{ "id": 4265724, "name": "AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MYLYNDA PAGE, Defendant and Counterdefendant-Appellant (Robert Chicoine et al., Defendants and Counterdefendants; American Insurance Company, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee). - AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MYLYNDA PAGE, Defendant and Counterdefendant (Robert Chicoine et al., Defendants and Counterdefendants-Appellants; American Insurance Company, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "American Family Mutual Insurance v. Page", "decision_date": "2006-07-11", "docket_number": "Nos. 2-05-0770, 2-05-0799 cons.", "first_page": "1112", "last_page": "1122", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 1112" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2533468 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "\"Decisions of the reviewing courts of foreign jurisdictions are not binding on Illinois courts\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "236 Cal. Rptr. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Cal. App. 3d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2210942 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" }, { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/191/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.W.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10121611 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/527/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 So. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9530762 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/429/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.Y.S.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" }, { "page": "910" }, { "page": "910" }, { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "59 A.D.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3042993 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" }, { "page": "381" }, { "page": "382" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/59/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 F.2d 142", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 127865 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" }, { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/330/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "841 P.2d 749", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10373490 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" }, { "page": "749-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/841/0749-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 A.L.R.5th 535", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 5th", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discussing cases dealing with definition of \"vacant\" land" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ga. App. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 836136 ], "weight": 16, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "\"the word 'vacant' modifies the word 'land,' not 'structure.' The policy covers land which is vacant\" (emphasis in original)" }, { "page": "789", "parenthetical": "\"the word 'vacant' modifies the word 'land,' not 'structure.' The policy covers land which is vacant\" (emphasis in original)" }, { "page": "376" }, { "page": "788" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "789" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "789" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "789" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "789", "parenthetical": "\"the word 'vacant' modifies the word 'land,' not 'structure.' The policy covers land which is vacant\" (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/212/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 F.2d 468", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1569384 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "citing Illinois cases for the definition of \"vacant\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/788/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 878169 ], "year": 1910, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/153/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372099 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140343 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777543 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "390-91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034125 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" }, { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0031-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1015, "char_count": 26041, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.074131106321132e-08, "percentile": 0.42596672624542975 }, "sha256": "314e1e41eaee0a725d8dac6769c496b2cb04c4159542774508338a66419493b8", "simhash": "1:df6ecd61f44e9da5", "word_count": 4326 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:16.995484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MYLYNDA PAGE, Defendant and Counterdefendant-Appellant (Robert Chicoine et al., Defendants and Counterdefendants; American Insurance Company, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee). \u2014 AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MYLYNDA PAGE, Defendant and Counterdefendant (Robert Chicoine et al., Defendants and Counterdefendants-Appellants; American Insurance Company, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants Mylynda Page, Robert Chicoine, Marguerite Chicoine, and Nicole Chicoine timely appeal the ruling of the circuit court of Du Page County granting summary judgment to plaintiff, American Family Mutual Insurance Company (American Family), and to defendant American Insurance Company (AIC) on plaintiffs complaint seeking a declaration that an injury occurring on the Chicoines\u2019 property was not covered by an American Family homeowners\u2019 insurance policy. Page and the Chicoines argue that the trial court erred in (1) ruling that the land on which the injury took place was not \u201cvacant land\u201d under the terms of the Chicoines\u2019 homeowners\u2019 insurance policies with American Family and AIC; and (2) ruling that the land was used as \u201cfarm land\u201d under the terms of the policies. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nThe parties do not dispute the relevant facts. The Chicoines own three parcels of real estate relevant to this appeal: their primary residence in St.- Charles, Illinois; a second home, located in Galena, Illinois; and a 97-acre property in Hanover Township, Illinois. The Chicoines obtained a homeowners\u2019 insurance policy for the St. Charles property and for the Galena property from American Family and AIC, respectively. Neither of the two policies explicitly refers to the Hanover property. However, the policies have similar provisions that extend coverage to \u201cvacant land\u201d owned by the Chicoines. The American Family policy defines the property insured as follows, in relevant part:\n\u201cFor Personal Liability and Medical Expense Coverages, insured premises also include:\n$ ^ ^\n(3) vacant land (other than farm land) owned by or rented to an insured. This includes land on which a one or two family dwelling is being built for the personal use of an insured.\u201d\nLikewise, the AIC policy states as follows, in relevant part:\n\u201c \u2018Insured location\u2019 means:\ne. Vacant land, other than farm land, owned by or rented to an \u2018insured.\u2019 \u201d\nOn July 20, 2002, while both of the above insurance policies were in effect, Page was injured while riding in an all-terrain vehicle driven by Nicole Chicoine on the Hanover property. Page later contacted American Family and AIC to make claims for her injury. On December 10, 2003, American Family filed a complaint for a declaration that its policy with the Chicoines did not cover the injury at the Hanover property. AIC filed a counterclaim against Page and the Chicoines for a declaration that its policy with the Chicoines did not cover the Hanover property injury.\nAmerican Family filed a motion for summary judgment, AIC joined and adopted the motion, and the Chicoines filed a countermotion for summary judgment. American Family attached to its motion for summary judgment a deposition from Robert Chicoine. In the deposition, Robert stated that he purchased the Hanover property in 1998 or 1999. The property was zoned as farmland, and the property tax assessment for the property indicated that the land was assessed as farmland. When Robert purchased the property, there were two structures located on it: \u201c[a]n old lean-to building and an old decrepitated [sic] barn.\u201d After he purchased the property, Robert had the barn torn down and had a \u201cmetal pole barn\u201d built. The new barn measured \u201c60 by 45\u201d and was a permanent structure. Robert later had a concrete floor poured for the structure, which cost approximately $18,000 to complete. He used the barn to house \u201cATV\u2019s, a car, and a *** tractor/mower.\u201d The Chicoines visited the property 8 to 10 times per year, either to walk the property or to ride in the all-terrain vehicles. Robert had never spent a night at the Hanover property.\nSometime before July 2002, Robert learned from a neighbor that wild alfalfa was growing on his land, and he agreed to allow the neighbor to cut and take the alfalfa. The alfalfa grew naturally, and Robert never made any effort to grow or harvest it himself. He received no income from the neighbor in exchange for allowing him to harvest the alfalfa. Though he had never worked on a farm or as a farmer, Robert\u2019s federal tax returns from 2000 to 2002 included farm profit and loss forms that indicated that he materially participated in business on the property, and he claimed tax deductions for \u201cfarm loss\u201d in the amount of his mortgage payments. The returns also indicated income from payments the government made to him on the condition that he refrain from growing certain crops.\nOn July 20, 2005, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. The trial court concluded that the Hanover property was not \u201cvacant land\u201d under the policies and, even if it was, it was \u201cfarm land\u201d and thus excluded from coverage. Page and the Chicoines appealed, and we consolidated their appeals.\nPage and the Chicoines first argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that the Hanover property did not constitute \u201cvacant land\u201d under the insurance policies and was thus excluded from coverage. Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when taken together in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. State Farm Insurance Co. v. American Service Insurance Co., 332 Ill. App. 3d 31, 36 (2002). The function of a reviewing court on appeal from a grant of summary judgment is limited to determining whether the trial court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact was raised and, if none was raised, whether judgment as a matter of law was correctly entered. American Service Insurance Co., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 36. When construing an insurance contract, the court\u2019s primary objective is to give effect to the intent of the parties at the time of contracting. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993). To ascertain the intent of the parties and the meaning of their insurance policy, the court construes the contract as a whole, with due regard to the risk undertaken, the subject matter that is insured, and the purposes of the entire contract. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108 (1992). If the words used in the policy are unambiguous, they must be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108. The interpretation of an insurance contract and the entry of summary judgment are questions of law that are reviewed de novo, without any deference to the trial court\u2019s ruling. Crum & Forster Managers Corp., 156 Ill. 2d at 390-91.\nThe relevant insurance policy language here extends coverage to \u201cvacant\u201d land owned by the Chicoines. The term \u201cvacant\u201d is not defined in the insurance policies. Therefore, we must determine whether the meaning of \u201cvacant\u201d includes the Hanover property. As noted, where terms of an insurance contract are unambiguous, we must accord them their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. We therefore turn to the dictionary, which states that the word \u201cvacant\u201d means, inter alia, \u201cbeing without content or occupant\u201d or \u201cnot occupied or put to use.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2527 (1993). The term is synonymous with the word \u201cempty.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2527 (1993).\nWe also consult several cases, both from Illinois and from foreign jurisdictions, that address the meaning of the term \u201cvacant.\u201d Though the parties cite no Illinois cases dealing with precisely the issue we face here, AIC cites several Illinois cases discussing the meaning of the term \u201cvacant\u201d in the context of fire insurance policies and defining it as \u201c \u2018generally empty or deprived of contents\u2019 \u201d (Lundquist v. Allstate Insurance Co., 314 Ill. App. 3d 240, 245 (2000), quoting Thompson v. Green Garden Mutual Insurance Co., 261 Ill. App. 3d 286, 291 (1994)), or \u201c \u2018empty of everything but air\u2019 \u201d (Gash v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, 153 Ill. App. 31, 33 (1910)). See also Myers v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 788 F.2d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Illinois cases for the definition of \u201cvacant\u201d); 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance \u00a7 1219, at 454 (\u201cvacant\u201d means \u201centirely empty, that is, lacking animate or inanimate objects\u201d), citing Myers, 788 F.2d 468. The definitions from these cases are instructive, but they are not dispositive, because, as Page points out, they each define \u201cvacant\u201d as it relates to a building, not a piece of land. See Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co. v. Smelcer, 212 Ga. App. 376, 378, 441 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1994) (\u201cthe word \u2018vacant\u2019 modifies the word \u2018land,\u2019 not \u2018structure.\u2019 The policy covers land which is vacant\u201d (emphasis in original)).\nThe parties also cite several analogous cases from foreign jurisdictions. See K. Reynaga, What Constitutes \u201cVacant Land\u201d Within Meaning of Liability or Property Insurance Policy Provisions, 47 A.L.R.5th 535 (1997) (discussing cases dealing with definition of \u201cvacant\u201d land). For example, in Dawson v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1992), the court was charged with determining whether land on which an all-terrain-vehicle-related injury occurred was \u201cvacant\u201d so as to fall under a homeowners\u2019 insurance policy with a provision similar to those quoted above. The court adopted the dictionary definitions of the word \u201cvacant,\u201d which indicated that the word meant \u201c \u2018containing nothing; empty\u2019 \u201d or \u201cland \u2018in the natural state.\u2019 \u201d Dawson, 841 P.2d at 751, quoting American Heritage Dictionary 1334 (2d Coll. ed. 1985). Because the land in Dawson contained several buildings regularly used by the owners, including two trailers, an outhouse, and a storage shed, the land was not empty, and thus the policy did not apply. Dawson, 841 P.2d at 749-50.\nTravelers Indemnity Co. v. Holman, 330 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1964), involved an area of open land surrounding three duplex lots all owned by the same insured. All of those duplexes \u201cwere on well defined traditional city lots which either were then, or were shortly to be, formally platted on approved subdivision plans.\u201d Holman, 330 F.2d at 149. With very little analysis, the court held that the tract of land between the duplexes was \u201cvacant\u201d because it was \u201cunoccupied [and] open.\u201d Holman, 330 F.2d at 149.\nIn DeLisa v. Arnica Mutual Insurance Co., 59 A.D.2d 380, 399 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977), the court considered whether land was \u201cvacant\u201d under an insurance policy where the land contained a cave with an iron gate at its mouth and a platform and steel ladder inside. DeLisa, 59 A.D.2d at 381, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 910. The owners of the property were not aware of the structures, which had been installed by a group of cave explorers whom the owners allowed to use the cave, free of charge. DeLisa, 59 A.D.2d at 381, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 910. The court held that the term \u201cvacant land,\u201d given its ordinary import, meant \u201clands that are both unoccupied and unused.\u201d DeLisa, 59 A.D.2d at 382, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 910. The court reasoned that \u201c[u]se of land implies the employment of the same in a manner that will materially benefit the owner.\u201d DeLisa, 59 A.D.2d at 382, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 910. It concluded that the land was unoccupied and, because the land was not used in any way beneficial to the owners, the land was vacant.\nWe do not agree with the holding in DeLisa, for several reasons. First, we do not agree that whether a property is used is relevant to the issue of whether it is vacant. The important inquiry focuses on the nature of the land and the objects upon it, not the way in which the land is used. Second, even if nonuse of the land were a component of vacancy, we would not see any reason to consider only use that is \u201cmaterially benef[icial] to the owner.\u201d The identity of the person using the land has no bearing on whether the land is used, because the word \u201cused\u201d would describe the land, and thus the question of use would center on whether the land was used, not whether the owner was using it. Therefore, if the court in DeLisa truly relied on a definition of vacancy that required nonuse, it would not have found the land to be vacant, because it was used by the cave explorers.\nThird, even if use by the owner were relevant to whether land is vacant, we would not believe that the use would have to be \u201cmaterially beneficial\u201d to the owner in order for the land to be considered nonvacant..The motive for building structures on a piece of land has no effect on whether those structures render the land nonvacant. Indeed, a property owner may place several buildings on a piece of land without any intention of deriving economic benefit from them. The land in such a case could hardly be considered vacant simply because it did not generate profit. Likewise, a property owner may accept money in exchange for refusing to build on a completely undeveloped forest property, or, as in this case, he could use his ownership of a property for favorable tax treatment. The land in either circumstance, if otherwise empty, could hardly be considered nonvacant simply because it produced profit for the landowner. The relevant inquiry centers, not on the economic effect of any structures on the property, but rather on the existence of any structures on the property. Accord Smelcer, 212 Ga. App. 376, 441 S.E.2d 788 (land containing an abandoned house was not \u201cvacant\u201d under an insurance policy). Therefore, we do not take use or \u201cbusiness or economic\u201d motive into account in determining if the Hanover property is vacant.\nWe note that the Chicoines at least partially rely on the holding in DeLisa as support for their argument. However, even if use were a factor to be considered in determining whether land is vacant, the land in this case was used. The Chicoines used the land regularly for recreational purposes, including all-terrain-vehicle riding, and, indeed, they were using the property in exactly that fashion at the time the injury giving rise to this litigation occurred. The Chicoines note that they derived no economic benefit from their use of the land, but, as noted above, the economic benefit of a piece of land is irrelevant to the issue of whether the land is vacant.\nIn Smelcer, 212 Ga. App. 376, 441 S.E.2d 788, an insurance company argued that land containing an abandoned old house did not meet the definition of \u201cvacant land\u201d so as to fall under coverage of a homeowners\u2019 insurance policy. Smelcer, 212 Ga. App. at 376, 441 S.E.2d at 788. The court looked to the dictionary, defining \u201cvacant\u201d as \u201c \u2018to be empty, be free,\u2019 \u201d and to previous state case law, defining the word as \u201c \u2018empty or deprived of contents or without inanimate objects.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Smelcer, 212 Ga. App. at 377, 441 S.E.2d at 789, quoting Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2527 (1993). It also cited a treatise that stated that \u201c \u2018clearly *** coverage [of \u201cvacant land\u201d] does not extend to land containing buildings [,] as \u201cvacant land\u201d refers to land unoccupied, unused and in the natural state.\u2019 \u201d Smelcer, 212 Ga. App. at 377, 441 S.E.2d at 789, quoting 11 Couch on Insurance 2d \u00a7 44:307, at 477-78 (1982). Thus, the court concluded that the land in question was not vacant. Smelcer, 212 Ga. App. at 377, 441 S.E.2d at 789. We agree with the holding in Smelcer on the basis that the land was nonvacant because it contained a building.\nIn American Motorist Insurance Co. v. Steffens, 429 So. 2d 335 (Fla. App. 1983), an insurance company argued that property on which a canal had been built was not vacant property that would be covered under a homeowners\u2019 insurance policy with language similar to that in this case. The insured had \u201cexcavated a portion of the property to create an interior lake, and then had a canal dug to connect the lake to the Intracoastal Waterway.\u201d Steffens, 429 So. 2d at 336. On appeal, the insurer contended that the canal land was nonvacant because it contained tidal waters, watercraft, and marine life. Steffens, 429 So. 2d at 337. It also contended that the canal was built to accommodate watercraft traffic and was specifically constructed to provide access to the interior lake, and it analogized the case to one in which a court determined that land with a clay road could not be considered vacant. Steffens, 429 So. 2d at 337. The court held that the land was, \u201cin the ordinary usage of the word, vacant land,\u201d even though it contained water and marine life and even though \u201cboats [were] operated\u201d upon it. Steffens, 429 So. 2d at 337. The court construed the term \u201cvacant land\u201d as meaning \u201cland which is unoccupied by any permanently affixed structure or inanimate object.\u201d Steffens, 429 So. 2d at 337.\nWe disagree with the holding in Steffens, and we find persuasive the insurer\u2019s argument in that case. The land in question had been altered with the addition of a canal that served as a transportation conduit for boats, much in the same manner that a sidewalk would serve as a transportation conduit for pedestrians. The court in Steffens reasoned that \u201c[o]ne would hardly consider a parcel of land as anything other than vacant merely because it contained a drainage ditch filled with water, anymore than one would consider a parcel of land on which there were only native trees and underbrush as anything other than being vacant.\u201d Steffens, 429 So. 2d at 337. That reasoning misstates the facts of the case. The canal was more than a simple \u201cdrainage ditch filled with water\u201d; it was a transportation conduit for watercraft. Nor is the analogy to \u201cnative trees and underbrush\u201d apt; the canal in Steffens was not native but, rather, was built by the landowner.\nIn Fort Worth Lloyds v. Garza, 527 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App. 1975), an insurer argued that land that contained an irrigation pump was not \u201cvacant land\u201d covered under an insurance policy. The court held that, \u201c[although there may be some question as to whether [the land was vacant], such doubt must be resolved in the insured\u2019s favor.\u201d Garza, 527 S.W2d at 199. It reasoned that the term \u201cvacant\u201d meant \u201cunoccupied\u201d and that an \u201cisolated irrigation pump *** does not make the land occupied.\u201d Garza, 527 S.W2d at 199. Thus, it concluded that the land in question was vacant.\nFinally, in Bianchi v. Westfield Insurance Co., 191 Cal. App. 3d 287, 236 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1987), the court considered whether land containing a man-made dam, a storage shed, and a dirt road leading to the dam could be considered \u201cvacant\u201d so as to be covered by an insurance policy. The court surveyed several of the cases already mentioned here and gleaned a rule that \u201cthe beneficial use or improvement of untenanted property renders it nonvacant, particularly if the use has accompanied the introduction of artificial structures.\u201d Bianchi, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 293, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 346. The Bianchi court concluded that the insured\u2019s property was not vacant, because it contained an artificial structure built for business or economic gain. Bianchi, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 291, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 345. We agree with the holding in Bianchi that the land was not vacant, but, as explained above, our conclusion does not rest on the question of whether the land was put to use or whether it was used for economic gain. Rather, we agree that the landowner\u2019s construction of a dam, a shed, and a dirt road on the property rendered it nonvacant.\nIn the present case, we hold that the Hanover property was not vacant. We base our conclusion on the fact that the land contained a pole building. To the extent that any of the above cases would dictate a different result, we find them unpersuasive. See Skipper Marine Electronics, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 210 Ill. App. 3d 231, 239 (1991) (\u201cDecisions of the reviewing courts of foreign jurisdictions are not binding on Illinois courts\u201d).\nPage and the Chicoines offer several arguments militating against our conclusion. First, the Chicoines argue that the term \u201cvacant\u201d as used in the insurance contracts must be considered ambiguous. The Chicoines note that the policies refer to vacant land \u201cother than farm land\u201d and thus that \u201cfarm land\u201d is meant to be a subset of \u201cvacant land.\u201d The Chicoines then reason that \u201creasonable people are familiar\u201d with the fact that farmland must include buildings such as barns, silos, and out-buildings, and, therefore, the policies\u2019 terms are ambiguous, because \u201cvacant\u201d cannot be meant in its ordinary sense. We disagree with the Chicoines\u2019 premise. Reasonable people can agree that farmers use buildings such as those the Chicoines mention, but it does not necessarily follow that farmers place at least one of those buildings on each piece of property that they farm. Therefore, we reject the Chicoines\u2019 argument that the insurance policies\u2019 terms are ambiguous.\nSecond, Page and the Chicoines urge that the above cases indicate that \u201cvacant\u201d should be defined, not in terms of whether the land is empty, but, rather, in terms of whether it is \u201chabitable.\u201d They thus argue that the Hanover land was not habitable, even though it contained buildings, and must be considered vacant. We disagree with this approach. The word \u201cvacant\u201d is used here to modify the word \u201cland,\u201d not the word \u201cbuilding\u201d or \u201cstructure.\u201d Smelcer, 212 Ga. App. at 378, 441 S.E.2d at 789 (\u201cthe word \u2018vacant\u2019 modifies the word \u2018land,\u2019 not \u2018structure.\u2019 The policy covers land which is vacant\u201d (emphasis in original)). While a building may be considered either habitable or unhabitable, that terminology is not typically used to describe land. The definition we adopt considers the meaning of the word \u201cvacant\u201d as it relates to land. To the extent that the cases Page and the Chicoines cite espouse a definition of \u201cvacant\u201d that hinges on habitability, we decline to follow them.\nThird, the Chicoines argue that the Hanover property was not used in a manner that materially benefitted them. However, as noted above, regardless of whether or how the Chicoines used the property, it contained a building and thus cannot be considered vacant. In any event, contrary to their assertions, even if they did not profit monetarily from their use of the land, the Chicoines nevertheless used the Hanover property 8 to 10 times per year, and they used the pole barn to store the all-terrain vehicles they sometimes used while at the property. Therefore, the building on the land was connected with their use of the land for recreational purposes.\nFourth, Page argues that the accident in this case occurred away from any buildings on the Hanover property and thus that the parties\u2019 purpose in excluding nonvacant land from coverage would not be served by denying coverage here. Page offers that the clauses excluding nonvacant land from coverage sought to avoid coverage of the risks associated with use of buildings or structures. We disagree. The purpose of the provisions is to define the scope of the Chicoines\u2019 insurance coverage, and we must enforce the terms of the contracts according to their plain and unambiguous language, as detailed above. We must also presume that the plain meaning of the contracts\u2019 terms reflects the parties\u2019 understandings of the allocation of risks in their contracts.\nFifth, the Chicoines point out that the American Family policy defines \u201cinsured premises\u201d to include \u201cvacant land (other than farm land) owned by or rented to an insured. This includes land on which a one or two family dwelling is being built for the personal use of an insured.\u201d Therefore, the Chicoines argue, the term \u201cvacant land\u201d must be meant to include land on which a dwelling is under construction, and thus the term \u201cclearly contemplates that land may be vacant even when there is a structure on it.\u201d We disagree. In our view, the language referring to a dwelling under construction is meant to create an exception to the ordinarily understood meaning of \u201cvacant land\u201d so that land with dwellings under construction may be included in the policy. The second sentence quoted from the policy is meant not to explain the meaning of the term \u201cvacant land,\u201d but rather to expand the coverage under the contract to land that would not otherwise be considered vacant. The sentence does not contemplate that land may be vacant even with a structure upon it in any context other than when a dwelling is under construction; instead, it indicates that land with a dwelling under construction may be covered as if it were vacant land, even though it otherwise would not be.\nBecause we agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the land in question here was not vacant, we do not reach the issue of whether it was farmland.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nKAPALA and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.\nAs noted above, we do not consider whether land or the structures thereon were used in determining whether land was vacant. We refer to the use of the canal here for the limited purpose of describing the canal.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Craig S. Mielke, of Foote, Meyers, Mielke & Flowers, LLC, of Geneva, for appellant Mylynda Page.", "Michael J. Morrisroe and Kristina J. Gibney, both of Michael J. Morrisroe, Ltd., of Bloomingdale, for appellants Marguerite Chicoine, Nicole Chicoine, and Robert Chicoine.", "Christine L. Olson McTigue and Jennifer K. Gust, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP of Chicago, for appellee American Insurance Company.", "Thomas J. Long, of Norton, Mancini, Weiler & DeAno, of Wheaton, for appellee American Family Mutual Insurance Company." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MYLYNDA PAGE, Defendant and Counterdefendant-Appellant (Robert Chicoine et al., Defendants and Counterdefendants; American Insurance Company, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee). \u2014 AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MYLYNDA PAGE, Defendant and Counterdefendant (Robert Chicoine et al., Defendants and Counterdefendants-Appellants; American Insurance Company, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee).\nSecond District\nNos. 2-05-0770, 2-05-0799 cons.\nOpinion filed July 11, 2006.\nCraig S. Mielke, of Foote, Meyers, Mielke & Flowers, LLC, of Geneva, for appellant Mylynda Page.\nMichael J. Morrisroe and Kristina J. Gibney, both of Michael J. Morrisroe, Ltd., of Bloomingdale, for appellants Marguerite Chicoine, Nicole Chicoine, and Robert Chicoine.\nChristine L. Olson McTigue and Jennifer K. Gust, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLP of Chicago, for appellee American Insurance Company.\nThomas J. Long, of Norton, Mancini, Weiler & DeAno, of Wheaton, for appellee American Family Mutual Insurance Company." }, "file_name": "1112-01", "first_page_order": 1130, "last_page_order": 1140 }