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INGALLS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE NEVILLE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an interlocutory appeal filed by the defendant, Ingalls Memorial Hospital (Ingalls), pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308), from an order that granted the plaintiffs, Debra Giangiulio, motion to compel discovery and required Ingalls to answer certain interrogatories and to produce an object. Ingalls argues that the information and the object sought to be discovered by the plaintiff were protected from disclosure by the physician-patient privilege (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2002)), the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2002)), section 8 \u2014 2102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, commonly known as the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101, 8 \u2014 2102 (West 2002)) and privacy rules and regulations created under the authority granted by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (Pub. L. No. 104 \u2014 191, 110 Stat. 1936; 45 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 160 through 164 (2005)). The trial court certified the following question for our review:\n\u201c[W]hether the Defendant Hospital is prohibited from responding to the Plaintiffs discovery requests pursuant to the Physician-Patient Privilege (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802), the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/3), the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2102) and the Privacy Rule set forth in Pub. L. 104 \u2014 191, 45 C.F.R. Parts 160-164.\u201d\nThe appellate court granted Ingalls\u2019 Rule 308 petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 308.\nBACKGROUND\nOn July 11, 2001, Giangiulio filed her first amended complaint against Ingalls. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was the victim of a criminal assault; that she was attacked by another patient during her stay at the hospital; and that Ingalls was negligent in preventing the attack by a third party. The alleged attacker was not named as a party defendant in Giangiulio\u2019s complaint.\nBefore filing her first amended complaint, on April 10, 2001, Giangiulio served Ingalls with 22 interrogatories and with a demand for production of nine documents, objects or tangible things. In its answers to the interrogatories, Ingalls objected to interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 as follows:\n\u201c2. State the full name, address, and telephone number of the \u2018JANE DOE\u2019 alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint.\nANSWER: Objection. INGALLS HOSPITAL will not be producing any documents, records, information or tangible objects relating to \u2018JANE DOE.\u2019 See Exhibit \u2018A\u2019 attached hereto for the basis for the refusal to provide these records.\n3. State the full name, address, and telephone number of all doctors, physicians, nurses, and any other staff who were treating the \u2018JANE DOE\u2019 alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint.\nANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory #2 above.\n* * *\n5. State the full name, address, and telephone number of the Defendant\u2019s employee or staff member who assigned the \u2018JANE DOE\u2019 to Room 417E.\nANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory #2 above.\nHt * *\n7. State the full name, address, and telephone number of all staff members who took and retrieved the knife from the \u2018JANE DOE\u2019 alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint.\nANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory #2 above.\n8. State the full name, address, and telephone number of the patient assigned to Room 417E, bed number 2 on the date of the accident alleged in the Complaint.\nANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory #2 above.\nHi * *\n10. State the period of time which \u2018JANE DOE\u2019 alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint was a patient at Defendant\u2019s facility immediately preceding the date of the accident.\nANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory #2 above.\u201d\nAs indicated in its answer, Ingalls attached Exhibit \u201cA\u201d to its response to the interrogatories and demand for production. Exhibit \u201cA\u201d was a letter addressed to plaintiffs counsel (John Brattoli) in which Ingalls\u2019 counsel explained the bases for the hospital\u2019s refusal to answer. In-galls\u2019 refusal to disclose the information was based on the following: the attorney-client and work product privileges in Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(2) (166 Ill. 2d R. 201(b)(2)); the physician-patient privilege in section 8 \u2014 802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2002)); sections 8 \u2014 2101 and 8 \u2014 2102 of the Medical Studies Act (735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101, 8 \u2014 2102 (West 2002)); and the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2002)).\nIn her request for production entitled \u201cdemand for production,\u201d Giangiulio requested certain documents, objects or tangible things. In request \u201cf,\u201d Giangiulio sought production of the knife that Jane Doe allegedly had in her possession which was later taken from her by In-galls\u2019 staff members. Ingalls objected to request \u201cf \u2019 as follows:\n\u201cf. The knife which the \u2018JANE DOE\u2019 alleged in Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint has in her possession and which was later taken from her by Defendant\u2019s staff members.\nRESPONSE: See response to (e) above.\u201d\nIn (e), Ingalls made the following response:\n\u201cRESPONSE: Objection. INGALLS HOSPITAL will not be producing any documents, records, information or tangible objects relating to \u2018JANE DOE.\u2019 See Exhibit \u2018A\u2019 for the basis for the refusal to provide these documents.\u201d\nIt should be noted that in support of the objections to the requests to produce, Ingalls attached a copy of the same letter to plaintiffs counsel that it used in its answers to the interrogatories. In the letter, Ingalls identifies the same bases for its objections.\nThereafter, Giangiulio filed a motion to compel responses to written discovery. Giangiulio argued that interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 are permitted by case law and not barred by privilege. Giangiulio further argued that Ingalls should be ordered to respond to paragraph \u201cf \u2019 of her demand for production, wherein she requested the knife. Giangiulio argued that the knife had nothing to do with the medical or psychiatric ailment for which Jane Doe was being treated, so the production of the knife would not violate the Confidentiality Act.\nIngalls responded to the motion by reiterating its position that the information sought in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 is protected by the physician-patient privilege. 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2002). In-galls also responded that the Confidentiality Act prevents it from revealing the information requested in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10. 740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2002). Ingalls further argued that the knife sought in request to produce \u201cf \u2019 has no bearing on the ultimate question of the hospital\u2019s liability in this case. Also, information regarding the knife would be protected by either the physician-patient privilege, the Confidentiality Act and/or the Medical Studies Act. In-galls made the same argument with respect to requests to produce \u201ce\u201d and \u201ch.\u201d Request \u201ce\u201d sought medical bills, records, notes, reports, statements, doctors\u2019 notes, nurses\u2019 notes, radiological reports, and any other documents regarding Jane Doe\u2019s care and treatment. Request \u201ch\u201d sought receipts, notes, records, reports, incident reports, investigation reports, accident reports, files, documents and bills related to the attack. We note that Ingalls objected to requests for production \u201ce,\u201d \u201cf,\u201d and \u201ch\u201d based upon the privileges delineated in its Exhibit \u201cA.\u201d However, we also note that Giangiulio\u2019s motion to compel only requested that the trial court order the production of the knife which was requested in request \u201cf \u2019 but did not seek to compel production of the document in requests \u201ce\u201d and \u201ch.\u201d\nIn a supplemental response to Giangiulio\u2019s motion to compel, In-galls objected on the basis of HIPAA. Pub. L. No. 104 \u2014 191, 110 Stat. 1936; 45 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 160 through 164 (2005).\nOn July 18, 2003, the trial court entered an order that granted Giangiulio\u2019s motion to compel responses to her interrogatories and compelled production of the object requested in demand \u201cf.\u201d The trial court also found, pursuant to Rule 308, that there was a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Ingalls\u2019, petition for leave to appeal was granted by the appellate court.\nANALYSIS\nGiangiulio initially argues that Ingalls should be deemed to have waived any objection to the interrogatories and demands for production that were sent to Ingalls on April 10, 2001. According to Supreme Court Rule 213(d), the discovery was to be answered within 28 days. 177 Ill. 2d R. 213(d). Ingalls\u2019 response was not received until January 13, 2003. As a result, Giangiulio argues Ingalls\u2019 objections should be deemed waived for failure to file those objections within 28 days.\nGiangiulio also argues that, because Ingalls made no argument in its opening brief with respect to interrogatories 4, 6, 14, 15, and 16, the trial court\u2019s ruling on those should be affirmed. Giangiulio insists that it is for the court, not the defendant, to determine whether the privilege actually attaches. Giangiulio argues that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 341(e)(7), eff. October 1, 2001), points not argued are waived.\nIngalls responds that questions concerning the timeliness of its responses to the discovery requests are beyond the scope of the certified question forming the sole basis of this appeal. Ingalls argues that none of its objections should be deemed waived because it made a broad attack based on various different statutory provisions.\nOur examination of an interlocutory appeal brought pursuant to Rule 308 is strictly limited to the certified question presented to the court. Fosse v. Pensabene, 362 Ill. App. 3d 172, 177 (2005), quoting Thompson v. Gordon, 356 Ill. App. 3d 447, 451 (2005), appeal allowed, 216 Ill. 2d 736 (2005). We conduct a de novo review of all questions of law. Fosse, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 177. With rare exceptions, we do not expand the question under review to answer other, unasked questions. Fosse, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 177, citing Hearing v. Baumgardner, 358 Ill. App. 3d 540, 542 (2005), citing Jones v. City of Carbondale, 217 Ill. App. 3d 85, 88 (1991). \u201cOur task is to answer the certified questions rather than to rule on the propriety of any underlying order.\u201d Fosse, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 177, citing P.J.\u2019s Concrete Pumping Service, Inc. v. Nextel West Corp., 345 Ill. App. 3d 992, 998 (2004). We note that in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 and in request to produce \u201cf,\u201d In-galls invoked the privileges delineated in Exhibit \u201cA.\u201d Therefore, we will only answer the certified question presented to the appellate court as it relates to interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 and request for production \u201cf\u201d where Ingalls invoked one of the aforementioned privileges.\nPhysician-Patient Privilege\nIngalls argues that the trial court erred in compelling responses to the written discovery because the information is protected by various statutes and regulations. According to Ingalls, the information is protected because Jane Doe, whose medical records are sought, has never been made a party to the litigation. Because she is a patient and a nonparty to the litigation, Ingalls argues that Jane Doe\u2019s situation falls squarely within the intended protection of the physician-patient privilege. 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2000). Ingalls also argues that it would be insufficient to attempt to protect Jane Doe\u2019s confidentiality simply by deleting her name from the records because the cumulative impact of information in a patient\u2019s medical records can make the possibility of recognition very high. According to Ingalls, it does not matter that the information contained in the records is extremely relevant because it is outweighed by the need for protection.\nGiangiulio argues that the information sought in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10, as well as the knife sought in the request for production, are not protected by the physician-patient privilege. Giangiulio argues that the disclosure of a patient\u2019s name does not violate a physician-patient privilege. Similarly, Giangiulio argues that learning the identity of and deposing the doctors and staff involved in Jane Doe\u2019s treatment, the person who assigned Jane Doe to Giangiulio\u2019s room and the person who retrieved the knife from Jane Doe does not automatically amount to the revelation of privileged, protected information. According to Giangiulio, Ingalls\u2019 arguments are based upon the idea that the information sought was medical treatment information, medical records, discharge summaries and other types of factual data. The interrogatories at issue are seeking the identity of people, not anything relating to Jane Doe\u2019s medical records or treatment. Finally, Giangiulio argues that the knife has nothing to do with the treatment received by Jane Doe or the medical or psychiatric conditions for which she was being treated at the time of the incident.\nIngalls replies that Giangiulio\u2019s response exceeds the parameters of the certified question. Additionally, because the certified question does not limit this court\u2019s inquiry to certain of the interrogatories, In-galls argues this court\u2019s review is generally directed to whether the information sought in discovery is protected by privilege.\nThe physician-patient privilege is codified in section 8 \u2014 802 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Tomczak v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 359 Ill. App. 3d 448, 452 (2005). The privilege is designed to help patients feel comfortable when making disclosures to their physicians and to protect their privacy from invasion. Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 452, citing Reagan v. Searcy, 323 Ill. App. 3d 393, 395 (2001). Section 8 \u2014 802 provides that \u201c[n]o physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve the patient.\u201d Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 452, quoting 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2002). Section 8 \u2014 802 specifically enumerates exceptions to the privilege. Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 452, citing 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2002). These exceptions are as follows: (1) homicide trials when the disclosure relates directly to the homicide; (2) civil or criminal malpractice actions against the physician; (3) when the patient expressly consents or, in case of his or her death or disability, a lawsuit is filed by a personal representative, beneficiary of an insurance policy, or another person authorized to sue for personal injury on the patient\u2019s life, health, or physical condition; (4) actions wherein the patient\u2019s physical or mental condition is an issue, whether the action is brought by or against the patient, a personal representative, beneficiary under a policy of insurance, or the executor or administrator of the patient\u2019s estate; (5) an action wherein the issue regards the validity of a document purporting to be the patient\u2019s will; (6) a criminal action with a charge of abortion, attempted abortion, or first degree murder by abortion; (7) civil or criminal actions arising from the filing of a report in compliance with the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (325 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2002)); (8) to any department, agency, institution or facility which has custody of the patient pursuant to State statute or any court order of commitment; (9) prosecutions where written results of blood-alcohol tests are admissible pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.4 (West 2002)); (10) prosecutions where written results of blood-alcohol tests are admissible under section 5 \u2014 11a of the Boat Registration and Safety Act (625 ILCS 45/5 \u2014 11a (West 2002) (renumbered as 625 ILCS 45/5 \u2014 16a (West 2002))); and (11) suspected terrorist offenses when the criminal action arises from the filing of a report of suspected terrorist offense in compliance with section 29D\u2014 10(p)(7) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/29D \u2014 10 (West 2002)). 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2002). After examining the aforementioned exceptions to the privilege, we find that none of the exceptions are applicable to the case at bar.\nAccording to Tomczak, the physician-patient privilege protects the medical records of nonparties. Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 452, citing In re D.H., 319 Ill. App. 3d 771, 776 (2001), and Parkson v. Central Du Page Hospital, 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 855 (1982). Similar protection exists for the medical records of nonparties when that information is to be used by the physician treating the nonparty but the information has been gathered by a nurse. Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 452, citing House v. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 206 Ill. App. 3d 437, 446 (1990), and Ekstrom v. Temple, 197 Ill. App. 3d 120, 124 (1990). According to House and Ekstrom, the physician-patient privilege prevents the disclosure of the medical records of nonparty patients, even though disclosure would not be barred by the physician-patient privilege if the nonparty patient had been a party. House, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 444, citing Ekstrom, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 130, and Parkson, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 854-55. We note, however, that the physician-patient privilege protection applicable to the medical records of nonparty patients is not absolute. Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 453, citing House, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 445. Tomczak explains that, in applying the physician-patient privilege, the Ekstrom court should have distinguished between the types of information sought. Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 453, citing Ekstrom, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 130. Following Tomczak, we believe that the applicability of a privilege depends on whether the nonparty patient information sought by Giangiulio is general information or is treatment information that is necessary to enable a physician to serve a patient. Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 453, citing Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435, 437 (1979). Geisberger holds that information such as the name and address of a patient alone, is not protected by the statutory privilege because that information is not a necessary part of a physician\u2019s duty to treat, prescribe or act for the patient. Geisberger, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 437. In order to establish the physician-patient privilege, the party seeking to assert it must show facts giving rise to the privilege. Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 454, citing Cox v. Yellow Cab Co., 61 Ill. 2d 416, 419-20 (1975), quoting Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (1956). Therefore, we must examine interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 and request \u201cf\u201d to determine the nature of the information or objects Giangiulio sought in her discovery and whether the information is required for the physician to be able to properly treat the patient.\nIn interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10, Giangiulio primarily sought identification information. She requested the name, address and telephone number of Jane Doe, of hospital staff members who treated her, and of any employee or staff member who was assigned to Jane Doe\u2019s hospital room. In request \u201cf,\u201d she sought the knife used in the assault. According to House, \u201c[s]imply revealing the patient\u2019s identity, in and of itself, will not result in the disclosure of confidential communications.\u201d House, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 445, citing Davis v. Hinde, 141 Ill. App. 3d 664, 666 (1986), and Geisberger, 72 Ill. App. 3d at 438. Because Giangiulio was stabbed, she sought identification information about the staff members who retrieved the knife. She also requested the knife itself pursuant to her demand for production. Finally, Giangiulio sought information on how long Jane Doe was a patient at the hospital before the attack.\nWhere Giangiulio sought the identity of the doctors and other employees and staff members who had contact with Jane Doe, she did not ask for Jane Doe\u2019s medical or psychiatric records. Similarly, asking for the names and other information about the employees who retrieved the knife allegedly used by Jane Doe during the assault or the name of the person who shared a hospital room does not automatically involve the release of Jane Doe\u2019s medical records or the treatment information contained therein. We note that Ingalls did not present any facts which established that Jane Doe\u2019s name, address and telephone number were necessary to enable her physician to care for or treat her. We find no nexus between the information sought and the care or treatment that Jane Doe received or the medical or mental condition from which she suffered. We simply do not believe that the information sought by Giangiulio in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8 would reveal details about Jane Doe\u2019s medical or mental condition or her diagnosis and treatment that would compromise her privacy rights.\nIn addition, in interrogatory 10 Giangiulio requests \u201ctime data\u201d or nonmedical factual information about the length of Jane Doe\u2019s stay in the hospital. The \u201ctime data\u201d requested in interrogatory 10 is not related to Jane Doe\u2019s diagnosis or treatment. There is no nexus between the \u201ctime data\u201d sought and the care or treatment Jane Doe received at Ingalls. Therefore, the \u201ctime data\u201d falls outside the scope of the physician-patient privilege. See Tomczak, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 452-54.\nIngalls also invoked the physician-patient privilege with regards to the knife. We note that the physician-patient privilege prohibits the disclosure of information but does not prohibit the disclosure of objects that are not related to the patient\u2019s medical care. 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2000). We also find that request \u201cf,\u201d requiring production of the knife, does not involve the release of information regarding Jane Doe\u2019s medical or mental condition, diagnosis or treatment.\nAccordingly, we hold that the information Giangiulio sought in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 and the knife sought in request for production \u201cf\u201d are not protected by the physician-patient privilege. 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 802 (West 2000).\nMedical Studies Act\nNext, Ingalls argues that the information sought is protected under sections 8 \u2014 2101 and 8 \u2014 2102 of the Medical Studies Act. 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101, 8 \u2014 2102 (West 2002). Ingalls argues that such information is defined and, with notable exception, placed within the scope of a privilege in section 8 \u2014 2101. Section 8 \u2014 2102 of the Medical Studies Act provides that privileged information shall not be admissible as evidence or discoverable in proceedings before courts, tribunals, boards, agencies or people. 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2102 (West 2002). According to Ingalls, the hospital\u2019s customary practice is to include a written reference to the Medical Studies Act, which contains a disclosure privilege, on every confidential report it generates that would be relevant to this case.\nGiangiulio argues that the Medical Studies Act does not apply to this situation because that Act deals with privileged materials in peer-review situations. According to Giangiulio, the Medical Studies Act is premised on the desire to encourage physicians to participate in frank professional evaluations and peer review. Because there is no medical malpractice in the case at bar, Giangiulio argues there is no peer-review-oriented reason to invoke the Medical Studies Act to prevent disclosure of the information requested in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8. Additionally, Giangiulio argues the Medical Studies Act does not apply to interrogatory 10 because it seeks no medical or psychiatric records.\nSection 8 \u2014 2101 of the Medical Studies Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cAll information *** used in the course of internal quality control or of medical study for the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality, or for improving patient care or increasing organ and tissue donation, shall be privileged, strictly confidential and shall be used only for medical research, increasing organ and tissue donation, the evaluation and improvement of quality care, or granting, limiting or revoking staff privileges or agreements for services, except that in any health maintenance organization proceeding to decide upon a physician\u2019s services or any hospital or ambulatory surgical treatment center proceeding to decide upon a physician\u2019s staff privileges, or in any judicial review of either, the claim of confidentiality shall not be invoked to deny such physician access to or use of data upon which such a decision was based.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101 (West 2002).\nThe purpose of the Medical Studies Act is to ensure that members of the medical profession can maintain effective professional self-evaluation and to improve the quality of healthcare. Pietro v. Marriott Senior Living Services, Inc., 348 Ill. App. 3d 541, 548 (2004), citing Roach v. Springfield Clinic, 157 Ill. 2d 29, 40 (1993); Stricklin v. Becan, 293 Ill. App. 3d 886, 890 (1997). The belief underlying the Medical Studies Act is that, without a statutorily mandated peer-review privilege, it is unlikely that physicians would evaluate their colleagues. Pietro, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 548, citing Roach, 157 Ill. 2d at 40; Stricklin, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 890, citing Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 480 (1984). However, Stricklin noted that the supreme court has also held that not every piece of information a hospital staff acquires is nondiscoverable, even if it is acquired by a peer-review committee. Stricklin, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 890, citing Roach, 157 . 2d 29. \u201c[T]he Act protects against disclosure of the mechanisms of the peer-review process, including information gathering and deliberations leading to the ultimate decision rendered by a peer-review committee, but does not protect against the discovery of information generated before the peer-review process begins or information generated after the peer-review process ends.\u201d Pietro, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 549, citing Webb v. Mount Sinai Hospital & Medical Center of Chicago, Inc., 347 Ill. App. 3d 817, 825 (2004).\nIt is a generally accepted rule of statutory construction that a statute should be read so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Doe v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, 297 Ill. App. 3d 240, 243 (1998), citing Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill. 2d 357, 365 (1985). The information sought in the interrogatories has nothing to do with peer review. We are not persuaded by the fact that Ingalls routinely references the Medical Studies Act when it produces documents. \u201cA party\u2019s \u2018mere assertion that the matter is confidential and privileged will not suffice.\u2019 \u201d Menoski v. Shih, 242 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121 (1993), quoting Ekstrom v. Temple, 197 Ill. App. 3d 120, 127 (1990). \u201cThe applicability of a discovery privilege is a matter of law for the court to determine, but the question of whether specific materials are part of a medical study is a factual question within that legal determination.\u201d Menoski, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 121, citing Niven, 109 Ill. 2d at 368, and Willing v. St. Joseph Hospital, 176 Ill. App. 3d 737, 744 (1988). We are unwilling to permit Ingalls to make Jane Doe\u2019s information privileged under the narrow scope of the Medical Studies Act by merely placing a disclaimer on a document that is not used in connection with a program or study designed to improve internal quality control, patient care or reduce morbidity or mortality. Zajac v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 212 Ill. App. 3d 779, 788 (1991). We find that the information requested in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 is not quality assurance information involving patient care. 735 ILCS 5/8\u2014 2101 (West 2002); also see Pietro, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 548. Because the Medical Studies Act is focused on information, records, reports, statements, notes, memoranda, or other data, it has no applicability to the knife sought in request to produce \u201cf.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101, 8 \u2014 2102 (West 2002). Therefore, we hold that the Medical Studies Act does not provide Ingalls with a shield for the information requested in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 or the knife requested in request \u201cf.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/8 \u2014 2101, 8 \u2014 2102 (West 2002).\nMental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act\nNext, Ingalls argues that the information sought in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 and the object sought in request \u201cf\u201d is protected from disclosure by section 3(a) of the Confidentiality Act. 740 ILCS 110/3(a) (West 2002). Ingalls argues that section 3(a) provides a broader protection from disclosure for all records and communications. According to Ingalls, it does not matter that the information sought is extremely relevant.\nGiangiulio argues that, as with the physician-patient privilege, the Confidentiality Act deals with medical information, medical records, discharge summaries and factual data contained in medical records. Because the information sought has nothing to do with Jane Doe\u2019s treatment or her underlying medical or mental condition, Giangiulio argues no privilege should attach.\n\u201cThe Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act provides that \u2018any record kept by a therapist or by an agency in the course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities service to a recipient\u2019 and \u2018any communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist or to or in the presence of other persons during or in connection with providing mental health or developmental disability services to a recipient,\u2019 including \u2018information which indicates that a person is a recipient,\u2019 \u2018shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this Act.\u2019 \u201d Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 71 (2001), quoting 740 ILCS 110/2, 3(a) (West 2000). The remainder of the Confidentiality Act identifies who may inspect and copy a recipient\u2019s mental health record, and when and how it is to be accomplished. Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 71. \u201c \u2018The Confidentiality Act is carefully drawn to maintain the confidentiality of mental health records except in the specific circumstances explicitly enumerated.\u2019 \u201d Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 71, quoting Sassali v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 296 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84-85 (1998). Where permitted, the Act has been carefully drafted with narrowly crafted exceptions by the legislature to limit any disclosures to accomplish a particular purpose. Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 71, citing Pritchard v. SwedishAmerican Hospital, 191 Ill. App. 3d 388, 402 (1989). According to the supreme court, \u201c[w]hen viewed as a whole, the Act constitutes a \u2018strong statement\u2019 by the General Assembly about the importance of keeping mental health records confidential.\u201d Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 71-72, quoting Mandziara v. Canulli, 299 Ill. App. 3d 593, 599 (1998). Therefore, \u201c \u2018[a]nyone seeking the nonconsensual release of mental health information faces a formidable challenge and must show that disclosure is authorized by the Act.\u2019 \u201d Chand v. Paila, 342 Ill. App. 3d 655, 662 (2003), quoting Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 72.\nAccording to the United States Supreme Court, \u201c[e]ffective psychotherapy *** depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment.\u201d Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 72, quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 337, 345, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (1996).\nUnlike in Norskog, where the Illinois Supreme Court found that records and communications concerning mental health treatment that a patient received are subject to the privilege in the Mental Health Act (Norskog, 197 Ill. 2d at 73), Giangiulio argues that she is not seeking information that is related to the mental illness or infirmity suffered by her attacker. Instead, Giangiulio argues that her discovery was directed at learning how long her attacker was a patient and which staff members and hospital employees had contact with her. In addition, Giangiulio also seeks production of the knife.\nThe Confidentiality Act defines both communication and confidential communication as being \u201cany communication made by a recipient or other person to a therapist or to or in the presence of other persons during or in connection with providing mental health or developmental disability services to a recipient. Communication includes information which indicates that a person is a recipient.\u201d 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2002). Mental health or developmental disabilities services \u201cincludes but is not limited to examination, diagnosis, evaluation, treatment, training, pharmaceuticals, aftercare, habilitation or rehabilitation.\u201d 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2002). The Confidentiality Act also defines a record as information \u201ckept by a therapist or by an agency in the course of providing mental health or developmental disabilities service to a recipient concerning the recipient and the services provided.\u201d 740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2002).\nThe Confidentiality Act prohibits the release of information that would tend to identify Jane Doe as a recipient of mental health services. 740 ILCS 110/3 (West 2002). There is a document in the record that alleges that Jane Doe was being treated for mental illness. The first amended complaint alleges that, \u201cprior to the date and time\u201d of the attack, Jane Doe \u201chad exhibited dangerous propensities both toward [Giangiulio] and other persons.\u201d The complaint also alleges that Jane Doe \u201csuffered from various mental and emotional illnesses thereby making her a danger to the health and well-being of other patients.\u201d The aforementioned allegations in the complaint identify Jane Doe as a possible recipient of mental health services. Given the allegations in the complaint, interrogatories 2 and 10 violate both the letter and spirit of the Confidentiality Act. Interrogatory number 2 asks for Jane Doe\u2019s name, address and telephone number. Similarly, because interrogatory number 10 asks for the period of time Jane Doe was a patient at Ingalls before the attack, it is a request for information found in her hospital records which is privileged if she is a mental patient, so it violates the Confidentiality Act. 740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2002). Conversely, it is not necessary to identify Jane Doe in order to answer interrogatories 3, 5, and 7. In those interrogatories, Giangiulio seeks information regarding the doctors, nurses, staff, and employees with whom Jane Doe had contact. Because Giangiulio is suing the hospital, its employees and staff for their negligence in allowing her to be attacked while a patient, no information about Jane Doe\u2019s medical or mental condition is required when answering those interrogatories. While continuing to designate her as Jane Doe, Ingalls is required to answer interrogatories 3, 5, and 7. The remaining interrogatory, number 8, asks for information concerning another patient in bed 2 in hospital room 417E. In the event the patient in bed 2 in room 417E is suffering from a \u201cmedical condition,\u201d her name, address, and telephone number are discoverable; however, if the patient is suffering from a \u201cmental illness\u201d or \u201cpsychological condition\u201d that would come within the purview of the privilege in the Confidentiality Act, the Act bars the release of that patient\u2019s name, address and telephone number. 740 ILCS 110/3 (West 2002). Because request to produce \u201cf\u201d does not seek mental health information (740 ILCS 110/2 (West 2002)) but, instead, seeks the knife, the Confidentiality Act is not applicable. 740 ILCS 110/3 (West 2002). Finally, we note that the Confidentiality Act will not apply if Jane Doe\u2019s name, address or telephone number is discovered through inadvertence or from some source other than her hospital records. House, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 442-45.\nHealth Insurance Portability and Accountability Act\nNext, Ingalls argues that the information sought is protected under parts 160 through 164 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 45 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 160 through 164 (2005). These are United States Department of Health and Human Services rules designed to protect patients\u2019 medical records. Ingalls argues that the HIPAA rules encompass individually identifiable health information including underlying data related to a patient\u2019s physical and/or mental health which identifies that individual. This includes common identifiers such as name, address, birth date, and social security number. However, according to Ingalls, the federal HIPAA privacy rules are not limited to financial transactions related to health care claims. Ingalls argues that, because it is a health care provider that transmits health information in an electronic form, it would be considered a covered entity under the HIPAA privacy rules. Without express written consent from the patient, Ingalls argues that it would be prohibited from disclosing any of the protected health information. According to In-galls, Giangiulio never obtained approval from Jane Doe for the release of her private medical records.\nGiangiulio argues that the information sought is not protected from disclosure by the federal HIPAA privacy rule. According to Giangiulio, HIPAA protects electronic transmissions from disclosure which concern health care claims, benefits, plans, enrollment, eligibility, premiums, the payment of premiums, referrals and reports of injury. Giangiulio argues that the underlying interrogatories do not request financial information that is related to health care claims protected by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.\nHIPAA is a federal Act \u201cintended to provide a baseline of health information privacy protections, which states are free to rise above in order to best protect their citizens.\u201d D. Wirtes, Jr., R. Lamberth, & J. Gomez, An Important Consequence of HIPAA: No More Ex Parte Communications Between Defense Attorneys and Plaintiff\u2019s Treating Physicians, 27 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 1, 4 (2003) (Important Consequence of HIPAA). Pursuant to HIPAA, the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) adopted privacy rules to regulate protected health information and when that information could be disclosed. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1320d(6) (2000); also see Moss v. Amira, 356 Ill. App. 3d 701, 710-12 (2005) (Quinn, J., specially concurring), citing 45 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 160, 164 (2004). Under the HIPAA, protected health information may not be disclosed without valid authorization and use or disclosure must be made in a manner consistent with the authorization granted. Moss, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 711 (Quinn, J., specially concurring), quoting Important Consequence of HIPAA, 27 Am. J. Trial Advoc. at 5-6, citing 45 C.F.R. \u00a7 164.512(e)(1).\nHIPAA contains a preemption provision that generally supercedes contrary state law provisions. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1320d \u2014 7(a)(1) (2000). The intended purpose of section 1320d \u2014 7(a)(1) of Title 42 of the United States Code has been implemented by section 160.203 of the Code of Federal Regulation. 45 C.F.R. \u00a7 160.203 (2005). However, HIPAA does not preempt state laws that are more stringent. 45 C.F.R. \u00a7 160.203(b) (2005); also see Important Consequence of HIPAA, 27 Am. J. Trial Advoc. at 4. According to HIPAA, the term \u201cmore stringent\u201d means, when compared with a particular state\u2019s law, HIPAA must permit disclosure in circumstances where the state law does not. 45 C.F.R. \u00a7 160.202 (2005). HIPAA also contains regulations for judicial proceedings that permit disclosure under certain conditions. 45 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 164.512(e)(l)(i), (e)(1)(h) (2005); Important Consequence of HIPAA, 27 Am. J. Trial Advoc. at 5-6. Those conditions include, but are not limited to, permitting disclosures pursuant to an order of a court, or \u201c[i]n response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process that is not accompanied by an order of a court or administrative tribunal.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 45 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 164.512(e)(l)(i), (e)(1)(h) (2005); Important Consequence of HIPAA, 27 Am. J. Trial Advoc. at 5-6; also see Moss, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 711 (Quinn, J., specially concurring). In those instances where a reasonable discovery request has been made, the trial court must make certain that the covered entity receives satisfactory assurances. 45 C.F.R. \u00a7 164.512(e)(l)(iii) (2005). The required assurances are that the party requesting the information has made a good-faith attempt to provide written notice to the individual (45 C.F.R. \u00a7 164.512(e)(l)(iii)(A) (2005)), that the notice included sufficient information about the litigation or proceeding in which the protected health information is requested to permit the individual to raise an objection to the court or administrative tribunal (45 C.F.R. \u00a7 164.512(e)(1)(iii)(B) (2005)), and the time for the individual to raise objections to the court or administrative tribunal has elapsed (45 C.F.R. \u00a7 164.512(e)(l)(iii)(C) (2005)) and either no objections were filed (45 C.F.R. \u00a7 164.512(e) (1)(iii) (C)(1) (2005)) or all raised objections were resolved by the court and the requested release of information is consistent with the court\u2019s resolution (45 C.F.R. \u00a7 164.512(e) (1) (iii) (C)(2) (2005)).\nWhere the information sought by a party to litigation involves a nonparty, HIPAA does not preempt Illinois law. Moss, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 712 (Quinn, J., specially concurring), quoting National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, No. 04 C 55 (N.D. Ill. February 6, 2004). According to Moss, the National Abortion Federation court held that \u201c \u2018Illinois law concerning when nonparty patient medical records may be disclosed by hospitals or doctors is far more restrictive [than HIPAA]\u2019 \u201d Moss, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 712 (Quinn, J., specially concurring), quoting National Abortion Federation, slip op. at 7.\nWe find that Giangiulio\u2019s interrogatories and requests for production were made pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 213 and 214 (177 Ill. 2d R. 213; 166 Ill. 2d R. 214). Therefore, we hold that HIPAA does not act as a bar to disclosure of the information requested in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 or production of the knife in request Up JJ\nCONCLUSION\nIn light of the foregoing, we answer the certified question as follows: (1) Ingalls is not prohibited by the physician-patient privilege from responding to interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 and request for production \u201cf\u201d; (2) the Medical Studies Act does not bar disclosure of the information requested in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 and request for production \u201cf\u201d; (3) the information requested in interrogatories 2 and 10 is protected from disclosure by the Confidentiality Act because disclosure of the information would tend to identify Jane Doe as a recipient of mental health services. However, the Confidentiality Act does not prohibit Ingalls from answering interrogatories 3, 5, and 7. As stated above, if the patient whose information is the subject of interrogatory 8 is suffering from a medical condition, the information is discoverable, but if the patient is suffering from a mental illness or psychological condition which would come within the purview of the privilege in the Confidentiality Act, Ingalls is not required to answer the interrogatory; and (4) HIPAA does not preempt Illinois law in this area and, therefore, does not bar disclosure of the information requested in interrogatories 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10 and request for production \u201cf.\u201d\nCertified question answered.\nGALLAGHER, PJ, and O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, J, concur.\nThe trial court\u2019s identification of \u201cthe privacy rule set forth in Pub. L. 104 \u2014 191, 45 C.ER. Parts, 160-164\u201d is a reference to HIPAA and the rules and regulations created thereunder. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1320d et seq. (2000); 45 C.ER. \u00a7\u00a7 160 through 164 (2005).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE NEVILLE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Elmore, DeMichael, Ashack & Daudish, of Oak Forest (Joseph E. Daudish, Joseph J. DeMichael, and James T. Ashack, of counsel), for appellant.", "Joseph L. Planera & Associates, of Chicago Heights (John P. Brattoli, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DEBRA GIANGIULIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INGALLS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201403\u20142179\nOpinion filed April 14, 2006.\nElmore, DeMichael, Ashack & Daudish, of Oak Forest (Joseph E. Daudish, Joseph J. DeMichael, and James T. Ashack, of counsel), for appellant.\nJoseph L. Planera & Associates, of Chicago Heights (John P. Brattoli, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0823-01", "first_page_order": 841, "last_page_order": 859 }