{ "id": 4265740, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF COLLEEN P. SEFFREN, n/k/a Colleen P. Foley, Petitioner-Appellee, and RANDAL SEFFREN, Respondent-Appellee (Keane Taylor, Third-Party Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Sefren", "decision_date": "2006-06-21", "docket_number": "No. 1-04-3775", "first_page": "628", "last_page": "638", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 628" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "300 N.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Ill. App. 3d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5344691 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/13/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 1115", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2973354 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "777 N.E.2d 1026", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498821 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365-66", "parenthetical": "discussing counsel's strategic choices to opt to not add the husband's aunt as a party in a dissolution proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473334 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/167/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132363 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 955", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3430086 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" }, { "page": "34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "735 N.E.2d 153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 908", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980723 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" }, { "page": "913", "parenthetical": "addressing a third-party action in the postdecree context" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0908-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 1156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173712 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 2d 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5557625 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/126/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "846 N.E.2d 1021", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discussing the 2000 amendments to section 2 - 301" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262857 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594-97", "parenthetical": "discussing the 2000 amendments to section 2 - 301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 596", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 972", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4136664 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "974" }, { "page": "973", "parenthetical": "German bank added as a third-party respondent in a dissolution proceeding" }, { "page": "976" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0972-01" ] }, { "cite": "836 N.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4258911 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "820 N.E.2d 1094", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 684", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3216733 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 1084", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289195 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1090" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/1084-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 955, "char_count": 24392, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.424092796634713e-08, "percentile": 0.4837266574228845 }, "sha256": "a3ba844356ce0bf5cba09aa779dd93b5b884ebcac9f5ecaaa404e5caeb02c445", "simhash": "1:aaf5b58e29d203d7", "word_count": 3964 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:16.995484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF COLLEEN P. SEFFREN, n/k/a Colleen P. Foley, Petitioner-Appellee, and RANDAL SEFFREN, Respondent-Appellee (Keane Taylor, Third-Party Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ERICKSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe marriage between petitioner Colleen Seffren, now known as Colleen Foley, and respondent Randal Seffren was dissolved in 1997. Respondent thereafter filed several postdecree motions in which he sought to suspend petitioner\u2019s visits with the parties\u2019 children, to add petitioner\u2019s live-in boyfriend, Keane Taylor, as a third-party respondent, and to enjoin Taylor from having any contact with the parties\u2019 children or from residing in petitioner\u2019s home. The circuit court granted respondent\u2019s motion to add Taylor as a third party and entered a permanent injunction. On appeal, Taylor argues: (1) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to add him as a third-party respondent; (2) Cook County was not the proper venue; (3) the circuit court lacked authority to enter a permanent injunction without holding an evidentiary hearing; and (4) the circuit court erred in denying his motion to reconsider.\nBACKGROUND\nOn December 29, 1997, the circuit court of Cook County entered a judgment dissolving the marriage between petitioner and respondent. Incorporated into that judgment was a joint parenting agreement establishing that the parties\u2019 two children, a daughter born in 1991 and a son born in 1993, would reside with each parent on alternating weeks (the alternating weekly parenting schedule).\nPetitioner began dating Taylor around the time of dissolution, and at some point, Taylor moved into petitioner\u2019s home located in Deer-field, Lake County. Taylor and petitioner are not married and it is not disputed that Taylor has no interest in petitioner\u2019s home.\nOn May 25, 2004, respondent filed in the circuit court of Cook County an emergency petition to suspend petitioner\u2019s visitation or parenting time, alleging that visitation with petitioner while she resided with Taylor seriously endangered the physical, mental, moral or emotional health of the children and that the children were afraid of Taylor. Respondent alleged petitioner had represented that Taylor would be moving out of her home. He also alleged that Taylor had gained access to petitioner\u2019s house by breaking a window when the daughter was present after petitioner had tried to keep him out. Attached to the petition were reports from the children\u2019s psychiatrist, Dr. Levin, outlining the negative effects, including depression and anxiety, the children experienced due to Taylor\u2019s presence in petitioner\u2019s home. Dr. Levin also reported that the daughter desired to injure herself and had suicidal thoughts. He recommended that any contact between the children and Taylor discontinue immediately. The petition was also supported by respondent\u2019s affidavit.\nOn that same date, the circuit court entered an order terminating the alternating weekly parenting schedule and ordering that the children reside with respondent until such time as Taylor has permanently vacated petitioner\u2019s home and that petitioner take all action to ensure that Taylor have no contact with the children. The court allowed petitioner reasonable visitation away from Taylor and her home and continued the matter to May 28, 2004.\nOn May 28, 2004, the court entered an order substantially similar to the one entered on May 25 after petitioner failed to appear in court and set the matter for a status hearing on June 29.\nOn June 23, 2004, respondent filed a motion to add Taylor as a third-party respondent. Respondent alleged that petitioner \u201cflagrantly disregarded\u201d the court\u2019s previous orders on several occasions and stated \u201c[i]t is imperative that this court have jurisdiction over [Taylor] in order to enjoin him from various destructive and dangerous activities.\u201d Notice of that motion was sent to petitioner and the matter was set for June 29. On that date, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Barbara Riley entered an order adding Taylor as a third-party respondent and ordering that the alternating weekly parenting schedule cease. Petitioner was allowed reasonable visitation.\nRespondent, on July 7, 2004, filed a petition pursuant to sections 11 \u2014 101 and 11 \u2014 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/11\u2014 101, 11 \u2014 102 (West 2004)) and section 501 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/501 (West 2004)) seeking injunctive relief against Taylor. Respondent alleged facts similar to those previously stated and added that Taylor had threatened respondent and, despite the court\u2019s previous orders, continued to be present at petitioner\u2019s home. Respondent sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) without notice or bond and a preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining Taylor from all contact with the children, from residing at petitioner\u2019s home, from having a key to petitioner\u2019s home, and from having any contact with respondent or his wife. Cook County Circuit Court Judge Melvin Cole entered the TRO, which was set to expire on July 14, the date of the hearing on the preliminary injunction.\nTaylor was served with summons, the petition for an injunction, and the TRO on July 8, 2004, at an apartment building in Highland Park. Counsel for Taylor then entered a special and limited appearance on July 13. On July 14, the parties entered an agreed order continuing the TRO and the hearing on the preliminary injunction until July 16. In that order, Taylor\u2019s attorney indicated he was unavailable to appear in court and was seeking a continuance \u201cwithout waiving objection to venue and jurisdiction.\u201d The following day, Taylor\u2019s attorney filed a \u201cMotion to Dismiss Keane Taylor as a Third Party for Lack of Jurisdiction.\u201d Taylor argued in that motion that \u201cthe court did not have jurisdiction over him\u201d because he was a resident of Highland Park in Lake County and because the actions complained of in respondent\u2019s petition for injunctive relief occurred in Lake County. He also argued that he was not subject to the Act because he was not party to the Seffrens\u2019 original dissolution action. The only statutory provision Taylor relied on in the motion was the general venue provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101 (West 2004)). That motion was noticed for July 16.\nIn the meantime, on July 9, 2004, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Raymond Figueroa entered an agreed order resuming the alternating weekly parenting schedule. The order also stated that petitioner \u201cshall take all action, including all legal remedies necessary to ensure that [Taylor] has no contact with the minor children *** including face-to-face interaction at home or away from home, phone calls, phone messages, letters, emails [sic] messages and the like,\u201d and that if Taylor had contact with the children, whether or not invited by petitioner, the alternating weekly parenting schedule would cease and the children would reside with respondent until such time as it could be assured that the children would have no contact with Taylor. A copy of that order was sent to petitioner and Taylor.\nWhen the parties appeared in court on July 16, 2004, the TRO entered on July 7 was set to expire. However, because there had not yet been a hearing on respondent\u2019s petition for an injunction, Judge Figueroa entered an order sua sponte, and over the objection of Taylor\u2019s attorney, stating that it was in the best interest of the children that they have no contact with Taylor and ordering Taylor to stay 100 yards away from them at all times. The order also set Taylor\u2019s motion to dismiss for hearing on August 25 and \u201centered and continued\u201d respondent\u2019s petition for an injunction to that date for status.\nOn July 30, 2004, respondent filed a second petition to suspend petitioner\u2019s visitation or parenting time, alleging that on July 26 or 27, Taylor had been at petitioner\u2019s home and had erased incoming and outgoing messages from the daughter\u2019s private answering machine, and that despite her intentions to the contrary, petitioner had no ability to ensure compliance with the court\u2019s orders prohibiting contact. Notice of the petition was sent to counsel for petitioner and Taylor and the matter was set for August 11.\nOn August 11, 2004, the parties appeared before Judge Riley and entered an agreed order continuing respondent\u2019s second petition to suspend visitation for \u201cstatus/hearing\u201d until August 25, the date the court would hear Taylor\u2019s motion to dismiss. Also set for August 25 was a subsequent petition respondent had filed for a rule to show cause and, as indicated above, respondent\u2019s petition for injunctive relief. The court additionally entered an order appointing Helen Sigman as the children\u2019s representative.\nOn August 25, 2004, the parties\u2019 attorneys and Sigman appeared before Judge Riley and presented arguments concerning: (1) Taylor\u2019s motion to dismiss; (2) respondent\u2019s petition for an injunction; (3) respondent\u2019s petition for a rule to show cause; and (4) respondent\u2019s second petition to suspend visitation. In regard to the motion to dismiss, Taylor\u2019s attorney argued that the Act did not provide the court with a mechanism to add third-party respondents and that, because Taylor was not party to the original dissolution proceeding, the court lacked jurisdiction over him. Counsel also argued the cause should be dismissed for lack of venue.\nSigman indicated that after speaking to both parents and the children, and after reading the reports prepared by the children\u2019s psychiatrist and exchanging phone messages with him, it was her conclusion that both petitioner and respondent cared for the children, that both parents, and the children, enjoyed the alternating weekly parenting schedule, and that the only issue was petitioner\u2019s inability to keep Taylor away from the children. Sigman wanted the July 9, 2004, order in which petitioner agreed to keep Taylor away from the children expanded to enjoin Taylor from being in petitioner\u2019s home at any time, including when the children did not live there.\nPetitioner\u2019s attorney represented that Taylor had moved out of petitioner\u2019s home in June and argued that the July 9 order was sufficient to protect the interests of the children. Counsel also argued that it was unnecessary to enjoin Taylor from residing in petitioner\u2019s home when the children were not staying there. However, if an injunction needed to be entered, counsel\u2019s position was that it should issue only against Taylor.\nTaylor\u2019s attorney objected, arguing that Taylor should be given an opportunity to respond in writing and appear before the court before an injunction was entered. The court responded by saying \u201c[t]hese are not his children, nor is this is [sic] his home.\u201d When counsel again argued that Taylor was entitled to appear in court or respond in writing, and was entitled to a hearing, the court responded \u201c[b]ut, [c]ounsel, a hearing on what? They are not his children. It is not his home.\u201d The court added \u201c[w]hat could he possibly say in regard to his ability to have contact with somebody else\u2019s children[?] *** It\u2019s not like he\u2019s being accused of wrongdoing.\u201d\nThe circuit court determined that jurisdiction was proper and denied Taylor\u2019s motion to dismiss. The court also found that a permanent, rather than temporary, injunction was necessary because the problem was ongoing. The court then entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Taylor from having \u201cany contact whatsoever\u201d with the Seffren children or petitioner\u2019s home and ordering him to remain at least 100 yards away from the children at all times. The order also prohibited petitioner from allowing Taylor contact with the children or access to her home. Respondent\u2019s second motion to suspend visitation and his petition for a rule to show cause were withdrawn, and the matter was ordered \u201coff-call.\u201d The court subsequently denied Taylor\u2019s motion to reconsider and made a finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement of its orders. Taylor now appeals.\nANALYSIS\nTaylor raises issues of jurisdiction, venue, and procedural due process on appeal. As respondent points out, Taylor has failed to support the majority of his contentions with citation to relevant authority in violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 21 (October 17, 2001), R. 341(e)(7), eff. October 1, 2001). Taylor has also failed to provide this court with the applicable standard of review as required by section (e)(6) of that rule. Respondent requests that we find Taylor has waived his contentions for appeal. This court \u201cis not a depository in which the appellant may drop the burden of argument and research\u201d and is entitled to have the arguments of the parties clearly set forth and supported by pertinent authority. In re Marriage of Winton, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1084, 1090, 576 N.E.2d 856 (1991); Johnson v. Matrix Financial Services Corp., 354 Ill. App. 3d 684, 698, 820 N.E.2d 1094 (2004). However, as waiver is a limitation on the parties and not on this court, we will not find Taylor\u2019s contentions waived. In re Marriage of Kostusik, 361 Ill. App. 3d 103, 114, 836 N.E.2d 147 (2005).\nI\nTaylor challenges the circuit court\u2019s determination that it had jurisdiction. Where a circuit court determines jurisdictional issues without hearing testimony, we review the court\u2019s determination de novo. In re Marriage of Kosmond, 357 Ill. App. 3d 972, 974, 830 N.E.2d 596 (2005).\nTaylor\u2019s jurisdictional challenge, as set out before the circuit court and before this court, is unclear. Although he claims to contest the circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction to add him as a third-party respondent, Taylor uses phrases such as \u201cover him,\u201d which sound in personal jurisdiction. The procedures used by trial counsel, including filing a special appearance to contest jurisdiction, also indicate a challenge to personal jurisdiction, at least under the preamended version of section 2 \u2014 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 301 (West 1998); KSAC Corp. v. Recycle Free, Inc., 364 Ill. App. 3d 593, 594-97, 846 N.E.2d 1021 (2006) (discussing the 2000 amendments to section 2 \u2014 301)). We will therefore address the circuit court\u2019s subject matter and personal jurisdiction.\nIn order for a judgment of a court to be valid, a court must have both jurisdiction of the subject matter of the litigation and jurisdiction over the parties. In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542, 547, 535 N.E.2d 818 (1989); State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill. 2d 294, 308, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986). Subject matter jurisdiction is derived from Article VI of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI) and refers to a court\u2019s power to hear and determine cases of the general class or category to which the proceedings belong. In re Marriage of Devick, 315 Ill. App. 3d 908, 913, 735 N.E.2d 153 (2000); In re Marriage of Hostetler, 124 Ill. App. 3d 31, 34, 463 N.E.2d 955 (1984). Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, is not conferred by any constitutional grant; rather, a court\u2019s jurisdiction over a person is conferred by the service of summons or by the filing of an appearance. Hostetler, 124 Ill. App. 3d at 34; see also In re Marriage of Schmitt, 321 Ill. App. 3d 360, 367, 747 N.E.2d 524 (2001).\nIn this case, the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction. Section 511 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/511 (West 2004)) grants the circuit courts jurisdiction to modify a previously entered judgment of dissolution, so long as a modification petition has been filed. Ottwell v. Ottwell, 167 Ill. App. 3d 901, 908, 522 N.E.2d 328 (1988). Here, respondent filed a petition to suspend petitioner\u2019s visits until such time as she could ensure the children would not be exposed to Taylor. Therefore, the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject of respondent\u2019s postdecree motions.\nFurther, contrary to Taylor\u2019s contention, he was properly added as a third-party respondent. Section 403 of the Act provides that the circuit court may join additional parties in its discretion. 750 ILCS 5/403(d) (West 2004). Even though the joinder of third parties is not specifically addressed in the postdecree context, section 105 of the Act states that the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2004)) shall apply except where otherwise provided. 750 ILCS 5/105(a) (West 2004). Section 2 \u2014 406 of the Civil Practice Law provides a way for individuals to be brought into cases as third parties. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 406 (West 2004). Following this statutory scheme, it seems that a circuit court may add third parties in dissolution cases, and cases from this court in fact support such a notion. See Kosmond, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 973 (German bank added as a third-party respondent in a dissolution proceeding); Devick, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 913 (addressing a third-party action in the postdecree context); In re Marriage of Olbrecht, 232 Ill. App. 3d 358, 365-66, 597 N.E.2d 635 (1992) (discussing counsel\u2019s strategic choices to opt to not add the husband\u2019s aunt as a party in a dissolution proceeding). Taylor even concedes that in some cases, courts may add certain parties as third-party respondents but, for unspecified reasons, argues he could not be added in this case. We will not entertain such a vague and unsupported argument and therefore conclude that the circuit court had the authority to add Taylor to the postdecree proceedings at bar, and otherwise had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings.\nWe similarly conclude that the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over Taylor. Section 2 \u2014 209(b)(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a court may exercise jurisdiction over a natural person domiciled within the state at the time the action arose. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 209(b)(2) (West 2004); Kosmond, 357 Ill. App. 3d at 976. The record in this case indicates that Taylor, a resident of Lake County, was domiciled in Illinois and was properly served with summons, the petition for a preliminary injunction, and the TRO on July 8, 2004. Personal jurisdiction was therefore proper.\nII\nTaylor next contends that the circuit court \u201cerred in denying [his] motion to dismiss\u201d because Cook County was not the proper venue. This contention also lacks merit.\nSection 512 of the Act addresses venue in the postdecree context. 750 ILCS 5/512 (West 2004). According to that section, where, as here, both the respondent and the petitioner no longer live in the judicial circuit where the dissolution was granted, further proceedings may continue in that circuit. 750 ILCS 5/512(c) (West 2004). Therefore, as the parties\u2019 marriage was dissolved in Cook County, venue remained in that county so long as neither party objected. The record indicates that neither petitioner nor respondent objected to the proceedings taking place in Cook County, and venue was therefore proper.\nTaylor argues that although Cook County may have been the proper venue to litigate any issues between petitioner and respondent, Lake County was the only venue to litigate respondent\u2019s motions for injunctive relief against Taylor. Taylor seems to argue that because section 512 addresses venue only as it involves the petitioner or the respondent, and not as it relates to third parties added post decree, the general venue provision of the Code of Civil Procedure applies. Relying on section 2 \u2014 101 of that Code, Taylor argues venue was proper in Lake County because that is where he resides and where the complained-of actions arose. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101 (West 2004). Taylor\u2019s contention fails, as normal venue rules generally have no application where a third party has been added because the third party is added to a preexisting lawsuit. 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice \u00a7 25.5, at 444 (1989).\nEven if we were to accept Taylor\u2019s contention that Cook County was an improper venue, the result would not be to dismiss the case. Rather, the proper relief would be to transfer the cause to Lake County. At no point during the proceedings did Taylor ever ask that the case be transferred to Lake County; rather, he sought only to dismiss the action in its entirety. As neither the Act nor the Code of Civil Procedure provides for such relief, the circuit court did not err in denying Taylor\u2019s motion to dismiss the case.\nIll\nTaylor next contends that the circuit court erred in entering a permanent injunction on August 25, 2004, because the matter was only set for status on that date and because the court did not provide him with an opportunity to respond or to present evidence.\nWhile the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the merits of the case (Butler v. USA Volleyball, 285 Ill. App. 3d 578, 582, 673 N.E.2d 1063 (1996)), the purpose of a permanent injunction is to maintain the status quo indefinitely following a hearing on the merits (American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Carroll, 122 Ill. App. 3d 868, 881, 462 N.E.2d 586 (1984)). In order to be entitled to a permanent injunction, the party seeking the injunction must demonstrate: (1) a clear and ascertainable right in need of protection; (2) that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and (3) that there is no adequate remedy at law. Sparks v. Gray, 334 Ill. App. 3d 390, 395, 777 N.E.2d 1026 (2002). Because the issues raised in this case present questions of law, our review of the grant of injunctive relief is de novo. Butler, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 582.\nWe agree with Taylor\u2019s contention that the circuit court erred in issuing an injunction permanently enjoining him from having any contact with the Seffren children or from residing in petitioner\u2019s home without holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter. It is settled law that a permanent injunction may be entered only after the party seeking the injunction demonstrates at \u201ca hearing on the merits\u201d the requisite elements for permanent injunctive relief. Carroll, 122 Ill. App. 3d at 881; Sparks, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 395; Butler, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 582. Further, a permanent injunction may not be entered without providing the respondent the opportunity to appear in court, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses where he or she is not in default. Pfeffer v. Lebanon Land Development Corp., 46 Ill. App. 3d 186, 193-94, 360 N.E.2d 1115 (1977); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Foremost Sales Promotions, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d 176, 178, 300 N.E.2d 488 (1973).\nThe report of the August 25, 2004, proceedings indicates that the circuit court considered only arguments from the parties\u2019 attorneys and the children\u2019s representative. Taylor was not present, and although Taylor\u2019s attorney objected several times and asked that Taylor be permitted to be heard and to present evidence, Taylor was not given an opportunity to respond to the allegations contained in respondent\u2019s petition or to present evidence. The circuit court then entered a permanent injunction without hearing any testimony or other substantive evidence. Because the procedures undertaken by the circuit court in this case were improper, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s order granting a permanent injunction and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In light of our findings, we need not consider Taylor\u2019s contention regarding the denial of his motion to reconsider.\nCONCLUSION\nThe portions of the circuit court\u2019s August 25, 2004, order finding jurisdiction and venue proper are affirmed. The circuit court\u2019s order granting a permanent injunction is reversed and the cause is remanded.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nHOFFMAN, P.J., and KARNEZIS, J., concur.\nRespondent had filed a motion to add Taylor to the initial dissolution proceedings. That motion, however, was stricken upon petitioner\u2019s motion.\nOnly a notice of motion for the rule to show cause is contained in the record on appeal. However, the record indicates the petition was in response to Taylor\u2019s violation of the court\u2019s order that he stay 100 yards away from the children.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ERICKSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard H. Marcus, of Glenview, for appellant.", "Deutsch, Levy & Engle, Chtrd., of Chicago (Stuart Berks and Leon Farbman, of counsel), for appellee Randal Seffren.", "Helen Sigman & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago (Natalie M. Stec, of counsel), for minors." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF COLLEEN P. SEFFREN, n/k/a Colleen P. Foley, Petitioner-Appellee, and RANDAL SEFFREN, Respondent-Appellee (Keane Taylor, Third-Party Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1-04-3775\nOpinion filed June 21, 2006.\nRichard H. Marcus, of Glenview, for appellant.\nDeutsch, Levy & Engle, Chtrd., of Chicago (Stuart Berks and Leon Farbman, of counsel), for appellee Randal Seffren.\nHelen Sigman & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago (Natalie M. Stec, of counsel), for minors." }, "file_name": "0628-01", "first_page_order": 646, "last_page_order": 656 }