{ "id": 4265433, "name": "CATAMOUNT CARGO SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Catamount Cargo Services, LLC v. Department of Employment Security", "decision_date": "2006-07-21", "docket_number": "No. 1-05-1464", "first_page": "1039", "last_page": "1044", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 1039" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "21 Ill. Reg. 12129", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "eff. August 20, 1997" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "697 N.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910262 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 1191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1194" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850740 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 N.E.2d 1060", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126348 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 Ill. Laws 3706", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45756 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 N.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511387 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "843 N.E.2d 273", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735912 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0175-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 511, "char_count": 12369, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.011112711018113e-08, "percentile": 0.3729590026291108 }, "sha256": "e7c4e9371f7b324ab01f55ef97c73e279ceadb7e11996fc596ca324b97ced7e9", "simhash": "1:3d7891d38938269d", "word_count": 1954 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:16.995484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CATAMOUNT CARGO SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GALLAGHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Catamount Cargo Services, LLC, appeals the dismissal of its complaint for administrative review. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction because plaintiff named only the Illinois Department of Employment Security (the Department) as a defendant, and failed to name the Director of Employment Security (the Director). We affirm.\nOn June 28, 2004, an administrative decision was rendered against plaintiff, assessing unemployment insurance contributions in the amount of $24,384.75 plus interest and penalties. The heading after the case caption on the first page of the decision states, \u201cDecision of the Director of Employment Security.\u201d The last page of the decision contains the signature of Brenda A. Russell and, immediately below the signature line, states, \u201cBrenda A. Russell, Director of Employment Security.\u201d\nOn August 2, 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review of the Director\u2019s final administrative decision. Plaintiff named the Department, but did not name the Director.\nOn September 7, 2004, defendant appeared and filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendant argued that it, the Department, was not the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d that issued the final decision sought to be reviewed. Defendant contended that the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d was the Director and that, pursuant to section 3 \u2014 107 of the Administrative Review Law (the Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107 (West 2004)), plaintiff was required to name the Director as a defendant in its complaint for administrative review.\nPlaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss and filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to add the Director as a defendant. Plaintiff contended that sections 3 \u2014 103 and 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103, 3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004)) authorized amendment of its complaint to add the Director as a defendant. Defendant replied that those sections did not authorize amendment of the complaint, under the circumstances of the instant case, where plaintiff had essentially failed, in the first instance, to name \u201cthe administrative agency\u201d in its complaint. The circuit court agreed with defendant that the Director was the administrative agency and, thus, sections 3 \u2014 103 and 3 \u2014 107(a) did not authorize amendment under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff filed this timely appeal.\nThis appeal involves only the legal issue of whether dismissal of the complaint was correct under the requirements of the Review Law. Thus, our review is de novo. Collinsville Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 218 Ill. 2d 175, 181, 843 N.E.2d 273, 277 (2006).\nUnder section 3 \u2014 103 of the Review Law, a complaint to review a final administrative decision must be filed and summons issued within 35 days of the date that a copy of the administrative decision was served upon the party affected by the decision. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 103 (West 2004). Prior to 1997, the courts interpreted the Review Law as requiring all proper defendants to be correctly named within the 35-day period for filing a complaint for review. Fragakis v. Police & Fire Comm\u2019n, 303 Ill. App. 3d 141, 707 N.E.2d 660 (1999). In 1997, however, the General Assembly adopted a number of amendments to the Review Law. Pub. Act 89 \u2014 685, \u00a7 25, eff. June 1, 1997. The purpose of the amendments was \u201cto reduce the possibility of error in naming and serving individuals who [were] acting in their official capacities as employees, agents, or members of the administrative agency or governmental entity and to avoid the harsh result of dismissing the complaint where the agency or entity ha[d] been named and served.\u201d Bunnell v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 295 Ill. App. 3d 97, 101, 692 N.E.2d 384, 387 (1998).\nSection 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law, as amended, provides:\n\u201cNo action for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an employee, agent, or member, who acted in his official capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, where the administrative agency, board committee, or government entity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this [ejection.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004) (language added by Pub. Act 89 \u2014 685, \u00a7 25, eff. June 1, 1997 (1996 Ill. Laws 3706, 3721)).\nPlaintiff contends that this language should be interpreted to mean that its failure to name the Director, an employee, who was acting in her official capacity, of an administrative agency, i.e., the Department, does not warrant dismissal of its complaint for administrative review because it named the administrative agency, i.e., the Department. In arguing that section 3 \u2014 107(a), as amended, applies here, plaintiffs argument is as follows: (1) the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d is the Department; (2) plaintiff named the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d; and (3) because plaintiff named the administrative agency, it is not prohibited from amending its complaint to name an employee of that administrative agency, i.e., the Director, who acted in an official capacity as \u201ca party of record to the administrative proceeding\u201d (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 107(a) (West 2004)). Defendant, however, contends that the Director, in rendering her decision, was the \u201cadministrative agency.\u201d Thus, plaintiff did not name the administrative agency and the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs complaint.\nA proper construction of the Review Law requires that this court determine precisely which \u201cadministrative agency\u201d is involved. Contrary to plaintiffs assertions, the critical inquiry here is determining the Director\u2019s status and whether she, as opposed to the Department generally, was the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d to which the relevant provisions of the Review Law pertain.\nSection 3 \u2014 101 of the Review Law defines administrative agency as follows:\n\u201c \u2018Administrative agency\u2019 means a person, body of persons, group, officer, board, bureau, commission or department (other than a court or judge) of the State, or of any political subdivision of the State or municipal corporation in the State, having power under law to make administrative decisions.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2004).\nBecause both a \u201cperson,\u201d such as the Director, and a \u201cdepartment,\u201d such as the Department here, may be an administrative agency, we must look to see which one, in the present case, had the requisite \u201cpower under law to make administrative decisions.\u201d\nIt has been recognized that the Director is the head of the agency known as the Illinois Department of Employment Security. See, e.g., Veazey v. Baker, 322 Ill. App. 3d 599, 749 N.E.2d 1060 (2001). Nevertheless, although the Department itself is an administrative agency, it has been well established for some time that the Director alone is also an administrative agency. See E&E Truck Line, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 262 Ill. App. 3d 547, 634 N.E.2d 1191 (1994). In E&E Truck Line, this court explained that the Director was the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d which made the final decision and had to be named in the caption of the complaint. E&E Truck Line, Inc., 262 Ill. App. 3d at 551, 634 N.E.2d at 1194. Because the employer had not named the Director as a defendant, the E&E Truck Line court held that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear the employer\u2019s complaint seeking judicial review of the Director\u2019s decision. E&E Truck Line, 262 Ill. App. 3d 547, 634 N.E.2d 1191.\nNothing in the amendments to the Review Law allows this court to have jurisdiction where the administrative agency is not named. Thus, section 3 \u2014 107(a) does not save plaintiffs complaint because the administrative agency was not named as a defendant.\nIn the present case, as in E&E Truck Line, the Director was acting pursuant to statutory authority that was explicitly vested in her. Under section 2200 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, the Director issues final administrative decisions regarding determinations and assessments as to the amount to be paid for unemployment insurance contributions by an employing unit. 820 ILCS 405/2200 (West 2004). That power is not vested in the Department \u201cgenerally.\u201d Under the definition set forth in section 3 \u2014 101 of the Review Law, the Director is the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d because she is the person who has the power under law to make administrative decisions regarding unemployment insurance assessments. We believe that the Director had to be named as a defendant because she was the administrative agency that issued the final administrative decision.\nAs further support for its argument that it should be allowed to add the Director to its complaint, plaintiff cites Traficano v. Department of Human Rights, 297 Ill. App. 3d 435, 697 N.E.2d 372 (1998). In Traficano, this court held that a former employee\u2019s failure to name the chief legal counsel of the Department of Human Rights did not prevent the former employee from amending his complaint to add the chief legal counsel. This court concluded that, \u201c[ijndisputably, the chief legal counsel of the Department was an employee or agent of the Department acting in her official capacity.\u201d Traficano, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 439, 697 N.E.2d at 374.\nThe reasoning in Traficano does not apply here. Although the chief legal counsel in Traficano was the final decision maker, he was not the \u201cadministrative agency.\u201d The agency was the Department of Human Rights and it was the decision of that \u201cadministrative agency\u201d that the chief legal counsel reviewed. Plaintiff fails to recognize that the Director\u2019s role, under the facts of the instant case, was not quite so circumscribed. Here, the Director was not acting as an agent or employee of the Department when she rendered her final administrative decision. Instead, the Director was the administrative agency that made the decision. Because plaintiff\u2019s underlying premise that the Department is the agency is incorrect, plaintiffs argument must fall.\nIn sum, the Director here was the pertinent \u201cadministrative agency\u201d because she was a \u201cperson\u201d who had the relevant \u201cpower under law to make administrative decisions.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2004). She made her administrative decision under the authority vested exclusively in her pursuant to section 2200 of the Unemployment Insurance Act. 820 ILCS 405/2200 (West 2004). Plaintiff named the Department, but that is insufficient. While the Department may be an administrative agency, under the statutory scheme here, it does not have the relevant \u201cpower under law to make administrative decisions.\u201d The Department may be \u201can\u201d administrative agency, but, in the instant case, it is not \u201cthe\u201d administrative agency as defined by the statutes.\nWe hold that the Director of Employment Security is the \u201cadministrative agency\u201d who is required by section 3 \u2014 107(a) of the Review Law to be named as a defendant in complaints for administrative review of the Director\u2019s decisions. Therefore, because plaintiff failed to name the administrative agency, i.e., the Director, within the 35-day time limit required by section 3 \u2014 103 of the Review Law, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction and correctly dismissed plaintiffs complaint.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019HARA FROSSARD and NEVILLE, JJ., concur.\nThe Veazey court nonetheless explained that \u201cwhen relief is sought from an adverse decision involving a claim for unemployment compensation benefits, the Board [of Review] is the \u2018administrative agency\u2019 from which the plaintiff must seek review.\u201d Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 603, 749 N.E.2d at 1063.\nUnder the Department\u2019s own rules, \u201c \u2018agency\u2019 means the Department of Employment Security.\u201d 56 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 2720.1, as amended by 21 Ill. Reg. 12129 (eff. August 20, 1997).", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GALLAGHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, P.C., of Chicago (Thomas G. Hancuch and Angela C. Pavlatos, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and John P. Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CATAMOUNT CARGO SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1-05-1464\nOpinion filed July 21, 2006.\nVedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, P.C., of Chicago (Thomas G. Hancuch and Angela C. Pavlatos, of counsel), for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and John P. Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1039-01", "first_page_order": 1057, "last_page_order": 1062 }