{ "id": 4264056, "name": "SANDY A. KRUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO NATIONAL LEAGUE BALL CLUB, INC., d/b/a The Chicago Cubs, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Krum v. Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc.", "decision_date": "2006-05-03", "docket_number": "No. 1-05-2342", "first_page": "785", "last_page": "790", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 785" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442037 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" }, { "page": "355-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "654 F.2d 1130", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1257981 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1133", "parenthetical": "Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e - 3(a) (1976))" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/654/1130-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 F.3d 272", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1358895 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275", "parenthetical": "federal age discrimination law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/147/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 F.3d 620", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11678912 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621", "parenthetical": "federal gender discrimination law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/157/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729", "parenthetical": "permitting claim where statute defined retaliation to include demotion, suspension, or any manner of adverse discrimination" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 Cal. App. 4th 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43", "parenthetical": "permitting claim where statute defined retaliation to include demotion, suspension, or any manner of adverse discrimination" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "535 S.E.2d 357", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "recognizing claim where statute defined retaliation as any \"adverse employment action\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497637 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683", "parenthetical": "recognizing claim where statute defined retaliation as any \"adverse employment action\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25359 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64", "parenthetical": "shielding employees from retaliation for testifying in workers' compensation proceedings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209177 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "denying plaintiff's claim for retaliatory failure to rehire or recall" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "178 Ill. App. 3d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2431211 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175", "parenthetical": "seasonal worker not recalled after filing workers' compensation claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/178/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477029 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" }, { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574194 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. App. 3d 596", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5450045 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/109/0596-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469094 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411621 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4135675 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5873049 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535962 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096615 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0340-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 645, "char_count": 11448, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.893249561031196e-08, "percentile": 0.4191221187026734 }, "sha256": "b85fcccf54c3563591cbec1f447a30cdca94e59b888d96932afeaeac041a7275", "simhash": "1:839d4cf7ceeb5465", "word_count": 1833 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:12:10.332814+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SANDY A. KRUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO NATIONAL LEAGUE BALL CLUB, INC., d/b/a The Chicago Cubs, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Sandy Krum (Krum) appeals from an order of the circuit court granting defendant Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc.\u2019s (the Cubs) motion to dismiss pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619 (West 2004)). On appeal, Krum contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his retaliatory discharge claim and in denying his motion for leave to file an amended complaint. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nKrum filed the instant lawsuit as a result of the Cubs\u2019 decision not to renew his one-year employment contract. Krum alleged the following relevant facts in his complaint. Krum was the assistant athletic trainer for the Cubs from 2001 until 2004. Krum was licensed as required by the Illinois Athletic Trainers Practice Act (225 ILCS 5/4 (West 2004)). The Cubs\u2019 head athletic trainer, however, did not have a license. After discovering this fact, Krum met with the Cubs\u2019 general manager on August 16, 2004. During their 3V2-hour meeting, Krum informed the general manager of numerous improper events that had occurred during the course of the athletic trainers\u2019 duties, including the head athletic trainer\u2019s failure to have a license pursuant to the Athletic Trainers Practice Act.\nIn early October 2004, during one of the last games of the season, a member of the Cubs\u2019 board of directors approached Krum in the dugout and told Krum, \u201cwe are sorry for putting you through this and we will handle it next week.\u201d On or about October 13, 2004, the Cubs \u201cterminated\u201d Krum. The Cubs continued to pay Krum\u2019s salary pursuant to his employment contract until December 17, 2004, when the contract expired. According to Krum, the Cubs terminated him in retaliation for Krum informing the general manager that \u201cthe head athletic trainer, the person responsible for making certain that the athletes of the Cubs were able to perform to the best of their ability and to quickly and adequately rehabilitate themselves from any injury, was not licensed to so act in the State of Illinois.\u201d Krum also alleged that he performed his duties satisfactorily and was never disciplined or reprimanded or told of any deficiencies in his work. Krum further alleged that, but for his disclosure that the head athletic trainer was unlicensed, the Cubs would have retained Krum as an employee.\nThe Cubs filed a motion to dismiss Krum\u2019s complaint pursuant to sections 2 \u2014 615 and 2 \u2014 619 of the Code, which was supported with an affidavit from the Cubs\u2019 general manager as well as a copy of Krum\u2019s employment contract. The circuit court granted the motion pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 and Krum now appeals.\nANALYSIS\nWe review motions to dismiss de novo. Owens v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 316 Ill. App. 3d 340, 344 (2000). We assume as true all facts pleaded in the complaint. Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455, 457 (1999). When reviewing motions to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615, we ask only whether the pleadings are sufficient to state a cause of action. Cwikla v. Sheir, 345 Ill. App. 3d 23, 29 (2003). We may affirm the trial court\u2019s order on any ground substantiated by the record. Kostal v. Pinkus Dermatopathology Laboratory, P.C., 357 Ill. App. 3d 381, 384 (2005).\nTo state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must plead: (1) that he or she has been discharged; (2) in retaliation for his or her activities; and (3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. Stebbings v. University of Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 3d 360, 365 (2000).\nIn granting the Cubs\u2019 motion to dismiss, the circuit court found that the Whistleblower Act (740 ILCS 174/1 (West 2004)) preempted Krum\u2019s claim for retaliatory discharge and under the facts set forth in Krum\u2019s complaint, Krum was unable to establish a claim based on the Whistleblower Act. The court also found that, even if the Whistle-blower Act did not preempt Krum\u2019s retaliatory discharge claim, his claim still failed because the Athletic Trainers Practice Act could not satisfy the policy element of retaliatory discharge. The court further held that the failure to renew an employment contract for a fixed duration could not serve as a basis for a retaliatory discharge claim.\nRetaliatory Discharge\nOn appeal, Krum first contends the circuit court erred in holding that the failure to renew an employment contract for a fixed duration could not satisfy the \u201cdischarge\u201d element in a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Specifically, Krum argues that Illinois courts have previously recognized retaliatory discharge actions based on an employer\u2019s failure to rehire and that other jurisdictions have recognized the failure to renew a contract as actionable retaliatory conduct. The Cubs counter that the authorities upon which Krum relies are inapposite and that his complaint must fail because his employment contract with the Cubs provided for a fixed duration. We agree with the Cubs.\nThe retaliatory discharge cause of action is a very narrow exception to the doctrine of employment at-will. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128-29 (1981). Where an employment agreement does not specify a fixed duration, either party can terminate the relationship \u201cat-will.\u201d Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 600 (1982). The parties may alter the at-will nature of the relationship, however, by providing for a fixed duration of employment. Cress v. Recreation Services, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 149, 171 (2003).\nIn Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29 (1994), the Illinois Supreme Court explained the scope of the retaliatory discharge cause of action. The court defined an at-will employee as \u201ca noncontracted employee *** who serves at the employer\u2019s will, and the employer may discharge such an employee for any reason or no reason.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Zimmerman, 164 Ill. 2d at 32. Noting that previous courts intended retaliatory discharge to be narrowly applied, the Zimmerman court declined to recognize a cause of action predicated on retaliatory demotion. The court stated that recognizing retaliatory demotion would \u201creplace the well-developed element of discharge with a new, ill-defined, and potentially all-encompassing concept of retaliatory conduct or discrimination.\u201d Zimmerman, 164 Ill. 2d at 39. We are thus constrained to interpret the elements of the retaliatory discharge cause of action narrowly.\nHere, because Krum\u2019s employment was subject to a contract of fixed duration, he was not an at-will employee. Krum is unable to cite to a single case where Illinois courts have permitted a plaintiff to bring a retaliatory discharge claim on the basis of a fixed-term employment contract. Nevertheless, he contends that \u201cIllinois courts have long recognized that retaliatory discharge actions for failure to rehire or recall are valid.\u201d In each case upon which Krum relies, the underlying claims were based on the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/4(h) (West 2004)), which specifically prohibits such retaliatory conduct. See Motsch v. Pine Roofing Co., 178 Ill. App. 3d 169, 175 (1988) (seasonal worker not recalled after filing workers\u2019 compensation claim); Klinkner v. County of Du Page, 331 Ill. App. 3d 48, 51 (2002) (denying plaintiff\u2019s claim for retaliatory failure to rehire or recall); Pietruszynski v. McClier Corporation, Architects & Engineers, Inc., 338 Ill. App. 3d 58, 64 (2003) (shielding employees from retaliation for testifying in workers\u2019 compensation proceedings).\nKrum nevertheless points to cases from other jurisdictions that have recognized retaliatory discharge claims based on refusal to rehire or recall. Again, in each of these cases, the underlying claim was based on a statute or law that specifically prohibited retaliatory failure to rehire or retaliatory discrimination. See Johnson v. Trustees of Durham Technical Community College, 139 N.C. App. 676, 683, 535 S.E.2d 357, 362 (2000) (recognizing claim where statute defined retaliation as any \u201cadverse employment action\u201d); Daly v. Exxon Corp., 55 Cal. App. 4th 39, 43, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 729 (1997) (permitting claim where statute defined retaliation to include demotion, suspension, or any manner of adverse discrimination). See also Kramer v. Logan County School District No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 621 (8th Cir. 1998) (federal gender discrimination law); Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 1998) (federal age discrimination law); Payne v. McLemore\u2019s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5th Cir. 1981) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e \u2014 3(a) (1976))).\nUnlike the laws underlying these cases, the Athletic Trainers Practice Act, the statute upon which Krum relies, contains no language prohibiting retaliatory employment conduct. Since our supreme court has consistently sought to restrict the common law tort of retaliatory discharge, we hold that, absent a statutory basis, contractual employees, such as Krum, cannot bring a claim for retaliatory discharge when employers fail to renew an employment contract.\nBecause we find that Krum cannot satisfy the first element of his claim for retaliatory discharge, we need not reach Krum\u2019s contention that the circuit court erred in finding that the Whistleblower Act preempted Krum\u2019s claim for retaliatory discharge.\nMotion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint\nKrum\u2019s final contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Subsequent to the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of Krum\u2019s complaint, Krum made an oral motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The circuit court denied Krum\u2019s motion, finding that there were no additional facts Krum could plead to cure the deficiencies in his complaint.\nWe review the circuit court\u2019s decision for abuse of discretion. Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 202 Ill. 2d 344, 351 (2002). The factors we consider are whether: (1) the proposed amendment would cure a defect in the pleadings; (2) the proposed amendment would prejudice or surprise other parties; (3) the proposed amendment is timely; and (4) there were previous opportunities to amend the pleading. Clemons, 202 Ill. 2d at 355-56.\nKrum argues that he never proposed an amendment because the court never allowed him the opportunity to do so. He does not now propose an amendment either; he only argues that it was improper for the circuit court to deny him the opportunity to file an amended complaint. Notwithstanding Krum\u2019s contention, because we find that Krum cannot establish that he was \u201cdischarged,\u201d he would be unable to allege any facts to set forth a claim for retaliatory discharge. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for leave to file an amended complaint.\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nTHEIS and ERICKSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KARNEZIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Fioretti & Lower, Ltd. (Robert W Fioretti and John B. Lower, of counsel), and Law Office of Lonny Ben Ogus (Lonny Ben Ogus, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Seyfarth Shaw, LLP (John W. Powers and Brian M. Stolzenbach, of counsel), of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SANDY A. KRUM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO NATIONAL LEAGUE BALL CLUB, INC., d/b/a The Chicago Cubs, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20142342\nOpinion filed May 3, 2006.\nRehearing denied May 23, 2006.\nFioretti & Lower, Ltd. (Robert W Fioretti and John B. Lower, of counsel), and Law Office of Lonny Ben Ogus (Lonny Ben Ogus, of counsel), both of Chicago, for appellant.\nSeyfarth Shaw, LLP (John W. Powers and Brian M. Stolzenbach, of counsel), of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0785-01", "first_page_order": 803, "last_page_order": 808 }