{ "id": 4265193, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM LANG, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lang", "decision_date": "2006-07-24", "docket_number": "No. 1-04-3247", "first_page": "588", "last_page": "592", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 588" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 N.E.2d 1256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2927271 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "131" }, { "page": "129-30" }, { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0120-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 575, "char_count": 10478, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.1428710708616603 }, "sha256": "2de5e264e142b8ccf2aa6b220199fad728b9fb0795b86c611301723a2b49f850", "simhash": "1:bf2a34a8e243b4f5", "word_count": 1698 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:16.995484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM LANG, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWilliam Lang was convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a felon after a jury trial. He was sentenced to seven years in prison. Because the remarks of the trial judge at the sentencing hearing bring into question whether defendant\u2019s constitutional right to have his sentence determined with the objective of restoring him to useful citizenship (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11) was impaired, we vacate his sentence and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge.\nDefendant does not challenge his conviction on appeal. Rather, defendant argues: (1) he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the trial court refused to consider his rehabilitative potential; and (2) he was improperly admonished under Supreme Court Rule 605(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 605(a)).\nGreat weight is given a trial court\u2019s sentencing determination. People v. Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d 120, 130, 616 N.E.2d 1256 (1993). The trial court has discretion to fashion an appropriate sentence and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 130. The trial court is in a better position to decide a proper punishment than is a court of review. Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 130.\nproper sentence must be premised on the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case. Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 130. The determination of an appropriate sentence depends on several factors, including the gravity of the offense, the circumstances of the commission and the defendant\u2019s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, age and criminal history. Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 131. It is the duty of the sentencing judge to strike an appropriate balance between protection of society and rehabilitation of the offender. Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 131. Trial judges are compelled to consider each defendant\u2019s individual rehabilitative potential. Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 131. The constitution requires that \u201c[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 11; Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 131. \u201cWhile this is not to say that the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship is to be accorded greater consideration than that which establishes the seriousness of the offense [citations], such concerns must be considered on a case-by-case basis.\u201d Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 131.\nDefendant here was found guilty of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, punishable as a Class 2 felony. See 720 ILCS 5/24 \u2014 1.6(d) (West 2000). Defendant was eligible to receive an extended-term sentence based on his criminal history. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b)(1) (West 2000). The sentencing range was no less than 3 years and no more than 14 years in prison. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014 1(a)(5), 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a)(4) (West 2000). The State argued defendant should receive close to the maximum. The State presented evidence of defendant\u2019s earlier convictions, including convictions for attempted murder, armed robbery, robbery, possession of a controlled substance and possession of cannabis.\nDefendant called Norbert Kuksta, an inspector at the Cook County jail, to testify in mitigation. Kuksta said defendant, while imprisoned for an earlier conviction, helped Kuksta identify correction officers who were smuggling contraband into the jail. Defendant also worked with Kuksta after his release. Kuksta said defendant\u2019s cooperation was \u201cinvaluable\u201d in making the prison system more secure. Also in mitigation, defendant presented evidence that he had obtained a bachelor\u2019s degree while in prison, had the support of his mother, had separated himself from gangs and was employed. Defendant also argued his criminal history since 1996 had consisted of nonviolent crimes and that he did not injure anyone in the shooting for which he was being sentenced.\nBefore sentencing, the trial judge said defendant was \u201capproaching middle age\u201d and had \u201cenough experience in the criminal justice system to know that under no circumstances should [he] be in possession of a gun.\u201d The trial judge referenced defendant\u2019s cooperation with Kuksta but questioned his motive in cooperating. The judge then made the following statement:\n\u201cAnd I frankly *** do not understand what the objective [of sentencing you] is. I don\u2019t understand what I or society gains by putting you in prison for possession of a weapon. If I thought it was going to deter you or anybody else, it might make sense. But I\u2019m fully aware that what I do to you is going to be zero effect on anyone else out there carrying a weapon.\n*** I would also not have any problem with [sentencing you] if I thought *** there would be some level of rehabilitation, but you don\u2019t need rehabilitating. You rehabilitated yourself [in spite] of the penitentiary by getting into things while in the penitentiary *** you [chose] to do.\nThe penitentiary is not [a way] for you to go and expect to find anything of a rehabilitative nature. We just warehouse people in penitentiaries. We don\u2019t rehabilitate them.\nThe Department of Corrections *** doesn\u2019t consider itself to be a rehabilitative institution. So, for you, sentencing you to the penitentiary is simply to isolate and take you out of society, and I think in many instances for the benefit [of] those who work in the prison industry because they need bodies in prison. And the population of inmates in this country has just gone over two million. It\u2019s a huge industry, and if you collapse it by staying out of the penitentiary, you will collapse economy all around this country.\nYou are sentenced to a term of [seven] years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.\u201d\nDefendant argues this excerpt demonstrates the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative potential and fashioned a sentence based on the judge\u2019s personal opinion of the prison system. Defendant cites Jeter.\nThe court there made the following statement during the defendants\u2019 sentencing hearing:\n\u201c \u2018First, I think it ought to be noted for the record that there [have] been references made by the attorneys, both the prosecution and for the defense, concerning punishment reflecting the possibility of rehabilitation. And I think it ought to be clear in everyone\u2019s mind that it is the [c]ourt\u2019s judgment that a penal institution is not a place where rehabilitation takes place.\nA penal institution is a place where people who have been convicted of crimes are sent in execution of their sentence.\nEarly on it was considered that rehabilitative programs would take place during the incarceration period. But the [c]ourt is not aware of any American penal institution that lives up to the responsibility of having programs that cause people in their custody to change their ways, and come in convicted felons and go out as people who are not going to commit any further crimes.\nAny rehabilitation that takes place under the circumstances in the American institutions comes about only as a result of the individual inmates affirming that after execution of that sentence that inmate is not going to be involved in any other anti-social or illegal activity. There is no rehabilitation *** program that exists that is worthy of being named such in any of our penal institutions in the [c]ourt\u2019s judgment.\nAccordingly], I sentence these gentlemen today and it is not just them, but that has been my posture since I adopted this attitude, I will be sentencing purely on the basis of punishment. The sentence that I will impose will be punishment for the crimes that these men have been convicted of. And if rehabilitation takes place, fine.\nSit down.\nIt will be for punishment only.\u2019 \u201d Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 129-30.\nThis court found on review that the trial judge failed to weigh the evidence presented at the defendants\u2019 sentencing hearing and instead sentenced the defendants \u201c \u2018for punishment only\u2019 \u201d based on his personal beliefs about the prison system. Jeter, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 131. The defendants\u2019 sentences were vacated on this ground. We believe defendant\u2019s sentence here must be vacated on the same ground.\nThe State argues Jeter is inapplicable because the trial judge\u2019s comments here concerned the prison system in general and not defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential. We disagree. Not only were the trial judge\u2019s comments here made in the context of deciding an appropriate sentence for defendant, but they were specifically directed to defendant. The trial judge made clear that its sentencing decision would rest on taking defendant out of mainstream society and not on defendant\u2019s rehabilitative potential.\nThe State also argues the trial judge\u2019s \u201copinions on the prison system were offered to mitigate rather than aggravate the length of defendant\u2019s sentence.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) The State maintains defendant did not suffer prejudice because the trial judge\u2019s opinion favored a lesser sentence. We fail to see the logic in the State\u2019s argument. The trial judge offered gratuitous remarks on the state of the Department of Corrections. The remarks may have been appropriate if made in a speech on prison reform to a bar association. But they are inexplicable at a sentencing hearing where a judge is bound to observe constitutional and statutory guidelines. Sentencing is the most solemn power a judge possesses. Whether defendant would have received a heavier sentence had the trial judge\u2019s opinion been different is irrelevant.\nDefendant\u2019s conviction is affirmed. Under Jeter, we vacate defendant\u2019s sentence and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing before a different judge. Defendant\u2019s argument that he was not properly admonished under Rule 605(a) is moot.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.\nGORDON and BURKE, JJ., concur.\nJustice Burke participated in the disposition of this case before her retirement from the court.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CAHILL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Jessica A. Hunter, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Manny Magence, and Michael J.A. Pasquinelli, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of. counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM LANG, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1-04-3247\nOpinion filed July 24, 2006.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Jessica A. Hunter, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Manny Magence, and Michael J.A. Pasquinelli, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of. counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0588-01", "first_page_order": 606, "last_page_order": 610 }