{ "id": 4266054, "name": "MATANKY REALTY GROUP INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEMETRIOS KATRIS et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Matanky Realty Group Inc. v. Katris", "decision_date": "2006-09-27", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201405\u20143753, 1\u201405\u20143893 cons.", "first_page": "839", "last_page": "844", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 839" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 997", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5594088 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1003" }, { "page": "1003" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0997-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415408 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609" }, { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3594331 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "valid lien not found on lot where work performed on water main in adjoining street was not connected to any work performed on the lot" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/120/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 Idaho 72", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Idaho", "case_ids": [ 882705 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "74" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "381" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/idaho/133/0072-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073580 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" }, { "page": "235-36" }, { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "288 Ill. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4958724 ], "year": 1919, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/288/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381808 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" }, { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 672", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637117 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0672-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 Ill. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4901618 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1917, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "valid lien not found on lot where work performed on water main in adjoining street was not connected to any work performed on the lot" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/281/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3749537 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809" }, { "page": "809" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 23", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5873049 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5765044 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "368" }, { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0365-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 657, "char_count": 13301, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.508737533217457e-08, "percentile": 0.4002169624561123 }, "sha256": "4eff9e30ec84045533b3ea3215c16e02fdaf24a90c1c94f853a8ec9f5c9f9762", "simhash": "1:2f77b7e22c89b5e5", "word_count": 2216 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:49.400377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MATANKY REALTY GROUP INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEMETRIOS KATRIS et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Matanky Realty Group, Inc., appeals from two orders of the trial court dismissing its complaint to foreclose on a mechanic\u2019s lien with prejudice pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(9) (West 2004)), and releasing the hen in favor of defendants Demetrios Katris, Anastasios Katris, Nick Reveliotis, unknown owners and nonrecord claimants. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice and releasing the mechanic\u2019s lien on the basis that defendants failed to assert an affirmative defense which defeated its claim. In the alternative, plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide an opportunity to amend the complaint.\nIn 1984, defendants purchased a piece of property in a shopping center from Hazel Crest Center, L.L.C. (Hazel Crest), and leased it to a restaurant. The property is located on the \u201coutlot\u201d of the shopping center, such that the restaurant is a stand-alone building without its own street access for traffic. A former owner of the shopping center granted a former owner of the outlot an easement appurtenent through the shopping center parking lot for purposes of ingress and egress and parking. Pursuant to the terms of the easement, the owner of the outlot was responsible for 5.8% of the \u201ccost of repair, replacement, maintenance and cleaning\u201d of the parking lot, \u201climited only to those costs which are reasonable and necessary considering the purposes intended.\u201d Further, the shopping center owner was obligated to provide a \u201cstatement stating in full detail the costs incurred with a certification that said costs were, in fact, reasonable and necessary.\u201d Defendants adopted the easement rights when they purchased the outlot.\nAccording to plaintiff, in 1996, it was hired by Hazel Crest as a property manager to \u201cprovide services to maintain, renovate, repair, improve and manage\u201d the parking lot. Then, in May 2005, defendants received an invoice for nearly a decade of work performed by plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that it sent defendants monthly invoices beginning in 1996 for the work, which included \u201cregrading, installation of new driveways, repaving, patching, crack filling, resealing, striping, landscaping, maintenance and cleaning of the parking lot and replacement of the parking lot lighting.\u201d Defendants, however, failed to respond to the invoices. On June 17, 2005, plaintiff recorded a mechanic\u2019s lien on both defendants\u2019 outlot and the easement and filed a verified complaint to foreclose on the lien and for breach of contract. Defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the verified complaint, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code, arguing that the mechanic\u2019s lien was improper because none of plaintiffs work was performed on their property. On November 7, 2005, in a written order, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss with prejudice. Then, defendants filed a motion to enforce the court\u2019s order and release the mechanic\u2019s lien. On November 15, 2005, in an additional written order, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion and released the lien. This timely appeal followed.\nChallenges to a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code are reviewed de novo. Dewan v. Ford Motor Co., 363 Ill. App. 3d 365, 368 (2005). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, this court accepts all well-pled facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Dewan, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 368. A section 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) motion to dismiss assumes that there is a sufficient cause of action stated in the pleading; however, there is some affirmative matter that avoids the legal effect of or defeats the claim. Dewan, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 368. An affirmative matter is a defense that \u201c \u2018negates the cause of action completely or refutes crucial conclusions of law or conclusions of material fact contained in or inferred from the complaint.\u2019 \u201d Dewan, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 368, quoting Cwikla v. Sheir, 345 Ill. App. 3d 23, 29 (2003). The remaining \u201c \u2018question[s] on appeal [are] whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Dewan, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 368, quoting Cwikla, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 30.\nThe Mechanics Lien Act (Act) (770 ILCS 60/1 (West 2004)) provides a method of recovery where a landowner received beneficial improvements to his property or his property value was increased because of a contractor\u2019s labor and materials. Gateway Concrete Forming Systems, Inc. v. Dynaprop XVIII: State Street LLC, 356 Ill. App. 3d 806, 809 (2005). Mechanics\u2019 liens are purely statutory; therefore, a contractor must strictly comply with the Act to be eligible for relief. Cronin v. Tatge, 281 Ill. 336 (1917); Gateway Concrete Forming Systems, Inc., 356 Ill. App. 3d at 809. \u201cMechanics\u2019 liens should be enforced when the party brings himself within the provisions of the statute, but they should not be extended to cases not provided for by the language of the Act even though they may fall within its reason.\u201d Luise, Inc. v. Village of Skokie, 335 Ill. App. 3d 672, 680-81 (2002). In pertinent part, the Act states:\n\u201cAny person who shall by any contract *** , express or implied, *** with the owner of a lot or tract of land, or with one whom the owner has authorized or knowingly permitted to contract, to improve the lot or tract of land *** is known under this Act as a contractor and has a lien upon the whole of such lot or tract of land and upon adjoining or adjacent lots or tracts of land of such owner constituting the same premises and occupied or used in connection with such lot or tract of land as a place of residence or business ***. *** This hen extends to an estate in fee, *** or any right of redemption or other interest that the owner may have in the lot or tract of land at the time of making such contract.\u201d 770 ILCS 60/1 (West 2004).\nIn the instant case, the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claim and released the lien because plaintiff failed to strictly comply with the Act. As a threshold issue, in order to assert a lien against defendants, plaintiff was required to demonstrate that defendants were \u201cowners of the lot or tract of land.\u201d Within the context of the Act, an owner refers to any person with an estate, right of redemption or other interest in the land. 770 ILCS 60/1 (West 2004); M. Ecker & Co. v. La Salle National Bank, 268 Ill. App. 3d 874, 878 (1994). This definition of owner has been extended to a beneficiary under a land trust (M. Ecker & Co., 268 Ill. App. 3d at 878) and a lessee (Hacken v. Isenberg, 288 Ill. 589 (1919)).\nHere, it is undisputed that the services at issue were performed on Hazel Crest\u2019s parking lot and that defendants held an easement appurtenant to the parking lot for purposes of ingress and egress and parking. An easement provides a right or privilege in the use of another\u2019s property. McMahon v. Hines, 298 Ill. App. 3d 231, 235 (1998). An easement qualifies as appurtenant when the user of the right enjoys a dominant estate over the used land, which is considered the servient estate. McMahon, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 235-36. The individual with the easement is entitled to the necessary use of the easement. McMahon, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 236. Accordingly, the easement provides use rights; however, it does not provide ownership rights or an ownership interest in the land. As a result, defendants cannot be considered owners of the parking lot or any portion thereof merely because they have rights under the easement.\nPlaintiff argues that its mechanic\u2019s lien is valid because it was hired by Hazel Crest, the owner in fee of the parking lot, to make improvements to the parking lot and thereby the easement, which benefitted defendants\u2019 adjoining property. Plaintiff, however, fails to acknowledge the determinative language in the Act. Pursuant to the Act, a contractor may obtain a lien only \u201cupon the whole of such lot or tract of land and upon adjoining or adjacent lots or tracts of land of such owner.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 770 ILCS 60/1 (West 2004). As we have established, defendants are not owners of the parking lot vis-avis the easement; therefore, no lien can be imposed upon their land no matter if it is adjoining or adjacent. Consequently, plaintiffs lien fails as a matter of law.\nAlthough we recognize that a lien may be extended to \u201can estate in fee, *** or any right of redemption or other interest that the owner may have in the lot or tract of land\u201d (770 ILCS 60/1 (West 2004)), we determine that \u201cother interest\u201d does not include easement rights when the improvements at issue were solely made on that easement and not in connection with any improvements to the principle property. Research into whether a mechanic\u2019s lien may be obtained under these circumstances has not unveiled any Illinois case law on point. However, as a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Idaho considered this issue in Fairfax v. Ramirez, 133 Idaho 72, 982 P.2d 375 (1999). In Fairfax, a contractor performed work on the principle property and a private easement road leading to the property. Erior to performing the requested work on the principle property, the contractor graded and laid gravel on the easement road in order to improve access to and allow for the improvements to the principle property. Fairfax, 133 Idaho at 74, 982 P.2d at 377. The contractor filed a lien on the principle property for outstanding payments from the improvements to the easement road. Fairfax, 133 Idaho at 74, 982 P.2d at 377. The supreme court ultimately determined that the improvements to the easement were essential preparatory work for the requested repairs to the principle property. Fairfax, 133 Idaho at 78, 982 P.2d at 381. As a result, the mechanic\u2019s lien properly attached to the principle property when the actual work at issue was performed on the adjoining easement, but was completed in connection with improvements made to the principle property. Fairfax, 133 Idaho at 78, 982 P.2d at 381.\nWe find that Fairfax is distinguishable from the instant case. Here, although the easement adjoins defendants\u2019 outlot and benefits the property, the improvements are not sufficiently connected thereto where no work was performed on the principle property. Similarly, mechanics\u2019 liens may be obtained when improvements are made to sidewalks, streets or driveways bordering or leading to a property (770 ILCS 60/1 (West 2004)); however, the work performed must be in connection with an improvement on that adjoining property. Cronin, 281 Ill. 336; Water Products Co. of Illinois v. Gabel, 120 Ill. App. 3d 668, 673 (1983) (valid lien not found on lot where work performed on water main in adjoining street was not connected to any work performed on the lot). We refuse to extend the interpretation of the Act, which is to be strictly construed, in order to support a mechanic\u2019s lien on defendants\u2019 outlot where plaintiffs work was solely completed on the easement. We note, however, that a mechanic\u2019s lien provides a cumulative remedy in addition to other remedies supplied by the common law for enforcement of a contract supporting the desired lien. Fieldcrest Builders, Inc. v. Antonucci, 311 Ill. App. 3d 597, 609 (1999). Our decision pursuant to the Act does not affect plaintiff\u2019s common law remedies. Fieldcrest Builders, Inc., 311 Ill. App. 3d at 609.\nWe find no merit in plaintiffs remaining contention that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide an opportunity to amend its complaint. No absolute right exists for a plaintiff to amend a pleading. Addison v. Distinctive Homes, Ltd., 359 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1003 (2005). The decision whether to grant or deny an amendment rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Addison, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 1003. In the instant case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion where no exercise of that discretion was requested because the record demonstrates that plaintiff never sought leave to amend its complaint. Consequently, plaintiff essentially argues that the trial court should have offered or encouraged it to amend the pleading without plaintiff initiating such a request. Plaintiffs argument is completely without merit. However, we note that, had plaintiff properly requested leave to amend its pleading, such an amendment would have been granted to the common law breach of contract claim.\nAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nTHEIS, PJ., and KARNEZIS, J., concur.\nThe orders have been consolidated for purposes of appeal.\nThe easement was recorded as document number 22 559 096 in the office of the recorder of deeds in Cook County on November 20, 1973.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Tiffany Harper, Lee D. Sarkin, and Robert W Matanky, all of Chicago, for appellant.", "Peter S. Stamatis, of Law Offices of Peter S. Stamatis, PC., of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MATANKY REALTY GROUP INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEMETRIOS KATRIS et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNos. 1\u201405\u20143753, 1\u201405\u20143893 cons.\nOpinion filed September 27, 2006.\nTiffany Harper, Lee D. Sarkin, and Robert W Matanky, all of Chicago, for appellant.\nPeter S. Stamatis, of Law Offices of Peter S. Stamatis, PC., of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0839-01", "first_page_order": 857, "last_page_order": 862 }