{ "id": 4266391, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. TARA, Respondent (Anthony Beall, Owner of Tara, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Tara", "decision_date": "2006-09-01", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201405\u20141044", "first_page": "479", "last_page": "490", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 479" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221527 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279617 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461664 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "the reviewing court accords great deference to the trial court's factual findings and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302611 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "the failure to object to hearsay not only waives the issue on appeal, but allows the evidence to be considered by the trier of fact and given its natural probative effect" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 2d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2538956 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "there is no requirement that a plaintiff produce medical testimony where the plaintiff clearly testifies to her injuries and the medical treatment she received" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/95/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2942819 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406-07", "parenthetical": "in a personal injury action, there is no requirement that a plaintiff produce medical testimony concerning the nature and consequences of injuries she sustained" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 3d 698", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2463443 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "it is customary for plaintiffs in injury cases to testify as to the injuries they received" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/15/0698-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600414 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55979 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "it is well established that when a statute defines the very terms it uses, those terms must be construed according to the definitions contained in the act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3827961 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" }, { "page": "429", "parenthetical": "it is never proper for a court to depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704268 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477000 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" }, { "page": "214-15" }, { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "\"Clear and convincing evidence is 'the quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the truth of the proposition in question,' i.e., more than a preponderance while not quite approaching the degree of proof necessary for a criminal conviction\"" }, { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "where the testimony is conflicting in a bench trial, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2527559 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0198-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1191, "char_count": 30171, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14292551419020955 }, "sha256": "234b4bbfad69829f488e25c21c60c4f9e328b4ffc782de2aaa2cf88cde5432b8", "simhash": "1:898aa548f8646988", "word_count": 4999 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:49.400377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. TARA, Respondent (Anthony Beall, Owner of Tara, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn May 6, 2005, the State filed a vicious-dog petition under section 2.19b of the Animal Control Act (Act) (510 ILCS 5/2.19b (West 2004)). The petition alleged that Tara, a rottweiler, attacked Melissa Blecker without justification. Following a bench trial, the Winnebago County circuit court found Tara to be a vicious dog. Tara\u2019s owner, Anthony Beall, appeals the order, arguing that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the puncture wound inflicted by Tara was a \u201cserious physical injury,\u201d and (2) Tara\u2019s actions were without justification. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA bench trial commenced on July 21, 2005, at which the following evidence was adduced. On August 20, 2004, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Blecker was taking her usual evening walk down a neighborhood street. First, Blecker passed Alexandria Reynolds, Beall\u2019s daughter, who was riding a bike in the opposite direction. Next, Blecker approached Tara, who was being walked on a leash by Sharon King, Beall\u2019s mother-in-law, and Kaitlyn Beall, Beall\u2019s eight-year-old daughter. As they passed each other on the same side of the street, Tara bit Blecker. This was the first time that Blecker had ever encountered King, Kaitlyn, or Tara.\nThe remaining facts are disputed, and we begin with Blecker\u2019s account of the incident. Blecker was walking for exercise, which she described as a \u201cpurposeful walk,\u201d such as walking down a hallway at work, but she was not power walking. When Blecker was about 15 to 20 feet away from King and Kaitlyn, Tara was barking loudly and lunging toward her. Blecker evidently looked worried, because King told her not to worry and that Tara would \u201click her to death.\u201d King was gripping the leash to prevent Tara from running away. Because of King\u2019s assurances, Blecker did not cross to the other side of the street, but instead made an arc of four to five feet around them. When doing so, Blecker stated, \u201cOoh, that\u2019s a big dog.\u201d Blecker never made eye contact with Tara or moved toward King or Kaitlyn. Tara then leapt out and bit Blecker\u2019s left arm in the triceps.\nAfter Tara bit down, she did not let go, and King had to grab Tara by the collar to pull her away. It felt like a bear trap on Blecker\u2019s arm. On a scale of 1 to 10, Blecker felt pain at level 10. Blecker was stunned, shocked, and having difficulty breathing. She then knelt down in Greg Lemek\u2019s yard, and King tried to look at Blecker\u2019s arm. When King asked Blecker what she wanted her to do, Tara was still barking and King was holding her back by the collar. At this time, Greg Lemek and his daughter Brittani came over to assist Blecker, who was taken to the emergency room.\nThe sweatshirt that Blecker was wearing that night, which had a hole and two bloodstains, was shown to the court. In addition, Blecker identified two photos taken of the wound after she returned from the emergency room, and two photos taken a few days later. There was a hard lump under her skin at the wound. When asked how deep the wound was, Blecker stated that it went all the way to the bone. Defense counsel objected on the basis that Blecker was not qualified to offer medical testimony, but the trial court overruled the objection. The emergency room doctor told Blecker that Tara\u2019s tooth had gone through the skin and muscle to the bone. As a result, the doctor irrigated Blecker\u2019s arm by using a water pistol to drive a stream of saline solution into the wound. When Blecker\u2019s arm filled up with water, the pain was excruciating. The procedure was performed a few times using Novocain, but then stopped due to the pain. Blecker received a tetanus shot, an antibiotic to prevent infection, and a Vicodin prescription. She did not receive stitches, because the wound needed to \u201cooze.\u201d Globs of fat came out of the wound.\nBlecker showed the court the scar, which measured one-quarter to one-half an inch wide. Although Blecker could perform normal daily activities, she still experienced \u201cburning pain\u201d more than once a month. In response to the burning, Blecker saw her primary care physician twice and a neurologist. Her neurologist explained that the pain resulted from the knot of scar tissue pressing on a nerve. Blecker also received an MRI. To eliminate the scar, the scar tissue would need to be removed from under the skin. Laser treatments would be required to make the scar less pronounced. The laser treatment was a form of plastic surgery, which Blecker could not afford.\nBrittani Lemek, age 13, testified that she was outside her house and saw the incident on August 20. According to Brittani, Blecker was walking normally down the street, not power walking. As Blecker approached Tara, Tara was \u201clunging out\u201d or \u201cleaning forward\u201d at Blecker. Blecker made no movements toward King, Kaitlyn, or Tara, and she walked into another person\u2019s yard in an attempt to veer away from Tara. Brittani thought that Blecker was a few feet from Tara when the dog jumped and bit Blecker\u2019s arm.\nKing\u2019s version of events differed from the testimony of Blecker and Brittani. According to King, Blecker was \u201cpower walking,\u201d with her arms bent at the elbows, her fists clenched, and her hands moving up to the height of her face. When Blecker was about 20 feet away, she looked at King, who said, \u201cDon\u2019t worry about the dog. She would probably lick you to death.\u201d The leash holding Tara, which measured 46 inches, was wrapped around King\u2019s wrist, reducing the length to about 38x/2 inches. Blecker never tried to steer clear of Tara, and Blecker was only six or seven inches away when she passed them. King could feel the movement of Blecker\u2019s arm as she passed by, but Tara did not growl or lurch at Blecker. Then, in a \u201cvery loud\u201d voice, Blecker said, \u201cThat really is a big dog.\u201d Tara turned quickly and leapt between them, \u201cgrabbing\u201d Blecker\u2019s arm with one of her fangs. After that, Tara sat down. King never saw Tara\u2019s mouth clamp down on Blecker\u2019s arm, and she did not pull Tara off of Blecker. At no point was Tara barking or growling. When King looked at Blecker\u2019s arm, she saw a red mark smaller than the end of a pen. The wound was not bleeding. King estimated that Tara weighed between 80 and 100 pounds.\nAlexandria, who was riding her bike, and Kaitlyn both testified that Blecker was power walking as she approached them. According to Kaitlyn, Tara was not barking or growling. When Blecker passed them, she almost brushed against King\u2019s shoulder, although Kaitlyn described the distance as 2x/2 to 3 feet away. In a louder-than-normal voice, Blecker said, \u201cBig dog, big dog.\u201d King told Blecker that Tara would probably lick her to death. Tara \u201clunged\u201d at Blecker and then sat down.\nDefense expert Dr. Susan Krebsbach, a veterinarian specializing in animal behavior, testified as follows. Dr. Krebsbach performed a three-hour in-home evaluation of Tara eight months after the incident (April 21, 2005). Dr. Krebsbach was introduced to Tara by the Beall family, and she also considered information given to her by the Bealls. In Dr. Krebsbach\u2019s opinion, Tara was \u201cextremely well-behaved\u201d and \u201cvery super-social\u201d; she exhibited no aggression or aggressive tendencies.\nDefense counsel then questioned Dr. Krebsbach about the following hypothetical. Blecker, a stranger, is walking fast and raising her arms over her head (power walking) when she approaches King, Kaitlyn, and Tara. She passes within a foot of them and loudly states, \u201cThat is a big dog.\u201d Tara lunges at Blecker and nips her upper-left arm. Dr. Krebsbach testified that, in her opinion, Tara would interpret Blecker as a threat and her response would be justified and appropriate in that context. Dr. Krebsbach explained that the two most important factors in the hypothetical were Blecker being a stranger and Blecker passing very close to Tara and \u201cher people.\u201d Dr. Krebsbach further explained that the nature of the injury supported her opinion, in that Tara took only one \u201cwarning bite,\u201d which was not very severe. When the threat retreated, Tara retreated. If Tara had bitten multiple times or not let go, that would have constituted more aggressive behavior. If Tara had had to be pulled away because she would not let go, the injury would have been worse because of \u201cscraping\u201d and \u201cdrag marks\u201d on Blecker\u2019s arm.\nOn cross-examination, the State posed a different hypothetical. Instead of power walking, Blecker is walking normally, swinging her arms at her sides. She arcs around Tara at a three- to five-foot distance and comments about the size of the dog in a normal voice. Dr. Krebsbach explained that a dog would not be justified in biting a stranger because of a perceived threat if the stranger approached the dog at a distance of three to five feet. In Dr. Krebsbach\u2019s opinion, Tara would not \u201clurch out\u201d and bite Blecker in this scenario.\nBecause it is difficult to grasp everything in one consultation, Dr. Krebsbach admitted that she might add to an initial diagnosis the more she got to know an animal. She also admitted that when she tested and evaluated Tara for aggressive responses, Tara was already familiar with Dr. Krebsbach, having worked with her for several hours.\nSeveral witnesses testified regarding Tara\u2019s temperament. Vicki Buckholz, a certified dog trainer and a kennel owner, evaluated Tara shortly after the biting incident. After observing Tara for approximately 10 days in her kennel, Buckholz opined that Tara had a nice, \u201ceven-keel\u201d temperament. She observed no aggressive traits in Tara. Pest exterminator Kris Mei testified that she had been in the Beall home numerous times when only Tara was present. Mei described Tara as a \u201cbig happy dog\u201d who had never growled at her, lurched at her, or bitten her. Beall\u2019s neighbor, Candy Bunk, testified that she had been around Tara \u201ccountless\u201d times and that she allowed her six-year-old to play at the Beall house. Bunk never observed any aggressive behavior in Tara.\nThe trial court found Tara to be a vicious dog, stating the following. Blecker did not torment, abuse, assault, or physically threaten Tara, but was engaged in \u201ccommon, ordinary, everyday walking along the streets.\u201d Although Tara \u201cprobably felt there was a threat\u201d and \u201cthought it was protecting\u201d given Blecker\u2019s \u201cunusual\u201d \u201cgait,\u201d Tara was not justified in biting or attacking Blecker. The puncture wound, especially one as deep as Blecker\u2019s, was \u201cserious by definition.\u201d Also, there was \u201cminor\u201d evidence of \u201cother teeth marks\u201d and \u201ca drag mark\u201d in the photos. The court was not sure whether the \u201clong kind of abrasion scratch mark\u201d was caused by \u201csomebody pulling the arm or pulling the dog off.\u201d The wound qualified as a \u201cserious physical injury,\u201d resulting in a \u201cdiscernable scar,\u201d which would require plastic surgery to remove. Blecker\u2019s ongoing pain, caused by the change in the interior of her arm, was consistent with a serious injury. While the court believed \u201c100% the testimony that Tara is a great dog,\u201d it had no choice but to find Tara \u201cvicious\u201d as defined under the statute.\nBeall moved to reconsider the ruling, and the trial court denied this motion. Beall\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nBeall presents essentially two arguments on appeal: first, that Blecker\u2019s wound was not a \u201cserious physical injury,\u201d and second, that Tara\u2019s conduct was justified. We will not reverse the trial court\u2019s vicious-dog determination unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Logan County Animal Control Warden v. Danley, 211 Ill. App. 3d 198, 203-04 (1991). A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (1995). This is because the trial judge, as the trier of fact, is in a superior position to a reviewing court to observe witnesses while testifying, to assess their credibility, and to determine the weight their testimony should receive. Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 214-15.\nA. Serious Physical Injury\nWe begin by setting forth the relevant statutes. Under section 2.19b, a \u201c[vjicious dog means a dog that, without justification, attacks a person and causes serious physical injury or death.\u201d 510 ILCS 5/2.19b (West 2004). Section 2.19 defines \u201cserious physical injury\u201d as \u201ca physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious or protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, impairment of the function of any bodily organ, or plastic surgery.\u201d 510 ILCS 5/2.19a (West 2004). Section 15(a) states that \u201c[t]he petitioner must prove the dog is a vicious dog by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d 510 ILCS 5/15(a) (West 2004).\nBeall makes several arguments why Blecker\u2019s puncture wound should not qualify as a \u201cserious physical injury.\u201d First, Beall asserts that the statute was never meant to include the type of injury that Blecker suffered, which Beall describes as a \u201cpea-sized pink dot.\u201d According to Beall, the legislative history reveals an intent to cover more serious injuries. The State responds that section 2.19a\u2019s definition of \u201cserious physical injury\u201d is clear and unambiguous; thus, it is improper to consider the legislative history. The State argues that even if we were to consider the legislative history, it does not show an intent to exclude Blecker\u2019s wound, as Beall claims.\nWe review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 144 (2006). The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Elementary School District 159, 221 Ill. 2d at 144. The plain language of a statute remains the best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent. Elementary School District 159, 221 Ill. 2d at 144. When the statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other aids of interpretation. Village of Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d 402, 429 (2005).\nIn urging this court to consider the legislative history, Beall does not explain how the statutory language is ambiguous. On the contrary, the statute contains a definition of \u201cserious physical injury.\u201d See Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 379 (1996) (it is well established that when a statute defines the very terms it uses, those terms must be construed according to the definitions contained in the act). As stated, \u201cserious physical injury\u201d is defined as \u201ca physical injury that creates a substantial risk of *** protracted impairment of health, impairment of the function of any bodily organ, or plastic surgery.\u201d 510 ILCS 5/2.19a (West 2004). Because this language is clear and unambiguous, we do not resort to other aids of interpretation, but rely only on the plain language of the statute.\nSecond, Beall asserts that the language in section 2.19a does not mention anything about being \u201cbitten,\u201d in contrast to section 2.12, which defines \u201chas been bitten.\u201d Under section 2.12, \u201c \u2018[h]as been bitten\u2019 means has been seized with the teeth or jaws so that the person or animal seized has been nipped, gripped, wounded, or pierced, and further includes contact of saliva with any break or abrasion of the skin.\u201d 510 ILCS 5/2.12 (West 2004). In Beall\u2019s view, the fact that the legislature defined a dog bite in section 2.12, but failed to include any such language in section 2.19a\u2019s definition of \u201cserious physical injury,\u201d evinces an intent not to include a typical dog bite in the category of a \u201cserious physical injury.\u201d Otherwise, Beall argues, every dog that bites a person and pierces the skin would be classified as a \u201cvicious dog.\u201d However, as the State points out, the statutory definition of \u201chas been bitten\u201d gives meaning to the phrase as it is used elsewhere in the Act (see 510 ILCS 5/13 (West 2004)). Also, rather than containing a list of specific injuries, such as being bitten or piercing the skin, section 2.19a describes injuries resulting from a dog attack in terms of their severity. Thus, whether an injury qualifies as a \u201cserious physical injury\u201d depends on its severity. Accordingly, the failure of the legislature to specifically include a dog bite in the definition of a \u201cserious physical injury\u201d does not indicate an intent to exclude a \u201cserious physical injury\u201d that results from a dog bite. See Village of Chatham, 216 Ill. 2d at 429 (it is never proper for a court to depart from the plain language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent).\nThird, Beall asserts that the State did not meet its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Blecker suffered a \u201cserious physical injury.\u201d See Baker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d 62, 69-70 (2005), quoting Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 213 (\u201cClear and convincing evidence is \u2018the quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder as to the truth of the proposition in question,\u2019 i.e., more than a preponderance while not quite approaching the degree of proof necessary for a criminal conviction\u201d). Specifically, Beall asserts that Blecker\u2019s \u201cself-serving lay testimony,\u201d without additional medical expert testimony, was insufficient to prove a \u201cserious physical injury\u201d by a clear and convincing standard. Beall also asserts that, because Blecker was not a medical expert, she was not qualified to testify about medical diagnoses, conditions, and procedures. For the following reasons, we reject these arguments and hold that the State proved that the injury caused impairment of the function of a bodily organ (Blecker\u2019s skin), protracted impairment of her health, and the need for plastic surgery.\nAs Beall admits, Blecker properly testified regarding the general nature of her injury, the level of her pain and discomfort, and the resulting scar and the hard lump beneath her skin. See Wiacek v. Hospital Service Corp., 15 Ill. App. 3d 698, 701 (1973) (it is customary for plaintiffs in injury cases to testify as to the injuries they received). Moreover, given Blecker\u2019s \u201cdiscernable scar,\u201d .the photographs, and the sweatshirt she was wearing on the night of the incident, medical testimony was not required in this case. See Geers v. Brichta, 248 Ill. App. 3d 398, 406-07 (1993) (in a personal injury action, there is no requirement that a plaintiff produce medical testimony concerning the nature and consequences of injuries she sustained); see also Turner v. City of Chicago, 95 Ill. App. 2d 38, 39 (1968) (there is no requirement that a plaintiff produce medical testimony where the plaintiff clearly testifies to her injuries and the medical treatment she received). Thus, Beall\u2019s blanket assertion that Blecker\u2019s testimony was improper fails.\nAs the trial court noted, the evidence presented at trial showed that the puncture wound inflicted by Tara was deep. Blecker testified that the wound went all the way to the bone, and that when her arm was irrigated, she could actually \u201cfeel\u201d her arm fill up with water, which was excruciatingly painful. Moreover, the emergency room doctor informed Blecker that the wound went through the skin and muscle, down to the bone. Because Beall failed to object to hearsay statements from the emergency room doctor, this issue is waived on appeal and the evidence could be considered by the trial court and given its natural probative effect. See People v. Ramsey, 205 Ill. 2d 287, 293 (2002) (the failure to object to hearsay not only waives the issue on appeal, but allows the evidence to be considered by the trier of fact and given its natural probative effect). Blecker further testified that she did not receive stitches because the wound needed to ooze and that globs of fat came out of the wound. The doctor prescribed antibiotics and gave her a tetanus shot to stave off infection. As the State argued at trial, skin is an organ. Thus, the court could have found that the puncture wound impaired the skin\u2019s function in protecting the body\u2019s internal structures from injury and infection.\nSecond, a hard lump of scar tissue remained beneath Blecker\u2019s skin 11 months after the incident. We note that the trial court was in a superior position to assess the severity of the wound by viewing Blecker\u2019s scar, which measured one-quarter to one-half an inch wide. Blecker\u2019s neurologist advised her that the burning pain she experienced more than once a month was caused by the underlying knot of scar tissue that continued to press on her nerve. (Again, Blecker\u2019s testimony could be considered by the trial court because Beall failed to make a hearsay objection.) Based on the continued burning sensations, the trial court could have found that the injury created a substantial risk of protracted impairment of health. As the court stated, Blecker\u2019s \u201congoing pain,\u201d caused by the change in the interior of her arm, was consistent with a serious injury. Third, Blecker testified that plastic surgery was required to remove the scar. Initially, the scar tissue would need to be removed from under the skin, and then laser treatment performed to make the scar less visible. Blecker testified that the laser treatment was a form of plastic surgery, which had not been performed due to the expense. \u201cSerious physical injury\u201d is defined as \u201ca physical injury that creates a substantial risk of *** protracted impairment of health, impairment of the function of any bodily organ, or plastic surgery.\u201d 510 ILCS 5/2.19a (West 2004). Because the scar could not be removed without plastic surgery, the court could have found that Blecker\u2019s wound constituted a \u201cserious physical injury.\u201d\nFurthermore, the trial court relied on photographs of Blecker\u2019s injury in determining the severity of the bite. While Beall challenges the court\u2019s interpretation of the photographs, which were taken after Blecker returned from the emergency room and a few days after the incident, we accord great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings. See People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 505 (2003) (the reviewing court accords great deference to the trial court\u2019s factual findings and will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence). The court, which specifically noted that it had several years of experience examining photos of injuries, found \u201cminor\u201d evidence of other teeth marks and a drag mark, which appeared as a \u201clong kind of abrasion scratch mark.\u201d With respect to the long scratch mark, the court made no definitive finding, stating that it was uncertain whether it was caused by \u201csomebody pulling the arm or pulling the dog off.\u201d Our review of the photos shows evidence of such marks. Additionally, we note that the court also viewed the sweatshirt that Blecker wore, which had a hole and two bloodstains. Based on the evidence, the trial court\u2019s factual findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the puncture wound inflicted by Tara constituted a \u201cserious physical injury.\u201d\nB. Without Justification\nBeall next argues that the trial court erred by disregarding Dr. Krebsbach\u2019s testimony when it applied a \u201chuman standard\u201d to Tara in finding that her actions were without justification. Beall asserts that, given Blecker\u2019s version of events, Dr. Krebsbach opined that Tara would not have bitten her. According to Beall, the court should have given more weight to Dr. Krebsbach\u2019s testimony, especially when the State presented no canine expert of its own to contradict her testimony.\nSection 15 provides the requirements for a vicious-dog determination. It states, in relevant part:\n\u201c(a) *** The Administrator, State\u2019s Attorney, Director or any citizen of the county in which the dog exists may file a complaint in the circuit court in the name of the People of the State of Illinois to deem a dog to be a vicious dog. Testimony of a certified applied behaviorist, a board certified veterinary behaviorist, or another recognized expert may be relevant to the court\u2019s determination of whether the dog\u2019s behavior was justified. ***\nA dog shall not be declared vicious if the court determines the conduct of the dog was justified because:\n(2) the injured, threatened, or killed person was tormenting, abusing, assaulting, or physically threatening the dog or its offspring, or has in the past tormented, abused, assaulted, or physically threatened the dog or its offspring; or\n(3) the dog was responding to pain or injury, or was protecting itself, its owner, custodian, or member of its household, kennel, or offspring.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 510 ILCS 5/15 (West 2004).\nAfter finding that Blecker did nothing to torment, abuse, assault, or physically threaten Tara, the court stated that the important issue was whether Tara was protecting King and Kaitlyn. The court reasoned:\n\u201cI have no doubt as much as I can tell, not being a dog psychic, that the dog probably felt there was a threat, felt it was protecting, did react. And I suspect we have a person who [sic] with a gait that the dog deemed unusual and strange, and the dog didn\u2019t know what to make of it, the dog tried to protect the people, but if that was a person doing what the dog did, I\u2019d tell the person you can\u2019t do that. The dog probably thought it was protecting, but it was not justified in that.\nWhat occurred was something common, ordinary, everyday walking along the streets in paths with animals. There was no justification, there was serious physical injury.\u201d\nThe facts in this case were disputed. On the one hand, King testified that Blecker never tried to steer clear of Tara but was power walking and passed them less than a foot away. Kaitlyn and Alexandria similarly testified that Blecker was power walking. On the other hand, Blecker testified that she was walking normally down the street, that she made an arc of several feet around Tara, that she made no movements toward Tara as she passed, and that she was a few feet away when Tara leapt out and bit her arm. Brittani completely corroborated this testimony, and even Kaitlyn described Blecker\u2019s distance from Tara as 21h to 3 feet at the time she was bitten. Based on all of the evidence, the trial court specifically found that Blecker was engaged in common, ordinary walking down the street. The court further found that Tara probably felt she was protecting King and Kaitlyn as Blecker passed, but that this did not justify biting Blecker. See Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 215 (where the testimony is conflicting in a bench trial, the trial court\u2019s findings will not be disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence).\nAccording to Dr. Krebsbach, Tara would not have been justified in biting Blecker if she were walking normally and passed at a three- to five-foot distance. While Dr. Krebsbach also opined that Tara would not \u201clurch out\u201d and bite someone in this scenario, as Blecker claimed Tara did, the weight to be accorded an expert\u2019s opinion is determined by the facts supporting the expert opinion and the reasons given for it. See Wilfert v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 318 Ill. App. 3d 507, 514 (2000). Moreover, the trial court is free to accept or reject expert testimony in whole or in part, and the trial court need not accept the opinion of one expert even where that expert\u2019s testimony is not directly countered by the expert testimony of another. Villareal v. Peebles, 299 Ill. App. 3d 556, 562 (1998). Under the facts presented, there was sufficient evidence to support the court\u2019s finding that Tara acted without justification when she bit Blecker.\nFurthermore, had the trial court accepted Beall\u2019s claim that Blecker was power walking as she passed Tara, our conclusion would not change. We recognize that, at trial, Dr. Krebsbach opined that Tara would be justified in interpreting Blecker as a threat if she were power walking and passed Tara closely. However, based on the statutory language, Tara would not have been justified in biting Blecker if Blecker were power walking or even jogging as she passed. The statute specifically sets forth the circumstances under which Tara\u2019s biting Blecker would be justified. Because Blecker never physically threatened, tormented, abused, or assaulted Tara, the only issue was whether Tara\u2019s action was justified because the dog was \u201cprotecting itself, its owner, custodian, or member of its household.\u201d 510 ILCS 5/15(a)(3) (West 2004). Regardless of Blecker\u2019s gait, there was simply no reason for Tara to \u201cprotect\u201d King and Kaitlyn. Otherwise, a dog\u2019s conduct would be justified anytime it perceived a threat and felt the need to protect. Thus, we disagree with Beall\u2019s assertion that the trial court should have placed greater weight on Dr. Krebsbach\u2019s testimony. Although such testimony \u201cmay be relevant to the court\u2019s determination of whether the dog\u2019s behavior was justified\u201d (emphasis added) (510 ILCS 5/15(a) (West 2004)), expert testimony may not trump the plain language of the statute. For these reasons, our decision does not hinge upon whether Blecker was power walking.\nAs a final matter, we find no merit in Beall\u2019s argument that the trial court incorrectly applied a \u201chuman standard\u201d to Tara in finding that the dog\u2019s actions were not justified. There is nothing in the court\u2019s discussion to show an improper standard being applied. Rather, as noted above, the court carefully followed the statute in finding Tara to be a vicious dog.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nThe court\u2019s determination that Tara is a vicious dog was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Winnebago County circuit court\u2019s judgment is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BOWMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Stephen M. Langley, of Schirger, Monteleone & Hampilos, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant.", "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin P Moltz and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. TARA, Respondent (Anthony Beall, Owner of Tara, Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201405\u20141044\nOpinion filed September 1, 2006.\nStephen M. Langley, of Schirger, Monteleone & Hampilos, P.C., of Rockford, for appellant.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Martin P Moltz and Sally A. Swiss, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0479-01", "first_page_order": 497, "last_page_order": 508 }