{ "id": 4263593, "name": "EUGENE A. COSTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATHERINE A. OLIVEN, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Costa v. Oliven", "decision_date": "2006-05-17", "docket_number": "No. 2-05-0793", "first_page": "244", "last_page": "248", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 244" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "55 Ill. 2d 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2940398 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/55/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 538", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2560807 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Cal. Rptr. 815", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "557 P.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "18 Cal. 3d 660", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2286246 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/18/0660-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735885 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Ill. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5490289 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" }, { "page": "53" }, { "page": "53-54" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "53" }, { "page": "54" }, { "page": "54-55" }, { "page": "57-58" }, { "page": "66" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/77/0049-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 569, "char_count": 8734, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14279828669547917 }, "sha256": "b0d8caec15b02c8e0784a15c84ec3cc5c11863ddea742c60c4eacfa0c7692d12", "simhash": "1:8e96ed9768c97caf", "word_count": 1396 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:12:10.332814+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EUGENE A. COSTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATHERINE A. OLIVEN, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GROMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Eugene A. Costa, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Du Page County dismissing counts I and II of his three-count complaint against defendant, Catherine A. Oliven. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erroneously relied on Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49 (1979), in dismissing his complaint. We affirm.\nOn March 21, 2005, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendant. According to the complaint, plaintiff and defendant lived together, unmarried, for 24 years. The parties had a \u201cquasi-marital\u201d relationship, with \u201call the indicia of a marital type relationship, including love, trust, mutual responsibilities and intimacy.\u201d On May 5, 1992, a child, Elsa, was born to the parties. Following Elsa\u2019s birth, plaintiff \u201cassume[d] the role of stay-at-home dad, nurturing, and homeschooling Elsa, and routinely performing all of the usual activities associated with maintaining an efficient household.\u201d Plaintiff \u201ccontributed the foregoing services to the family unit in order to enable [defendant] to work full-time pursuing various entrepreneurial endeavors such as the creation of her own corporation.\u201d \u201c[Defendant] wielded much influence and superior bargaining power over [plaintiff] *** and successfully obtained title to almost every possession the couple acquired through joint labor and efforts, and every significant asset the couple shared.\u201d On December 3, 2004, defendant demanded that plaintiff vacate their home. Count I seeks the imposition of a constructive trust upon real, personal, and intellectual property owned by defendant. Count II seeks an accounting of all income and assets in defendant\u2019s possession and an award of punitive damages in the amount of $250,000. Count III seeks payment of unpaid wages and final compensation under the Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 ILCS 115/5 et seq. (West 2004)) for services rendered to defendant while plaintiff was defendant\u2019s employee.\nOn April 25, 2005, defendant moved to dismiss counts I and II under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 2004)). Defendant argued that plaintiffs claims were unenforceable based on section 214 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/214 (West 2004)), which prohibits common-law marriage, and based on Hewitt. Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion and found \u201cno just cause to delay the enforcement or appeal\u201d of the order. Plaintiff timely appealed.\n\u201cWhen a claim has been dismissed for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code, the critical inquiry on review is \u2018whether the allegations of the complaint, when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d First Midwest Bank, N.A. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 218 Ill. 2d 326, 334 (2006). Because the question is one of law, the court\u2019s review is de novo. First Midwest Bank, 218 Ill. 2d at 334.\nThis case is controlled by Hewitt. In Hewitt, the parties cohabited from 1960 to 1975 and had three children. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 52. During college, Robert Hewitt proclaimed to Victoria Hewitt \u201cthat they were husband and wife and would live as such, no formal ceremony being necessary, and that he would \u2018share his life, his future, his earnings and his property\u2019 with her.\u201d Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 53. The parties immediately began holding themselves out as husband and wife. Relying on Robert\u2019s promises, Victoria devoted her efforts to Robert\u2019s professional education and the establishment of his pedodontia practice, even obtaining financial assistance from her parents for this purpose. Victoria worked in Robert\u2019s practice and received payroll checks that she deposited into a common fund. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 53-54. By 1975, Robert had an annual income of $80,000 and had accumulated large amounts of property, owned either jointly with Victoria or separately. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 54.\nVictoria filed for divorce, and her complaint was dismissed by the trial court. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 52. Victoria filed an amended complaint that sought an equitable one-half share of the parties\u2019 assets, based upon theories of implied contract, constructive trust, and unjust enrichment. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 53. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint, \u201cfinding that Illinois law and public policy require such claims to be based on a valid marriage.\u201d Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 54. The appellate court reversed. Adopting the reasoning of Marvin v, Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), the appellate court held that the amended complaint stated a cause of action on an express oral contract. The appellate court noted that Robert and Victoria had \u201clived a \u2018most conventional, respectable and ordinary family life\u2019 ***, the \u2018single flaw\u2019 being the lack of a valid marriage,\u201d and it \u201cconcluded that [Victoria] should not be denied relief [based] on public policy grounds.\u201d Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 54-55.\nOur supreme court reversed. The court stated that \u201c[t]he issue of unmarried cohabitants\u2019 mutual property rights *** cannot appropriately be characterized solely in terms of contract law, nor is it limited to considerations of equity or fairness as between the parties to such relationships. There are major public policy questions involved in determining whether, under what circumstances, and to what extent it is desirable to accord some type of legal status to claims arising from such relationships. Of substantially greater importance than the rights of the immediate parties is the impact of such recognition upon our society and the institution of marriage.\u201d Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 57-58. The supreme court held \u201cthat [Victoria\u2019s] claims are unenforceable for the reason that they contravene the public policy, implicit in the statutory scheme of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.\u201d Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 66.\nIn Ayala v. Fox, 206 Ill. App. 3d 538 (1990), this court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint filed by an unmarried cohabitant seeking imposition of a constructive trust over a home in which she lived with the defendant for 10 years. Relying on Hewitt, we held \u201cthat plaintiff, as an unmarried cohabitant, is not entitled to an equitable interest in the property\u201d and noted that a contrary holding \u201cwould contravene the public policy of this State.\u201d Ayala, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 542.\nPlaintiff argues that Hewitt\u2019s rationale \u201cshould no longer be applied as a blanket rule in every set of circumstances involving unmarried cohabitants\u201d and advances three reasons in support of his argument. First, plaintiff argues that \u201cthe public policy at the time of Hewitt [sic] decision is susceptible to different but equally compelling interpretations.\u201d Second, plaintiff argues that there has been \u201csubsequent legislative activity and changes in social and judicial attitudes.\u201d Third, plaintiff argues that \u201cit is clear that the holding of Hewitt leads to harsh and unjust results tending to cause one of the cohabitants to potentially become dependent on public aid, and thus, cannot be considered good public policy.\u201d Similar arguments were advanced and rejected in Hewitt: \u201cThe real thrust of plaintiffs argument here is that we should abandon the rule of illegality because of certain changes in societal norms and attitudes. It is urged the social mores have changed radically in recent years, rendering this principle of law archaic. It is said that because there are so many unmarried cohabitants today the courts must confer a legal status on such relationships.\u201d Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 60. As the Hewitt court stated, \u201c \u2018[T]hese questions are appropriately within the province of the legislature, and *** if there is to be a change in the law of this State on this matter, it is for the legislature and not the courts to bring about that change.\u2019 \u201d Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d at 66, quoting Mogged v. Mogged, 55 Ill. 2d 221, 225 (1973).\nBased on the foregoing, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Du Page County dismissing counts I and II of plaintiffs complaint.\nAffirmed.\nBOWMAN and O\u2019MALLEY, JJ., concur.\nCount III is not at issue in this appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GROMETER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ronald J. Broida and Jeffrey A. Tullis, both of Broida & Tullis, of Naperville, for appellant.", "Theodore Birndorf and Wayne Jarvis, both of Theodore Birndorf & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EUGENE A. COSTA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATHERINE A. OLIVEN, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201405\u20140793\nOpinion filed May 17, 2006.\nRonald J. Broida and Jeffrey A. Tullis, both of Broida & Tullis, of Naperville, for appellant.\nTheodore Birndorf and Wayne Jarvis, both of Theodore Birndorf & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0244-01", "first_page_order": 262, "last_page_order": 266 }