous that the lawmakers labeled the section 411.2 assessment as a \u201cfine\u201d during legislative debates. The State also asks us to ignore the fact that legislative amendments to section 411.2 did not refer to the credit-against-assessment issue. According to the State, \u201cit is not clear the legislature would even have reason to know that the fees being imposed were subject to offsets under section 570/411.2, since the fee would probably not be offset in the vast majority of cases.\u201d Both these arguments are unconvincing insofar as they ignore well-established rules of statutory interpretation. See Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992) (noting that, in construing a statute, \u201cit is instructive to consider relevant statements by legislators concerning the nature and effect of the proposed law\u201d); People v. Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d 920, 925 (1997) (noting that when the legislature amends a statute but leaves unchanged a provision that has been judicially construed, the legislature\u2019s conduct indicates agreement with the judicial interpretation of the statute). Moreover, the State\u2019s latter argument is absurd in light of the principle that the legislature is presumed to know the judicial interpretation of a statute (Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Burris, 118 Ill. 2d 465, 475 (1987)), and there are numerous published opinions holding that the assessment imposed by section 411.2 of the Act is properly offset by the $5-per-day credit (see, e.g., People v. McNeal, 364 Ill. App. 3d 867 (2006) (adopting reasoning of Fort)-, People v. Haycraft, 349 Ill. App. 3d 416, 430 (2004); Gathing, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 620; Rodriguez, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 41; Otero, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 287; People v. Reed, 255 Ill. App. 3d 949, 951 (1994); Brown, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 466).\nWe are also unconvinced by the State\u2019s other arguments that an assessment imposed under section 411.2 of the Act is more akin to a \u201cfee.\u201d The State claims that because the funds \u201care used to remedy the effects of the defendant\u2019s involvement in the criminal drug culture,\u201d the statute allows the defendant to perform public service in lieu of monetary payment, and the payment of the assessment may be suspended if the offender enters a substance-abuse program, the legislature did not intend the statutory drug assessment to be subject to the $5-per-day credit.\nSubsections (h) and (i) of section 411.2 (720 ILCS 570/411.2(h), (i) (West 2002)) govern the allocation of funds collected pursuant to the statute. Depending on the population of the county, all monies collected pursuant to section 411.2 are forwarded to either the county treasurer or the State Treasurer. 720 ILCS 570/411.2(h), (i) (West 2002). The funds are then used as grants to persons licensed under section 15 \u2014 10 of the Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse and Dependency Act (20 ILCS 301/15 \u2014 10 (West 2002)) for the treatment of pregnant women who are addicted to alcohol, cannabis, or controlled substances; for the needed care of minor, unemancipated children of women undergoing residential drug treatment; or for the treatment of anyone addicted to alcohol, cannabis, or controlled substances. 720 ILCS 570/411.2(h), (i) (West 2002). An examination of these statutory provisions supports the notion that the legislature intended the assessment as a \u201cfine.\u201d First, as the Gathing court pointed out, the assessment is payable to a public treasury. Gathing, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 620. Second, it is obvious that the assessment does not fall within the definition of a \u201cfee.\u201d Nothing in the statute suggests that the assessment was intended as a charge for labor or services. See People v. Littlejohn, 338 Ill. App. 3d 281, 283-84 (2003) (holding that mandatory donation to a crime-stoppers organization was a fine against which the $5-per-day credit should apply). Therefore, we find that the assessment more closely resembles a pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence. The fact that the statute allows the defendant to perform public service in lieu of monetary payment (720 ILCS 570/411.2(e) (West 2002)) or that the payment of the assessment may be suspended if the offender enters a substance-abuse program (720 ILCS 570/ 411.2(f) (West 2002)) does not detract from the punitive nature of the assessment. Both public service and participation in a substance-abuse program are authorized dispositions for various offenses under both the Unified Code (see, e.g., 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143 (West 2002)) and the Act (see, e.g., 720 ILCS 570/410 (West 2002)). Thus, the statute merely allows the court to substitute one form of disposition for another.\nThe State\u2019s remaining argument fares no better. The State asserts that the statutory drug assessment \u201cis unrelated to the relative infamy of the defendant\u2019s behavior.\u201d A cursory examination of the statute reveals the flaw of the State\u2019s position. Section 411.2(a) (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a) (West 2002)) sets forth penalties ranging from $200 to $3,000, depending on the class of the offense. Thus, a defendant convicted of a Class B or Class C misdemeanor is assessed the sum of $200 (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a)(6) (West 2002)) while a defendant convicted of a Class X felony is assessed the sum of $3,000 (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a)(l) (West 2002)). Thus, the amount of the assessment is related to the seriousness of the defendant\u2019s behavior.\nIn sum, the assessment imposed by section 411.2 of the Act is in the nature of a fine and is properly offset by the presentence credit created by section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, we find that defendant is entitled to a credit of $1,710 against his statutory drug assessment of $2,000. In this case, the sentencing order grants defendant 342 days of credit toward his prison sentence. However, the trial court did not award defendant the $5-per-day credit. Therefore, we modify the judgment to reflect the credit.\nDefendant also urges us to vacate that portion of the trial court order requiring him to submit a blood sample for DNA analysis pursuant to section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 4\u20143 (West Supp. 2003)). Section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 requires certain offenders to submit specimens of blood, saliva, or tissue for entry into a computer database. Defendant argues that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 violates his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches (see U.S. Const., amend. TV; 111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 6) in that: (1) the statute requires no showing of a \u201cspecial need\u201d for a search that is unsupported by individualized suspicion; (2) defendant\u2019s interest in avoiding bodily intrusions and maintaining the privacy of his genetic information outweighs any interest the State has in deterring and prosecuting recidivist criminal acts; and (3) it is unlikely that the genetic information stored in the database will aid law enforcement agencies in solving or prosecuting future crimes. Our supreme court recently upheld the constitutionality of section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Unified Code, rejecting arguments similar to the ones advanced by defendant in this case. People v. Garvin, 219 Ill. 2d 104, 117-25 (2006). Even if we could do so, defendant offers no persuasive reason to depart from the precedent established by the supreme court in Garvin.\nFor the reasons set forth above, we agree that defendant is entitled to the credit against his drug assessment for time spent in custody prior to sentencing. Accordingly, we modify the judgment to reflect a credit of $1,710 against the $2,000 drug assessment. However, we reject defendant\u2019s contention that section 5 \u2014 4\u20143 of the Unified Code is unconstitutional.\nAffirmed as modified.\nBOWMAN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GROMETER" } ], "attorneys": [ "G. Joseph Weller and Kathleen Week, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTWAN D. YOUNGBLOOD, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201404\u20140987\nOpinion filed May 17, 2006.\nG. Joseph Weller and Kathleen Week, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Martin P. Moltz and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0210-01", "first_page_order": 228, "last_page_order": 233 }