{ "id": 4264255, "name": "U.S. BANK N.A., as Trustee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY B. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "U.S. Bank N.A. v. Phillips", "decision_date": "2006-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 1-05-1829", "first_page": "593", "last_page": "596", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 593" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208019 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0613-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 3d", "weight": 7, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" }, { "page": "178-79" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "179" }, { "page": "179-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Cal. App. 4th 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 6049122 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "392" }, { "page": "392-93" }, { "page": "393-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/134/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.Ct. 847", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 6138955 ], "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/307/0247-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 416, "char_count": 7922, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.947487136851577e-08, "percentile": 0.3113513567779434 }, "sha256": "d53e9d301b0cba5e19fe65c0810ed808932e5c60719e93ee56d9461ec2b5a134", "simhash": "1:79e4c5a65d0888e7", "word_count": 1331 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:16.995484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "U.S. BANK N.A., as Trustee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY B. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Anthony Phillips appeals, pro se, from the denial of his \u201cPetition to Vacate a Void Judgment and Collateral Attack Under Authority of Illinois Statute.\u201d For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nOn December 31, 2001, defendant obtained a mortgage for $255,000 from New Century Mortgage Corporation (New Century) to purchase a parcel of property commonly known as 2024 East 171st Court in South Holland, Illinois. The mortgage and corresponding note were owned by plaintiff, U.S. Bank N.A., as trustee for New Century, and serviced by Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB (Ocwen).\nOn August 14, 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint to foreclose defendant\u2019s mortgage, alleging that defendant had failed to pay the monthly installments on the mortgage since June 1, 2002. Defendant was personally served on September 9, 2002, but did not appear or otherwise answer the complaint. On October 28, 2002, the circuit court entered an \u201cOrder of Default\u201d against defendant, as well as a \u201cJudgment for Foreclosure and Sale\u201d (Judgment) ordering the subject real estate to be sold at a judicial sale.\nOn February 5, 2005, defendant sent a letter to Ocwen, purporting to tender payment for the entire balance of the mortgage by an enclosed \u201cBonded Bill of Exchange\u201d (Bill). The Bill stated that \u201c[t]he obligation of the *** Secretary of Treasury *** arises out of the want of consideration for the pledge and by the redemption of the pledge under HJR \u2014 192, Public Law 73 \u2014 10 and 59 S.Ct. 847.\u201d Attached to the Bill were instructions on how to process it with the United States Treasury Department. The instructions stated that defendant had established a \u201cPersonal Treasury UCC Contract Trust Account\u201d through the Treasury Department, and that the Bill was a negotiable instrument that should be mailed to the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) for redemption.\nOn February 8, 2005, defendant was sent a \u201cNotice of Sale,\u201d stating that, pursuant to the Judgment entered on October 28, 2002, the subject property would be sold at a judicial sale on March 8, 2005. On March 1, 2005, defendant filed a pro se \u201cMotion to Vacate Sale with Prejudice,\u201d claiming that the Bill had been dishonored \u201cthrough failure to process such tender in total satisfaction of the proclaimed liability.\u201d Defendant, citing section 3 \u2014 603 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code) (810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 603 (West 2004)), argued that although the Bill had been dishonored, his obligation on the mortgage was discharged because he had tendered payment. The record contains no indication as to the disposition of defendant\u2019s motion.\nPlaintiff purchased the subject real estate at a judicial sale on March 8, 2005. On March 21, 2005, the circuit court entered an order approving the judicial sale and directing the sheriff of Cook County to evict defendant from the subject property.\nOn April 13, 2005, defendant filed a pro se \u201cPetition to Vacate a Void Judgment and Collateral Attack Under Authority of Illinois Statute.\u201d In that petition, defendant claimed that the judgment against him was void because he had tendered payment and was therefore discharged of his obligation to pay the mortgage. The circuit court denied the petition, and defendant filed this appeal.\nOn appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in denying his petition. He specifically claims that the Bill was a valid negotiable instrument and, therefore, argues that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order approving the judicial sale because he had tendered payment through that Bill and was therefore discharged of his obligation under the mortgage.\nAlthough we have found no Illinois cases dealing with the issue presented in this appeal, we do find the California Appellate Court\u2019s recent decision in McElroy v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 134 Cal. App. 4th 388, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176 (2005), instructive. In McElroy, plaintiff defaulted on a loan secured by a deed to his property and attempted to redeem the loan by tendering to defendant a \u201cBonded Bill of Exchange Order\u201d (Bill) that is virtually identical to the Bill at issue in this appeal. McElroy, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 390, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 177. Attached to the Bill were instructions stating that the Bill was a negotiable instrument that could be processed by mailing it to the United States Treasury Department and that plaintiff had established a \u201cPersonal UCC Contract Trust Account\u201d with the Treasury Department. McElroy, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 390, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 177. The Bill expressly stated that the Secretary\u2019s obligation to honor the Bill arose \u201cout of the want of consideration for the pledge and by the redemption of the pledge under Public Resolution HJR \u2014 192, Public Law 73 \u2014 10 and Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247, 59 S. Ct. 847, 83 L. Ed. 1266 (1939).\u201d McElroy, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 392, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 178-79. Defendant refused to process the Bill and subsequently sold plaintiff\u2019s property at a foreclosure sale. McElroy, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 390, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 178.\nOn review, the court found that the Bill was not a negotiable instrument because it was not made \u201cpayable to order or to bearer\u201d as required by the California Uniform Commercial Code and that it was not a check because it was not drawn on a bank. McElroy, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 392, 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 179. The court further found that, although the Bill purported to identify the source of the Secretary\u2019s obligation to honor the Bill, the cited sources did not establish any such obligation. McElroy, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 392-93, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 179. Therefore, the court concluded that the Bill was a \u201cworthless piece of paper\u201d that amounted to no tender at all and found that the foreclosure was proper. McElroy, 134 Cal. App. 4th at 393-94, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 179-81.\nIn this case, the Bill tendered by defendant is not a negotiable instrument because it is not made \u201cpayable to bearer or to order,\u201d as required by section 3 \u2014 104 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104(a)(1) (West 2004); see also Krajcir v. Egidi, 305 Ill. App. 3d 613, 621 (1999). Additionally, although a check may be a negotiable instrument even when not made payable to bearer or to order (810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104(c) (West 2004)), the Bill is not a check because it is not drawn on a bank (810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 104(f) (West 2004)).\nWe have also reviewed the sources identified in the Bill as giving rise to the Secretary\u2019s obligation to honor the Bill and find that they create no such obligation. Nor do they discuss a \u201cPersonal Treasury UCC Contract Trust Account\u201d or the \u201credemption of a pledge.\u201d The Bill is nothing more than words strung together on a piece of paper which lack any cohesive meaning and convey nothing. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the trial court\u2019s refusal to acknowledge defendant\u2019s Bill as a valid negotiable instrument.\nIn reaching this conclusion, we reject defendant\u2019s reliance on section 3 \u2014 603 of the Code (810 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 603 (West 2004)) to argue that the court lacked jurisdiction to approve the sale because he had tendered payment to plaintiff and was thus relieved of his obligations under the mortgage. As discussed above, defendant did not tender \u201cpayment\u201d but, rather, a piece of paper that was entirely lacking in value. Therefore, the Bill did not discharge defendant\u2019s obligation to pay the mortgage, and the circuit court did not err in approving the judicial sale of the property.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL, P.J., and GORDON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Anthony B. Phillips, of Chicago, appellant pro se.", "Patrick J. McCann, of Noonan & Lieberman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "U.S. BANK N.A., as Trustee, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTHONY B. PHILLIPS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1-05-1829\nOpinion filed June 26, 2006.\nAnthony B. Phillips, of Chicago, appellant pro se.\nPatrick J. McCann, of Noonan & Lieberman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0593-01", "first_page_order": 611, "last_page_order": 614 }