{ "id": 4265480, "name": "DANIEL J. SEDLOCK, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE CITY OF OTTAWA, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Sedlock v. Board of Trustees", "decision_date": "2006-08-22", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201405\u20140736", "first_page": "526", "last_page": "529", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 526" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "512 N.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3610672 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 N.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. App. 3d 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3497391 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/141/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "816 N.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "814" }, { "page": "814" }, { "page": "814" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5457208 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" }, { "page": "773" }, { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588617 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0304-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 436, "char_count": 8661, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14288497128597072 }, "sha256": "54249e15bebda7a9d225158bd543773ffb3b61f5df23c56435b67327647321e6", "simhash": "1:8a359dffe22f25bc", "word_count": 1396 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:49.400377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DANIEL J. SEDLOCK, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE CITY OF OTTAWA, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal of the trial court\u2019s dismissal of petitioner Daniel Sedlock\u2019s complaint for declaratory judgment. Sedlock asked the circuit court of La Salle County to declare that the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the City of Ottawa (PPF) does not have the authority to make a final salary determination for Sedlock in any sum other than $84,338.31.\nBACKGROUND\nSedlock retired as chief of police of the City of Ottawa on September 8, 2003. Sedlock\u2019s salary, as chief of police, was $64,000 until the city council of the City of Ottawa amended his employment agreement on August 5, 2003, to increase his annual salary to $84,338.31. The increase in his salary took effect on September 1, 2003, one week before his retirement. The PPF set a public hearing to be held on October 26, 2004, to consider what the final salary determination should be for calculating the future retirement pension of Sedlock.\nUnder section 3 \u2014 111 of the Illinois Pension Code (the Code), a police officer shall receive a pension of one-half of the salary attached to the rank held on the last day of service. 40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 111(a) (West 2004). Pursuant to the Code, \u201csalary\u201d means the annual salary, including longevity attached to the police officer\u2019s rank, as established by the municipality\u2019s appropriation ordinance, including any compensation for overtime which is included in the salary established, but excluding any \u201covertime pay,\u201d \u201choliday pay,\u201d \u201cbonus pay,\u201d \u201cmerit pay,\u201d or any other cash benefit not included in the salary so established. 40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 125.1 (West 2004).\nOn October 5, 2004, Sedlock filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting that the court enter an order finding that the PPF has no authority under the Code to make a final annual salary determination in any sum other than the amount of $84,338.31. The PPF filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint because there was no actual controversy between the parties since the PPF had not yet made a determination as to what the salary was and no final appealable decision by the PPF had been made. Sedlock filed a motion to strike the PPF\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nA hearing was held on both motions and, on May 31, 2005, the court denied Sedlock\u2019s motion to strike and granted the PPF\u2019s motion to dismiss. First, the court found that it is the PPF\u2019s fiduciary duty to determine a police officer\u2019s salary when calculating his pension. Then, the court found that dismissal was appropriate because Sedlock was required to exhaust his administrative remedies, if dissatisfied with any decision of the PPF\u00a1 before seeking judicial relief in court.\nThere are two issues before this court. First, whether the PPF has the authority to determine what a police officer\u2019s \u201csalary\u201d is under the Code for the purpose of calculating the officer\u2019s pension benefit amount. The second issue is whether, after having answered the preceding question in the affirmative, the trial court properly dismissed the declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.\nANALYSIS\nWe affirm the circuit court. First, we address whether the court has jurisdiction to decide whether the PPF has the authority to determine Sedlock\u2019s salary. Generally, a person with a claim from an administrative agency must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking relief from the judicial system pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Review Law. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2004). However, the court has recognized several exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, including when the agency\u2019s jurisdiction is attacked because a party claims that it is not authorized by statute to do something it is attempting to do, as Sedlock claims here. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 309, 547 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1989); Wright v. Pucinski, 352 Ill. App. 3d 769, 773, 816 N.E.2d 808, 814 (2004). Where an administrative assertion of authority to hear or determine certain matters is challenged on its face as not authorized by the enabling legislation, such a facial attack does not implicate the exhaustion doctrine and exhaustion is not required. Wright v. Pucinski, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 816 N.E.2d at 814. The rationalization for this exception is that when an agency\u2019s statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction is at issue, no questions of fact are involved. The agency\u2019s particular expertise is not implicated in the necessary statutory interpretation. Wright v. Pucinski, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 774, 816 N.E.2d at 814. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to decide whether the PPF had the authority to determine Sedlock\u2019s salary for the purpose of calculating his pension under the Code.\nNext, we consider whether the PPF has authority to determine Sedlock\u2019s \u201csalary.\u201d We agree with the trial court\u2019s statutory interpretation that the PPF has the authority to determine what Sedlock\u2019s salary is under the Code for the purpose of calculating his future pension. Section 3 \u2014 132 of the Code provides that, pursuant to section 3 \u2014 131, police pension fund boards have the exclusive control and management of the pension fund. 40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 132 (West 2004). The fundamental purpose of a police pension fund board is to determine eligibility to participate in the fund. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 141 Ill. App. 3d 447, 455, 490 N.E.2d 232, 238 (1986). Additionally, the trustees of the fund are statutorily designated as fiduciaries. Section 1 \u2014 101.2 of the Code provides that any person who exercises any discretionary authority or control over the money amount of a pension fund is a \u201cfiduciary.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101.2 (West 2004). As a fiduciary, each board member is required to \u201cdischarge his or her duties with respect to the *** pension fund solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and *** for the exclusive purpose of *** providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 109 (West 2004).\nWe hold that the board\u2019s statutory duties include determing what Sedlock\u2019s annual salary should be for the purpose of calculating his retirement benefits. Granting Sedlock\u2019s request could result in circuit courts being charged with making salary determinations for thousands of public employees seeking disability or retirement pensions each year. This is not what the legislature intended. The board is in the best position to determine whether Sedlock\u2019s most recent salary included overtime, holiday, bonus, or merit pay.\nNext, we consider whether the court properly dismissed the complaint for declaratory judgment. Once the court properly determined the scope of the PPF\u2019s authority, there was no actual controversy between the parties since there had been no determination by the PPF as to what the salary of Sedlock was or what his retirement pension will be. Under section 3 \u2014 128 of the Code, all final administrative decisions of the pension board are judicially reviewable under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law. 40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 128 (West 2004). An administrative decision is \u201cany decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of [a party] and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 (West 2004). Until there is a final appealable decision by the PPF, any action brought before the court is premature and the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. Judicial review can only be undertaken where there is a final agency determination. Taylor v. State Universities Retirement System, 159 Ill. App. 3d 372, 374, 512 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1987).\nWithout a final decision from the PP\u00cd] there is simply nothing for the circuit court to review. The circuit court, therefore, correctly determined that it had no subject matter jurisdiction on the issue of what Sedlock\u2019s salary should be.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nLYTTON and O\u2019BRIEN, JJ, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Peter F. Ferracuti and Jennifer Kiesewetter (argued), both of Law Offices of Peter F. Ferracuti, PC., of Ottawa, for appellant.", "James L. Dobrovolny (argued), of Dobrovolny Law Offices, of Urbana, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DANIEL J. SEDLOCK, JR., Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE CITY OF OTTAWA, Respondent-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201405\u20140736\nOpinion filed August 22, 2006.\nPeter F. Ferracuti and Jennifer Kiesewetter (argued), both of Law Offices of Peter F. Ferracuti, PC., of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJames L. Dobrovolny (argued), of Dobrovolny Law Offices, of Urbana, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0526-01", "first_page_order": 544, "last_page_order": 547 }