{ "id": 4265992, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VICTOR A. MATTIS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mattis", "decision_date": "2006-08-23", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201405\u20140586", "first_page": "432", "last_page": "438", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 432" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "67 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5812072 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/67/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 S.W.3d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 11478584 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/11/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 A.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7882653 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345", "parenthetical": "false grand jury testimony did not warrant dismissing indictment where truthful answer would not have substantially influenced grand jury's decision" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/550/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171743 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1010", "parenthetical": "hearsay testimony before grand jury did not invalidate indictment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738380 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60", "parenthetical": "otherwise valid indictment may not be challenged on the basis of the character of the evidence the grand jury considered" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435351 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4135762 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3254876 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/136/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098506 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209960 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. App. 3d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3306009 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/68/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 Ill. App. 3d 935", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3194566 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "937" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/85/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5730504 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166491 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 695, "char_count": 13979, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.03000602042643e-08, "percentile": 0.5040087279219754 }, "sha256": "3ee1dc6c01af096a2646ff4eef9ab6ac83a5ff38be48ce62cf073bf052b94743", "simhash": "1:9f66707211ce1174", "word_count": 2183 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:49.400377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VICTOR A. MATTIS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KAPALA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA Lake County grand jury indicted defendant, Victor A. Mattis, for possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2004)) and possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2004)). The trial court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the prosecutor presented misleading evidence to the grand jury. The State appeals, arguing that the prosecutor\u2019s conduct did not warrant the harsh sanction of dismissal. We reverse and remand.\nOn September 16, 2004, North Chicago officer Corey Marquardt investigated a complaint of a man selling marijuana in the backyard of 1538 Victoria Street. Marquardt eventually arrested defendant and prepared a report detailing these events. The prosecutor who presented the case to the grand jury referred to Marquardt\u2019s report. However, Marquardt did not testify. The only witness was Marquardt\u2019s supervisor, George McClary. His testimony consisted primarily of one-word answers to the prosecutor\u2019s leading questions about what Marquardt reported.\nDefendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the prosecutor presented the grand jury with perjured evidence. Defendant referred to several inconsistencies between Marquardt\u2019s report and McClary\u2019s testimony. Specifically, defendant noted the following:\n\u2022 McClary testified that Marquardt heard about the crime from a \u201cconfidential informant\u201d while Marquardt reported having talked to \u201ca man.\u201d\n\u2022 McClary testified that Marquardt was told the man selling drugs was Victor Mattis while Marquardt\u2019s report referred only to \u201ca Jamaican black male.\u201d\n\u2022 McClary testified that drugs were being sold out of an apartment while Marquardt reported that drugs were being sold in a backyard.\n\u2022 Both officers referred to two bags of marijuana. However, Mc-Clary testified that the smaller bag was found first and was thrown down by defendant and recovered by Marquardt, while the second, larger bag was found behind a door. Marquardt\u2019s report, however, stated that the larger bag was found first and was recovered from defendant\u2019s pocket. The second, smaller bag was thrown to the ground and recovered there.\n\u2022 McClary testified that defendant admitted the marijuana belonged to him and was for his own personal use while Marquardt reported no such admission.\nIn addition, defendant noted that McClary testified that the larger bag weighed 107 grams while a laboratory report, available at the time of the grand jury proceedings, showed that the bag actually weighed 87.3 grams. Defendant also complained that McClary, in response to the prosecutor\u2019s question, testified that cannabis is \u201cgenerally sold in 1 gram increments.\u201d Defendant argued that one gram was an unrealistically small amount to purchase.\nDefendant also contended that the assistant State\u2019s Attorney became a witness before the grand jury. One of the jurors asked how to convert 107 grams to the English system. The prosecutor replied as follows:\n\u201cTo be honest I will say that I believe we\u2019re not going to answer that here. I think we can probably answer that for you later. I think based upon the information that you received from Officer McClary there\u2019s probably enough for you to decide. But if that\u2019s something you\u2019d like us to look into, I\u2019m sure we can do that for you. Any other questions?\u201d\nThe trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion and dismissed the indictment without prejudice. The court found that the problems defendant complained of were the result of sloppiness rather than intentional misconduct. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the prosecutor presented misleading evidence to the grand jury, which evidence may have influenced its decision to indict.\nThe State moved to reconsider. The prosecutor contended that many of the discrepancies in the evidence that defendant noted were essentially matters of semantics. The prosecutor argued, for example, that there was not much difference between calling someone a \u201cman\u201d and a \u201cconfidential informant.\u201d Moreover, the prosecutor told the court that Marquardt assured him that defendant did admit owning the marijuana, but that Marquardt had left this fact out of his report. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider and the State timely appeals.\nInitially, we conclude that we have jurisdiction of this appeal. Although the parties do not question our jurisdiction, we have an independent obligation to consider our jurisdiction. Ferguson v. Riverside Medical Center, 111 Ill. 2d 436, 440 (1985). In a civil case, an order dismissing a complaint without prejudice is not appealable. Paul H. Schwendener, Inc. v. Jupiter Electric Co., 358 Ill. App. 3d 65, 73 (2005). However, the State may appeal an order dismissing an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct (People v. Marbly, 85 Ill. App. 3d 935, 937 (1980)), even if the dismissal is without prejudice. People v. Harris, 68 Ill. App. 3d 12, 15-16 (1979). Therefore, we have jurisdiction of the appeal.\nChallenges to grand jury proceedings are limited. In general, a defendant may not challenge the validity of an indictment returned by a legally constituted grand jury. People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239, 255 (1998); People v. Rodgers, 92 Ill. 2d 283, 287 (1982). A defendant may, however, challenge an indictment that is procured through prosecutorial misconduct. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 255. Prosecutorial misconduct does not per se warrant dismissing an indictment. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 256. However, the presentation of deceptive or inaccurate evidence may violate a defendant\u2019s due process rights, justifying dismissal if the defendant can show that the misconduct affected the grand jury\u2019s deliberations. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 257; People v. J.H., 136 Ill. 2d 1, 12-13 (1990).\nGenerally, abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard for reviewing a trial court\u2019s ultimate ruling on a motion to dismiss charges. People v. Brener, 357 Ill. App. 3d 868, 870 (2005). However, because the essential facts concerning what happened at the grand jury proceedings are undisputed, we review de novo whether defendant suffered a prejudicial denial of due process that could warrant dismissal. People v. Campos, 349 Ill. App. 3d 172, 175 (2004).\nWe conclude that the State\u2019s conduct was not so egregious as to warrant the extreme sanction of dismissing the indictment (albeit without prejudice). Clearly, McClary had little personal knowledge of the facts surrounding defendant\u2019s investigation and arrest and merely agreed with the prosecutor\u2019s characterization of Marquardt\u2019s report. It might have been preferable to have an officer who actually participated in the investigation testify before the grand jury, but defendant does not contend that this fact alone deprived him of due process. See People v. Fassler, 153 Ill. 2d 49, 60 (1992) (otherwise valid indictment may not be challenged on the basis of the character of the evidence the grand jury considered); People v. Pulgar, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1010 (2001) (hearsay testimony before grand jury did not invalidate indictment). Instead, defendant points to several discrepancies between Marquardt\u2019s report and McClary\u2019s testimony to argue that the State presented deceptive or inaccurate evidence that induced the grand jury to find probable cause. We disagree.\nMany of the discrepancies defendant identifies are relatively minor details that could not have affected the grand jury\u2019s determination of probable cause. For example, McClary testified that the smaller bag of marijuana was found first, whereas Marquardt\u2019s report states that he found the larger bag first. It is likely that the prosecutor, having read the report some time earlier, was merely confused on this point. Surely, however, defendant does not contend that the grand jury would have refused to indict had it been correctly informed that the larger bag was the first one found. See Sanders v. United States, 550 A.2d 343, 345 (D.C. App. 1988) (false grand jury testimony did not warrant dismissing indictment where truthful answer would not have substantially influenced grand jury\u2019s decision).\nOther discrepancies are, as the State contends, merely matters of semantics. In the report, Marquardt testified that he heard about defendant\u2019s criminal activity from \u201ca man,\u201d while the prosecutor\u2019s question referred to a \u201cconfidential informant.\u201d It is clear that someone can be both a man and a confidential informant. A male, not identified in the report or testimony, who provides information is both a \u201cconfidential informant\u201d and a \u201cman.\u201d\nThe most significant discrepancy between the police report and the live testimony is defendant\u2019s admission that the marijuana was his. This \u201cfact\u201d was included in the latter but omitted from the former. The trial prosecutor assured the trial court that Marquardt had told him that defendant made the statement, but that Marquardt had not included this fact in his report. While we recognize that the prosecutor\u2019s statement was not evidence, the point is that defendant cannot show on this record that McClary\u2019s grand-jury testimony on this point was deceptive or inaccurate. On this limited record, it appears that McClary\u2019s testimony that defendant admitted owning the marijuana was true and that the omission of this fact from the report was a mistake. Of course, defendant may explore this point on cross-examination if the case goes to trial.\nAnother potentially significant flaw in the grand-jury evidence was the discrepancy in the weight of the marijuana. McClary agreed with the prosecutor that the total weight of the cannabis was 107 grams, whereas a laboratory report, available at the time, showed that it weighed only 87.3 grams. While this discrepancy arguably makes defendant\u2019s conduct seem more serious, the added weight did not increase the degree of the offenses with which defendant was charged. See 720 ILCS 550/4(d), 5(d) (West 2004). Thus, the relatively small discrepancy did not materially prejudice defendant.\nThe parties have not cited, and our research has not uncovered, an Illinois case factually similar to this one. Both parties discuss Commonwealth v. Baker, 11 S.W.3d 585 (Ky. App. 2000). There, a mother was charged with abuse for beating her daughters. As in this case, the arresting officer prepared a report, but a different officer, Goff, testified before the grand jury. Goff admitted that he knew little about the case and relied on the prosecutor to provide relevant information through his questioning. Testifying in this manner, Goff stated that the defendant had beaten her daughters with an aluminum baseball bat. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging that, although numerous items were removed from her home pursuant to a search warrant, a baseball bat was not among them. The trial court dismissed the indictment with prejudice. The appellate court agreed that the indictment was properly dismissed, but held that the dismissal should have been without prejudice. Baker, 11 S.W.3d at 590.\nBaker, while factually similar, is distinguishable because the inaccurate grand-jury testimony was much more significant than that under consideration here. Beating someone with an aluminum baseball bat is more serious than beating someone with fists, or even a \u201cwooden stick\u201d or \u201cclub,\u201d as was alleged in Baker at various times. The error there had the potential to alter the fundamental nature of the crime with which the defendant was charged and could have affected the grand jury\u2019s decision to indict. Here, as noted, any inaccurate information presented to the grand jury related to relatively minor details and would not have altered the nature of the crimes with which defendant was charged.\nDefendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly became a witness before the grand jury based on his response to the question about converting metric weights to the English system. Defendant\u2019s precise contention is difficult to ascertain, given that the prosecutor declined to answer the question. Defendant apparently objects to the statement, \u201cI think based upon the information that you received from Officer McClary there\u2019s probably enough for you to decide.\u201d This is clearly a statement of opinion, not a factual assertion. The prosecutor is supposed to advise the grand jury on the pertinent law. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 254. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a prosecutor may not express his opinion that he has presented sufficient evidence to secure an indictment.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed, and the cause is remanded.\nReversed and remanded.\nBOWMAN and O\u2019MALLEY, JJ., concur.\nWe have found no case specifically discussing the standard of review of an order dismissing an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, such cases are virtually nonexistent. However, the standard for reviewing dismissals on the grounds listed in section 114 \u2014 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 1 (West 2004)) should apply. Although prosecutorial misconduct is not specifically listed in section 114 \u2014 1 as a ground for dismissing an indictment, People v. Lawson, 67 Ill. 2d 449, 455-56 (1977), which explicitly held that a court has inherent power to dismiss an indictment for a due process violation, referenced section 114 \u2014 1. Lawson noted that the grounds listed in section 114 \u2014 1 are not exclusive and thus implied that the dismissal of an indictment is accomplished pursuant to that section even if the ground is not specifically listed therein.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KAPALA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Thomas A. Lilien and Barbara R. Paschen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VICTOR A. MATTIS, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201405\u20140586\nOpinion filed August 23, 2006.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nThomas A. Lilien and Barbara R. Paschen, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0432-01", "first_page_order": 450, "last_page_order": 456 }