{ "id": 4266246, "name": "VIVIAN HOFFELT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Hoffelt v. Department of Human Rights", "decision_date": "2006-10-20", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20141629", "first_page": "628", "last_page": "640", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 628" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "536 U.S. 101", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1254428 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "2073" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "2075" }, { "page": "117" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "2075" }, { "page": "118" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "2075" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/536/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 N.E.2d 550", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 Ill. App. 3d 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5252946 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/224/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2567610 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 F. Supp. 2d 1012", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9271251 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1014", "parenthetical": "in the retaliation setting, the standard for determining whether an employer's act constitutes an adverse employment action has been determined to be less demanding" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/307/1012-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 F.3d 1211", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 3452322, 996999 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1217-18" }, { "page": "1219" }, { "page": "1219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us-app-dc/370/0074-01", "/f3d/438/1211-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 U.S. 53", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3500335 ], "weight": 31, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" }, { "page": "357-58" }, { "page": "2413" }, { "page": "67" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "2414" }, { "page": "61" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "2411" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "2415" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "2415" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "2415" }, { "page": "68-69" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "2415" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "2415" }, { "page": "360" }, { "page": "2415" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "359" }, { "page": "2415" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/548/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 U.S. 742", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11183137 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" }, { "page": "652-53" }, { "page": "2268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/524/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "633 N.E.2d 202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5372684 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 F.3d 658", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 8939237 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" }, { "page": "660" }, { "page": "662" }, { "page": "662", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "662" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "662" }, { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/420/0658-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 F.3d 783", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9412438 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" }, { "page": "788" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/295/0783-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 F.3d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9285235 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/359/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 F.3d 437", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9042843 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/89/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 U.S. 792", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 10002 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/411/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 684", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "687" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5570132 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 1105", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1111" }, { "page": "1111" }, { "page": "1112" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221526 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "316" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "836 N.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 1170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5595587 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/1170-01" ] }, { "cite": "806 N.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" }, { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1012", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3832415 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1017" }, { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/1012-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1146, "char_count": 28924, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.39269767736494e-08, "percentile": 0.3960923976648832 }, "sha256": "ae3796c505f2400e0df83fb690b3f5f2ef7c677aac961c258e494ddc6c4cd34f", "simhash": "1:597c38822ec315d7", "word_count": 4567 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:49.400377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "VIVIAN HOFFELT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn April 25, 2005, the Illinois Department of Human Rights (the Department), through its chief legal counsel, issued a final appealable order pursuant to the Illinois Human Rights Act. 775 ILCS 5/8\u2014 111(A) (West 2004). Petitioner, Vivian Hoffelt, now seeks review and reversal of that order which dismissed her charges of sex discrimination and unlawful retaliation for having complained of sexual harassment.\nPetitioner began work with the City of Chicago (the City), in July 1988 as an aviation security officer at O\u2019Hare International Airport. Beginning in late 1999, her superior officer, Sgt. Christopher Disandro, allegedly began a pattern of inappropriate conduct toward her. On one occasion in late 2001, Disandro, referring to petitioner and another female officer, said, \u201cI would love to have one on the face and one on the crotch.\u201d After this statement, petitioner told Disandro to leave her alone. Allegedly, Disandro began retaliation toward petitioner that negatively affected her treatment on the job and caused her to fear for her personal safety. When Disandro was suspended in August 2002 for violating the City\u2019s residency requirement, he became furious with petitioner because he suspected that she had \u201cdropped a dime\u201d on him. He allegedly threatened that he \u201cknew people from the old neighborhood\u201d and that he could have her \u201cdropped\u201d and that he knew people who were getting released from prison soon.\nOn May 1, 2003, petitioner filed a six-count charge against the City, alleging that she had been subjected to various forms of discrimination from early November 2002 until the date of filing. Each and every count alleged that she had been harassed or discriminated against by Lt. Zanders.\nCount I alleged harassment from early November 2002 and continuing until the present (May 1, 2003) due to her sex, female. In this count, petitioner alleged that Lt. Zanders harassed her by referring to her and other females as \u201cincompetents,\u201d \u201cbottom feeders,\u201d and \u201cinept.\u201d She further alleged that he claimed male employees wrote better reports, talked to her in a demeaning manner, and yelled at her, creating a hostile work environment.\nCount II also alleged harassment from early November 2002 and continuing until the present (May 1, 2003). Count II alleged that the harassment was in retaliation for petitioner\u2019s opposing unlawful discrimination. In this count, petitioner alleged that she was harassed by Lt. Zanders, who condoned Disandro\u2019s sexual harassment of her and another employee, and again alleged that Lt. Zanders harassed her by referring to her and other females as \u201cincompetents,\u201d \u201cbottom feeders,\u201d and \u201cinept,\u201d claiming that male employees wrote better reports, talking to her in a demeaning manner, and yelling at her, creating a hostile work environment. Petitioner also alleged that Lt. Zanders harassed her after she opposed unlawful discrimination (Disandro\u2019s alleged sexual harassment), thereby raising an inference of retaliatory motivation.\nCount III alleged unequal terms and conditions of employment, during the same time period contained in counts I and II, due to her sex, female. She alleged that Lt. Zanders continually gave her less desirable assignments and on several occasions had denied her holiday and compensatory time pay, although it had been previously approved and/or she had documentation to justify it, forcing her to submit additional information and documents before the situation was corrected.\nCount IV alleged unequal terms and conditions of employment, during the same time period contained in counts I, II, and III, and repeated the same allegations as count III. The basis of count IV\u00a1 however, was retaliatory motive for petitioner\u2019s opposing unlawful discrimination, namely, Disandro\u2019s alleged sexual harassment.\nCounts V and VI each alleged inaccurate performance evaluation in January 2003. Count V was based upon her sex, female. Count VI alleged retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination.\nOn October 15, 2004, the Department dismissed petitioner\u2019s charge for lack of substantial evidence. On April 25, 2005, the chief legal counsel upheld the dismissal for lack of substantial evidence.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\nThe decision of the chief legal counsel to sustain dismissal of a charge should be upheld unless the decision was \u201carbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.\u201d Gusciara v. Lustig, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1017, 806 N.E.2d 746, 750 (2004). Agency action is arbitrary and capricious when the agency contravenes the legislature\u2019s intent, fails to consider a crucial aspect of the problem, or offers an implausible explanation contrary to agency expertise. Allen v. Lieberman, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1170, 1177, 836 N.E.2d 64, 69 (2005). Substantial evidence is defined as \u201cevidence which a reasonable mind accepts as sufficient to support a particular conclusion and which consists of more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.\u201d 775 ILCS 5/7A \u2014 102(D)(2) (West 2004); see Stone v. Department of Human Rights, 299 Ill. App. 3d 306, 314, 700 N.E.2d 1105, 1111 (1998). Substantial evidence has also been said to be \u201csuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\u201d Stone, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 315, 700 N.E.2d at 1111. For the following reasons, we affirm the chief legal counsel\u2019s decision to sustain the Department\u2019s dismissal of counts I, III, and V which were based on sex discrimination. However, we conclude that the chief legal counsel abused his discretion in finding a lack of substantial evidence regarding petitioner\u2019s claims of retaliation based upon her opposing unlawful discrimination, namely, Disandro\u2019s alleged sexual harassment.\nANALYSIS\nPetitioner\u2019s claims, although somewhat intertwined, include charges of discrimination based on her sex (i.e., her gender-based status), as well as charges of retaliation based on her opposition to Disandro\u2019s alleged sexual harassment (i.e., her conduct). We shall first address petitioner\u2019s sex discrimination charges.\nSex Discrimination Claim\nIn analyzing employment discrimination actions brought under the Human Rights Act, the Commission and the Illinois Supreme Court have adopted the analytical framework set forth by the United States Supreme Court in its decisions addressing claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e et seq. (1982)). Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178, 545 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1989). A person can establish discrimination through either the direct method that an adverse employment action was taken for unlawful discriminatory reasons or through the indirect method pursuant to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 178-79, 545 N.E.2d at 687.\nTo establish a prima facie case of discrimination in accordance with the analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), a complainant must demonstrate that (1) she engaged in a protected activity that was known by the respondent; (2) the respondent subsequently took some adverse action against the complainant; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the disadvantageous employment action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Because petitioner failed to show that the City committed a material adverse act against her, she failed to sufficiently demonstrate the second element and, thus, failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.\nRespondents assert that \u201cnot everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action.\u201d Smart v. Ball State University, 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996). They note that whether petitioner proceeds by the direct or indirect method of proof, she must show a materially adverse employment action. Rhodes v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004). In other words, she must show that \u201c \u2018material harm has resulted from ... the challenged actions.\u2019 [Citations.]\u201d Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2002).\nIn order to be considered materially adverse enough to constitute discrimination, an employment action must constitute a \u201c \u2018severe or pervasive\u2019 change in the daily \u2018conditions\u2019 of employment ***. [Citations.]\u201d Washington v. Rlinois Department of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 661 (7th Cir. 2005). As the court in Traylor explained, an adverse employment action had been defined by that court as \u201c \u2018more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Traylor, 295 F.3d at 788. We conclude that petitioner did not suffer a materially adverse employment action sufficient to support her charges of discrimination based on sex. Counts I, III and V allege that petitioner was harassed, subjected to unequal terms and conditions of employment, and given an inaccurate performance evaluation, and that all of these actions were based upon her sex. Those allegations, taken as true, do not establish a severe or pervasive change in the daily conditions of employment. Thus, the chief legal counsel did not abuse his discretion in finding a lack of substantial evidence to support petitioner\u2019s charges of discrimination based on sex. We conclude that the chief legal counsel correctly upheld the Department\u2019s dismissal of counts I, III, and V\nRetaliation Claim\nIn order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the Human Rights Act, petitioner must show that: (1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) her employer committed a material adverse act against her; and (3) a causal nexus existed between the protected activity and the adverse act. Stone v. Department of Human Rights, 299 Ill. App. 3d 306, 316, 700 N.E.2d 1105, 1112 (1998); Carter Coal Co. v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1, 633 N.E.2d 202 (1994). We conclude that petitioner has established a prima facie case of retaliation and the chief legal counsel erred in sustaining the Department\u2019s finding of a lack of substantial evidence. We specifically reject respondents\u2019 argument that the City did not commit a material adverse act against her with respect to her retaliation claim. As we shall explain below, in light of White, with respect to petitioner\u2019s retaliation claims, she sufficiently demonstrated the second element, that the City committed a material adverse act against her.\nIn determining whether an employer\u2019s alleged retaliation constituted an actionable adverse act, the Illinois Human Rights Commission has considered analogous federal cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e et seq. (1982)). See, e.g., In re Papa, Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm\u2019n Rep. 1997SF0146 (June 9, 2000). The United States Supreme Court had noted, with respect to Title VII\u2019s antidiscrimination provision requirements, that a broad array of actions may constitute an adverse employment action including such employer acts as \u201chiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.\u201d Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633, 652-53, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2268 (1998). More recently, however, the United States Supreme Court discussed the degree of material adversity that must be alleged in a Title VII retaliation claim. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). As the White court noted, Ellerth did not even mention Title VII\u2019s antiretaliation provision White, 548 U.S. at 65, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 357-58, 126 S. Ct. at 2413), and declined to extend Elleth\u2019s holding. The White Court distinguished Title VII\u2019s antidiscrimination provision from its antiretaliation provision. See also Washington v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that \u201c[Title VII\u2019s antiretaliation provision] is \u2018broader\u2019 than [its antidiscrimination provision] in the sense that retaliation may take so many forms, while [the antidiscrimination provision] is limited to discrimination \u2018with respect to [the worker\u2019s] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment\u2019 \u201d).\nThe White Court acknowledged that \u201cthe anti-retaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.\u201d White, 548 U.S. at 67, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 126 S. Ct. at 2414. The White opinion then characterized \u201chow harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination must be in order to fall within [Title VU\u2019s antiretaliation] provision\u2019s scope.\u201d White, 548 U.S. at 61, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 355, 126 S. Ct. at 2411.\nIn describing the level of seriousness to which the retaliation must rise in order to be actionable, the White Court noted the courts of appeals had used differing language and agreed with the formulation set forth by the Seventh Circuit and the District of Columbia. See Washington v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Court decided that a retaliation plaintiff must show \u201ca reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, \u2018which in this context means it well might have \u201cdissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.\u201d \u2019 \u201d White, 548 U.S. at 68, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 126 S. Ct. at 2415, quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219, quoting Washington v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005) (same).\nAs the White Court explained, the reason it addressed materiality of the adverse employment action was to separate \u201csignificant from trivial harms,\u201d such as petty slights or minor annoyances. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. The Court referred to a reasonable employee\u2019s reactions because the provision\u2019s standard for judging harm must be an objective standard. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 360, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. An objective standard was noted to be judicially administrable in that \u201c[i]t avoids the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff\u2019s unusual subjective feelings.\u201d White, 548 U.S. at 68-69, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 360, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.\nAs noted, this was the standard previously applied by the Seventh Circuit in Washington. The Washington court, noting that a change in hours normally would not be material, decided that where an employee had sought and been approved for flextime in order to care for her son who had Down\u2019s syndrome, the removal of her flextime schedule, by way of abolishing her position and requiring her to start a newly created position, could potentially constitute a material change to her working conditions that was actionable under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII. Washington, 420 F.3d at 662. See also Balderrama v. Kraft Foods North America, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (in the retaliation setting, the standard for determining whether an employer\u2019s act constitutes an adverse employment action has been determined to be less demanding).\nWith respect to the materiality requirement, the Washington court opined that potentially \u201can act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others.\u201d Washington, 420 F.3d at 661. The court gave the following example:\n\u201cSuppose an employer knows that a particular worker has a nervous condition or hearing problem that makes him miserable when exposed to music for extended periods. Many people find music soothing and welcome its addition to the workplace. But if an employer sought to retaliate for a charge of discrimination by exploiting this vulnerability, moving him from a quiet office to one where Muzak plays constantly, that could be a material change if not, indeed, a constructive discharge ***.\u201d Washington, 420 F.3d at 662.\nThe White Court also declared that \u201cthe significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.\u201d White, 548 U.S. at_, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 360, 126 S. Ct. at 2415. The White Court gave the following example: \u201cA schedule change in an employee\u2019s work schedule may make little difference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with school age children.\u201d White, 548 U.S. at_, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 360, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.\nIn support of her claims of retaliation for opposing Disandro\u2019s alleged sexual harassment, petitioner has alleged that she suffered a harm in that she was harassed by Lt. Zanders, who condoned Disandro\u2019s sexual harassment of her and another employee, and who referred to her, and other females, as \u201cincompetent,\u201d \u201cbottom feeders,\u201d and \u201cinept,\u201d talked to her in a demeaning manner, and yelled at her, creating a hostile environment.\nIn further support of her retaliation claims, she claims that she was assigned more often to a post considered to be a less desirable assignment. This assignment was even acknowledged by three witnesses, i.e., three other officers, to be \u201ca punishment post.\u201d There was evidence from Officers Weidel, Velasquez and Dancy. All three attested to the fact that those post assignments, which consist exclusively of sitting at an entrance gate and \u201cswiping in\u201d vehicles, as opposed to patrol duties throughout the airport grounds, are commonly known by officers as punishment assignments. Respondents downplay the significance of petitioner\u2019s claim that she was assigned to posts 1 and 2 \u2014 posts described by three witnesses as \u201cpunishment posts\u201d \u2014 more often than men and more often than anyone who did not complain about sexual harassment.\nRespondents are incorrect about the significance of Lt. Zanders\u2019 assignment decisions, in the retaliation setting. As the Commission has explained:\n\u201cIn every workplace there are job duties which are considered undesirable. If an employer, with impunity, could assign employees who protest unlawful discrimination to undesirable tasks, very few individuals would protest against unlawful discrimination. Just as some people might prefer to work the overnight shift, it is likely that a few sergeants would prefer to work behind a desk instead of on patrol. Nevertheless, where assignments are generally seen as undesirable, the employer should not be able to use the fact that a few people might enjoy the assignment to avoid liability for having retaliated against an employee.\u201d In re Papa, Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm\u2019n Rep. 1997SF0146, slip op. at 9 (June 9, 2000).\nAdditionally, petitioner alleged that her compensatory time off requests were denied where they had been granted before and, finally, that she was given a lowered performance rating. With respect to charges of retaliation, the Illinois Human Rights Commission has recognized actionable adverse employment actions based upon claims of undesirable job assignments and lateral transfers and this court has agreed. See In re Papa, Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm\u2019n Rep. 1997SF0146 (June 9, 2000); All Purpose Nursing Service v. Illinois Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 205 Ill. App. 3d 816, 828, 563 N.E.2d 844 (1990). We conclude that petitioner has met her burden of showing substantial evidence of an adverse employment action under her retaliation claim. She has sufficiently alleged employment actions that \u201c \u2018well might have \u201cdissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.\u201d \u2019 \u201d White, 548 U.S. at 68, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 126 S. Ct. at 2415, quoting Rochon, 438 F.3d at 1219, quoting Washington, 420 F.3d at 662.\nIn the hearing before the Department, it concluded that there were certain uncontested facts. Based upon the uncontested evidence, petitioner has also established the other two elements of a prima facie case for retaliation. She has established the first element, namely, that she was engaged in a protected activity. It was uncontested that petitioner filed an internal complaint about Disandro\u2019s harassment in August 2002 with Lt. LeRoy Pestka and Juan Rodriguez, personnel department officer.\nPetitioner has also demonstrated that a causal nexus existed between the protected activity and the adverse act. In the hearing before the Department, it was uncontested that Lt. Zanders was aware of petitioner\u2019s complaint against Disandro. As noted earlier, when Disandro was suspended in August 2002 for violating the City\u2019s residency requirement, he became furious with petitioner because he suspected that she had \u201cdropped a dime\u201d on him. He allegedly threatened that he \u201cknew people from the old neighborhood\u201d and that he could have her \u201cdropped,\u201d and that he knew people who were getting released from prison soon. It was uncontested during the Department\u2019s hearing that, during this time, petitioner indicated that Disandro retaliated against her for opposing his sexual advances and she was advised to file a police report against Disandro and to file a formal complaint with the City\u2019s sexual harassment office. The Department found that it was uncontested that, in September 2002, Disandro was terminated from his employment. Petitioner disputes this fact and asserts that Disandro remained on administrative leave and that he continued to show up at the workplace and was assisted by Lt. Zanders in gaining unauthorized access to the restricted area of the workplace. Petitioner contends that Lt. Zanders openly expressed his hostility toward her based upon his comments in reaction to her complaints about Disandro\u2019s conduct, bluntly telling her, \u201cI do not care what you\u2019ve got.\u201d In addition to these acts, Lt. Zanders allegedly engaged in all of the other acts in petitioner\u2019s charge that constituted the material adverse employment actions, in retaliation for her opposing the harassment by Disandro.\nMoreover, temporal proximity between a protected activity and an adverse action has been considered. A prima facie case of retaliatory discharge can be established by showing a short time span between the filing of a discrimination charge and the employer\u2019s adverse action. See, e.g., Maye v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 224 Ill. App. 3d 353, 362, 586 N.E.2d 550, 556 (1991) (and cases cited therein). Because petitioner established a prima facie case of retaliation, she created a rebuttable presumption of unlawful retaliation by the City. Petitioner, however, contends that, in making the threshold determination of a lack of evidence, the Department strayed radically from its proper role within the Illinois statutory scheme under the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)) and functioned more like an adjudicative body than an investigative body. We conclude that the chief legal counsel\u2019s decision to uphold the Department\u2019s dismissal of counts II, I\\( and VI must be reversed and this cause remanded for further investigation.\nBecause we are remanding this matter, it is important to note that we disagree with respondents\u2019 position that the Department correctly refused to consider Disandro\u2019s alleged sexual harassment of petitioner because her \u201ccharge\u201d did not allege sexual harassment and that, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to consider the acts of sexual harassment committed by Disandro. We agree with petitioner that pursuant to the Morgan doctrine, the entire pattern of harassment should have been considered. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002). Petitioner\u2019s complaint clearly alleged that Lt. Zanders\u2019 harassment was in retaliation for her prior opposition to the alleged sexual harassment by Disandro.\nPetitioner also notes that she has direct evidence of Lt. Zanders\u2019 openly announced sexual bias based upon his comments that women are \u201cbottom feeders,\u201d \u201cinept,\u201d and \u201cincompetent,\u201d and his view that women, as a class, cannot write police reports as well as men, as a class. As noted earlier, petitioner further contends that Lt. Zanders openly expressed his hostility toward her based upon his comments in reaction to her complaints about Disandro\u2019s conduct, bluntly telling her \u201cI do not care what you\u2019ve got.\u201d\nIn Morgan, the Court explained that a \u201chostile work environment\u201d results from the \u201ccumulative effect of individual acts.\u201d Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 123, 122 S. Ct. at 2073. Thus, these acts \u201ccollectively constitute one \u2018unlawful employment practice.\u2019 \u201d Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 125, 122 S. Ct. at 2075, quoting 42 U.S.C. \u00a72000e \u2014 5(e)(1) (1994). The Morgan Court held that even acts that occurred outside the statute of limitations period could be considered. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 125, 122 S. Ct. at 2075.\nAlthough the Morgan case involved a statute of limitations defense, the reasoning applies here. All of the incidents comprising a hostile work environment are part of one unlawful employment practice, and the City may be liable for all acts that are part of this single claim. As this court recognized in Gusciara v. Lustig, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 806 N.E.2d 746 (2004), however, the Morgan Court qualified its holding by \u201cspecifying that an act that occurs within the prescribed period will not enable an employee to recover for acts occurring outside the period if the later act \u2018had no relation to the [earlier] acts\u2019 or if, \u2018for some other reason, such as certain intervening action by the employer/ the more recent act was \u2018no longer part of the same hostile environment claim/ \u201d Gusciara v. Lustig, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 1019, 806 N.E.2d at 751, quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 118, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 125, 122 S. Ct. at 2075.\nPetitioner has alleged that the claims were related. In counts II, IV and VI of her six-count discrimination charge, petitioner alleged that the harassing conduct of Lt. Zanders was in retaliation for her opposition to unlawful discrimination by complaining to Lt. Zanders and others at the City about Disandro\u2019s sexual harassment; sexual harassment which petitioner further alleged was condoned by Lt. Zanders. Thus, similar to Morgan and Gusciara, the instant case involves one unlawful employment practice and Lt. Zanders\u2019 actions, if proved, constitute a part of the same hostile work environment as the alleged prior sexual harassment allegations against Disandro, as well as Disandro\u2019s alleged threatening conduct since his return, all of which arguably result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment (see 775 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 101(E) (West 2004)).\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the chief legal counsel\u2019s decision affirming the Department\u2019s dismissal of petitioner\u2019s charges of sex discrimination in counts I, III, and V We conclude, however, that there was substantial evidence presented of retaliation against petitioner for opposing Disandro\u2019s sexual harassment. Thus, the chief legal counsel abused his discretion in upholding the Department\u2019s dismissal of counts II, IV( and VI and those counts are reinstated. We remand this cause to the Department for further appropriate proceedings on the charges.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nO\u2019HARA FROSSARD and NEVILLE, JJ., concur.\nPetitioner has detailed the specific acts which comprise three pages of her brief. We need not include them here, because the City does not dispute that Hoffelt filed an internal complaint in August 2002 about Disandro.\nIn White, similar to the instant case, no \u201cformal charge\u201d had been previously filed, but there was an internal complaint.\nAlthough there was intervening action by the City when Disandro was suspended for violating residency requirements, there was no intervening action on the part of the City with respect to petitioner\u2019s hostile environment claim, which constitutes one unlawful employment practice.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Chicago-Kent Law Offices, of Chicago (Richard J. Gonzalez, of counsel), for appellant.", "Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon and Ruth Masters, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee City of Chicago Aviation Department.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VIVIAN HOFFELT, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20141629\nOpinion filed September 1, 2006.\nRehearing denied October 16, 2006.\nModified opinion filed October 20, 2006.\nChicago-Kent Law Offices, of Chicago (Richard J. Gonzalez, of counsel), for appellant.\nMara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon and Ruth Masters, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee City of Chicago Aviation Department.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Laura Wunder, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0628-01", "first_page_order": 646, "last_page_order": 658 }