{ "id": 4264837, "name": "HILARY KRAWCZYK et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOM LIVADITIS, Defendant-Appellee (Berton N. Ring, P.C., Appellant; Soula J. Spyropoulos, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Hilary Krawczyk v. Livaditis", "decision_date": "2006-06-15", "docket_number": "No. 1-04-2228", "first_page": "375", "last_page": "379", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 375" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980737 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 956", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171561 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "963" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186551 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6-7" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "7" }, { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 978", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3581931 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "984" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0978-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 824", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4258657 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0824-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735798 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173601 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259127 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 964", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75412 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0964-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150177 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0260-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 543, "char_count": 9237, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.884212328542985e-08, "percentile": 0.36863751516015025 }, "sha256": "4a85177670df46e8a20b42691597bc51740e246f8b8c54816c0bb3b71afae0d0", "simhash": "1:014e78c547c8d0e5", "word_count": 1526 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:16.995484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HILARY KRAWCZYK et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOM LIVADITIS, Defendant-Appellee (Berton N. Ring, P.C., Appellant; Soula J. Spyropoulos, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs Hilary and Elizabeth Krawczyk, and appellant Berton N. Ring, EC., appeal an order of the circuit court of Cook County awarding plaintiffs $4,200 in damages for defendant Tom Livaditis\u2019s breach of a lease and violations of the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7\u00a7 5 \u2014 12\u2014080, 5 \u2014 12\u2014100 (amended November 6, 1991)) (RLTO), arguing that the trial court: (1) improperly merged the damages from the contract claim with those for multiple violations of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014080 and a violation of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014100; (2) abused its discretion in reducing the attorney fees and costs from $19,624 to $5,601.25; and (3) abused its discretion in failing to award sanctions under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) against Livaditis and his counsel, appellee Soula J. Spyropoulos.\nThe issues relating to the improper merger of damages are best understood by briefly summarizing plaintiffs\u2019 seven-count complaint. Count I alleged breach of contract, demanding the return of the security deposit. Count II alleged that defendant failed to return the security deposit within the time stated by section 5 \u2014 12\u2014080 of the RLTO. Count III alleged that defendant commingled the security deposit with defendant\u2019s personal assets in violation of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014 080 of the RLTO. Count IV alleged that defendant failed to provide the tenant with a summary of the RLTO, in violation of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014170 of the RLTO. Count V alleged that defendant failed to issue a receipt for the security deposit in violation of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014080 of the RLTO. Count VI alleged that defendant failed to maintain the leased premises, allowing the tenant to vacate and have the security deposit refunded under section 5 \u2014 12\u2014110 of the RLTO. Count VII alleged that defendant violated section 5 \u2014 12\u2014100 of the RLTO by failing to notify the tenant of citations from the City of Chicago and a notice from People\u2019s Gas that it would discontinue utility service to the building. The trial court entered an award of $4,200, representing $1,400 on count VI and merging damages on counts I, II, III, V and VII. The trial court did not enter judgment on count IV\nThe resolution of the damages issues is controlled by the text of the RLTO and this court\u2019s decisions in Plambeck v. Greystone Management & Columbia National Trust Co., 281 Ill. App. 3d 260 (1996), and Szpila v. Burke, 279 Ill. App. 3d 964 (1996). The award in this case was in the amount of $4,200 \u2014 which includes the $1,400 security deposit (as damages for the failure to maintain). The $1,400 is separately marked in the judgment order, so it cannot be said that it was \u201cmerged\u201d into the other damages. The damages for the breach of contract claim also represent the return of the security deposit and are properly merged with the damages for the failure to maintain, not with the other claims under the ordinance. However, this error is purely technical. The trial court also awarded $2,800 \u2014 twice the security deposit, which is the measure of damages under section 5 \u2014 12\u2014080(f) of the RLTO. As for the remaining $2,800, both Plambeck and Szpila provide for this singular award in cases of multiple violations of other portions of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014080.\nAppellants argue that Szpila was overruled by our supreme court in Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2001), but the sole issue in Lawrence was whether the RLTO required a landlord\u2019s violation of the interest payment provisions to have been willful before the tenant was entitled to recover the damages, attorney fees and costs. Our supreme court overruled Szpila to the extent that it conflicted with the court\u2019s decision, but otherwise stated that Szpila was \u201cproperly distinguished\u201d by this court. Lawrence, 197 Ill. 2d at 12. This court distinguished Szpila on the grounds that there were multiple violations of the RLTO alleged in multiple counts and\u2014 secondarily \u2014 that the plaintiff in Szpila contributed to the compounding of violations by not acting earlier. Lawrence v. Regent Realty Group, Inc., 307 Ill. App. 3d 155, 159 (1999). Thus, the supreme court approved treating multiple violation cases differently.\nAppellants also argue that People ex rel. Department of Public Health v. Wiley, 218 Ill. 2d 207 (2006), and City of Chicago v. Elevated Properties, L.L.C., 361 Ill. App. 3d 824 (2005), are persuasive authority for imposing a separate penalty for each violation of the RLTO. Wiley involved the Family Practice Residency Act (110 ILCS 935/1 et seq. (West 2002)), which created medical scholarship contracts that require the recipient to perform a term of service in designated shortage areas after becoming licensed to practice medicine. Section 10 of the statute provides that if a recipient fails to perform, the recipient \u201cshall pay to the Department a sum equal to 3 times the amount of the annual scholarship grant for each year the recipient fails to fulfill such obligation.\u201d 110 ILCS 935/10 (West 2002). This language expressly refers to penalties for \u201ceach year\u201d of an annual scholarship. In contrast, the payment of a security deposit is a singular event and the RLTO does not specify double damages for \u201ceach\u201d violation of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014080. Similarly, in Elevated Properties, the vacant building registration ordinance specifically provided that every day a violation continued constituted a distinct and separate offense, with a mandatory fine for each offense. Wiley and Elevated Properties demonstrate that the City of Chicago could have employed such language, but chose not to do so.\nHowever, section 5 \u2014 12\u2014080(f) provides that it \u201cdoes not preclude the tenant from recovering other damages to which he may be entitled under this chapter.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 5 \u2014 12\u2014080(f) (amended November 6, 1991). Accordingly, plaintiffs are correct that the trial court erred in failing to award separate damages for the violation of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014100 (requiring disclosure to tenants regarding legal proceedings, cutoff of utilities), as the ordinance specifically states that such violations shall entitle the tenant to remedies under section 5 \u2014 12\u2014090.\nIn short, the trial court did not err in its calculation of damages for the breach of contract claim or the violations of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014080 of the RLTO. The trial court did err in failing to assess damages under section 5 \u2014 12\u2014090 for the violation of section 5 \u2014 12\u2014 100. That error may have affected the amount of attorney fees and costs awarded, as any such calculation includes a consideration of the results achieved for the client. Kaiser v. MEPC American Properties, Inc., 164 Ill. App. 3d 978, 984 (1987). Thus, the trial court must reconsider these issues on remand.\nFinally, appellants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to impose Rule 137 sanctions against defendant and defense counsel. Pursuant to Rule 137, the trial court may impose sanctions against a party or his counsel for filing a motion or pleading that is not well grounded in fact, not supported by existing law, or lacks a good-faith basis for modification, reversal, or extension of the law, or is interposed for any improper purpose. Peterson v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6-7 (2000). As the Peterson court explained, \u201c[t]he purpose of Rule 137 is to prevent the filing of frivolous and false lawsuits.\u201d Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 7. Yet, \u201cthe rule is not intended to penalize litigants and their attorneys merely because they were zealous, yet unsuccessful.\u201d Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 7. Because the rule is penal in nature, it must be strictly construed. Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 7. When called upon to determine whether sanctions were appropriate in a given case, we employ an abuse of discretion standard of review. Baker v. Daniel S. Berger, Ltd., 323 Ill. App. 3d 956, 963 (2001). A trial court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person could take the view it adopted. Technology Innovation Center, Inc. v. Advanced Multiuser Technologies Corp., 315 Ill. App. 3d 238, 244 (2000).\nIn this case, the trial court found that this was one of many cases where the lawyers seemed incapable of getting along, but ultimately concluded that under the circumstances, sanctions were unwarranted. Following a review of the record, we cannot say that no reasonable person would take this view. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for sanctions.\nFor all of the aforementioned reasons, this case is reversed and remanded for a recalculation of damages, fees and costs consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nQUINN, P.J., and MURPHY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CAMPBELL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Berton N. Ring, P.C., of Chicago (Berton N. Ring and Brendan Keating, of counsel), for appellants.", "Rotman & Elovitz, Ltd., of Chicago (Louis S. Elovitz and Robert D. Rotman, of counsel), for appellee Tom Livaditis.", "Soula J. Spyropoulos, of Chicago, appellee pro se." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HILARY KRAWCZYK et al, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOM LIVADITIS, Defendant-Appellee (Berton N. Ring, P.C., Appellant; Soula J. Spyropoulos, Appellee).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1-04-2228\nOpinion filed June 15, 2006.\nBerton N. Ring, P.C., of Chicago (Berton N. Ring and Brendan Keating, of counsel), for appellants.\nRotman & Elovitz, Ltd., of Chicago (Louis S. Elovitz and Robert D. Rotman, of counsel), for appellee Tom Livaditis.\nSoula J. Spyropoulos, of Chicago, appellee pro se." }, "file_name": "0375-01", "first_page_order": 393, "last_page_order": 397 }