{ "id": 4264209, "name": "STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHARON CONNOR HOOKS, Defendant-Appellant (Donya Tyree Hooks, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Hooks", "decision_date": "2006-06-19", "docket_number": "No. 1-05-2516", "first_page": "819", "last_page": "829", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 819" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "690 N.E.2d 1073", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35395 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 Wis. 2d 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8667970 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" }, { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/150/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 Wis. 2d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8673855 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20-21" }, { "page": "644-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/112/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Minn. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 305774 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/284/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599" }, { "page": "599" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3467507 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" }, { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 N.E.2d 321", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 16, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5415110 ], "weight": 16, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "295-96" }, { "page": "297" }, { "page": "297" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "297" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "299" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 595", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 18, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596-97" }, { "page": "596" }, { "page": "596-97" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "596-97" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "596-97" }, { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3617506 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406-07" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "406" }, { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "578 N.E.2d 926", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930" }, { "page": "930" }, { "page": "930" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592135 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1212" }, { "page": "1212" }, { "page": "1212" }, { "page": "1212" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107-08" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108-09" }, { "page": "108-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "785 N.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894480 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "359" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0356-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 890, "char_count": 27989, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.372795618555238e-08, "percentile": 0.4817599404444043 }, "sha256": "c6c7d8b4b4b828457060c628479ee8aabb05888371c47827230b7f6297b9fbb5", "simhash": "1:bb70939eabd438c7", "word_count": 4580 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:16.995484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHARON CONNOR HOOKS, Defendant-Appellant (Donya Tyree Hooks, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff-appellee, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm), filed this action seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Donya Tyree Hooks (Donya) in an underlying negligence suit filed by her former sister-in-law, Sharon Connor Hooks (Sharon). The trial court granted State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment, finding that the policy\u2019s household exclusion applied to Sharon and that State Farm, therefore, had no duty to defend or indemnify Donya: Sharon appeals the grant of summary judgment in State Farm\u2019s favor. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.\nBACKGROUND\nIn her negligence complaint against Donya, Sharon alleged that on March 4, 2001, she was living in an apartment in a multi-unit residential building on Green Street in Chicago when a fire broke out and caused her to sustain multiple injuries. Sharon alleged that Donya, as owner of the building, was negligent in failing to provide or maintain working smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, in allowing \u201ctenants with connections to drug activity\u201d to go into the basement where the fire started, and in failing to provide an emergency escape light in the common hallways.\nDonya tendered her defense of the suit to State Farm pursuant to a homeowner\u2019s policy she maintained with her brother and co-owner of the apartment building, Donald Hooks (Donald). Donald was married to and living with Sharon in the insured building at the time of the fire; however, he was not named as a defendant in Sharon\u2019s complaint. State Farm initially accepted the defense under a reservation of rights, but it later decided that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Donya against Sharon\u2019s action because Sharon was an \u201cinsured\u201d under Donya and Donald\u2019s policy. State Farm then withdrew its defense and filed the instant action against Donya and Sharon seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Donya.\nDonya and Donald\u2019s homeowner\u2019s policy with State Farm stated in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cDEFINITIONS\n\u2018You\u2019 and \u2018your\u2019 mean the \u2018named insured\u2019 shown in the Declarations. Your spouse is included if a resident of your household. \u2018We\u2019, \u2018us\u2019 and \u2018our\u2019 mean the Company shown in the Declarations.\n* * *\n5. \u2018insured\u2019 means you and, if residents of your household:\na. relatives\n* * *\n6. \u2018insured location\u2019 means:\na. the residence premises;\n$ ^ $\n11. \u2018residence premises\u2019 means:\na. the one, two, three or four-family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or\nb. that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations.\n* * *\nSECTION II \u2014 LIABILITY COVERAGES\nCOVERAGE L \u2014 PERSONAL LIABILITY\nIf a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence, we will:\n1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and\n2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages, to effect settlement or satisfy a judgment resulting from the occurrence, equals our limit of liability.\ns-\u00ed jfc\nSECTION II \u2014 EXCLUSIONS\n1. Coverage L and Coverage M do not apply to:\n^ \u00ab\u00ed> \u00ed\u00bb\nh. bodily injury to you or any insured within the meaning of part a. or b. of the definition of insured.\nThis exclusion also applies to any claim made or suit brought against you or any insured to share damages with or repay someone else who may be obligated to pay damages because of the bodily injury sustained by you or any insured within the meaning of part a. or b. of the definition of insured.\nSECTION II \u2014 CONDITIONS\n2. Severability of Insurance. This insurance applies separately to each insured. This condition shall not increase our limit of liability for any one occurrence.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nIn its complaint for declaratory judgment, State Farm contended that because Sharon was married to Donald, she was a relative of both Donald and Donya and was, therefore, an \u201cinsured\u201d under the policy. State Farm further asserted that under the policy it had no duty to defend Donya, as a named insured, against claims of bodily injury from another \u201cinsured.\u201d Donya, thereafter, brought a counterclaim for vexatious delay and wrongful denial of coverage pursuant to section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code. 215 ILCS 5/155 (West 2004). Donya\u2019s counterclaims are not part of this appeal.\nAfter both Donya and Sharon filed answers to the complaint, State Farm brought a motion for summary judgment reasserting the contentions made in its complaint and further emphasizing the fact that Sharon was living with and married to Donald, a \u201cnamed insured\u201d under the policy, at the time of her injuries. Donya and Sharon filed separate responses to State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment. They each contended that Sharon was not an \u201cinsured\u201d as to Donya because Donya did not reside at the premises and was not a member of Sharon\u2019s household. However, they both conceded that Sharon was, in fact, an \u201cinsured\u201d as to Donald because Sharon and Donald were married and lived together at the insured residence. Donya additionally contended that the policy\u2019s severability clause (\u201cseverability of insurance\u201d as cited above) required that Sharon\u2019s status be determined independently for each \u201cnamed insured\u201d and that, therefore, Sharon\u2019s status as an \u201cinsured\u201d as to Donald did not release State Farm from its obligations to defend and indemnify Donya because Sharon did not qualify as an \u201cinsured\u201d as to her. Finally, both Donya and Sharon contended that the policy was ambiguous and should therefore be construed against State Farm. The court granted State Farm\u2019s motion finding that Sharon was an \u201cinsured\u201d as defined by the policy and that the severability provision had no bearing on that status. Thereafter, Sharon brought this appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\nSharon first contends that under the plain language of the policy, she cannot be considered an \u201cinsured\u201d as to Donya because they were not residing together at the insured residence at the time of the fire as required by policy\u2019s definition of \u201cinsured.\u201d Sharon further argues that to the extent that the policy is unclear as to whether she qualifies as an \u201cinsured,\u201d it must be considered ambiguous and be construed against State Farm as the drafter of the policy. Sharon also contends that the policy\u2019s severability clause supports her position that her status as an \u201cinsured\u201d must be tested separately for both Donya and Donald because it essentially creates two distinct policies for the two named insureds. Therefore, Sharon contends that her status as an \u201cinsured\u201d in relation to Donald has no effect on her status in relation to Donya. State Farm contends that, under the unambiguous requirements of the policy, Sharon was an \u201cinsured\u201d for purposes of the entire policy by virtue of the fact that she was married to and living with Donald at the insured residence. State Farm also maintains that the severability clause has no effect on whether someone qualifies as an insured. Accordingly, State Farm maintains that it has no duty to defend or indemnify Donya for the claims brought by Sharon.\nAs noted, Donya and Donald\u2019s homeowner\u2019s policy defined \u201cinsured\u201d as \u201cyou, and if residents of your household: (a) your relatives.\u201d The policy further excluded coverage for \u201cModify injury to you and any insured.\u201d Based on these provisions, the parties agree that State Farm would have had no duty to defend or indemnify Donald had Sharon decided to sue him for her injuries because Sharon qualified as an \u201cinsured\u201d by virtue of her marriage to and cohabitation with Donald. Similarly, the parties also essentially agree that if Donya were the sole named insured on the policy, Sharon would not qualify as an \u201cinsured\u201d and State Farm would be required to defend and indemnify Donya because, although the two were related in law, they were not residing together as required by the policy\u2019s definition of \u201cinsured.\u201d Thus, the primary issue in this case is whether Sharon\u2019s status as an \u201cinsured\u201d should be determined once for the entire policy as urged by State Farm, or whether it must be determined separately for both of the named insureds, as urged by Sharon.\nSummary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file, viewed in light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2004). Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Illinois Emcasco Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National Casualty Co., 337 Ill. App. 3d 356, 359, 785 N.E.2d 905, 908 (2003).\nTo determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend, the court must look to the allegations of the underlying complaint and compare those to the relevant provisions of the insurance policy. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 107-08, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (1992); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 73, 578 N.E.2d 926, 930 (1991). The underlying complaint and the insurance policy must be liberally construed in favor of the insured. Wilkin, 144 Ill. 2d at 74, 578 N.E.2d at 930. If the underlying complaint alleges facts within, or potentially within, the policy\u2019s coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend its insured. Wilkin, 144 Ill. 2d at 73, 578 N.E.2d at 930.\nMoreover, an insurance policy is a contract and construction of its provisions is a question of law. Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 108, 607 N.E.2d at 1212.\n\u201cIn construing an insurance policy, the court must ascertain the intent of the parties to the contract. [Citations.] To ascertain the meaning of the policy\u2019s words and the intent of the parties, the court must construe the policy as a whole [citations] with due regard to the risk undertaken, the subject matter that is insured and the purposes of the entire contract [citation]. If the words in the policy are unambiguous, a court must afford them their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. [Citations.] However, if the words in the policy are susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, they are ambiguous [citation] and will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer who drafted the policy [citations].\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 108-09, 607 N.E.2d at 1212.\nState Farm contends that Sharon qualified as an \u201cinsured\u201d for the entire policy because she was living with and related to Donald, a named insured. State Farm further contends that Sharon\u2019s status was not affected by the fact that neither she nor Donald was living with Donya, the other named insured, at the time of the fire. In this regard, State Farm avers that the severability clause has no effect on whether someone qualifies as an insured. In support, State Farm relies upon the decision of this court in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d 404, 525 N.E.2d 595 (1988). We disagree that Guccione supports State Farm\u2019s position in this case.\nIn Guccione, husband and wife, Anthony and Tessie Guccione, were named insureds on a homeowner\u2019s insurance policy issued by State Farm. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 405, 525 N.E.2d at 595. The Gucciones\u2019 policy contained nearly identical provisions to those involved in the instant case: it defined \u201cinsured\u201d as \u201c \u2018you and the following residents of your household: a. your relatives.\u2019 \u201d Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 525 N.E.2d at 596. The policy further defined \u201cyou\u201d as \u201cthe named insured shown in the declarations and the spouse if he or she is a resident of the same household.\u201d Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 525 N.E.2d at 596. The policy also excluded coverage for \u201c \u2018bodily injury to you or any insured within the meaning of *** the definitions of insured.\u2019 \u201d Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 525 N.E.2d at 596.\nAfter being injured by an accidental shooting at the insured residence, Tessie\u2019s son from a previous marriage, Gus Kazas, brought a personal injury claim against Anthony. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 405, 525 N.E.2d at 595. Anthony tendered his defense to State Farm pursuant to the homeowner\u2019s insurance policy, and State Farm subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment arguing that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Anthony because Gus was an \u201cinsured\u201d under the policy and his claim was, therefore, excluded. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 405, 525 N.E.2d at 595. The court found that the exclusionary provision of the policy unambiguously denied coverage to Anthony for Gus\u2019s claim because Gus was a resident of Anthony\u2019s household and was a relative. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 525 N.E.2d at 596.\nThe court also addressed Anthony\u2019s argument that the policy\u2019s severability clause provided separate coverage to Anthony, Tessie, and Gus. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 406-07, 525 N.E.2d at 596-97. The severability clause in Guccione was identical to the one involved in the instant case: \u201c \u2018This insurance applies separately to each insured. This condition shall not increase our limit of liability for any one occurrence.\u2019 \u201d Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 525 N.E.2d at 596. The court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co. held that an insurance policy\u2019s severability clause essentially created separate policies for each insured. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 525 N.E.2d at 596-97; see United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 60 Ill. 2d 295, 299, 327 N.E.2d 321, 323 (1975). The court then found that even if it viewed Anthony as a separately insured party, the exclusionary clause would still apply because Gus clearly fell within the definition of \u201cinsured.\u201d Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 525 N.E.2d at 597.\nDespite its contentions to the contrary, Guccione does not support State Farm\u2019s position. Although the facts in that case are similar in many respects to those before us now, and although the relevant policy provisions are nearly identical, there is one crucially dispositive distinction between the facts of the instant case and those in Guccione. Under both policies, in order for someone to qualify as an \u201cinsured,\u201d that person must be both a relative of the named insured and reside in the same domicile as the named insured. In Guccione, the underlying plaintiff, Gus, met both requirements in that he was related to and living with both of the named insureds, Anthony and Tessie. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 525 N.E.2d at 597. Although Gus\u2019s relationship to Anthony would appear to be that of stepson, the declaratory plaintiff in that case did not contend that he was not Anthony\u2019s relative because of a lack of consanguinity. See Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 525 N.E.2d at 597. In contrast, here, the underlying plaintiff, Sharon, did not reside with Donya, the named insured against whom Sharon\u2019s claim was directed.\nState Farm, nevertheless, argues that the court in Guccione rejected the notion that a severability clause can intersect with a policy\u2019s definition of \u201cinsured\u201d and thereby affect the applicability of a policy exclusion. We do not find any such rejection in Guccione. Rather, the court in Guccione acknowledged the operative validity of the reasoning of our supreme court in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., which, as discussed below, is relied upon by the appellant in this case. See Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 525 N.E.2d at 596-97. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the court held that a similar severability clause, albeit in the context of an automobile insurance policy, acted to essentially create separate policies for each insured. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 299, 327 N.E.2d at 323. After citing to United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Guccione court held that even when it viewed Anthony as a separately insured party, Gus still qualified as an \u201cinsured\u201d under the policy\u2019s definition such that the insurer would not be required to provide coverage for Anthony. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 407, 525 N.E.2d at 597.\nAs previously noted, Sharon, the appellant in this case, relies on United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. to support her position that under the severability clause her status as an \u201cinsured\u201d must be determined with regard to Donya independently from her status with regard to Donald. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Sealy Mattress Company (Sealy) entered into an agreement with Hawthorn Leasing Company (Hawthorn) to lease trucks. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 296, 327 N.E.2d at 322. Under the agreement, Hawthorn furnished Sealy with insurance for bodily injury by having Sealy named as an additional insured under Hawthorn\u2019s comprehensive automobile liability policy with Globe. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 296, 327 N.E.2d at 322. Sealy also carried its own comprehensive automobile liability policy with United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company (USFG) to provide coverage for both owned and \u201cnon-owned\u201d vehicles with the condition that it would be excess insurance if there was any other valid and collectible insurance. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 296, 327 N.E.2d at 322.\nTurner, an employee of Hawthorn, brought suit against Sealy for personal injuries he sustained when a Sealy employee moved a truck Turner was servicing. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 296, 327 N.E.2d at 322. Sealy\u2019s insurer, USFG, thereafter filed an action for a declaratory judgment directed against Globe to determine the liabilities under the two companies\u2019 respective policies. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 295-96, 327 N.E.2d at 321.\nHawthorn\u2019s policy with Globe (under which Sealy was named as an additional insured) excluded coverage \u201c \u2018(b) to any obligation for which the insured or any carrier as his insurer may be held liable under any workmen\u2019s compensation,\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018(c) to bodily injury to any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of his employment by the insured.\u2019 \u201d United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 297, 327 N.E.2d at 322. The policy also contained the following severability clause: \u201c \u2018The insurance afforded applies separately to each insured against whom claim is made or suit is brought, except with respect to the limits of the company\u2019s liability.\u2019 \u201d United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 297, 327 N.E.2d at 322.\nThe supreme court affirmed the appellate court\u2019s judgment in favor of USFG and against Globe, stating:\n\u201c[T]he severability clause provides each insured with separate coverage, as if each were separately insured with a distinct policy, subject to the liability limits of the policy. The employee exclusion, therefore, does not exclude protection for an additional insured against an injury suffered by an employee of another insured. The exclusionary clause applies only to the situation where an insured is sued by its own employee.\u201d United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 299, 327 N.E.2d at 323.\nState Farm contends that the supreme court\u2019s treatment of the severability clause in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. is inapplicable here because, as noted above, that case involved an automobile liability policy and not a homeowner\u2019s policy like in the instant case. We note an additional related difference in the fact that United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. involved an employee exclusion rather than an exclusion of \u201cinsureds\u201d on the bases of family relationship and cohabitation. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 297, 327 N.E.2d at 322. While these are distinguishing factors, these distinctions do not alter the plain meaning of the severability clause and its apparent impact on the exclusion in this case. Although United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. involved a different type of policy and a different exclusion, the severability clause in that case is analogous to the severability clause before us now insofar as they both state that the insurance \u201capplies separately to each insured.\u201d The court in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. applied this same severability language to permit recovery by an employee of one of the insureds against a coinsured so long as that coinsured was not an employer. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 299, 327 N.E.2d at 323. In explaining the basis for finding such an interrelation between the severability clause and the exclusionary provision under its subject policy, the court in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. stated:\n\u201cA reasonable interpretation of the language of the severability clause, that \u2018the insurance afforded applies separately to each insured,\u2019 leads to the obvious conclusion that each insured is to be treated as if each were separately insured. The language shows that the insurer recognizes an obligation to additional insureds distinct from its obligation to the named insured.\u201d United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 299, 327 N.E.2d at 323.\nIn point of fact, Guccione, upon which State Farm relies, overtly acknowledged the applicability of the foregoing analysis in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. to its homeowner\u2019s policy. See Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 525 N.E.2d at 596-97. As noted previously, Guccione did not reject this analysis as being applicable to a homeowner\u2019s policy, but simply held that under its facts, the sever-ability clause would not have any impact because the claimant resided with and was related to each of the insureds and, consequently, even if the insurance policy were considered to be separate with respect to each insured, the claimant\u2019s suit would, nevertheless, remain excluded. Guccione, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 525 N.E.2d at 597.\nAlthough not articulated by State Farm, we recognize that the court in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. noted that the underlying function of the exclusionary provision in its subject policy was\n\u201cto preclude an employee from suing his employer for injuries suffered as a result of the employer\u2019s negligence. The purpose behind this exclusion is that the employee is covered by workmen\u2019s compensation and can recover with or without a showing of negligence. This purpose, however, fails when an employee sustains injuries through the negligence of one other than his employer though covered by the same policy, as in the case at bar. If liability for this latter type occurrence was to be excluded from the policy, it could have been clearly stated.\u201d United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 299, 327 N.E.2d at 323.\nWhile the reason for the exclusion of family member coresidents in this case is not the same as that articulated in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the language in the respective severability clauses is nearly identical. And, as pointed out above, the court in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. did not hesitate to interpret the term \u201capplies separately to each insured\u201d to modify the exclusion in that case so as to render the insurer liable for claims brought by an employee of one insured against the nonemployer coinsured. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 299, 327 N.E.2d at 323. So, too, the clear import of the term \u201capplies separately to each insured\u201d contained in the severability clause of the instant policy must be construed to modify the exclusion so as to render the insurer liable for claims brought by a related household member of one named insured against another named insured residing in a separate household. In that regard, we note that State Farm does not provide us any alternatively plausible purpose or application of the sever-ability clause in this policy.\nWe also note, for that matter, that the business purpose behind family exclusion provisions in homeowner\u2019s policies has been discussed in several decisions. For instance, in Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Scott, 161 Ill. App. 3d 372, 514 N.E.2d 595 (1987), the court noted the purpose for a \u201cfamily exclusion\u201d may be to avoid the possibility of collusion between resident household members. Scott, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 514 N.E.2d at 599. The Scott court also cited a Minnesota Supreme Court case in which it was suggested that an additional purpose for the exclusion could simply be to keep premiums down by excluding those individuals most likely to be injured, namely, resident family members. Scott, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 379, 514 N.E.2d at 599, quoting Minners v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 284 Minn. 343, 350,170 N.W2d 223, 227 (1969); see also A. G. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 112 Wis. 2d 18, 20-21, 331 N.W.2d 643, 644-45 (App. 1983); Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d 434, 456, 442 N.W.2d 25, 35 (1989). Interestingly, each of the foregoing underlying business reasons would emphasize the need for a combined familial and residence-sharing relationship in order to come within the underlying business purpose. Thus, the application of the severability clause to narrow the scope of the exclusion to permit coverage for a claim against an insured residing in a separate domicile is by no means inconsistent with the foregoing articulated business purposes. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 60 Ill. 2d at 299, 327 N.E.2d at 323.\nHowever, in any case, the insurance policy here in question does not purport to recite any underlying business purpose or intent regarding its exclusion. Manifestly, the impact of the severability clause upon the scope of the exclusion must be determined from the language of the policy itself. See Willison v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 294 Ill. App. 3d 793, 797-98, 690 N.E.2d 1073, 1075 (1998) (\u201c[a]n insurance policy is a contract and must be interpreted in accordance with rules of contract construction. [Citation.] The function of a court in construing an insurance policy is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the policy\u201d (emphasis added)). Thus, the clear language of the severability clause under these circumstances would, as in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., modify the exclusion so as to permit coverage for a coinsured whose household is not being shared by the claimant. Such a meaning is supported by a plain reading of the clause, which, as noted, states: \u201cThis insurance applies separately to each insured.\u201d As we have noted above, State Farm does not purport to provide any alternate plausible purpose or function for that severability clause and we cannot, thereby, conjecture that the severability clause had some purpose behind it other than to treat each insured as if he or she had his or her own policy, subject only to the liability limits of the policy. Moreover, even if the applicability of the severability clause were ambiguous, any such ambiguity would have to be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer as the drafter of the contract. See Outboard Marine Corp., 154 Ill. 2d at 108-09, 607 N.E.2d at 1212. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nCAHILL, P.J., and BURKE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "James M. Harman, of Harman, Fedick & O\u2019Connor, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "David E. Neumeister and Jennifer L. Medenwald, both of Querry & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHARON CONNOR HOOKS, Defendant-Appellant (Donya Tyree Hooks, Defendant).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1-05-2516\nOpinion filed June 19, 2006.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied August 17, 2006.\nJames M. Harman, of Harman, Fedick & O\u2019Connor, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nDavid E. Neumeister and Jennifer L. Medenwald, both of Querry & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0819-01", "first_page_order": 837, "last_page_order": 847 }