{ "id": 4265608, "name": "THE VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND et al., Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Village of Willowbrook v. Board of Trustees of Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund", "decision_date": "2006-07-11", "docket_number": "No. 2-04-0960", "first_page": "1097", "last_page": "1103", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 1097" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602236 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736057 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "493" }, { "page": "493" }, { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260152 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0512-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 594, "char_count": 14309, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14289192149812596 }, "sha256": "c4580a2e6a0b8cbbcb721cf63d06161b39d05112a09ad2ee0c3d155ee5a2b341", "simhash": "1:931281ed77d70474", "word_count": 2312 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:16.995484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND et al., Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants, the Board of Trustees of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund and Louis Kosiba, in his official capacity as Executive Director of the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (collectively, IMRF), appeal from the judgment of the trial court remanding the cause to IMRF for further proceedings. Plaintiff, the Village of Willow-brook, cross-appeals from the same judgment. We reverse and remand the cause for further proceedings.\nThis action arises from the retirement of Raymond E. Arthurs, Jr., as chief of police for the Village of Willowbrook on January 30, 2000. Arthurs had served as a police officer in Palos Heights from 1971 to 1990. During that time, he participated in the Palos Heights police pension fund. In March 1990, he became the Willowbrook chief of police and joined the Willowbrook police pension fund. In 1991, Arthurs switched his participation to the IMRF Sheriffs Law Enforcement Employee Plan (SLEP). At that time, he requested a transfer of all his pension credits from the Palos Heights and Willowbrook pension funds into the IMRF fund. The Palos Heights fund transferred 18 years and 9 months of pension credit along with $89,608.38. The Willowbrook fund transferred one year and five months of credit and $13,601.22. This total of $103,209.60 was $11,786.32 more than the $91,423.28 that IMRF required to be transferred; according to IMRF, the overage was \u201cretained by IMRF and credited to the Village of Willowbrook and the member\u2019s SLEP reserves.\u201d\nArthurs began receiving his IMRF pension in February 2000. In June 2001, IMRF informed Willowbrook that the Willowbrook SLEP plan had \u201cnegative assets of $306,453\u201d and that Willowbrook would be required to make a \u201cminimum monthly contribution\u201d of $2,464.75. These minimum payments were to continue \u201cuntil the obligation is paid off or until new members enroll in the SLEP plan and the calculated monthly employer contribution *** exceeds the minimum contribution amount.\u201d Willowbrook appealed the IMRF administrative staff decision to the IMRF Board of Trustees Benefit Review Committee (Board), which recommended that the full IMRF Board confirm the calculation of the additional amount due. After the IMRF Board approved the recommendation, Willowbrook filed a complaint for administrative review. The trial court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that IMRF was correct in using a \u201cstate-wide\u201d average contribution rate to calculate the contributions required to be transferred to the SLEP plan but in error in not adding interest for the periods transferred. The trial court then remanded the cause to IMRF for recalculation of the necessary payment to IMRF, again using \u201cstate-wide averages\u201d but now adding interest for each year transferred. The court retained jurisdiction \u201cuntil the final numbers are calculated.\u201d IMRF recalculated and determined that the charge to Willowbrook would have been lowered by $78,322.89, to $678,592.43. Although the recalculation was presented to the IMRF Board, the Board \u201cdecided to reaffirm their [sic] initial decision.\u201d Willowbrook moved the court to enter a final and appealable order, which the court did by declaring its June 14, 2004, ruling to be final and appealable. IMRF then appealed, and Willowbrook cross-appealed.\nIMRF first contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 7 \u2014 139(a)(9) of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 139(a)(9) (West 2004)). However, in an appeal from the judgment in an administrative review proceeding, we review the administrative agency\u2019s decision, not that of the trial court. Dowrick v. Village of Downers Grove, 362 Ill. App. 3d 512, 515 (2005). We will uphold an agency\u2019s findings of fact unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, while we review de novo an agency\u2019s rulings on questions of law. Dowrick, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 515. Mixed questions of law and fact, where historical facts are established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the only issue is whether the facts satisfy the settled statutory standard, will be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard \u2014 that is, the decision will be upheld unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Dowrick, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 515.\nIn this case, the parties do not dispute the facts regarding Arthurs\u2019 time of service or the amounts actually transferred from the pension funds to the SLEP plan. At issue is the application of section 7 \u2014 139(a)(9) of the Code, which provides for the transfer of service from other retirement systems and requires in part:\n\u201c[P]ayment by the member of the amount by which (1) the employer and employee contributions that would have been required if he had participated in this Fund as a sheriffs law enforcement employee during the period for which credit is being transferred, plus interest thereon at the effective rate for each year, compounded annually, from the date of termination of the service for which credit is being transferred to the date of payment, exceeds (2) the amount actually transferred to the Fund.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 139(a)(9) (West 2004).\nThe primary objective in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. Harshman v. DePhillips, 218 Ill. 2d 482, 493 (2006). The best indication of legislative intent is the statute\u2019s language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Harshman, 218 Ill. 2d at 493. We must look at the statute as a whole, considering all relevant parts. Harshman, 218 Ill. 2d at 493. Where the statute\u2019s language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect without resorting to other aids of construction. Harshman, 218 Ill. 2d at 493. However, a statute should also be construed in conjunction with other statutes that address the same subject. People v. Grever, 222 Ill. 2d 321, 334-35 (2006).\nIMRE argues that the Code requires the inclusion of interest in the calculation only \u201cfrom the date of termination of the service for which credit is being transferred to the date of payment,\u201d in the words of section 7 \u2014 139(a)(9). Thus, since the date of termination of service and the date of payment were in the same year, no interest should have been included in the calculation.\nWe agree. The plain words of the legislature do not require the inclusion of interest calculated for each year that the member paid into his prior retirement plan. There is simply no requirement that interest be paid for the period that the member participated in the municipal pension fund. Interest may be required, depending on the facts and circumstances of the individual transfer to the IMRE plan. For example, there was a period of just over one year between Arthurs\u2019 termination of service in the Palos Heights pension plan and the transfer of his credit and funds to the IMRE SLEP plan. It would appear that a calculation of interest would have been appropriate in that instance. However, where, as here, the date of termination of service and the date of payment are in the same year, no interest is required. To require the calculation of interest in this instance, as Willowbrook contends and the trial court ordered, would require one to read an additional clause into the statute, which we will not do.\nOur conclusion is further bolstered by the statutory provisions under which Arthurs transferred into the IMRF SLEP plan. Section 3 \u2014 109.1 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 109.1 (West 2004)) allows chiefs of police to transfer their participation from municipal police pension funds to the IMRF fund. Section 3 \u2014 110.3(a) (40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110.3(a) (West 2004)) then provides that creditable service shall be transferred upon payment from the police pension fund to the IMRF fund of:\n\u201c(1) [T]he amounts accumulated to the credit of the applicant on the books of the fund on the date of transfer; and\n(2) employer contributions in an amount equal to the amount determined under paragraph (1); and\n(3) any interest paid by the applicant in order to reinstate service.\u201d\nAgain, there is no requirement that interest be transferred for the period that the member participated in the municipal retirement fund. The only interest provided for in this statute is the interest that a member may have paid into the fund to reinstate service.\nPrior to July 1, 1988 (at a time when only county sheriffs, not chiefs of police, were allowed to transfer service from police pension funds to the IMRF fund), such transfers required an amount equal to:\n\u201c(1) [T]he amounts accumulated to the credit of the applicant, including interest, on the books of the fund on the date of transfer; and\n(2) employer contributions in an amount equal to the amount determined under subparagraph (1).\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 110.3(a).\nHowever, Public Act 85 \u2014 941 (Pub. Act 85 \u2014 941, eff. July 1, 1988), section 1, amended the Code on July 1, 1988, deleting the phrase \u201cincluding interest\u201d from subparagraph (1) and adding the following language:\n\u201c(B) Until July 1, 1989, any such county sheriff may reinstate service which was terminated by receipt of a refund, by payment to the police pension fund of the amount of the refund with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per year, compounded annually, from the date of refund to the date of payment.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 3 \u2014 110.3.\nAt all times, however, both prior to and after the amendment in July 1988, section 7 \u2014 139(a)(9) required the calculation of interest \u201cfrom the date of termination of the service for which credit is being transferred to the date of payment.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 108\u00bd, par. 7 \u2014 139(a)(9) (text of paragraph effective until July 1, 1988, and text effective July 1, 1988).\nThus, the legislature clearly differentiated between the accumulated interest in the municipal pension funds and the interest to be calculated for the period between the termination of service and the date of payment to the IMRF fund. Furthermore, the legislature explicitly amended the statute to remove any reference to the accumulated interest in the account. There can be no doubt but that the interest calculation that survives to this day is not the same as the accumulated interest in the account.\nWillowbrook cites approvingly the trial court\u2019s statement that, \u201cFrom an actuarial standpoint, interest is mathematically required and failure to include interest will produce unfunded liabilities.\u201d While this may be an actuarial truism, the legislature is not an actuary, and legislative action is not bound by the actuarial tables. We cannot agree with Willowbrook\u2019s argument that the statute \u201cdoes not work\u201d under IMRF\u2019s interpretation. If it did not work, the legislature would have \u201cfixed\u201d it long ago. While the statute may not work in Willowbrook\u2019s favor, it is clear that the legislature chose to exclude the accumulated interest from the transfer to the IMRF plan. Therefore, we must reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment remanding the cause to IMRF for a calculation of interest.\nWillowbrook contends in its cross-appeal that the trial court erred in affirming IMRF\u2019s use of an average employer SLEP contribution rate, instead of a separate municipal contribution rate, when calculating the contributions necessary for Arthurs\u2019 transfer to the SLEP plan. Section 7 \u2014 139(a)(9) of the Code requires calculation of \u201cthe employer and employee contributions that would have been required if [the member] had participated in this Fund as a sheriff\u2019s law enforcement employee during the period for which credit is being transferred.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 139(a)(9) (West 2004). The trial court concluded that use of a separate contribution rate for each municipality would make that calculation \u201cquite difficult, if not actually impossible.\u201d\nSection 7 \u2014 172 of the Code provides in relevant part:\n\u201c(b) A separate municipality contribution rate shall be determined for each calendar year for all participating municipalities together with all instrumentalities thereof. The municipality contribution rate shall be determined for participating instrumentalities as if they were participating municipalities. ***\n* * *\n(c) A separate municipality contribution rate shall be computed for each participating municipality or participating instrumentality for its sheriffs law enforcement employees.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 172(b), (c) (West 2004).\nSubsection (b) also provides a detailed list of percentages that are to be the basis of the municipality contribution rate. See 40 ILCS 5/7\u2014 172(b) (West 2004).\nThe legislature has clearly directed that such separate municipality contribution rates are to be calculated. Both Willowbrook and IMRF stipulated before the IMRF Board of Trustees Benefit Review Committee that:\n\u201c27. The Illinois Pension Code requires IMRF to determine a separate municipality contribution rate for the SLEP employees of each participating municipality for each calendar year. 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 172; IMRF Manual For Authorized Agents, Secs. 7.00, 7.20.\u201d\nWhether the calculation is difficult or not, the legislature has required it, and the parties have stipulated that it must be done. IMRF has presented no cogent argument as to why the Code does not apply in this case or why its own stipulation should be disregarded. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in affirming IMRF\u2019s use of a statewide average contribution rate instead of a separate municipality contribution rate, and the cause must be remanded for a calculation using a proper municipal contribution rate.\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversed, and the cause is remanded to IMRF for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded\nHUTCHINSON and BYRNE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kathleen O\u2019Brien and Michael B. Weinstein, both of Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, of Oak Brook, for appellants.", "Michael I. Richardson and Corinne S. O\u2019Melia, both of Franczek Sullivan, P.C., of Chicago, and Thomas W. Good, of Gorski & Good, of Wheaton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL RETIREMENT FUND et al., Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-04-0960\nOpinion filed July 11, 2006.\nKathleen O\u2019Brien and Michael B. Weinstein, both of Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, of Oak Brook, for appellants.\nMichael I. Richardson and Corinne S. O\u2019Melia, both of Franczek Sullivan, P.C., of Chicago, and Thomas W. Good, of Gorski & Good, of Wheaton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1097-01", "first_page_order": 1115, "last_page_order": 1121 }