{ "id": 4264696, "name": "QUINCY SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 172, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Quincy School District No. 172 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board", "decision_date": "2006-08-02", "docket_number": "No. 4-05-1027", "first_page": "1205", "last_page": "1211", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 1205" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "681 N.E.2d 111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" }, { "page": "113-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 796", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3562015 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805", "parenthetical": "\"[a]fter a judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded, the inferior tribunal can take only such further proceedings as conform to the judgment of the appellate tribunal\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 164", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168", "parenthetical": "When \"the mandate of a court of review is precise and unambiguous, the mandate must be followed by the tribunal to which it is issued\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3570759 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608-09", "parenthetical": "When \"the mandate of a court of review is precise and unambiguous, the mandate must be followed by the tribunal to which it is issued\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. App. 3d 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2681222 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/189/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 N.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910257 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 N.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "27 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5358291 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/27/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314", "parenthetical": "\"Precise and unambiguous directions in a mandate must be obeyed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2989590 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "\"Precise and unambiguous directions in a mandate must be obeyed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 1236", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1238" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 878", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2587317 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "883" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0878-01" ] }, { "cite": "427 N.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ill. 2d 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5468706 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/86/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 1271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1275" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260344 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 N.E.2d 1094", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1098" }, { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 1149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472388 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1152" }, { "page": "1152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/1149-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 936", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265239 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0113-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 660, "char_count": 14544, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14284635899621947 }, "sha256": "6b40c3bb1caaadb6d0e0445a892b24c9adcfd06a81f9be4aafa624227873f9fb", "simhash": "1:424eb0a6292dbd26", "word_count": 2410 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:50:16.995484+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "QUINCY SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 172, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner, Quincy School District No. 172 (School District), seeks direct review of a November 2005 order of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB) finding the School District had violated section 14(a)(1) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (Labor Act) (115 ILCS 5/14(a)(l) (West 2004)) as alleged in the August 2001 unfair-labor complaint filed by the Quincy Educational Association, Local No. 809, IFT/AFT, AFL-CIO (Association).\nOn review, the School District argues (1) the IELRB erred in not following this court\u2019s directive to hold a hearing on the merits following remand and (2) the IELRB erred in not holding the Association had waived or was estopped from bringing a motion to deem all allegations of the complaint admitted. We reverse and remand.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn January 2001, the Association filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the IELRB, asserting the School District had violated the Labor Act by failing and refusing to submit a grievance to arbitration as demonstrated by the School District\u2019s filing of a lawsuit to enjoin a scheduled arbitration hearing. On August 8, 2001, the IELRB\u2019s executive director issued a complaint and notice of hearing. On August 28, 2001, the School District filed its answer, along with a motion for leave to file the answer one day out of time.\nIn January 2002, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the School District\u2019s motion for leave to file a late answer. In its July 2002 recommended decision and order, the ALJ found the School District\u2019s answer was in fact late and the School District failed to show \u201cgood cause\u201d for the late filing. Because of the School District\u2019s failure to file a timely answer, the ALJ deemed admitted the complaint\u2019s allegations. In doing so, the ALJ saw no need to require the Association to file a motion to have the complaint\u2019s allegations deemed admitted.\nIn January 2003, the IELRB affirmed the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision and order, finding, inter alia, the School District had failed to show \u201cgood cause\u201d for its filing an untimely answer, and thus it need not address whether the School District presented a meritorious defense. The IELRB also found the Association\u2019s response to the School District\u2019s motion to reconsider, in which it only argued the School District should not be granted leave to file a late answer, was the equivalent of a motion to have the complaint\u2019s allegations deemed admitted. Thus, the IELRB deemed admitted the complaint\u2019s allegations and then found the School District had violated section 14(a)(1) of the Labor Act. Based on that violation, the IELRB ordered the School District to cease and desist from certain actions and to take certain affirmative actions. The School District\u2019s appeal followed.\nThis court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the cause to the IELRB for further proceedings. Quincy School District No. 172 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, No. 4 \u2014 03\u20140181 (March 2, 2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We affirmed the IELRB\u2019s holding that good cause did not exist for the School District\u2019s late answer. However, we reversed the IELRB\u2019s decision deeming the complaint\u2019s allegations admitted even though no motion had been filed, finding the IELRB\u2019s interpretation of section 1120.30(d)(3) of Title 80 of the Administrative Code (80 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1120.30(d)(3) (Conway Green CD-ROM January 2001) (eff. January 5, 1990)) was clearly erroneous, arbitrary, and unreasonable. Specifically, we noted section 1120.30(d)(3) expressly required a party to file a motion when seeking to have the allegations of a complaint admitted when the other party failed to file a timely answer. As the Association never sought to have the complaint\u2019s allegations deemed admitted, the IELRB\u2019s interpretation of section 1120.30(d)(3) would render the \u201c[o]n motion of a party\u201d language meaningless. Thus, we reversed the IELRB\u2019s finding that the complaint\u2019s allegations should be deemed admitted and vacated that portion of its order based on the admission of the allegations. We then concluded as follows:\n\u201cSince no party filed a motion to have the complaint\u2019s allegations deemed admitted, we remand the cause for a hearing on the merits.\u201d Quincy School District No. 172, slip order at 14.\nThis court issued its mandate on March 30, 2004.\nOn April 21, 2004, the Association filed a motion pursuant to section 1120.30 to deem the allegations of the complaint admitted. On April 26, 2004, the IELRB ordered the case remanded to the ALJ for a hearing on the merits. On April 29, 2004, the ALJ ordered the School District to show cause why the Association\u2019s motion should not be granted. In May 2004, the ALJ granted the Association\u2019s motion and recommended that the allegations of the complaint be deemed admitted.\nIn November 2005, the IELRB, in a 3 to 2 decision, affirmed the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision and order. The IELRB majority concluded the ALJ correctly declined to conduct a hearing on the merits and instead determined that the School District had admitted to violating section 14(a)(1) of the Labor Act by failing to file a timely answer to the complaint. The majority acknowledged this court\u2019s order requiring a hearing on the merits \u201c[sjince no party filed a motion to have the complaint\u2019s allegations admitted.\u201d However, the IELRB read this court\u2019s \u201cdirection to have a hearing on the merits was conditioned on the fact that no such motion had been filed.\u201d Since the Association filed a motion to have the allegations of the complaint deemed admitted after this court\u2019s order was handed down, \u201ca ruling that there should be no hearing on the merits because the [Association] has filed a motion to have the allegations of the [c]omplaint be deemed admitted does not conflict with the [a]ppellate [c]ourt\u2019s ruling.\u201d\nThe IELRB also responded to the School District\u2019s argument that the Association waived or was estopped from having the allegations in the complaint deemed admitted because the Association delayed in filing its motion and stated during a January 15, 2002, conference call that it had no other motions to raise. The IELRB found the Association filed its motion \u201cwith reasonable promptness\u201d after this court\u2019s decision and before the Association received the IELRB\u2019s order scheduling a hearing. In finding the School District admitted the allegations of the complaint by failing to file a timely answer, the IELRB concluded the School District violated section 14(a)(1) of the Labor Act by refusing to arbitrate the grievance.\nTwo members of the IELRB dissented, pointing out this court specifically stated \u201cwe remand the cause for a hearing on the merits.\u201d The dissenting members found this court\u2019s direction to be \u201cclear and specific\u201d and stated the majority\u2019s decision would invite \u201cfurther litigation over this issue and resulting delay.\u201d This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe School District argues the IELRB erred in ignoring the express directive of this court to hold a hearing on the merits on remand. We agree.\nA. Standard of Review\nWhen a trial court or other tribunal is told to proceed in conformity with the appellate court\u2019s mandate, those tribunals \u201cshould consult the opinion to determine what the mandate requires.\u201d Emerald Casino, Inc. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 366 Ill. App. 3d 113, 118 (2006). After remand, the tribunal \u201cis required to exercise its discretion within the bounds of the remand. Whether it has done so is a question of law.\u201d Clemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 202 Ill. 2d 344, 351, 781 N.E.2d 1072, 1078 (2002). Thus, whether the IELRB complied with our mandate is subject to de novo review. See Clemons, 202 Ill. 2d at 352, 781 N.E.2d at 1078; People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Firstar Illinois, 365 Ill. App. 3d 936, 939 (2006).\nB. The IELRB\u2019s Decision on Remand\nThe appellate court\u2019s mandate is its judgment, which, \u201cupon\ntransmittal to the trial court, vests the trial court with authority only to take action that conforms with the mandate.\u201d In re Marriage of Ludwinski, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1149, 1152, 769 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (2002). A tribunal \u201cmust follow the specific directions of the appellate court\u2019s mandate to the letter to insure that its order or decree is in accord with the decision of the appellate court.\u201d Ludwinski, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1152, 769 N.E.2d at 1098.\n\u201c \u2018The correctness of the trial court\u2019s action on remand is to be determined from the appellate court\u2019s mandate, as opposed to the appellate court opinion. [Citations.] However, if the direction is to proceed in conformity with the opinion, then, of course, the content of the opinion is significant. [Citations.] In construing the language, matters which are implied may be considered embraced by the mandate. [Citation.] The trial court may only do those things directed in the mandate. [Citations.] The trial court has no authority to act beyond the dictates of the mandate. Thus, the controlling question in the appeal from the remand in this case is whether the trial court complied with the mandate.\u2019 \u201d Aardvark Art, Inc. v. Lehigh/Steck-Warlick, Inc., 284 Ill. App. 3d 627, 630-31, 672 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (1996), quoting PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291, 308-09, 427 N.E.2d 563, 571 (1981).\nIn the case sub judice, this court\u2019s mandate stated as follows:\n\u201cIt is the decision of this court that the order on appeal from the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board be AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and the cause be REMANDED to the Board for further proceedings as more fully set forth in the order of this court, a copy of which is attached hereto.\u201d\nIn the last sentence of the order prior to the conclusion section, this court stated: \u201cSince no party filed a motion to have the complaint\u2019s allegations deemed admitted, we remand the cause for a hearing on the merits.\u201d Quincy School District No. 172, slip order at 14.\nThe mandate in this case directed the IELRB to conduct further proceedings as stated in our order. That order required a hearing on the merits to be conducted on remand. \u201c[W]hen a reviewing court remands a cause with specific directions, they must be followed exactly.\u201d County of Menard v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 202 Ill. App. 3d 878, 883, 560 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 (1990); see also Stuart v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 75 Ill. 2d 22, 28, 387 N.E.2d 312, 314 (1979) (\u201cPrecise and unambiguous directions in a mandate must be obeyed\u201d); Berry v. Lewis, 27 Ill. 2d 61, 62-63, 187 N.E.2d 688, 689 (1963); Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Otis Elevator Co., 297 Ill. App. 3d 383, 387, 696 N.E.2d 697, 700 (1998); Independent Voters of Illinois v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 189 Ill. App. 3d 761, 767, 545 N.E.2d 557, 560 (1989); County of La Salle ex rel. Peterlin v. Pollution Control Board, 146 Ill. App. 3d 603, 608-09, 497 N.E.2d 164, 168 (1986) (When \u201cthe mandate of a court of review is precise and unambiguous, the mandate must be followed by the tribunal to which it is issued\u201d); Jones v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 127 Ill. App. 3d 793, 805, 469 N.E.2d 393, 402 (1984) (\u201c[a]fter a judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded, the inferior tribunal can take only such further proceedings as conform to the judgment of the appellate tribunal\u201d). The language in this court\u2019s mandate and order was clear, specific, and binding. The IELRB erred in not holding a hearing on the merits consistent with our order.\nIn its decision and now in its appellate brief, the IELRB contends a hearing on the merits was no longer necessary since the Association filed a motion to have the complaint\u2019s allegations admitted after this court\u2019s order was handed down. However, the IELRB\u2019s interpretation of our directive was erroneous. This court did not say that \u201cunless a party files a motion in the future to have the complaint\u2019s allegations deemed admitted,\u201d a new hearing must be conducted on remand. The \u201c[sjince no party filed a motion\u201d language does not lend itself to any discretionary action or future filing.\nThe IELRB also argues this court\u2019s order did not preclude the filing of an appropriate motion by the Association. However, the reasons for the rule that the directions in the court\u2019s mandate must be obeyed is \u201cthat it would be impossible to negate every conceivable issue in an opinion and that a decision which failed to exclude a particular result did not include it by implication.\u201d City of Springfield v. Allphin, 82 Ill. 2d 571, 574-75, 413 N.E.2d 394, 396 (1980). The language in the order, in effect, foreclosed the filing of a motion and specifically required the matter proceed to a hearing on the merits. If the IELRB was dissatisfied with this court\u2019s previous order to hold a hearing on the merits, it could have petitioned for a rehearing or appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois. See Foster v. Kanuri, 288 Ill. App. 3d 796, 799, 681 N.E.2d 111, 114 (1997).\n\u201cWhen an appellate court reverses and remands the cause with a specific mandate, the only proper issue on a second appeal is whether the trial court\u2019s order is in accord with the mandate.\u201d Foster, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 799, 681 N.E.2d at 113-14. We hold the IELRB\u2019s decision was not in accord with our mandate. Thus, that decision must be reversed, and this cause must be remanded once again for a hearing on the merits. Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not address the School District\u2019s remaining argument on appeal.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the IELRB\u2019s order and remand the cause for a hearing on the merits.\nReversed and remanded.\nSTEIGMANN and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE TURNER" } ], "attorneys": [ "David W. Gearhart and Jennifer E. Behm, both of Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, and Brett K. Gorman, of Schmiedeskamp, Robertson, Neu & Mitchell, of Quincy, and John J. Gazzoli, Jr., of Schmiedeskamp, Robertson, Neu & Mitchell, of St. Louis, Missouri, for petitioner.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Mary Patricia Kerns, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board.", "Gilbert A. Cornfield, of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for respondent Quincy Educational Association, Local No. 809." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "QUINCY SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 172, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-05-1027\nOpinion filed August 2, 2006.\nDavid W. Gearhart and Jennifer E. Behm, both of Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C., of St. Louis, Missouri, and Brett K. Gorman, of Schmiedeskamp, Robertson, Neu & Mitchell, of Quincy, and John J. Gazzoli, Jr., of Schmiedeskamp, Robertson, Neu & Mitchell, of St. Louis, Missouri, for petitioner.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary S. Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Mary Patricia Kerns, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board.\nGilbert A. Cornfield, of Cornfield & Feldman, of Chicago, for respondent Quincy Educational Association, Local No. 809." }, "file_name": "1205-01", "first_page_order": 1223, "last_page_order": 1229 }