{ "id": 4265316, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARGARET A. COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Coleman", "decision_date": "2006-08-30", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201404\u20141084", "first_page": "394", "last_page": "401", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 394" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "146 Ill. 2d 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596932 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" }, { "page": "374" }, { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/146/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 870, "char_count": 19832, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14287724882802047 }, "sha256": "c2256939185b81418499a9a0476c2cf4ee9005e7c0b3da6a83fff0ac2b14f183", "simhash": "1:d6aab0a0eda5c3f2", "word_count": 3409 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:49.400377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARGARET A. COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant, Margaret Coleman, was convicted of battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3(a)(1) (West 2002)) and driving under the influence of alcohol. In this timely appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove battery beyond a reasonable doubt because it did not establish that defendant\u2019s use of force was unjustified. We affirm.\nDefendant was tried via bench trial beginning on July 14, 2004. Tara Rittner testified first for the State, and she testified as follows. On September 16, 2003, at approximately 8 p.m., she and her husband, Ralph Rittner, were driving home from a childbirth class when they approached the intersection of Route 176 and Waukegan Road, facing north. The traffic control device in the intersection was red as the Rittners pulled into the turn lane to turn left onto Route 176. When the traffic control device indicated a green left-turn arrow, Ralph turned left. As the car turned left, Tara noticed a dark-colored sport utility vehicle resting in a corner gas station\u2019s parking lot exit facing Route 176. She assumed that the car would wait for them to pass before turning onto Route 176. However, after the Rittners made a \u201cnormal left turn,\u201d the sport utility vehicle \u201cpulled right out in front of [them].\u201d Tara estimated that the Rittners were traveling approximately 25 to 30 miles per hour as they completed the turn. Ralph attempted to stop and swerved to the right, but the Rittners\u2019 car hit the sport utility vehicle. The back end of the sport utility vehicle skidded to the side, and then the sport utility vehicle \u201ckept going\u201d before it stopped behind some cars at a red traffic light. Ralph asked Tara if she was alright and then exited the car to obtain the license number of the sports utility vehicle. She saw Ralph walk toward the other car and then, \u201cthe next thing [she] knew there was a scuffle.\u201d After the police arrived, and after Tara was placed in an ambulance for monitoring, she saw Ralph, who had a ripped shirt, scratch marks \u201call over his neck\u201d and also on his chest and hand, and bite marks.\nThe State next called Ralph to testify, and he testified as follows. At approximately 8 p.m. on September 16, 2003, he was driving Tara home from a childbirth class. He had not consumed any alcohol on that day. He drove north on Waukegan Road and stopped in the left turn lane at the intersection of Waukegan Road and Route 176. His was the first car in the turn lane waiting for the traffic control signal to display a green turn arrow so that he could turn west on Route 176. There was a gas station on the northwest corner of the intersection. Once the traffic control device displayed the green arrow, Ralph turned onto Route 176 in the southern of two westbound traffic lanes. He estimated that he was traveling at 10 to 15 miles per hour as he made the turn. As he completed his turn, he saw a sport utility vehicle pull out in front of him from the gas station parking lot. Ralph turned his steering wheel to the right and pressed his brakes, but he was unable to avoid hitting the other car. He made sure Tara was alright and then looked for the other car. The collision pushed the other car into the median area of Route 176. He saw it \u201cslowly trail[ ] around into the eastbound traffic of Route 176 and [not] stop.\u201d The car continued \u201cseveral hundred feet\u201d before it was forced to stop at a red traffic light behind several other cars. On cross-examination, Ralph agreed that, if the car had not moved, it would have partially blocked eastbound traffic on Route 176. On redirect examination, Ralph recalled that the intersection at which the car stopped had two center lanes (for driving forward) and a left and a right turn lane and that defendant stopped in the left center lane at the red traffic light.\nRalph ran to the other car in order to see its license plate, and, once he got close enough, he knocked on the driver\u2019s side window of the other car to \u201ctr[y] to make contact with the driver,\u201d whom he identified in court as defendant. He recalled having some trouble reading the license plate as he approached. Ralph yelled to defendant, \u201c \u2018You hit us. You hit us. You can\u2019t leave.\u2019 \u201d Defendant looked back at him with an expression of \u201csurprise and shock.\u201d She rolled down her window, and Ralph noticed a \u201cvery strong odor of alcohol.\u201d Ralph repeated to defendant that she had hit him and needed to stop, and defendant looked at him and said, \u201c \u2018What, what did I do?\u2019 \u201d Ralph repeated \u201cseveral times\u201d that she hit him, and defendant eventually began to step out of her car to assess the situation. As she stepped out of the car, it began to roll forward. Ralph \u201cjumped into the car and slammed on the brakes and put the car in park and took the keys out, because [he] didn\u2019t want the car to cause another accident and get somebody else hurt.\u201d At that point, several bystanders arrived and assured Ralph they would stand by until police arrived.\nOn cross-examination, Ralph stated that he told several officers that defendant exited her car without shifting the car into park, but he did not recall specifically which officers he told and which he did not. He acknowledged that his written statement to police did not reference defendant\u2019s exiting her car without shifting it into park. On cross-examination, he denied defense counsel\u2019s suggestion that he taunted defendant with her keys. On redirect examination, Ralph recalled that, after he stopped defendant\u2019s car and shifted it into park, he took the keys and told defendant that \u201c \u2018[he was] not giving these [keys] back until the police arrive[d].\u2019 \u201d\nDefendant was \u201ca few feet\u201d away from Ralph, and he noticed that she was slurring her words and not making \u201ccoherent sentences.\u201d She \u201cdemanded her keys because she was in the armed forces, and her commander needed the keys.\u201d She also threatened serious physical injury to Ralph if he refused to return her keys. Ralph \u201crefused to give her the keys and let her flee.\u201d Defendant continued to implore Ralph to return her keys, and she made incoherent references to Tara. Ralph also noticed that defendant \u201cwouldn\u2019t stand still\u201d and was \u201cshuffling her feet back and forth.\u201d Ralph had seen individuals under the influence of alcohol several times, and he concluded that defendant was \u201cmost decidedly intoxicated,\u201d based on \u201cthe smelling of alcohol on the breath, the *** staggering motions, slurred speech, [and the fact that she appeared] disoriented.\u201d\nDefendant then \u201cphysically tried to remove the keys from [Ralph\u2019s] grasp.\u201d When that was unsuccessful, defendant \u201ckind of pound[ed] on [his] arms with a fist\u201d several times. When that was unsuccessful, defendant began pounding him with her fist and \u201cscratching at [his] neck.\u201d Defendant tore his shirt when she \u201cgrabbed the neckline and was trying to pull and whip [him] around.\u201d Defendant also tried to \u201cgain leverage on [his] arm and kind of leaned down keeping her body in between [his] and the arm, and tried to [g]naw on [his] wrist.\u201d Though her teeth came in contact with his wrist, she did not break the skin. Ralph refused to give her the keys and told her he was trying to \u201cstop another accident from happening.\u201d He stated that \u201c \u2018[they needed] to get this taken care of \u201d and that they would \u201c \u2018get it taken care of when the police arrive.\u2019 \u201d Defendant\u2019s responses to those statements were nonsensical and \u201cgarbled.\u201d On cross-examination, Ralph stated that some of the bystanders attempted to calm defendant, but that none of them physically intervened. He also acknowledged that he did not reference defendant\u2019s biting him in his written statement to police.\nWhen police arrived, defendant \u201cmoved away from her car and actually ran across the eastbound lanes of Route 176\u201d toward a forest area. An officer pursued her into the woods, and Ralph heard the officer \u201ctr[ying] to get her to cool down.\u201d\nOfficer Robert Copeland testified next for the State, and he testified as follows. At approximately 8 p.m. on September 16, 2003, he was on patrol when he received a dispatch call indicating that a fight had broken out after a traffic accident, and he proceeded to the scene of the accident. Wfiien he arrived at the scene, he saw a male and a female engaged in \u201csome type of fray.\u201d They separated when he pulled up, and he saw that the male\u2019s shirt was torn. Defendant\u2019s car was parked either in the left center lane or the left turn lane at an intersection.\nThe male began telling Copeland what had happened, and the female, whom Copeland identified as defendant, began walking away from the scene. It appeared that defendant was fleeing the scene. Copeland yelled for her to stop, but defendant continued. Copeland ran after her and, when he caught her, asked her to return to the scene so that they could \u201csort this out.\u201d Defendant made a comment that she \u201chad to go\u201d and attempted to keep moving. Copeland told her she could not move any further, but defendant tried to continue to move. Copeland grabbed her arm, turned her around, and attempted to lead her back to the scene. Defendant tried to pull away from him, but she was not actively fighting him. Copeland did not recall exactly what defendant was saying at the time, but he stated that \u201c[n]othing that she said made any sense.\u201d Defendant\u2019s speech was \u201cmush mouthed,\u201d her eyes were red and glassy, and she had \u201ca strong odor of alcohol about her.\u201d Copeland concluded that defendant was under the influence of alcohol that night.\nWhen they arrived back at the scene of the accident, Copeland instructed defendant not to move, but she continued to try to walk away. Defendant \u201ckept saying *** she had to leave,\u201d and she refused to remain seated. Police placed her in handcuffs, and she did not \u201cgive [them] any more trouble\u201d after that. Copeland was able to read defendant\u2019s license plate without any difficulty. Copeland\u2019s contact with Ralph was limited.\nDefendant testified on her own behalf, and she testified as follows. On the evening of September 16, 2003, defendant had \u201chad a couple of small drinks,\u201d but she was not feeling any effects from the alcohol. On cross-examination, she estimated that she had less than two shots of vodka, and she finished her last drink 20 to 24 minutes before the incident. She drove to the gas station to purchase some items, and, after checking for traffic, she exited the gas station to travel west on Route 176. As she was turning, the Rittners\u2019 car impacted the rear of her car, causing it to fishtail into the eastbound lane. She came to a complete stop and tried to determine how to get out of traffic and return to the gas station parking lot. She proceeded to an intersection and stopped behind other cars stopped at the red light. She stopped in the left center traffic lane. After a few seconds, a man she identified as Ralph began \u201cpounding on [her] window and screaming at [her].\u201d She informed him that she was trying to return to the parking lot, but Ralph \u201copened [her] car door and he grabbed the sleeve of [her] windbreaker with his fingers and [said] \u2018Oh no, you\u2019re not. You\u2019re not going anywhere. And you\u2019re trying to flee the scene of an accident.\u2019 \u201d She then shifted the car into park, removed her seat belt, and \u201cconceded\u201d to get out of her car.\nShe walked to the back of her car to inspect the damage and then informed him that she could not see it and that she wanted to go to the gas station parking lot, where there was light. Ralph began yelling at her again and telling her that she was a drunk driver. He then ran up to the driver\u2019s door of her car, climbed inside the car, and started \u201cfeeling around on the dash, he turned the radio on, turned it off, turned the heater on, turned it off, started feeling around the seats.\u201d Defendant testified that she felt that Ralph may have been attempting to carjack her. She walked to the driver\u2019s door of her car and asked Ralph to get out of her car, and then she heard the jingle of her keys as Ralph disengaged her car engine. Ralph \u201celbow-butted\u201d her in the chest and exited the vehicle with her keys in his hand. Ralph did not say anything as he ran to the rear of her vehicle. Defendant followed him and then, from \u201ca socially acceptable distance,\u201d held her hand out and told him to return her keys. Ralph was \u201cvery manic, jumping around; it was very childish acting.\u201d He held the keys up and dangled them and told her, \u201c \u2018You cannot have these keys back. These are mine now.\u2019 \u201d Defendant replied that they were her keys and had her name on the dog tags attached to them, and Ralph replied, \u201c \u2018Why? Are you a dog?\u2019 \u201d She explained that she was referring to her army dog tags and again requested that Ralph return the keys. Ralph replied, \u201c \u2018They\u2019re mine now and you\u2019re never going to get them back.\u2019 \u201d He turned and threatened to throw her keys into the woods. Ralph then pulled out his shirt and shoved his hand, with her keys, underneath his shirt. He began \u201cbouncing around,\u201d saying, \u201c \u2018Well, I just might shove them down my pants.\u2019 \u201d\nRalph poked the longest key through his shirt, and defendant attempted to grab the key, but their skin never touched. At that point, the police arrived. She never bit, scratched, or hit Ralph. Copeland told her to stand next to her vehicle, and she did so.\nAfter considering the evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of battery and driving under the influence. Defendant timely appeals.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty of battery beyond a reasonable doubt. When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, a reviewing court applies the reasonable doubt standard as set forth in People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). People v. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d 363, 374 (1992). The relevant inquiry for the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d at 374. A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses and will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant\u2019s guilt. Campbell, 146 Ill. 2d at 375.\nDefendant argues that she was justified in using force against Ralph because he interfered with her lawful possession of her car. Indeed, \u201c[a] person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that [s]he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other\u2019s trespass on or other tortious or criminal interference with *** personal property, lawfully in [her] possession.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 3 (West 2002). However, the State counters that Ralph\u2019s possession of defendant\u2019s keys was not tortious or criminal, because the evidence demonstrated that he was using justifiable force to make a citizen\u2019s arrest of defendant. We agree with the State.\n\u201cA private person who makes *** a lawful arrest is justified in the use of any force which he would be justified in using if he were summoned or directed by a peace officer to make such arrest ***.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 6(a) (West 2002). The State points out that the evidence shows that there were two bases under which Ralph could have justifiably applied reasonable force to prevent defendant from driving her car. First, defendant\u2019s actions indicated that she intended to flee the scene of the accident, in violation of section 11 \u2014 402 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 402(a) (West 2002) (\u201cThe driver of any vehicle involved in a motor vehicle accident *** shall immediately stop *** [and] shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such motor vehicle accident [until the drivers trade information and render any necessary aid]\u201d). Ralph testified that, after the accident, defendant continued to drive until stopped by a red traffic signal. Defendant counters this testimony by arguing that she was forced to drive her car forward in order to move it out of the way of traffic and that Ralph confronted her before she had an opportunity to return to the gas station as she intended. However, though defendant claimed that she intended to return to the gas station parking lot, by her own admission she proceeded not to a turn lane in order to circle back to the scene of the accident, but instead to one of two center lanes from which traffic could move only forward. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that there was ample testimony to establish that Ralph was justified in using force to prevent defendant from fleeing the scene.\nThe second basis for Ralph\u2019s use of force to detain defendant was that doing so prevented her from driving under the influence of alcohol. On appeal, defendant disputes this basis on the ground that Ralph\u2019s testimony, which supported a finding that defendant was intoxicated, was not credible. According to Ralph\u2019s testimony, before he took her keys, defendant emitted a strong odor of alcohol and slurred her words. He testified that he concluded that she was drunk.\nDefendant points out that Ralph was in an agitated state during the incident and that his written report to police made no mention of biting or of having to stop defendant\u2019s car because she exited it without shifting it into park. However, the trial court apparently considered the testimony before it and found the State\u2019s witnesses to be more credible than defendant, and, as noted above, it is not our function to reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Further, even if we were to assess the credibility of the witnesses based on the record before us, we would find the State\u2019s witnesses to be more credible. We note that Copeland\u2019s observations of defendant at the end of the incident lent credibility to Ralph\u2019s conclusions. Indeed, all three of the State\u2019s witnesses offered consistent and believable accounts of the incident. Defendant, on the other hand, offered testimony that differed wildly from Ralph\u2019s, and she directly contradicted Copeland\u2019s recollections regarding her behavior after his arrival at the accident scene. Her explanation that defendant shredded his own shirt by using her car key was also incredible. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we agree with the State that the evidence established that Ralph was justified in using force to prevent defendant from driving under the influence.\nDefendant does not argue that the amount of force Ralph employed would have been unjustifiable to stop defendant from fleeing or from driving under the influence, but rather that Ralph\u2019s applying any force was unjustifiable because defendant did not intend to flee or to drive under the influence. We reject those arguments above, and, in any event, we hold that the amount of force Ralph used, which, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, consisted only of his holding defendant\u2019s keys until police arrived, was certainly justifiable under these circumstances.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.\nAffirmed.\nBYRNE and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Lilien and Vicki P Kouros, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P Moltz and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARGARET A. COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201404\u20141084\nOpinion filed August 30, 2006.\nThomas A. Lilien and Vicki P Kouros, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P Moltz and Marshall M. Stevens, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0394-01", "first_page_order": 412, "last_page_order": 419 }